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(1)
Jynooels
The ala o f th is thesis la to give s thorough axposltlon o f 
Santayana's philosophy o f a rt, with a o r it lo a l commentary using the 
Methods o f analytical aesthetics*
The aubjeot o f the f i r s t  chapter is  the thesis that beauty is  
ob jectified  pleasure. I t  is  argued that Santayana's views suggest an 
Insight defensible by analytic techniques. The second chapter is  concerned 
to  expend Santayana's insights Into the role o f the materials o f a work 
o f art. Chapters I I I  and 17 are a consideration o f his views on form and 
expression, respectively. The subjects reviewed are the c la ss ifica tion  o f 
foras, the sources o f pleasure in form, the nature o f fo ra , the nature 
o f expression, tragedy, comedy and the sublime.
Chapter V is  concerned with Santayana's views on the nature and 
relation o f poetry and re lig io n . An outline of an analytic theory o f 
poetry is  offered in o r it io ia a .
Chapter VI deals with the presuppositions o f the aesthetics o f  
the l i f e  o f ieason period, end with Santayana's view o f the nature o f  art 
as emergent frws instinctive  action. Chapter VII is  concerned with his 
views on the aesthetics o f ri.uslo, architecture, the a r t is t ic  uses o f 
language, painting and sculpture. Neglected insights are stressed, e .g . 
his theory o f the nature o f representation. The eighth chapter sets out 
Santayana's doctrine o f the relation o f nrt and sora llty .
Chapter IX deals with la te  papers and passages on aesthetics 
re flectin g  the philosophy o f the enlma o f Jolng. The subjects dealt with 
arei the sp iritual l i f e )  alleged sim ilarities o f doctrine with Proust; his 
vlsws on Cubism, caricature, and the Aesthetic movement| the varied 
meanings o f the key predicates in aesthetic discourse| hie revised form- 
a lia t ic  theory o f beauty, and scattered renerka in his fin a l work, 
nominations and Powers'.
The conclusion is  that Cantayan* has fa r  more to  o ffe r  analytic 
aeathetiolans than is  generally considered to  be the oase.
TH": AESTHETICS O?
CEO H CE SAÏ'TATAKA
’’ igures in brackets re fe r  either to page 
referenoea or to  referenoes accompanied by 
notes. Where a figure refers to a note, and 
not aerely  a page referenoe, i t  is  followed 
by an asterisk , within the braokets.
(3)
IimODTOTIQK
II  AIM  «ad Method o f th is Thails
'/«orr« "antayana died in 1952 at the age o f eirhty-nlne. He le f t  
an oeuvre of twenty-eight fu ll-len gth  books and a host o f a rt ic le s » deal­
ing with metaphysics, epistemology, aesthetics» ethics and p o litic s » 
together with a play» two volumes of poetry, a novel end an autobiography, 
'lnoe his death» his le tte rs  have been published, together with several 
volnaes o f uncollected papers and unpublished manuscripts. Neither 
during his life tim e nor a fte r  I t  was there any lack o f discussion o f his 
work. He was the second philosopher to  be mads the subject o f a volume in 
Jchilpp'a 'L ibrary o f Living Philosophers', and has been the subject o f 
many stadias. His philosophy o f a rt, or parts o f  I t ,  has already been 
mede the subject o f four studies o f book length, "hat roora, then, is  there 
for a fifth ?
There are two main reasons why a further study o f this aubjsot is  
ju s t ified . In the f ir s t  place, three o f the four extent studies are almost 
en tire ly  expository! those by Arnettt 'Santayana and The Sense o f Beauty') 
Ashmore: 'Santayana, Art, and Aaathetios', and Lida, 'B elleza, Arte, y 
?oeaia en la st^tlca de Santayana'. Again, Sartor Lida's book, as is  evident 
fro » Its  t i t l e ,  takes as i t s  subjeot-aetter only certain aspeots o f 
.antayana's views, The fourth study, S inger's, 'Santayana's Aesthetics!
A C ritica l In tro d u c t io n w h ile  oontalning fa r  more c r it ic a l appraisal than 
the other three studies, la  avowedly not exhaustive» Moreover, Dr. Singer 
takes fo r granted an answer to  one o f the central questions o f Santayana 
scholarship, the compatibility o f the system o f the iealma o f Being with 
Santayana's ea r lie r  works, f in a lly , o f these four books, only that by 
Dr. Arnett ooaes close to setting Santayana's philosophy o f art in the 
context o f I ts  varying presuppositions. None o f the studies so fa r 
published, then, is  exhaustive, and only one alas at providing a c r it ic a l 
evaluation.
’ econdly, no writer has considered Santayana's aaathetios from
U )
the point o f view of analytical philosophy. Apart from occasional referencei 
to  'The Tense o f beauty', Santayana's philosophy o f art Is almost completely 
i  nored In an&lytioal c irc le s , ("’he same Is  true o f the rest o f his 
philosophy. Islands o f Interest both in 3rltaln and the Halted States are 
few and far between.) Though an established figure with a place In the 
history o f philosophy. Santayana la now very l i t t l e  read.
The slots o f the present thesis emerge from these considerations.
They are f i r s t ly  to glee a thorough exposition of Santayana's philosophy o f 
art, setting the viev3 of each period into the context o f the presupoos- 
itione Santayana employed at the time) and secondly to o f fe r  e commentary 
on his aesthetics from *n analytical standpoint, to  see whether he might 
have more to  o ffe r  to  ourrent trends In aesthetics than his present nog leot 
eeema to Indicate.
The treatment o f th- subject-matter In whet follows Is  fundamentally 
chronological: chapters I  -  TV deal with 'The Tense o f Beauty'| Chapter V 
ch iefly  with 'Interpretations o f Poetry and Heligion' (1900j and suoh parts 
o f *'!’hree Philosophical ^oe ts ', 1910, as are relevant)| Chapters VI -  V III 
are concerned with ' Season In A rt ' (1905) and Chapter IX with la te  pieaes 
or. aesthetics which re fle c t  the development o f the system of the teslas of 
Being. I t  happens also that th is  chronological method almoat completely 
coincides with treatment by top ic , since, so fa r  aa aesthetios Is concerned 
at any rate, .antayana said almost a l l  o f what ha had to say on a given 
subject In one place, other comments being few and only very rare ly  showing 
a development in his opinion. Vherever possible, and th is la almost always, 
a l l  Bantayana's remarks on a given subject are gathered Into a single 
chapter. There 13 only or e exception to th is generalisation, l .e .  the 
theory o f the nature o f beauty. The development o f the realms o f being 
committed 'Tart ay ana to n change in the opinion on th is matter expressed In 
'Tne 3er.ee o f Beauty'. Because the la ter remarks are u n in te llig ib le  without 
an explanation of the concepts Involved, the treatment o f '■-anteyana's 
views on the nature o f beauty are divided between the f ir s t  and last
chapters.
II: 3on» Biographical Data
(5)
Santayana Is now a h istorical figure, and son» Information on 
his l i f e  helps to  put his work in perspective. This section deals very 
b r ie fly  with his l i f e  and major works, the next with the leading influences 
on his thought*
Jorge r.uguatir. Kioolas oils de Santayana was born on December 16th, 
1363 in Madrid o f Spanish par nts. This was his mother's second marriage, 
she having f i r s t  been the w ife o f a Dos tor. merchant named Sturgis* Before 
nts death, Sturgis had gained from his w ife the promise that their children 
would be educated in Soston, and so to  Boston Señora Santayana moved shortly 
a fter the birth  o f her son by her seoond husband. Santayana himself 
stayed in Avila  with Ills father until 1372, in which year Senor Santayana 
took him to Boston (since America offered better opportunities fo r  his son) 
and, having spent the winter there, returned to  Spain, leaving his son in  
his w ife 's  care. Santayana was to stay in America for fo rty  years, passing 
through the Boston la tin  School, Harvard, and doctoral studies in Sermany.
He worked as a member o f the philosophy department at Harvard (1889-1912), 
attaining the rank o f Professor. His colleagues included Josiah Boyce and 
William James.
During the tenure o f his oost at Harvard, Santayana published his 
poems (1 ) and his play. (2 ) The major philosophical productions o f these 
years were 'The Sense of 3eauty' (1896) and the fiv e  volumes o f the .oat 
ambitious of his early works, 'The L ife  o f lesson' (1903-6). During th is  
period he also published his two most sustained pieoes o f lite ra ry  critic ism : 
'Interpretations of Poetry end telig ion ' (1900) and, 'Three Philosophical 
Poets'. (1910).
The last work named was the fin a l book oompleted before Santayana's 
departure from America in 1912. The proximate reason Tor hia resignation 
of the Harvard Professorship was the death o f his mother in the previous 
year, and the consequent removal o f any family bond to keep hia in America;
and he had also by th is tine acquired enough money to  provide him with a 
private Income. These, however, were merely the Immediate clrounstancee 
o f his departure. His wisn to  leave was of nary yeara* standing, since, 
early on, he had cone to  find the American ethos In general -  the * genteel 
tradition» as he ca lls  I t  -  and the 'genius looi* o f Harvard quite anti­
pathetic to  his nature. He was sophisticated, cultured, and inclined to  a 
detached attitude to l i f e .  The remuante o f Purltenlan which survived in the 
unwritten morality o f Harvard -  the stress on the non-c ont era pla 11 ve virtues 
o f action, e ffic ien cy , and enterprise -  were rébarbative. This morality 
paid l i t t l e  heed to the ideals o f detachment and re fle c t io n , both deeply 
ingrained characteristics o f th is huropean déraciné. Santayana never 
returned to America.
A fter pelode in  S eville  and Parie, Santayana came to England, where 
the f i r s t  War detained him u n til 1918. This stay produced most o f the 
essays la te r  collected and published aa 'Soliloqu ies in England and Later 
Soliloqu ies ' (1922). further travels eventually led him to Lome, where he 
settled in 1925, and which became hie home fo r the remaining twenty-seven 
years o f hie l i f e .  Much o f th is fina l period in his l i f e  was given over to 
tbn working out o f hie philosophical system, elaborated in 'Scepticism and 
.-.nlmal ’n lth ' (1923), and the four volumes o f 'The cealma o f Seing' (1927- 
¿0). He also wrote his hest-aelling novel, 'The Last Puritan' (1936), and 
his le s t philosophical work, the massive p o lit ic a l trea tise , • ominations 
and Powers' (1951). He continued to work to within a few days o f his death, 
on September 26th, 1932.
¿H i ¿9711? IftflWftfiM 9P ¿WitMflRt11...Ifeflftgi.fti
The present thesis does not pretend to  supply s complets study o f 
Santayana's philosophical debts) i t  is  appropriate, however, to indicate 
b r ie fly  tnose philosophers who most deeply lnfluenoed his outlook. The 
present section 1a restricted  to  writers whose work had a marked e ffe c t  on 
tils philosophy in generals specific  debts with regard to aaathetios are set 
out below, mainly in the notes to the relevant chapters.
(7)
In the history of Amarloan philosophy, iant&yana is usually 
located as a member o f the C r it ie a l Realists, the group forming the
second wave o f the reaction against Begelian Ideal Lma in America (3 *)« 
Santayana's ei counter with Idealism in his philosophically formative years 
was o f the f ir s t  iKportar.ee» Two Id ea lis t philosophers in particular 
provided points o f view largely  in  opposition to which he worked out 
opinions whloh he retained a l l  his l i f e :  they were Hermann T.otze and 
Ooslah loyce.
ioyce suggested to far.tayana that tx>tze would be an appropriate 
subject for a doctoral thesis, a suggestion which Santayana coaewhat 
reluctantly acoepted» The duly completed thesis, and marginalia in hla 
copies o f Lotxe' s works, show that Santayana did not take over any spec ific  
doctrines from the Sermon phlloaopher. Typical in th is respect is  the 
rela tion  o f the two on the subject of the nature o f beauty. Lotze regards 
the sense o f beauty as at onoe an amotion o f pleasure in us and a b e lie f in 
the objective value of what gives ua this pleasure: what distinguishes an 
aesthetic emotion is  its  in terpretative nature. Beauty is  the sense that 
nature has succeeded in her task, has subdued bar materials, and accomplished 
her purpose. ?he sense of beauty becomes the pledge o f rea l harmony o f 
law and purpose in the world, end the subjeotlon o f the orig ina l facts to  
both. (¿ ) Santayama, at least so far as his early theory o f beauty is  
concerned (o f .  Ch. I ,  below) would agree that the experience o f beauty is  
one o f pleasure; but there hia agreement with Iotze would end. *or 
Santayana, beauty is  ob jsctified  pleasure, i . e .  pleasure projected onto an 
object end experienced as one o f the ob ject's qu a lities . This view docs 
not commit Santayana to regarding the object as ob jectively  valuable. 
Moreover, while Santayana would agree that the fe e lin g  o f pleasure produced 
by a beautiful object indicates a certain harmony, he would maintain, taking 
the theory o f evolution far more seriously than Lotse, that th is harmony 
ia between organism and environment and brought about by mechanical means.
He en tirely  abjures the fin a l causality postulated by Lotze.
What ’antayana did take fro *  Lotte ware general the asee o f thought 
w^ioii oooupiud h i »  fo r many years» bom  a l l  his l i f e *  In the la tte r  olese 
sones Santayana's aonoam with the relation  o f the rea l and the ideal» end 
this problem must have been very deeply impressed upon him by the study o f 
Lotze. The lerman metaphysician takes i t  as axiomatic that the rea l in a l l  
respects sa t is fie s  our ideals» and o ffe rs  his entlrs system as a confirm­
atory argument fo r  this axiom. Santayana could not aooe|A the oonoluaion» 
but he must have begur to work out his own position in opposition to that 
o f Lotze. Again» lotze contends tfet the languages o f poetry and aoienea 
are riot to be regarded as «.compatible, modes o f language and oulture 
being irraduclbly many.(5) The theme o f the nature and relation of poetio 
and sc ien tific  language is  o f oonslderable impórtanos in Santayana's 
thought, (o f .  Chs. V and V II» below)*
for :oyoe'a philosophy Santayana had a marked d is lik e » objecting 
ch ie fly  to the former's theory o f good and e v i l .  Soyoe regards the re l­
ations o f both good and e v i l ,  truth and error, as ln d iris ib lsr there oan 
be no truth without error, no good without e v il*  The preseros o f e v i l  is  
3aid by ioyoe to be a neoessary condition fo r  perfeotion# from this i t  
follows that the Absolute, the ultimate re a lity , is  i t s e l f  Impure. Again, 
ioyce holds that there Í3 necessarily con flic t between values* This was to  
antayana possibly the most pernicious o f a l l  the doctrines he regarded as 
Homantlc, and which he always detested. Ha thought o f toyoe's viaw as a 
consecration o f e v il  by a demonstration o f i t s  In ev ita b ility , a consecration 
whioh would lead to indifference to i t .  Hoyo# depicts the world as 
in trin sica lly  and Inescapably e v i l ,  and yet blesses i t  as a model o f what 
ought to be* lantayann summarised his objection to thla type o f view 
some time la ter* L ife  i t s e l f ,  he claims, ex ists only In virtu# o f a 
relativelyfantonent modicum of organization within the general flux o f things* 
"The momentum of such organisation at f ir s t  oreates a d l f f -
erenoe between jood and e v i l ,  or gives them a meaning at a ll*
Thus the oore o f l i f e  is  always hereditary* steadfast and 
ol»»>la«hfc| toe eergln o f bcroarism and blind adventure round i t  
may be as wide as you w ill*  and in some wild hearts the love o f 
th is flu id  serein may be keen, as might any othsr looee passion. 
Hut to oreaoh barbarism ( l . e .  as Gantaysna considers loyce does) 
as the only good, in igneraaee or hatred of the possible perfect­
ion of every natural thing, was a scandal« a belated Calvinism 
that remained fanatical a fter ceasing to  be Christian”. (6)
The main positive influences were Cpinosa, end several ancient 
philosophers. r?roa Spinosa Cantayana took materialism and moral rnlativinm 
in the form o f the b e lie f that things are good or bad not in themselves 
but in relation to human wants and needs.(7 ) 'Cram the Creeks he again took 
materialism (e .g . from Democritus* and from the Epicureans, v ia  Lucretius), 
but his a ff in ity  with classic culture was fa r  deeper than simply doctrinal 
sympathies. This a f f in ity  beooises d e a r  from the period when, aa a doctoral 
student in Cermany, he began to d isow er the ancient world. (There was no 
course in Greek philosophy fo r  undergraduates at Harvard at that time. 
Gantayana himself la te r  introduced one). He wrote to  a friend« "Creek 
statues say so much more to  me than any other fora« o f a rt, and the Creek 
view o f l i f e  End nature eppeala to me so strongly that I  am unjust to other 
forms".(3) Agai«., to  William James« "'.'hat I enjoy moat here ( l . e .  Hnrlir.) 
is  the museum, where I  go almost da lly . The snoiont statues are the w st 
beautiful things I have ever aeon".(9 ) He was deeply impressed by 
-aulser. 'a lectures on Creek ethics« " ...h e rs  at la s t was a vindication o f 
ordf-r end beauty in the institutions o f men and in th sir id eas ".(19) Ten 
years la te r , ha employed a sabbatical year at Cambridge (1896-7) in the 
study o f Plato and A ris to tle « " . . .b y  that study and change o f aoone my 
mind was greatly enriched, and the composition of 'The L ife  o f  lesson' 
was the consequence".(11) The central place accorded to the values of
harmony In hie early eth ic (o f* 3h. VI« belov) and to  a P la ton lstlc  
contemplatl n in the la te r  (o f. Gh. IX, below) te s t if ie s  to  hie unwavering 
»¿•UgianoG to  ureea standards, as Jsoques Huron oayss "oantaysna est ua 
discip le des <reoa, qui lcesrnent V sea yeux la  sags see perdue" .(1 2 )
fo r loyoe'e philosophy Santayana had a permanent d is lik e  and £br 
that of Spinosa and the Greeks a deep and equally durable a llegiance. His 
relation to the thought o f William James by contrast is  ambivalent. With 
James's la te r  doctrines, Santayana had no sympathy -  he could not even take 
seriously the Pragmatist doctrine of truth*(13) His debt is  rather to the 
Jrjaes o f the 'Princip les o f Psychology' period. Here the influence is  not 
in the form o f ex p lic it , particular doctrines, but rather concerns the 
sp ir it  and deepest assumptions of Jamss's thoughti "Chief o f th ese.. .  was 
a sense for the unadulterated, unexplained, instant fact o f experlenoe" . ( 14 ) 
James was deeply aware o f experience as a flu x  o f ephemeral, immediate 
impressions, and this le f t  Its  mark on Santayana in the form o f the le t te r 's  
acceptance o f the epistemological d istinction between the immediately given 
in experience, and the mind's construction on i t .  He held this view a l l  
his life s  lienee his remark that he remained a discip le o f the early  Jamesi 
"A master in the art o f recording or divining the ly r ic  quality o f 
experience as i t  actually came to  him or me".(15) The immediatc/mediate 
distinction is  crucia lly  Important In Santayana's aesthetics, being used in 
hie theory o f aesthetic experience, both o f the spectator and the creator, 
(o f .  especially Ch.V, below).
IYi ¿grtftyaqp'g SBBMBfcifltt af
I t  might seem paradoxical that a philosopher now probably best 
remembered as nr. aesthetioian should have written that» " . . . in  philosophy 
I recognise no separable thing called aestheticsj and what has gone by the 
name o f the philosophy of art..*seems to me sheer verb iage.."(16 ) Again, 
writing in hi a autobiography about the lectures at Harvard which eventually 
became 'The Sense o f Seauty't "...although I  didn't have, and haven't now, 
a clear notion of what 'aesthetics' may be, I undertook to  give a course
(10)
(11)
on that su b ject.."(17 ).
The apparent paradox« however« la easily dispelled. In the first
*uot&tlon In the «rireoealns paragraph« ^awtagrana maintain» tnat he 
recognises no separable study called aesthetics, '"'hat emerges both from 
. is  theoretical remarks and his philosophic practice Is that be regards 
eesthetlcs as inseparable from certain other areas o f Inquiry, most notably 
psychology and eth los. Just as in hi3 aesthetics 'Santayana always 
(Im p lic it ly  or e x p lic it ly ) denies the autonomy of the work o f a rt, so he 
always considers aesthetics I t s e l f  ir re fra g ib ly  linked with these other 
studies.
His position Is set out c learly  In a short coper dating from 1904, 
•vhat is  Aesthetics?* His thesis is  that, "the word 'aesthetics ' la 
nothing but a loose term la te ly  applied In academia c irc les  to everything 
that has to do with works o f art or with the sense of beauty".(18) Thua 
the student o f Venetian painting is  said to be emplyed in aesthetics; so 
I 3 the psychologist in Ids laboratory experimenting to  determine the moot 
pleasing division of a s tr ip  of white paper; also said to  be part o f 
aesthetics is  any d ia lec tica l speculation about thr relation of the beautiful 
to the rational or to the absolutely good* "The truth is  that the group o f 
a c t iv it ie s  we can ca ll aesthetic is a motley one, created by certain 
h istoric and lite ra ry  accidents".(19)
dantayana continues that, lr  his view, several types of inquiry 
can legitimately be said to form part o f aesthetics. Muoh that la  aesthetics 
is  factual, e.g. description o f the phenomena o f tuata and the psychology 
o f aesthetic experience. Again, moral philosophy must sometimes consider 
aesthetic values* aesthetic experience must ju s t ify  its  place in the good 
l i f e  by being benefic ia l, and compatible with other goods. The breadth o f 
tantnyana' s conception of aesthetics is  again shown in hia defin ition  of 
a third a c t iv ity  whloh, in his view, can legitim ately be called aesthetic, 
"the art and function of criticism "*
on that subject.." (17 ),
The apparent paradox, however, la easily dispelled. In the f i r s t  
quotation In the preoealna paragraph, ^autajiana maintain* boat he 
recognises no separable study called aesthetics. "hat eeergea both fro* 
his theoretical resmrks and his philosophic praatloe is  that he regards 
aesthetics as inseparable from certain other areas o f  inquiry, >nost notably 
psychology and ethics. Just as in his aesthetics Santayana always 
(im p lic it ly  or e x p lic it ly ) denies the autonomy of the work o f a rt, so he 
always considers aesthetics I t s e l f  t rrs frag lb ly  linked with these other 
studies.
His position is set out c learly  in a short paper dating from 1906, 
''•'hat is  Aesthetics?1 His thesis is  that, "the word 'aesthetics ' is  
nothing but a loose term la te ly  applied in academic c irc les  to everything 
that has to do with works o f art or with the sense of beauty"#(18) Thus 
the student o f Venetian painting is  said to be emplyed in aestbetlos) so 
is  the psychologist in his laboratory experimenting to  determine the most 
pleasing division of a s tr ip  of white papor| also said to  be part of 
aesthetics is  any d ia lec tica l speculation about thr> relation  of the beautiful 
to the rational or to the absolutely good! "The truth is  that the group of 
a c t iv it ie s  we can ca ll aesthetic is a motley one, created by certain 
h istoric and lite ra ry  accidents".(19)
ant&yano continues that, in his view, several types o f inquiry 
can legitimately be said to  form part o f aesthetioe. Kuch that is  sesthstios 
la  factual, e.g. description of the phenomena o f tumte and the psychology 
o f aesthetic experience. Again, moral philosophy must sometimes consider 
aesthetic values! aesthetic experience muet Justify it s  plaoe in the good 
l i f e  by being beneficia l, and compatible with other goods. The breadth of 
lantnyana's conception of aesthetics is  again shown in his defin ition  of 
a third a c t iv ity  whloh, in  his view, can legitim ately  be called aesthetic, 
"the art and function of o r lt la isa " i
(12)
"This la a reasoned appreciation o f human works by a mind 
not wholly ignorant o f th e ir  subject or occasion, their 
school, and their process o f manufacture".(20 )
These 'flaws on the scone o f aestbetlos are reflected  In oantayana's 
philosophic proetloa, In the Introduction to  ’ The Sense of beauty1, ha 
puts forward a view of aesthetics whloh for the t ie s  and plac" was 
revolutionary: instead o f mstaphysioal aesthetics In the Platonic or 
Hegelian manner he o ffers his readers a sc ien tific  Investigation into the 
roots o f taste . He distinguished between three approaches which have been 
taken equally to both ethics and aesthetics. The f ir s t  is  didactic and 
consists in the exercise o f the moral or aeathetie faculty i t s e l f ,  the 
actual pronouncing of praise, blame, and precept. The second is  h istorioal 
and consists in the explanation,
"o f conduct or o f art as a part o f anthropology, and seeks 
to discover the conditions o f various types o f character, 
foras o f po lity , conceptions of ju stice , and schools o f 
criticism  and a r t " . (21)
The third approach, to which 'The Sense o f leauty' la devoted, is  psycho­
log ica l :
" I t  deals with moral and aesthetic Judgements aa phenomena 
o f mino and products o f mental evolution. The problem here 
is  to understand the o r ig in  end conditions o f these feelings 
and their relation to the reat o f our economy."(22) 
ouch an inquiry, i f  successful, would reveal the roots o f taste in human 
nature, and enable us to  distinguish transitory preferences from those 
whioh, springing from universal elements of the human constitution, are 
comparatively permanent and widely ahared. Again, such a study would have 
a beneficia l consequence by c la r ify in g  the exparlanoe on which i t  is  
dlreoted. I t  should reveal which habita make for greater and more 
d ivers ified  aesthetic enjoyments.(23)
(13)
In 'Ths .'er;ae of deauty* (o f .  Cha. I  -  IV, below), I t  la psychology 
on which Santayana draws moot heavily fo r non-phtlosophical support fo r  his 
aesthetics. In ' eaaon In A rt*, (o f .  Cha. VI -  V I I I ,  below) while 
psychology -nr) bio logy are s t i l l  greatly In evidence, the dominating conoern 
is  a moral ones Santayana is  concerned to  estimate the place o f art In his 
(then) eonoeption o f the good l i f e .  The stress changes again in his late 
papers and remarks on aesthetics dealt with in Chapter IX , below. Here he 
is  most often concerned to  trace out the implications fo r  aesthetics o f the 
metaphysics, epistemology and philosophy of mind o f the iealms o f doing. He 
is  never tempted to  waver from his early conclusion that aesthetics could 
not exist i f  pursued in iso la tion . The relation of th is conception o f 
aesthetics to ar. analytic point o f view Is one of the themes of the 
following pages.
( U )
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The subject o f this chapter is  the doatrine, put forward in the 
f ir s t  chapter o f "The Tense of leauty", that beauty Is ob jectified  pleasure. 
This theory is the only part of Santayana's aesthetics to have gained wide 
currency: i t  is  unusual among Santayana's view* in having been taken over 
wholesale on occasion.(1*) Two points can be made by way o f introduction. 
The f ir s t  is  h is torica l. While "The Sense o f Seauty" was in general w ell 
received by reviewers, the coausonest reaction to the ob jectification  theory 
was that i t  is  too down to earth, giving a blatantly naturalistic account 
o f a phenomenon which had received far more mystical treatment at the hands 
o f id ea lis ts : as Sons comments, beauty had been fo r  some time a sensuous 
manifestation o f the Absolute.(2 »)
Secondly, i t  is  ironic that the ob jectifica tion  theory o f beauty 
3hould be by now the only part o f Santayana's aesthetics which is  at a l l  
widely known, since the theory o f beauty was one o f the few points on 
which he changed his mind. A new theory, from which the idea o f object­
ifica tion  is  absent, is  entailed by the doctrines o f "The tealms of 3eing", 
'or reasons already given in the foregoing general Introduction, th is la te r  
theory is  discussed separately below, in Chapter IX .(3*)
I I ;  •‘•'r$?MPPQ& tlgpg
Santayana confesses that he has what he ca lls , "A certain tempera­
mental rhetoric'' personal to him. One o f it s  most obvious features is  a 
deliberate luxurianoe o f terminology, designed to avoid the a rid ity  which 
technica lity often brings with i t .  Another feature o f his manner o f 
writing is  a nonchalant neglect o f the proper sequenoe of exposition. Both 
features o f his sty le ere present from the time o f "The Sense o f 3eeuty” 
onwards. The f ir s t  feature leads to ambiguity, the second to lnexplioitness 
over the presuppositions o f his doctrines. This section la conesrned to set
(15)
out those presuppositions, in the form they take at the time of w riting o f 
"The Sense o f beauty".
Least exp lic it in this early  book is  the metaphysical doctrine of 
m teria lis? !, i . e .  the view that the u ltiaet* s tu ff o f a l l  there is ,  is 
in soot'' sense o f the term matter and none o f i t  is  mind, where the la tte r  
is  conceived o f as non-extended substance* This view is  sinply taker, for 
panted, together with the common-sense view that there is  an external,
8patio-tempora l world o f discrete objeots* Neither doctrine is  stated as 
e x p lic it ly  as this in "The Sense o f Beauty", nor is  either argued for* The 
reason for th is neglect is  partly lent aya/, a1 a temperamental d is lik e  for 
technica lity, but even more so his absolute conviction o f the truth o f his 
world-view* As he wrote la ter (he refers to these doctrines as 'naturalism1, 
his usual term for them)i "The necessity of naturalisa as a foundation for 
a l l  other serious opinions was clear to me from the beginning.,# " ( 5) I f  
naturalism is  condemned, supematuralism has no point o f  application to the 
natural world, and i f  solipsism is  true, the whole ed ifica  o f human 
knowledge crumbles. Cna cannot do serious history, science, or philosophy, 
Santayana contends, unless naturalise is allowed as true. This quasi- 
trnnscendantal argument seems to be at the root o f Santayana'e metaphysical 
b e lie f ,  and i t  certa in ly has some force. A fter centuries o f fa ilu res to 
provide a workable a lternative to e conceptual scheme based on the 
assumption that what there is ia a world o f physloal objects, i t  is  tru is tic  
to point out that the concepts o f material objeots are oentral to ordinary 
language, as i t  is  also to indioate that the fa ls ity  o f solipsism is 
assumed in a l l  branches of human enquiry except certain epistemologies. I t  
Is not at a ll clear i f  th is stratum o f our oonoeptual soberna could be 
altered. A language in which there were no such ooneepts would be unimagin­
ably d ifferen t from our own.
!ls remarks bearing on the philosophy o f mind in "The Sense o f Beauty" 
aro ambiguous. The oharaateristlo position of his la te r  writings is
(16)
epiphenomenalism, and, In the absence o f avidanoe to the contrary, i t  is  
reasonable to assume that he held bom  fora  o f th is theory when w riting th is 
early work. I t  aust be admitted, ..ovever, that his few remarks in "The 
..'er.se o f :eauty" or this subject are ambiguous between eolphenomenaIIsis 
and other forms o f materialist theory o f the mind, e .g ., discussing 
expression, he writes: “The nusbed reverberations of these associated fe e l­
ings continue in the brain, . . “ (6 , My emphasis). One must turn to his la te r  
writings fo r  more precision on th is po in t.(7)
Inexplioitceas is  a characteristic o f the theory o f preoeptlon o f 
"The ’enee o f  3eeuty". The ¡sost that can he said with safety is  that a 
va r ie ty  o f representationallaa is presupposed throughout. Writing o f the 
Judgement o f beauty he alalms that i t  ia “based on the character o f 
immediate experience*(8 ), end such a mediate/lmmediote distinction is  
presupposed in the discussion o f the object i f  icat lor. o f pleasure in '.he 
experience o f beauty.(9 ) '.'hat the data o f immediate experience are, and 
how immediate-data-etatements are rolated to mediate-experienoe-atatsments 
are problems not faced in “The 3er.se o f  beauty", dantayana did not put 
forward a fu lly  developed theory on these points until he oame to formulate 
the doctrine o f essence th irty  years la ter.
Moving from the perceptions to the peroelver, I t  is  worth noting 
that Santayana is  free from any naive tendency to hypoatatlse in his view 
o f the s e lf .  He remarks that:
“ I  care about myself because 'm yself' is  s name for the things 
I  have at heart. To set up the verbal figment o f personality 
end make i t  an object of concern apart from the interests whloh 
were it s  aontent and substance, turns the moralist into a pedant, 
and ethics into a superstition“ .(10)
Again:
" . . .  among the ideas with whloh every objeat has relation, thara 
la  one vaguest, most comprehensive, and most powerful one, namely,
(17)
the idea o f the s e lf .  The impulses, memories, principles and 
energies which ve designate by that word b a ffle  enumerationj indeed,
the/ constantly fade and change into one another) and whether the 
s e lf Is anything, everything or nothing depends on the aspect of 
I t  which ve nem«ritorily f ix ,  and especia lly  on the de fin ite  objeot 
with which we contrast I t " . (11)
One cannot pretend, however, that Santayana provides here anything more than 
a suave restatement o f the introspective discovery made by Hume, though 
one must concede to Santayana that his concerns In "The 'er.se o f deauty" do 
not require a theory o f the s e lf and it s  identity , 
l l l i  Santayana's harly e fin ltlon  of ataafar
The aim o f the f ir s t  chapter o f "The Sense o f 3eauty" is  to define 
the nature o f beauty by the method o f genus and d iffersnee. The conclusion 
Is that beauty is  value positive, in trinsic , and o b jec tified . The simplest 
method o f exposition is  to set out what Santayana says about each o f those 
term3, beginning with "value".
Santayana was o f course not an analytic philosopher, and accordingly 
his theory of value is  d ifferen t in intention and oontsnt from the 
analyses o f the logic of evaluative Judgment which are the proper staple o f 
analytic ethics and a es th e tic . The style o f theory he puts forward is  
most c learly  understood as an answer to the question« why is  i t  that human 
beings value anything at a l l ,  as opposed to making mars Judgments o f fact 
about what there la? b r ie fly , Santayana'a answer la  that wa value things 
beoauae we have wants and needs which must ha sa tis fied . Us value whatever 
maximises our satisfaction , and dlsvelue whatever has the reverse e ffe c t .
In tha vocabulary o f his commentators, ha pitta forward a variety o f the 
interest theory o f value.(12*) This dootrine is  one which Santayana retained 
throughout his oarear. I t  is adumbrated in his dootoral thesis, and 
assumed in a l l  hie published works. (13*) I t  is  o f importance not only in 
the theory o f beauty but also determines bis views on the ro le o f tha 
subjeot-matter o f the work o f art. (o f .  Ch. V, below.) Moreover, I t  la
fundamental to his ethics, and, sines he regards ethics as having 
authority over aesthetics, is  o f Importance in his views on art and 
morality, (o f .  Ch. V III, below).
One must concede to  his c r it ie s  that Santayana is  ambiguous with 
regard to the unit o f value, and ttu  terms 'wants' and 'needs' above were 
used marefy- to allow synoptic brevity. Towards the end o f his f ir s t  
chapter, summarising the argument, 3mntaymna writes«
"Beauty la a value, that is ,  i t  is  not a perception o f a 
matter o f fact or o f a rela tion « i t  is  an emotion, an a ffection  
o f our vo lition a l and appreciative nature".(14)
This statement is imprecise in many respects, some o f them philosoph­
ic a lly  important. Does he mean, fo r  example, that anything to  which a 
person assigns value is something a propos o f whloh he fee ls  an emotion, 
or does he mean that evaluative statements are sophisticated expressions 
o f emotion, os Ayer and "teveneon were la te r  to claim? Other remarks do 
not help in resolving these ambiguities: fo r example, he writes even more 
imprecisely, " . . . a l l  worth leads us back to fe e lin g  somewhere, or else 
evaporates into nothing -  into a word or a superstition*.(15) Again, 
discussing in e ffe c t necessary and su ffic ien t conditions fo r  something's 
being valued, he argues that the existenoe o f conscious beings is  msrely 
a necessary condition for the occurrence o f the a c t iv ity  o f valuing, 
su fficiency being attained only when thaee beings also have emotions«
" . . . f o r  the existenoe o f good in any fora i t  is  not merely consciousness 
which is  required but emotional consciousness that la needed. Observation 
w i l l  not do, appreciation la  required".(16) In hie most lengthy remark on 
the theory o f value in general in "The 3e«me o f Beauty", the terms 'fe e l in g ',  
'p leasure', 'need' and 'passion1 a l l  occur close together«
"...from  thmse..feelings o f  ours the greet world o f perception 
derives e l l  its  value, i f  not also it a  existenoe. Things arc 
intercat leg beoauae we care about than, and Important because
(18)
(19)
v« need them. Had our perceptions no connexion with our 
pleasures, we should soon dose  our eyes on th is world} i f  our 
in te lligence were o f no service to our passions, we should cone 
to doubt, in the lasy freedom o f reverie, whether two and two 
sake fo u r " .(17)
’ Pleasure', 'need', 'fe e l in g 1, e tc ., are therefore a l l  introduced 
by Santayana into the discussion o f the question why anythin,? is  ever 
valued, but th is  is  a strength and not a weakness as Pepper and Singer, 
for example, assume. (18) Indeed the assumption by these writers that this 
is  a weakness betrays a naive essentialism on their part. The force o f 
what Santayana says can be exhibited as follows t to say o f any x that 
' I  value x, yet i t  sa tis fies  no desire o f any person, nor any want or need 
or passion, nor gives anyone any pleasure' is  to say something lo g ica lly  
odd, the oddity revealing a conceptual link o f a high order of generality 
between the notions of valuing anything and the valuer's having wants, 
needs, e tc ., which demand satisfaction . Aa Santayana says, i f  there were 
beings whose nature were merely in te llectu a l, who merely described events 
outsi e them, there would be no evaluation among them. This insight Is 
absent from a l l  but the :ost recent analytic studies o f evaluation, whera 
i t  deserves a more prominent p lace.(19)
Pepper makes two ftarther criticism s o f Santayana's value theory, 
the f ir e t  o f whioh can be rebutted. His f ir s t  point is  that the standard 
proposed by Santayana whereby we ere to order and evaluate the various wants, 
needs, an<! interests that ws have, is  inexact.(20) In, " teason in G o ion 
Sense" (o f .  Ch. VI, below), Sentayana advooates what might be oalled 
sympathetic weighing o f poss ib ilitie s  in order to harmonies our desiresi 
to consider a l l  the interests whioh would be involved in each o f the 
various poss ib ilitie s  o f eotlon open to us, end to perform that aotion 
which promoted the maximal satisfaction o f des ire .(21) Certainly th is is  
inexact, but i t  la also e l l  that a human being oan do. The problem whioh
(20)
faces Santayana is  the same as that which faces U tilitarians and in response 
to vhlah Sentham composed the f e l i o i f i o  calculus, namely, that wants, needs, 
nil: so forth are not amenable to exact quantification, with the consequence 
that no exact measure o f th e ir  optimal satisfaction  can be worked out. ”he 
only answer to  th is is  to  s*helt Its  patent truth, but to point out that 
people do isake such oomparisona and predict Iona, with varying degrees o f 
ra tiona lity  and suooess, merely on the baale o f remembered and reported 
satisfaction . Of course th is is  Inexact and lapsrfeet, but there is  no 
a lternative.
Pepper's third criticism  cannot be dismissed SO ea s ily . His point 
is  that to  sot up harmony and maximal satisfaction  o f Interests as the 
necessary and su ffic ien t condition o f the rational l i f e ,  as Sentayana does 
(even i f  only in passing in "The Sense o f Seauty" )  Is  to make an arbitrary 
stipulation! th is is  merely to make one interest among many the standard 
for the ordering o f a l l  others, and no ju s tifica tion  e » ' be produced far 
such a save.(22) Santayana's reply to  th is point in aa follows* He 
admits that Inman beings may have intense paasions which i t  is  impossible 
to harmonlsei
"There are, then, intense values that are ev ils  in one 
another's eyes. To harmonise then is  simply lmposalbls| a l l  
that the interest in harmony ( i t a a l f  only one o f the passions) 
can aspire to do is  to separate, to a lternate, or partia lly  to  
saorlfios e l l  the passions, or some o f them, so that they may 
co llide as l i t t l e  as possible and that each may act fanatically  
ca ll e v i l  that which another finds good"*(23)
What is  odd hare is  f i r s t ly  that Santayana In e ffe o t  admits Pepper's 
oritloism  by saying that the interest in harmony is  only one of the 
passional and secondly the admission ttat the l i f e  o f harmonised passions -  
and so, in Santayana's view, happiness -  is  unattainable. Tbs attempted 
Justification o f harmony in the last sentence o f the above quotation merely
(21)
repeats the theory In question and invites the sane queries t why is  partia l 
sa tisfaction  o f aost desires to  be preferred to ooeplete sa tis faction  o f a
few? The only Justification  which could be provided fo r th is  position is 
to  maintain that maximal harmony o f Interests brings maximal happiness, le t  
Santayana nowhere proves th ie i nor does he provide any argument fo r the 
further assumption whioh would have to be demonstrated to  make this case 
cogent, i . e .  that i t  is  irra tiona l to wish not to be happy. These are 
d if f ic u lt ie s  whioh Santayana never sa tis fa c to r ily  overcame.
Value is  the genus o f which beauty is  a species. The remaining 
argument o f chapter I  o f ""’he 'ense o f 3eauty" is  a specification  o f three 
d iffe ren tiae  Intended to  define i t s  axaot nature. The f i r s t  o f tbsse 
d lffs rsn tlae  is  that beauty is  a positive value. The d istin ction  between 
positive and negative values is  the weakest link in the argument o f 
antayana'a f ir s t  chapter. I t  is  constituted by two claims, f i r s t ly  that 
aesthetic Judgments are la rge ly  positive, i . e .  o f approval, while moral 
judgments are la rge ly  negative (24 ), and e-condly that the perception o f 
beauty la o f the presence o f something good, while that o f ugliness is 
merely o f a lack or absence.(25) Ko aesthetic perception is  o f a positive 
e v i l .  The f ir s t  point, intended to eontraat aesthetic with moral judgments, 
has only to be stated fo r  i t s  extreme su perfic ia lity  to appear. Statements 
o f aesthetic condemnation arc common enough, aa are expressions o f moral 
approbation, and accordingly, Santayana's alleged contrast is  o f no use in 
distinguishing them, "he second point i f  rather better. There is  s good 
reason to  regard ugliness as merely an absence or a lack, l .a .  that the 
notion o f uglineea is  such that the term 'ugly*Is predicated o f those 
«esthetic objeeta whioh do not have the form they ought to  have. The only 
further comment whioh Santayana makes on th is point is  to  ssy that where 
ugliness ceases to be merely amuoing or uninteresting i t  bcoomca a positive 
e v i l  aura enough, hut a moral e v i l ,  not an aesthetio one.(26) The force o f 
the term, "moral" is  revealed i f  one considers the second o f the alleged 
d iffe ren tiae  o f beauty, namely ita  in tr in s ioa llty .
(22)
Onoe again contrasting moral and aesthetic Judgments, 'antayana 
writes that judgments o f beauty are "necessarily in trinsic end based on 
bu* character o f  immediate experience," newer consciously on the o e iie fs  
one has concerning the u t il ity  o f the beautiful ob ject.(27) Moral Judgments, 
by contrast, when they are nosltlve, ere derived from be lie fs  concerning 
the benefits involved in a certain course o f action. The distinction la  
para lle l, Santayana argues, to that between work and play.(28) Play is  
whatever a c t iv ity  is  done spontaneously and fo r I ts  own sake, work being 
that which ia done under the spur o f necessity. A corollary drawn from 
this is  that a l l  values are in one senee aesthetio, since a l l  instrumental 
values are valuable as a means to an in trin sic  value.(29) Tbs coro llary  
onn be dismissed at once« i f  whatever leads to an intrinsic value is i t s e l f  
ipso facto ar. in trinsic value, then a l l  values are in trin sic , and there 
ceases to be any work fo r  on intrinaio/lnstrumental distinction to  do. I f  
on the other hand, instrumental values are in trinsic in a sense o f the 
la tte r  term other than it s  normal sense, then the distinction remains as 
i t  was, and th.” corollary is superfluous. ’’he main claims, howaver, demand 
a longer consideration, since they raise complex Issues, and contain 
elements o f truth and fa ls ity .
.’ sr.tayana claims that a l l  positive moral Judgments in some sense 
re fer to the anticipated benefloial consequences o f the object of the 
judgment. This is not true, even where the moral system is  U tilita r ia n , 
fo r every U tilitarian  system involves e t  least erne assertion o f the form,
"x is  good in I ts e l f " ,  where x may be pleasure, happiness, se lf-rea lisa tion , 
and so on. In tu itlon ist accounts o f ethles generally include more then 
one such assertion« Moore, for example, in "Princip le Ethics", gives both 
aesthetic enjoyment and personal a ffection  as intrinsic goods, lantaymne's 
reply to this criticism  would he simply th is» eertain ly a l l  moral systems 
embody at least one assertion o f in tr in s ic  goodness, but whatever le  an 
lntrlnsio good is  an aaathatlc good, not a moral one.
(23)
Whatever on* might think o f this position so s conceptual recommend­
ation, i t  is  o art a in ly  not defensible as fin analysis o f the usage o f the 
te n s , 'aesthetic* and 'moral*. The meaning o f these oonoepts is  o f 
course s t i l l  the subject o f philosophical debate, but the main 11m s  o f 
difference can be adumbrated fa ir ly  b r ie fly . 3ullough, following the 
English aesthetloians o f the Enlightenment and Kant, points the way with 
the concept o f psychical distanoe.(30) Whatever is  aesthetica lly  <p»od is 
good without refererioe to  our common physical wants and needs; very roughly, 
the aesthetically good is  that which pleases in contemplation* (This 
subject is  taken up in more de ta il at several points in  tha fo llow ing 
pagas.) This view indicates the truth on which Santayana has fastaned, 
namely ttmt no aesthetic judgment positive or negative is  an evaluation o f 
the aesthetic object in  terms of consequences, precise ly  because the 
aesthetic attitude precludes such a practical consideration. Certainly, 
than, a l l  aesthetic goods are, in antaymna'a vocabulary, in trinsic goods; 
but the converse, which he also asserts, that a l l  in tr in s ic  goods are 
aeathetio goods, does not hold o f ordinary usage. The in trinsic goods 
of moral uyaterns, e .g . pleasure, happiness, sa lf-rea llsa tion , are not 
objeots o f contemplation, but the goals o f what one might label practical 
in terest) their attainment, end the avoidance o f the corresponding ev ils  
is the r.im o f a large part o f our deliberate action. Indeed only whan a 
generous degree o f certainty In respect o f these moral goods la  attained 
can wa usually find peace o f mind enough to take up the aesthatio attitude 
to anything.
3y way of approaching tha last o f tha d iffe ren tia e  o f beauty, 
antayana makes several preliminary comments. So fa r  he has located beauty 
within the species o f positive, in trinsic value, but to say only th is does 
not d iffe ren tia te  the pleasure o f the experience o f  beauty from any 
physical pleasure, whioh la equally a positive and in trinsic value. He 
solve« th is problem without d if f ic u lty  by deevir» e ti-e tioB  to  the feet that 
i t  is  a common feature o f what wa ca ll physical pleasures that they, "ca ll
our attention to some part o f our body, and..Mica no object 90 conspicuous 
to  us as the organ in whioh they a r is e " . (31) 3y contrast, in the aesthetic 
experience o f pleasure, our organs are "transparent, they aust not intercept 
our attention, but carry i t  d ire c t ly  to  eoae external ob jec t".(32) This 
se ttled , he attempts to refute two classic theories o f  the nature o f 
aesthetic pleasure.
The f ir s t  of these is  the view that aesthetic pleasure is  dis­
interested pleasure, that in the contemplation o f beauty the passions are 
quieted, and we are content merely to  be In the presence o f wbet we do not 
seek to possess. Of his two objections to the view the f ir s t  is  that ths 
alleged disinterest o f the response cannot be fundamental«
"The beauties o f nature and o f the p lastic  arts are not oonsumed 
by being enjoyed| they retain a l l  the e ffioacy  to impress a 
second beholder. But th is  circumstance Is  accidental, and those 
aesthetic objects whioh depend upon change and are exhausted in 
time, as are e l l  performances, are things the enjoyment o f which 
is  an object o f r iva lry  and is  coveted as muoh as any other 
pleasure".(33)
This objection clearly miscarries* No-one would dispute that works o f art 
and their performances where they have them are sought a fter and that in 
oonsequenoe their exohange value is  often very great} but i t  does not follow 
from this that aesthstic contemplation is other than disinterested, as 
Santayana seems to think. He continues«
"The troth which the theory is  trying to  state seems rather to  be 
that when we seek aesthetic pleasures we have no further pleasures 
in mind...This Is tru e, but i t  is  true st bottom o f a l l  pursuits
and enjoyments. Every ree l pleasure is  in  one aenee disinterested"(34)
'what is  wrong hero is  the assumption that the rea l troth  behind the dis­
in terest theory is  the truiam that pleasure is  pursued for i t s  own sake} 
certain ly aesthatio pleasure la  an and in i t s e l f )  but the point which
the additional property o f being contemplative.
Kant la  presumably the source o f the second theory o f aesthetic 
pleasure vhlah Santayana attacks, the view that aesthetio pleasure la  a 
universal pleasure.(35) ''hen one Judges an object to be beautiful, one 
expects everyone else to agree. Santayana considers this view to be nonsense 
" I t  is  unmeaning to say that what is  beautiful to  one man ought to be 
beautiful to another".(36) The reasons Santayana gives in support o f this 
assertion are derived from his deterministic epi phenomena 11 sin i
"There is  notoriously no great agreement upon aesthetio matters» 
and 3uch agreement as there is  is  based on sim ilarity  o f orig in , 
nature and circumstance among men, a sim ilarity  which, where i t  
ex is ts , tends to bring about iden tity  in a l l  Judgments and 
fe e lin g s " . (37)
There are several d if f ic u lt ie s  involved in these assertions, not the least 
o f which is  the use o f the vague term 's im ila r ity ' to carry a l l  the weight 
o f explanation. More important, however, is  Santayana's apparent miscon­
struct ion o f Kant. What Kant assumes with regard to the universality o f 
the aesthetic Judgment is  thlat where gra tifica tion  is  concerned, we do not 
expect people to enjoy what we enjoy, and do not bother to argue about 
d ifferent preferences. This is  not the ease, however, with aesthetio objects, 
where we do bother to  argue and expect other people to agree with us. Kent 
is  discussing the log ica l form o f aesthetio argumentt Santayana'a factual 
generalisations are beside the point.
The fin a l step in the argument to define beauty is  the elaim that 
the lrat o f it s  d ifferen tiae is  ob jec tifica tion . Ob J sot i f  loot ion is a 
psychological phenomenon which 3*u taynna defines as "the treesformation o f 
an element o f  sensation into the quality o f a th ing".(38) The argument 
behind this Involves the lmmediate/medlate distinction , and a theory o f 
concept formation. 3ar.tayana claims that ooneapts were formed orig ina lly
dlsinterest/dietr.noe theorist a wish to make la  th-t aoathotio pleasure has
to serve as labels fo r  whatever groups o f sensations are associated by 
repeated, simultaneous occurrence, and that in an alleged pristine state, 
human beings regarded a l l  sensations as qua lities o f objects* As tine vent 
on, however, the need for a simpler conception o f objects led to a 
reduction of properties o f objects to  a minimum, only a few primary 
qua lities o f objects like extension retaining th e ir  status as objective.
A ll the rest, lik e  colour, are regarded as secondary q u a lities , e ffe c ts  o f 
the object on us. The naive tendency to ob jec tify  remains, however, In 
certain areas o f experience, nnd one such area is  the experience o f beauty: 
"Beauty is  an emotional element, a pleasure o f ours, which nevertheless wet- 
regard as a qua lity  o f th in gs".(39) 'ifcy should the tendency to  ob jectify  
hrve romained in operation with respect to beauty? antayana's answer la 
that the pleasure afforded by a beautiful object is  not loaallsed in one 
organ, and so does not draw attention to  the perceiving body; again, the 
pleasure is Intimately connected with the form and substance o f the object, 
and so naturally we fa l l  here to separate the pleasure fro *  the other 
ob jectified  qua lities of the object. The conclusion o f the analysis is  ths 
de fin ition  o f beauty with which this section began: beauty Is value 
positive, In trin sic  and ob jec tified .
Nelson Goodman has some hard words to say about the ob jeotifloa tlon  
theory: he does not refer to  Gantayana by name, but must have him In mind. 
Having stated the theory, he comments:
"Apart from Images o f some grotesque process o f transfusion, 
what oar th is mean? To oonalder the pleasure as possessed 
rather than occasioned by the ob>ot -  to say In e ffe c t  that 
the object le  pleased -  say amount to saying that the objeot 
expresses the pleasure. But since a atm aesthetic objeote are 
Bed -  express Badness rather then pleasure -  th is comes nowhere 
near distinguishing In general between aesthetic and nonaesthetlo 
objeots or sxperlenoe".(«.<>)
(27)
To be mde to  stick , Goodman must back up this orltloism  with aoas harah 
readings o f tba text o f "The Sanaa of Seauty" (assuming, onoa again, that 
i t  ia Santayana be haa In mind). He assumes that the ob jectIfioatlon  theory 
must be conatruad as a theory intended to define the aesthetic in general, 
rather than beauty in particular. Tet Santayana, in the present work and 
in  la ter ones, haa d istinct defin ition  o f aesthetic experience as immediate 
experience. I f  the ob jectifica tion  theory is  construed as a theory o f beauty 
alone, then ioodoan's criticism  is  beside the point. I t  must be admitted, 
however, that Santayana leaves the exact mechanism o f ob jectifica tion  out 
o f  his account, thus giving p rhaps some ground for Soodaan's sarcastic 
references to a grotesque process o f transfusion.
■antayana's theory o f beauty does, however, contain an important 
d if f ic u lty ,  k’hat is  wrong with i t  emerges I f  one considers its  main 
lingu istic  coro llary. I f  i t  la the ease that beauty la pleasure regarded 
as a property of an object, then i t  follows that 'beautifu l* la a denoting 
term. Its  denotation being the quality o f plaeaure which 'ex hypothesi' I 
regard as a property o f the objeet o f my judgment. Hut i f  thie were so, i t  
would be the case that I would regard the object's beauty as a quality o f 
the same kind as i t s  shape or weight, for example, a quality whose presenoe 
I can Indicate, iaore or less e ffe c t iv e ly , by ostension and measurement.
: o-one does th is , however, when beauty la  in quest-on. I  cannot go up to an 
object and indicate its  beauty in tha same way that I  oan indicate those 
properties which are allowed ordinarily, andby Santayana, to oount aa 
ob jective.
The theory o f ob jeotlfioatlon  in conjunction with 3entayane'a thesis 
as to the nature o f aesthetic experienoe, Involves him in a further serious 
d if f ic u lty . Throughout the ea r lie r  part o f hie career ( l . e .  prior to the 
development o f the philosophy o f the desists o f Helng), Santayana maintains 
that aesthetic experience is  immediate experience, l . e .  though he would not 
have used t ills  vocabulary, experienoe o f the flux o f sense data. The
(28)
The d if ficu lty  Is  that, in  any eomaon philosophical usage, "Immediate 
experience" Is  experience o f sensetiona which are unconceptualised. This 
hein^ so, i t  is  d if f ic u lt  to see how an aesthetic experience could be 
experience o f an object ¿g. *E object, «tree  tn experience something as 
an object is  to  hare conceptualised i t  to some degree. How then can beauty 
be pleasure ob jectified , i . e .  regarded ns a property o f an object? 
antoyana cannot maintain both hie early  de fin ition  of beauty, and his 
theory o f aesthetlo experience, (fu rther d if f ic u lt ie s  in th is sarly theory 
o f aesthetlo experience are discussed in  Chapter V, below).
To condemn the conclusion o f lantayana's analysis might seem to  
indicate that he has l i t t l e  o f value to  t e l l  us about the nature o f beauty, 
"his would he, however, a hasty conclusion and Ignores some of the 
important truths about beauty on which he has fastened. He sees f i r s t l y  
that beauty is  an in trinsic value, that i t  is  sought for its  own sake.
No object is beautiful in the central uses o f the term in virtue o f any 
beneficial consequences with which i t  may be connected. Those who maintain 
a functionalist account o f beauty could not be more wrong. econdly he 
stresses properly that the experienoe o f beauty is ar experience o f pleasure. 
?hi3 is a conceptual matter, fo r  to  say, "1 find object x beautiful, yet i t  
gives me no pleasure," without any quail filiation ( i . e .  one must rule out 
accidental unpleasant associations) is  to  v io la te the rules fo r the use o f 
the term 'b eau tifu l'. As he says "An object cannot be beautiful i f  i t  oan 
tva pleasure to nobody t a beauty to which a l l  aer. were forever ind ifferen t 
is  a contradiction in tem s".(4 1 ) Thirdly and cost importantly, the 
remainder of ''"he Sense o f leauty" is  given to the study o f three classes o f 
elements in the aesthetic object which contribute to besutyi materials, form, 
and expression, "he argument o f the next aeetlon in that i f  th is insight 
( I . e .  that these faotors are a ll contributors to the beauty o f an aesthetic 
object) is  combined with some recent discoveries in the log ic  o f evaluative 
terms, the product is an socurate analysis o f the logio o f the Judgment of
bonuty. lo g ic a l analysis supports the ns Jar Inal ght Santayana gives us 
about the factors which contribute to beauty.(42*)
vti . a ¿ “tilrny 9f tfr Jqaaas&r °f
For the sake o f completeness a few mlror points about the term 
'beauty' and Its  cognates can be cleared up at the ou tlet, ’ ’he present 
analysis la concerned only with the oentral uses o f  the term, •-'hat these 
central uses are w i l l  emerge in the course o f what fo llows) non-oentral uses 
ars those In which 'beauty* and mors often 'b eau tifu l' are used as synonyms 
for 'good ', i .e .  merely as a general adjective o f commendation, most oftsn 
in phrases lik e , "This is  a beautiful cake", or adverbially in  phrases 
lik e , "Tills la beautifu lly made". In it s  central uses i t  is  predicated o f 
e wide range o f ob jects: works o f  art o f a l l  kinds, works o f c ra ft , and 
natural phenomena, animate and inanimate. Agai: , i t  is  Fr*-:iaable in degrees 
objects can be more or less beautiful than one another -  though there is  no 
unit o f beauty. Just as there is  no unit o f pleasure. F inally, while i t  is  
undoubtedly the most written about o f aesthetic v irtues, i t  has no special 
conceptual link with the notion o f a work o f a rt. I t  is  certa in ly  not a 
necessary condition for anything's oeing s work o f  art, for while many works 
o f art are beautiful, one wants to say that some are neither beautiful nor 
ugly, ("he concept o f art is  discussed at mow length in 3h. V I, below.)
The :’lrs t point o f substance to note is  that 'b eau tifu l', to borrow 
a term from contemporary ethics, Is a supervenient or consequential predicate.
(43) ’ he force o f  this claim has in e ffe c t Dean adumbrated already in the 
rebuttal o f  lentayana•s ob jectification  theslst 'b eau tifu l' is  not a 
prsdloate applied to  an object on tho same rounds as predloatea specifying 
its  colour, shape, weight, duration, or s ise. ('.base one oan c e l l  ' f i r s t -  
le v e l ' predicates.) ¡ether i t  is  what one might term a second-level 
predicate, applied to an objeot because that objeat has oertain qualities 
whioh are specified by fir a t- le v s l predicates. This ie why one cannot 
indicate an ob ject's  beauty in the same way that one can indicate lta  
colour, shape, e tc . "hat typ ica lly  these f ir s t - le v e l  qua lities and
(29)
predicates are In the case o f beauty w ill  be discussed shortly.
The second major point -  again an importation from ethlos -  is  that 
the mealing o ' the tens 'b eau tifu l' is  d istin ct from the c r ite r ia  fo r its  
use.(44) I f  an object is  called 'b eau tifu l') then before one knows for 
what reasons the predicate has beer, applied on th is occasion) one knows 
that the object has been commended -  in i t s  non-ironic uses 'b eau tifu l' is  
an honorific term -  as aesthetica lly  pleasing in oertain respects. ( I t  is  
to be emphasised here again that the present analysis is  lim ited only to 
the most central uaes o f the term 'b ea u tifu l'. In oertain oases. the term 
car: be not only not honorific but pejorative. I t  could be said o f a work 
which tended to be cloying* "This la  too b eau tifu l".) As i t  stands o f 
course th is theory of the core o f meaning o f the term 'beau tifu l' la  
remarkably uninformative. not serving to d iffe ren tia te  'b eau tifu l' from 
any other aesthetic virtue predicate) but i t  ia  not too d if f ic u lt  to  f i l l  
out the crucial lacunae. One notes f i r s t ly  the recurr vios o f one o f the 
themes on whioh Santayana ia Justly insistent) namely the link between beauty 
and pleasure. Any experience o f  a beautiful ob ject is  pleasant.
The elaboration of the foroe of the qua lification ) "aesthetica lly  
pleasing" loads back to the de lica te  issue o f the analysis o f the aesthetic 
attitude. Most attempts at a characterisation o f th is attitude fasten on 
one variety o f experience occasioned by a work o f art or a natural aesthetic 
object, and advanoe to the claim thmt such a type o f experience ia occasioned 
by n il objects to whioh one takas up the aasthetio attitude* such are the 
theories o f empathy, o f repose, synesthesia, a fee lin g  o f uarmality. or 
simply pleasure. I t  is  unlikely that any person with a wide experience o f  
the e ffects  o f aesthetic objects would wish to  deny that a l l  these feelinga 
car. be occasioned by such ob jeots. but in no case is  any o f thase experiences 
an invariant feature o f aesthetlo experience. To impest a point already made 
above, the best snalysis remains that o f psyohiosl distance* the aesthmtic 
attitude oonaiats in the separation of tbs aesthetic experience from the
(31)
wants and needs o f everyday l i f a ,  and the responses wa normally make to 
the environment In the execution o f our pm otloal purposes.
A good deal o f pressure here rests on the tern, 'p ra c t ic a l',  and 
I t  is  oy no means easy to  g ive « »  exact explanation of I ts  ■caning, on# 
oar., however, give a general characterisation o f  whet la meant by consider­
ing som uncontentlous fa c ts . I t  la a psychological commonplace that 
ordinarily, our perceptions reg ister roughly what we need to  perceive and 
Indeed to a degree what we want tofproeive. A l l  we notice o f the morning 
bus is  its  number, not the shape o f the radiator g r i l l ,  nor the proportions 
o f the windows in relation to  one another and in  relation  to  the aids area 
o f the bus. Again, turning to  cases o f expectation, whan wa are waiting 
for a 'phone o a l l ,  many sounds taka on at any rate in i t ia l ly  th- sound o f 
the 'phone b e l l ;  when w" are urgently looking fo r  a friend, many people 
take on, again in it ia l ly ,  a resemblance to thma. The pecu liarity o f tha 
aesthetic attitude 1b that we are to a degree released from th is bondage 
o f needs end can concentrate on what one rather htlp leasly labels the whole 
set o f qu a lities  o f the object fo r their own sake, not in relation  to  our 
most obvious and tiae-oonsuming satisfactions.
Sight is  the sense on which we re ly  moat fo r our information, and 
i t  is  a feat o f  some d if f ic u lty  to stop seeing in a want-and-need governed 
way. That is  why we need books to t e l l  us how to  look at pioturesi to  
concentrate our attention on what is  there to be eeen, rather then merely 
noticing whet would normally ba not load, iea lie t ic  pictures in exaet 
geometrical prspeotlve are in a sense tha noet accessible end yet the hardest 
to  approach with a purely aesthetic attitude, sinoe they present us with 
scales which we interpret without d if f icu lty  in  a want-end- . ed governed 
way.(45*) To notice subtleties o f colouring, ohalroeeuro, disposition o f 
forms, bruahwork and so on is  something moat o f  us must learn to  do. Non- 
representational paintings demand an aasthatio approach! hence the corns on 
foaling o f bewilderment experleneed by so aany when confronted with them.
(32)
Hopefully, th is account gives some Indication of what Is  meant by 
'psyoh leally distanced'. The theory reappears on the conceptual le v e l 
in studies such as '’rmoon'a, "Whet makes a situation aesthetic?"( Ah)•
He concludes that to react aesthetically  to an object is  to be impressed 
favourably or otherwise by a sensible property o f the thing, with no 
u lte r io r  grounds. Or again, to appreciate aesthetically  is  to be oonoemed 
so le ly  with a th ing's looking somehow without concern fo r whether i t  
rea lly  is  lik e  that.(¿7) This is  o f  oourse highly inexact, but one can 
see the link with the theory of psychical distancer the absence o f u lterior 
concern, or a concern with the real nature o f the object considered marks 
o f f  the aesthetic attitude from the more practical one which takes up 
most o f our liv in g  time.
This analysis allows one to gloss the above claim that the oore o f
the meaning of 'b eau tifu l' is  to be aesthetically  pleasing in certain 
respects. To be aesthetica lly  pleasing is  to  please without reference to 
the satisfaction  of practical wants and needs, to give a pleasure which 
is  independent of the accomplishment of our ordinary purposes. This is  
the truth which lie s  behind Santayana's iden tification  o f aesthetic end 
in trinsic  values, fo r to regard an object as beautiful is  to coaaend i t  
Independently of Its  instrumental properties. The fin a l major point in 
the log ic  o f beauty is  to specify what these non-instrumental properties 
ars, and this is  in e ffe c t  to specify f ir s t - le v e l properties, ths typioal 
c r ite r ia  for the uae o f 'b ea u tifu l'.
The Judgment that an object is  beautiful can be supported by reasons, 
and what thsae reasons specify are material, formal, and expressive 
properties o f the beautiful object, 'a  fo r t io r i ' not predicates concerning 
i t s  function, l .s .  in e f fs o t , its  relation  to our practical purposes. 
..Santayana saw th is truth fu lly  enough to structure the whole o f "The Sense 
o f Beauty" around i t ,  and it s  fores readily becomes apparent i f  ona 
considers even one example. Suppose I  am asked why I oonslder Watteau's
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" Ie  7aux Pas" to  be a pointing o f great beauty. The reasons I  can give 
f a l l  naturally Into the three classes Implied by the structure o f 
antayane's boo let I  can re fer to the delicacy o f the colouring, to the 
organie disposition o f the forms, and to the expression o f a sad, delicate 
and soohlstloated sense o f epheaerallty. This is not to  say tto t there 
are always reasons from each o f the three olasses for avery use of 
'b ea u tifu l', merely that there must be at laast one reason from at least 
one of them.
inference to  the olassio sources on the theory o f beauty reveals 
that most writers have considered only one claas o f reasons -  formal 
reasons -  to be In question where beauty Is  ascribed to  any object. Most 
o f P lato 's writing on the subject Is  o f course an application o f the 
theory o f forms to the notion o f beauty (48 ), but occasionally Plato 
discusses what an object which partlclpetes In the 7orm of the beautiful 
looks lik e . At 'Phllehua' 64a, he writes: '•measure and symmetry are 
b«auty and virtue a ll the world over", (Jowett’ s translation) and at 
’ loph lst' 228 he analyses deformity or ugliness as consisting In dis­
proportion. The link between beauty and form remains the dominant theme 
in the cla8sis analyses o f beauty. A r is to tle 's  scattered remarks on tha 
subject exhibit him a s s  formalist, in  the present sense o f the term, 
i . e .  one who holds that the term 'beau tifu l' Is always ascribed on the 
basis o f formal properties o f tne object. In the 'Metaphysios' he writes 
• hot: "The ch ief forms o f beauty ere order and symmetry and defin iteness.."
(49 ), end at more length In the 'P oe tics ':
" . . t o  be beautiful, a liv in g  creature, and every whole made up of 
pmrte, must not only present a certain order In i t s  arrangement o f 
parts, but also be o f a certain d e fin ite  magnitude, beauty Is  a 
matter o f alse and order."(50)
Augustine argues that the essenoe o f  beauty Is  what he ca lls  unity, and 
th is unity results from the relations o f the perta o f  the ob ject.(51)
(3-0
T a lc in g  a very long 8tap forward to tha '{nllghtanmant, one finds sim ilar 
views, as indead one expects from a period self-oocsoioualy devoted to 
classica l models. leasing retteries shot« "Physical beauty arises from the 
harmonious e ffe c t o f nan i f  old parts that can be taken in at one view. "(52) 
Diderot, attempting to  find a common mean in f fo r a l l  uses o f  the term, 
»r.oluded that beauty ooneista in the perception o f rela tions ('rapports ') 
(53)
xamples o f form alistic analyses in this manner can be multiplied 
eas ily  «rough (5<0 but neither weight o f numbers nor Btature o f proponent 
entails the adequacy of the view, end indeed a w riter ae ea r ly  as Plotinus 
realised that i t  could not be the whole story. As he points out, beauty 
oannot merely consist in symmetry, proportion and the appropriate colour, 
for on this viaw only coaplsx objects can be beautiful, yet one wants to 
say that things which in any ordinary sense do not have discern ible parts 
ere also beautiful, e .g . a single note, or a co lour.(55*) fhr truth o f 
the matter la , as Santayana saw, that both material and expressive 
properties oar. equally be specified  in  reasons advanced in  support o f a 
judgment o f beauty. nndoubtedly formal properties are o f great importance 
but they do not constitute the whole truth about beauty.
This leads on naturally to the question o f the condition-governing 
o f the torm 'b eau tifu l'. Ko one condition or set of conditions is  
necessary for tne predioation o f 'b eau tifu l'« the example o f  simple 
objeots -iven by Plotinus demcliehea the prime fao ie a ttraa tlve  view that 
some formal predicate is  a necessary condition} and re flec tion  shows that 
material and expressive predicates can equally be advwoed independently 
o f one another. There is  an indefin ite set o f  predloetes o f  the three 
claases proposed, and the va rie ties  o f human sensib ility  are such that 
almost any one or combination of lo g ica lly  compatible predicates can be 
used in theiMsons given in support of the judgment o f beauty, 'beautifu l 
is  condition-governed simply to the extent that the set o f conditions used
(35)
in its  central cases has fo r its  members predioatea specifying properties 
o f any o f the three classes proposed.
a f in a l point id bos question o f oev a distinction is  to oe naoe 
between 'beautifu l» and »pretty*. 3oth terns cor Tuallfv almost the 
same class o f nouns; both are aesthetic virtue predioatea; both have the 
log ica l properties o f supervenience and a distinction between meaning and 
cr ite r ia  fo r  use, and the asoription o f  »pretty» can be supported by 
reasons, as is  the ossa with 'b eau tifu l1, fhe difference l ie s  f i r s t ly  
in the classes o f reason advanced to nuppcrt them while material and 
formal predicates can in te llig ib ly  be used to support the ascription of 
prettineas, oases where expressive predicates are used are extremely 
rare, ’eoonaly, the contedts o f the material and formal reasons is 
d iffe ren t! the predicates used w ill  ooaaaonly have the connotations of 
su perfic ia lity  and aphemarality in the oaae o f »pretty*. But perhaps the 
most important difference between the two notions -  indeed th is is  probably 
why there is  a distinction between them in the f i r s t  place -  l ie s  in the 
quality o f  the experienee which prettineea and beauty respectively provide. 
Pretty things provide immediate a ttraction , and a temporary and super­
f ic ia l  fe e lin g  of pleasure. The experience o f  beautiful things is  o f 
quite a d ifferen t order, and deserves a section to  i t s e l f .
Y; fcrotrtiftM gf  3«
Analysis o f the judgment in which the term »beautiful» is  used does 
yield  the benefit of a clear understanding of what la  happening when this 
word is  used, and its  logic f i t s  in w ith the ootmaon-sense b e lie fs  about 
beauty which are oommonplaee, mainly o f oourae the disagreement bowmen 
person and person, aentury and century, culture and culture, over whet la 
beautifu l. But analysis omits one Important feature o f the phenomenon o f 
beauty, the effect whioh a beautiful objaet has on us. As .¡antayana says, 
no object is  positively valued unless i t  provides us with some kind o f 
satis faction , and beautiful objects have been the subject o f devotion
(36)
time out o f mind. 3o fa r , the expsrienoe o f beauty has been described 
merely as aesthetica lly  pleasant; but there Is  reason to believe that 
the experience oar. be more exactly described, since descriptions o f I t
agree In important reupects. The experience beauty provides Is  that o f 
deep inward peace and harmony: th is la  the harmonioua free-p lay o f the 
facu lties o f vhloh Kant speaks, Schopenhauer'a b liss fu l release from the 
stream of w illin g, the "serene and blessed mood" Wordsworth f e l t  at 
Tintern Abbey, the sleep of health and qui t  breathing o f Keats* And 
furthsr, the beautiful object is  such that i t  does not lose i t s  effloacy:
I t  Is  a Joy forever, again as Keats says. Of a l l  th is Santayana was 
perfectly aware*
'The in s ta b ility  o f our attention, the need o f rest and repair 
in our organs, makes a round o f objects necessary to  our minds; 
but we turn from a beautiful thing, as from a truth or a friend, 
only to retun: incessantly, and with increasing appreciation. ?'or 
do we lose a l l  the benefit o f our achievements in the in tervals 
between the v iv id  realisations o f what we have gained. The t —e 
o f the mind is  permanently raised; and we liv e  with that general 
sense o f steadfastness and resource, which ia perhaps the kernel 
o f happiness. Knowledge, a ffection , re lig ion  and beauty are not 
less constant influences in a man's l i f e  because his consciousness 
of them is interm ittent. Even when absent, they f i l l  the chambers 
o f tho mind w ith a kind o f fragranoe. "hey have a continual efficacy 
as well as a perennial worth*.(56*)
'i l l  S fiM lM Utt
while the conclusion of the early theory o f the nature o f beauty must 
be rejected for the reasons given, yet Santayana's treatment o f the subject 
yields an insight which can be expended with p ro fit by means o f  the 
techniques o f philosophical analysis, "entayana ssea Justly that a 
complete philosophy o f  beauty must take aooount of the role o f the material
(37)
and expressive properties o f the aesthetlo ob ject, and not merely formal 
properties. In analytic Idioms, this becomes the thesis that the Judg­
ment o f beauty can be supported by reasons specifying properties o f any 
or a l l  o f these kinds possessed by the beautifu l object* I t  should be 
emphasised fin a lly  that th is ssrly  view of beauty has a virtue character­
i s t i c  o f much of Santayana's aesthetics, l . e .  thearoldanoe of a l l  slaple 
forms of essentlalism. I t  is  one of the most striking features o f 
lactayana's philosophy o f art that he attempts to  do Justice to  the 
complexity o f the data o f the subject, far more so than many writers who 
are better remembered. This Is a point to be reinforced in the following 
chapters.
Chactw Hi The Materials of Beaaty
l i  iPtryfogUOT
At the end o f Chapter I  o f "The ense o f  Beauty", Santayana considers 
that he has established the nature o f beauty. In the sooond chapter, he 
Investigates fa ir ly  b r ie f ly  what he oa lls  the materials o f beauty. I t  is  
as well to  be clear from the outset that the tens 'm ateriels ' in the t i t l e  
o f the chapter is  s ligh tly  misleading, since Santayana is  not concerned 
primarily to  dlsouss what ro le the material o f a work o f art or nature 
plays in lts to ta l aesthetic e ffeo ti on th is point in fact he says fa ir ly  
l i t t l e ,  though i t  w i l l  be argued tint his few hints are w ell worth 
expanding and investigating at more length. Instead, he reviews certain 
main features of the human constitution -  basic instincts, the fiv e  
senses -  and considers how and to what degree each contributes to 
aesthetic experience. The materials o f the t i t l e  are not those o f 
aeethetio objects, but o f the hum* aesthetic senae. As a consequence, 
most o f the ohapter consista o f informal psychological generalisations, 
which while they show Santayana very muoh 'au fa i t '  with the psychology 
o f his day, would probably not now be considered proper philosophical 
subjects at a l l .  In the present chapter, i t  is  argued that the value 
o f lantayana'a rennrks in the second ohapter o f "The Sense o f leadty" 
lie s  in the 'aperçus' concerning the materials o f a work o f a rt, casually 
assorted by him in his conclusion. I t  is  in any oase to Santayana's 
credit to have mentioned this subjsot at a l l ,  i t  being almost en tire ly  
neglected by aestheticians«
Three points o f philosophical interest are passed over deliberately 
with l i t t l e  cornent in the c r it ica l expoaltlon which fo llows! Santayana'a 
remarks on the role o f the subject-matter in a work o f a rt, his theory of 
physical objects, and some remarks about muslo. The reason for this 
present neglect Is that in e l l  ceeea, these subjects ar« considered at 
greater length in the f i r s t  volume o f "The l i f e  o f Beeson", l . e .  "¡{eason
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in Jommon Sense"« and in Santayana's second fu ll-len gth  work on 
'»esthetics, "Reason In A rt", The views put forward In the present 
chapter are best considered In conjunction with the appropriate sections 
o f chapters 71, 7TI and IX, below.
H i The Materials of the Sense o f Seautar
The aim o f the second chapter o f "The Sense o f  Seauty" Is to review, 
"the various elements o f our aonsoiousness"(l*) to see what each con­
tributes t o  the beauty o f the world. Santayana considers the d ifferen tia  
o f beauty to  be ob jectifica tion , end consequently fo r him any element of 
consciousness contributes to our sense of beauty i f  and only I f  i t  la 
"inextricab ly associated" with the ob jectify ing  processes o f the under­
standing. ""here Is no funotlon In human nature which cannot contribute 
something to  the e ffe c t , though funotlons vary very much among themselves 
In the amount and dlreot.nes3 o f their contribution: sight, hearing, memory, 
and Imagination are the main contributora, but to  regard this l i s t  as 
complete Is  to betray an inexcusable haate.
?or example, while bodily funotlons 8uoh as the growth and dsoay of 
tissues and the circu lation  of the blood are unconscious, yet thslr 
e ff ic ie n t  functioning Is a necessary condition for our w ell being, and 
they a ffe c t  the quality o f our ooneoious experience:
"S light alterations are not without th eir eonsoloua echot and 
the whole temper and tone o f our mind, the strength of our 
pessiona, the grip and concatenation o f our habits, our power and 
attention, and the live lin ess o f our fancy and affection# are due 
to the influence of these v ita l fo rc e s ".(2)
K fflc leney in bodily funotlons is  s necessary condition fo r  taking 
pleasure in  anything, Mid consequently "hr taking aeathetlc pleasure In 
anything; but one must stress that health merely makes a sense o f beauty 
possible; i t  does not guarantee I t .  The sense of beauty la guaranteed 
by other features o f consolouanees.
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The element these features have in common, according to  Car.taysna, 
is  that they are favourable to what he ca lls , 'id e a t io n '. (3 ) He does not 
define this term, but his exam-ties make i t  apparent that he means, roughly, 
favourable to the occurrence of méritai imagery. A state favourable to 
Ideation is dmwsiness, fo r in such a state, lethargy f a l l s  on the outer 
senses, leaving the imagination a l l  the freer, "and by heightening the 
colours of the fanoy, often suggests and reveals beautiful images".(4)
I f ,  by contrast, the body is  over-exercised and over-fed, the imagination 
is ratarded, while the senses remain awake, and the state is one o f 
aesthetic in sen s ib ility . Why exactly states favourable to  ideation 
should contribute to the sense of beauty (= ob jectifica tion ) is not clear, 
iantayana's remark is  that such states, "are o f course apt to extand 
something of th eir intimate warmth to the pleasures o f  contemplation, and 
thuo to intensify the sense o f beauty and the interest o f thought".(5 )
9ut how does a state such as drowsiness aid the projection which Santayana 
asserts to occur in aesthetic experience? A state in which lethargy grips 
the senses is surely antipathetic to theoMurrwee o f th is  alleged 
projection, slnoe in a state o f drowsiness, or any cither state in which 
we are absorbed lr. private imaging, we take less notice o f  the external 
objects on which we are allagaJ to project our plensure.
Of the instincts, the most powerful contributor to the sense o f beauty 
is  love. Ideally , Cantayana claims, a female should arouse a male only 
at such times as i t  is  f i t  sha should become pregnant, leaving both 
animals free to exercise other functions the rest of the time. In polft 
of fa c t, arousal is far more frequent than reproduction and the malntalnance 
of the race demands. This redundancy in strength o f the sexual drive is  
o f the greatest importance in aesthetics, slnoe, " i t  ls m c la e ly  from the 
waste, from the radiation of the asxual passion, that beauty borrows 
warmth".(6) Commonly, the aesthetlo response is an emotional response, 
or at least partly so, and this whola phenomenon is  due to redundant 
sexual pasalont "..th e  whole sentimental aids o f our aesthetic sensib ility
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-  without which i t  would be perceptive and mathematical rather than 
aesthetic -  is due to our sexual organisation remotely s t ir red ."(7 )
The occurrence o f  such phenomena, ns sublimation, and the wide-spread 
reverberations of the sexual drive are now psychological common coin, 
and undoubtedly there is  some truth in  Santayana's assertions. The only 
defect o f his presentation is its  b revity , f’o reason is  given, fo r 
example, why the aggression drive, 'remotely s tirred ' should not also be 
a contributor to the emotional side o f  the aesthetic response.
Before sexual union oan take place, the drive must be arousedt the 
prospective partners must find one another a ttractive. ?or th is  reason, 
both sexes develop secondary sexual characteristics, and simultaneously 
the sexual inatlnot is extended to various secondary objeots. Colour, 
grace, and form owe their aesthetic power to  the stirrin g  o f  profound 
sexual Impulses. Again, there is  no denying the role o f association, 
especia lly sexual association, in aesthetic responses, but Santayana's 
theory as i t  stands -  once again i t  is  only very b r ie fly  presented -  w ill  
surely not explain certain obvious fa c ts . Why, fo r example should human 
beings take an aesthetic interest in  highly reotilin ear forms, or stone 
or m etallic surfaces, not obviously related to secondary charactarlstlos 
o f either sex?
love is favourable to ob jectifica tion , and so to beauty, because in 
love, "The attention is fixed upon e well-defined object, and n il the 
e ffe c ts  i t  produces in the mind are ea s ily  regarded as powers or 
qu a lities  o f that ob ject." (8 » ) further, on "Santayana's theory o f value, 
we value most whatever Interests us most, and since the objeets o f love 
are o f the most profound Interest to  human beings, love is the most 
considerable o f the contributors to the sense o f beauty. I f  the fancy 
is  oocupled with the image o f a single paraon, the peraon appears perfect, 
and we are said to be in love. When the drlva lacks a apeoiflo  object, 
or has been sacrificed to  some other in terest, or is  not as yet fu lly
(42)
conscious, I t  Manifests I t s e l f  in other directions« "re lig ious devotion, 
zealous philanthropy, fondness for pet an laris , love o f nature and of 
art: "We may say, then, that for man a l l  nature is  a secondary object o f 
sexual passion, and that to th is fhot, the beauty o f nature is la rge ly  
due." (9 )
The social Instincts -  the oarentel, the pa trio tic , and the merely 
gregarious -  are not d ire c tly  at much importance in aesthetics. Such 
importance as they have is  indireot, in that an appeal to them in works 
o f art helps f i x  our attention on the work, (love also has th is indirect 
importance). The reason fo r their lack o f direct influence in comparison 
with love is  said to be th is : mar. is pre-eminently a social animal, and 
socia l needs are almost >ib fundamental in him as v ita l functions, and 
often more conscious, -'riendshlp, wealth, reputation, powar and 
influence, added to  family life ,con stitu te  the main elements o f happiness. 
3ueh goals ars only very pa rtia lly  composed o f images of d e fin ite  objects: 
when by chance they are so composed, e .g . 'home' imaged as cottage and 
garden, then they become beautiful ob jects, Dut th is case is  exceptional: 
the goals o f the social Instincts are rarely ob jec tified , (10) ".ranted 
the objeotifior tion theory of the aesthetic experience, Santayana is  on 
shaky ground at th is point. The goals ne mentions oan be and usually are 
pursued in spec ific  forms: the pursuit aime at a spec ific  position o f  
influence or power, a certain amount o f money, a certain reputation, a 
certain friend. This oeing so, they are quite susceptible to imaging, 
and so to the ob jeo tifloa tlon  of value. Iron ica lly , the detachment/ 
psychical distance view of aesthetic experience, rejected by 3entayana 
in the previous chapter, »coords fa r better with the claim that the social 
instincts, apart from the Indireot contribution as subject matter in works 
o f art, are o f small consequenee in aesthetic experience. Indeed, the 
distanced experience is  antipathetic to  then: i t  is  precisely such wants 
and needs as these whioh are in  some way held in abeyance in aesthetic 
experience.
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Santayana turns next to  consider the contributions made to  aesthetic 
experience made by the fiv e  senses. The lower senses, touch, taste and 
smell, furnish the least part o f our ob jectified  ideas, end eo play the 
sealleat pert (among the senses) in aesthetic appreciation, 'hey have been 
called the unseathetic as well as the lower senses, but their lack of 
aesthetic u t ility  is  not due to  any Inherent defect, but to the function 
they happen to have in our experience. 3mell and taste are not intrins­
ic a lly  spatia l, and so not suited to the representation o f nature, which 
can only be spatia lly  represented. Again, they have not reached the same 
degree o f organisation as sounds, and so cannot furnish any play o f sub­
jec tiv e  sensation comparable to  music in in terest. Musical forma owe their 
ob jectification  to th e ir  f ix i t y  andeomplexityj tastes by contrast have 
never been so accurately or universally c lass ified . 'or th is reason, the 
art o f combining dishes and vines remains serv ile , rather than fin e . Ae 
in the oase of the social instincts, the mein aesthetic value o f the lower 
senses is  Indirect. fs lng e stensa from Keats', "The Eve o f 3t. Agnes,” 
as illu stra tion , Santayana claims that poetry vhloh suggests 're a l 
sensetlone* of the lower senses ipso fhoto gains in power.(11)
One point here requires elucidation. The distinction between fine end 
servile  art is developed at len/th in "Season In A rt” . A ll art has two 
stages, the f ir s t  mechanical, Industrial, or s e rv ile , the second lib era l 
or fin e . In the f i r s t ,  untoward matter is prepared; in the seoond, i t  is 
appropriated to ideal uses and endowed with a sp ir itu a l funotion. This 
sp iritual function consists in the activ ity  of turning an apt material into 
an expressive and deligh tfu l form, thus f i l l in g  the world with objects 
which by symbolising ideal energies tend to revive them under a favouring 
influence, and therefore to  strengthen and refine them.(12) Thus in the 
present context, Santayana la claiming that the creations o f cookery arm 
incapable o f performing the functions which he holds to be d is tin ctive  o f
fine art
(M)
There Is l i t t l e  to quarrel with In these straightforward assertions, 
beyond the ob jectification  theory o f aesthetic experience which underlies 
them. 3y uia phrase, 'not in tr in s ica lly  sp a tia l1, a l l  lie appears to mean 
is  that olfactory and gustatory sensations do not have a shape or form 
In a sense analogous to that in which the objects o f  sight have shape, 
and thus cannot be used to represent natural objects -  the only point to 
dispute Is the apparent assumption that visual art is  always represent­
ational, so obviously fa ls if ied  by architecture, (Compare the paralle l 
emphasis on Imitation In section I I I ,  below.) The reason fo r  this 
untenable stress on representation is  surely the ob jectifica tion  theory 
o f aesthetic experience) i f  we are to ob jec tify  our fee lin gs , there must 
be some d e fin ite ly  formed object on which to  projeot them, and such 
objects are not provided by the lower senses, barring perhaps touch. 
Indeed, the rea l oddity of these remarks is  that Santayana oan allow the 
lower senses to contribute to aesthetic experience as much as ha does. I t  
is  hard enough to make sense o f the Ides o f regarding pleasure as a 
quality o f  objects in the ease o f objects o f sight and hearing: what I t  is  
to project pleasure onto a ta c t ile  or gustatory sensation, for example, 
defies the imagination. Small wonder Goodman speaks o f "images of some 
grotesque process o f transfusion" being called up by the ob jectifica tion  
theory.(13)
The imyohical distance theory avoids such groteequeness. There is  no 
oddity or d if f ic u lty  about enjoying ta c tile  and olfaotory sensations from 
a distanced point o f view, witness the pleasure o f touching fur or s ilk  
or marble or s tee l, and o f savouring the various natural and a r t i f ic ia l  
perfumes that there are. (A fic tion a l but oredlble example o f a highly 
developed aesthetic experience o f perfumes le  provided by Dea Esaelntes 
in Huysmans' "A labours" (M ) » )  Sullough maintains that distanoe Is  also 
possible, In privileged moments admittedly, with gustatory sensations, 
and refers to a passage in  luyau's, "Problemes be T'Ksthitlque
Contemporaine", In which the author describes the e ffe c t o f drinking 
ch illed  milk a fte r  a long and t ir in g  elimbt "..en  buvant oe la lt  fr e ís  
ou toute la  sontagne avalt mis eon perfua et dont chaqué gorges savour— 
euae me renimalt, J'eprouval certaineaent une serle de sensations que le  
mot aarreable est insur'issut a designer. " ’ s ta ll coame une symphonle 
pestorale sálele par le gout ou lieu  d 'e tre  par l 'o r e l l le ." (1 5 * ) Certainly, 
though, such moments as these are rare; Santayana is  right at least to  
regard the lower senses as fa r  less important than hearing and sight in 
th eir contribution to  aesthetic experience, though his view is neither 
especia lly Insightfu l nor o rig ina l.
The theory o f ob jectification  governs the few remarks Santayana 
makes about music in the present ohapter. He cannot deny the Importance 
o f hearing ae a contributor to aesthetic exparienoea, yet is faced with 
a slight d if f ic u lty .  He holds that sounds, lix e  tastes and smalls, are 
not 'ln tr in s loa lly  spat La i', naan in : once again that they lack so permanent, 
de fin ite  and eas ily  Iden tifiab le a shape as visual objects. How then do 
the undisputed aesthetic pleasures o f sound arise? His answer is  that 
Decause sounds are precisely measurable in respect o f pitch and duration -  
he omit8 volume -  "an object almost as complex and describable as the 
v is ib le  one oan be built out o f them."(16) Again, "(Sounds) have 
comparable pitches and durations, and de fin ite  combinations o f those 
sensuous elements are as tru ly  obleots as chairs and tab les ."(17)
Underlying this is  an embryonic form o f the theory o f physical objects 
more fu lly  developed nine years la te r in , " lesson in Common Cense".
Jantayanr holds a variety o f representationallst theory o f perception, 
and so is committed to explaining why various sets o f sense should come 
to be regarded as individual object a. Here he comments only that, " . . f o r  
a c r it ic a l philosophy, v is ib le  objects are also nothing but p oss ib ilities  
o f sensation... ob jsotiv lty  can accrue to  any mental figment that lias 
enough cohesion, content, and individuality to be desorlbable and
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recognisable, and these qualities belong no less to  audible than to 
spatial Ideas."(13) But while thic is  so, while the world o f sound Is ,
"capable o f In fin ite  va r ie ty ,"(19) md hcs ss much as the world o f 
matter the power to interest us end s t ir  our emotions, yet sound, "has 
proved the less sevleeable and constant «poarition; and, therefore, music, 
which builds with I ts  materials, while the purest and most Impressive o f 
the art8 la  the least human and instructive o f them."(20) What exactly 
la the Intended foroe o f these reservations is  not explained, and there 
Is l i t t l e  point In speculating, since the key terms -  'human', 's ev ioeab le ', 
etc. -  are a l l  extreme^ imprecise.
The subject of sound leads Santayana to some more general observations.
A sound is  a note only I f  i t s  vibrations are regular; otherwise I t  is  a 
noise, and th is distinction  illu stra tes a con flic t o f  principles which, 
according to Santayana, occurs everywhere in aesthetics. The principles 
involved are those o f purity and of Interest. The principle o f purity 
states that the value of an a r t is t ic  element, and indeed our a b il it y  to 
perceive I t ,  depends on the omission from the fie ld  o f attention o f a ll  
elements which do not obey a simple law. In the present case, we bear 
a note only when a set o f regular vibrations Is discriminated in the chaos 
o f sound. But i t  camot be the esse that purity is  the sole criterion  of 
aesthetic merit, sinoe i f  i t  were there would be no sound more beautiful 
than ttat of the tuning fork. The principle of purity must compromise 
with that o f interest i the objeot must have enough variety and expression 
to hold our attention for a while, and to s t ir  our nature widely. This is 
a l l  perfectly  true, perfectly  unoontentious, and t e l l s  us very l i t t l e .
Primacy among the human senses goes to sight. Again the theory of 
physical objects l ie s  behind Santayana's remarksi "When the time came fo r  
our in telligence to maka the great metaphysical leap, and conoeive its  
content as permanent and independent, or, in other words to imagine th ing», 
the idea o f these things had to  be constructed out o f the materials already
_
present to the mind. 3ut the f i t t e s t  material for such construction was 
that furnished by the eye...os the essence o f the thin;? is  its  existence 
in  our ¿boence, the t;«ins is  spontaneousi^ conceived o f in teres o f 
s ig h t .*(22) (One wonders why the thesis that thlngtaood consists essent­
ia l l y  ir. existence independent o f  our perception should alone en ta il that 
the thine should spontaneously he conee'.ved In terms o f s igh t.) Since 
sight is thus pre-eminent, and since a l l  aesthetic values are perceptual 
vslues, then beauty is  to be expected to be la rge ly  a visual phenomenon.
^ lo r  to the e ffec t o f form, however, is  that of colour, which while 
purely sensuous and so no better in tr in s ica lly  than the e ffe c t  o f any other 
sense, is  the more readily an element o f beauty since i t  is  involved in 
the perception o f visual objeata. The values of colours d if fe r  appreciably, 
and further, have analogy to the values of other sensations. The explana­
tion  of the f ir s t  point Is that each has a spec ific  nervous process, and 
so naturally each has a d ifferen t value. A ffin it ie s  between sensations 
o f the different senses ore explained by s im ila rities  in these processes: 
high notes and v io le t colours both involve responding to  high rates o f 
vibration . The e ffects o f colour, he cocoludes, deserve more study than 
they have hitherto received. The colours o f stained glass windows, for 
example, have a powerful aesthetic e ffe c t.
These few points concerning sight and colour are not especially 
illuminating, and some have been fa ls if ie d  by events and discoveries sinoe 
Santayana wrote, ""here ia not the one to one correspondence between 
frequency o f ligh t waves strik ing the retina and the experience o f colours 
which Santayana asserts to be the case: a variety o f d ifferen t combinations 
o f wavelengths can result in the same colour being experienced. (C f.J.J.S.
mart: "Philosophy and c ie n t lf le  vealisa", London, 1963# Ch. IV, and 
T).C. Oennetti "Content and Consciousness", Lon on, 196?, p .M3)• Again, 
the e ffaote  o f oolour, especially intense colour have been dlsouaaed, 
fo r example, by Huxley, in "Heaven and H ell".
The most striking feature o f the synoptic concluding section o f the 
second chapter, "Materials Jurvayed", is  lantayana's b lithe tr ip le
#4uivocation u*t the term, "¿ae.ter.Uii". To oegin with, he uses i t  in an 
epistemological sense, to mean roughly sensei 'We have now gone over 
those organs o f  perception that g ive us the materials out of »filch »ie 
construct ob jects ..." (2 3 ) Materials are o f less importance in a work 
o f art than form or arrangement, he claims, but one must not Ignore the 
importance they do have. The f ir s t  aspect of their importance claimed 
by Santayana involves a sh ift to  the second sense of "material", now 
used in a metaphysical sense to mean that o f which fora is  the form, or 
some formless substance. Materials are indispensable, since, " '’arm 
cannot be the form o f nothing."(24) This is presumably meant to be a 
necessary truth} in any event, i t  is not espeoially informative in 
aesthetics. The third sense of 'm ateriaIs' has the common sense meaning 
o f the sort o f s tu ff a thing is made o f. The wise use o f material »d l l  
heighten the e ffe c t  o f any aesthetic object;
"There is  no e ffec t o f form which an e ffe c t o f material could not 
enhance, and th is e ffect o f material raises the la tte r  to a higher 
power end gives the beauty o f the object a certain poignancy, 
thoroughness, and in fin ity  »Ailoh otherwise i t  would have lacked.
The Parthenon not in marble, the king's crown not o f gold, and
the stars not of f ir e ,  would be feeble and prosaic things." (25) 
This casual remark, le f t  undeveloped here by Santayana, is  arguably 
the most valuable in the whole chapter, since i t  suggests a line o f
investigation almost entirely neglected by aesthetlcians, namely that o f
considering what general truths, i f  any, there are to be found concerning 
the materials o f a work o f art. lantayana himself, while continuing to 
hold views on the matter comparable in generality to those In the present 
chapter, does not develop his thesis in d e ta il. ! ine years la te r, in 
"Heason in A rt", he w rit*8.
"That the medium in every a rt has a character o f it s  own, a
U8)
U9)
character lim itin g  Its  representative value, may perhaps safely 
be asserted, and this in trinsio character in the medium antedates
and permeates a l l  representation."(26)
And four years a fte r  that, in 1913, he writes in a letters
"n e ts , lin es , attitudes, stu ffs a l l  have a certain hypnotic 
power, a sensuous mafic that enthralls us i f  we gaze at them 
intently. This I have always known, and i t  is  the fau lt o f our 
cr.nalssance (from the sixteenth century to  the middle o f  the 
nineteenth, and even today among academic and conventional a rtists ) 
not to have fe l t  this sensuous quality enough, to have no natural 
idolatry, but to have been Interested in a pompous completeness 
and discursive llte ro iy  reports -  Tolas on canvas."(27)
The rost o f this chapter la an expansion of th is 'aper^u', the beginning 
o f a general Investigation o f the role o f the material o f a work o f art.
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One further suggestion can be drawn from Santayana himself. In an 
early paper only recently edited and published (an address to  the Harvard 
Camera Club) he considers the relationship between photography and the fine 
arts. In the course o f his argument, he claims that the 'essence' o f the 
fine arts is , "not so much to mirror or reproduce the outer aspects of 
things, however bewitching, es to create in imitation o f the processes o f 
Mature, but in d iffe ren t materials, things analagoua to the natu ral."(28) 
Again, a few pages la ten
" . . . i t  Is only the fascination exoercised over us by rea l things 
that can suggest to us the possib ility  of their ideal perfection) 
and i f  we hasten to render this ideal perfection in some a r t i f ic ia l  
medium, and are enraptur'd even by tbs dead suggestion o f a complete 
beauty, how muata more must we desire that oomplete beauty i t a e l f . . . "
(29)
In both remarks, Santayana stipulates in e ffe c t , that fo r anything to be 
a work of a rt, two neoessary conditions must be sa tis fied : (a ) that the
(50)
work be tin imitation o f nature, and (b )  that i t  be in a material 
d iffe ren t from that o f which i t  ia  an im itation. The reat r io t  ion of 
works o f art to im itations of nature is  o f  course untenable, at least 
in any informative sense o f •Imitation' j but, rest r io t in * oneself to 
the sub-class o f works o f art which are im itations, is  i t  the o»ee that 
they are always d iffe ren t in material from that which la imitated? In 
other words, is i t  a necessary condition fo r being a work o f im itative 
a rt that imitation and imitated are composed o f different materials? 
Certainly the condition is sa tisfied  by im itative works o f sculpture, 
painting and litera tu re . What o f ballet? Where a ballet alrae to be 
im ita tive , what i t  im itates are the gestures o f  human beings or animals 
or fantasy creatures, often in states o f Intense emotion, but i t  does 
so by means o f sim ilar gestures made by dancers. Does th is en ta il that 
there is  no change o f medium in ballet? Perhaps the point can be saved, 
since ballet ia  not im itation of gesture'tout court1, but to a musical 
accompaniment. I f  th is be allowed as pert o f the defin ition  o f ballet, 
Then the point derived from Santayana is  carried.
Even i f  i t  be disallowed on the ground that a dance might s t i l l  
qua lity  as a ballet even i f  danced without accompaniment, the minimal 
finding remains that in almost every case o f Im itation, the material is 
changed. This la i t s e l f  o f importance, since as lullough points out, the 
change o f material is  a feature o f the presentation of e work o f art which 
helps the spectator or listener to taka up the distanced attitude. 
A r t i f ic ia l i t ie s  o f staging play a parallel role in the performing a rts .(30) 
'urther, the simple fact o f noticing the ohange of medium in almost every 
case o f works of Im itative a r t , again set down so nonchalantly by 
antsyana, reinforces the suggestion that a study of materials might help 
towards understanding art.
IVi r e s t io n s About the Materials of A Work o f ¿jA
Prom the philosophical point of view, the study of matériels arranges
(51)
i t s e l f  around three questions!
(1 ) do the materials used in works o f art have a nature or set o f  
in tr in s ic  properties such that i t  is  possible to be »true1 or 'fa ls e *  to 
these natures in the uses to which the materials are put? In other words, 
is  any form of the doctrine of truth to materials interesting, informative,
tenable?
( i i )  how, i f  at a l l ,  do the properties of the materials o f works o f 
art a ffect the other properties of the work? Tor present purposes, one 
oan divide up the properties o f works o f a rt into various classes! 
material, formal, expressive, concerning meaning, and concerning subject- 
matter,
( i l l )  does the answer to  question ( l i )  d if fe r  importantly for the 
various arts?
In the following sections, these questions are considered using the remarks 
o f a number o f modern a rtis ts  and writers on art as data.
Vi Truth to Materials
Varieties o f the doctrine o f truth to materials have been held by 
leading a rtis ts  o f the present century. One version of it  is  included in 
"rank Lloyd Wright's doctrine of organic, or in tegral, or Uaonian architec­
ture. The natural house ia  above a l l  an organic unity in which s ite , 
materials, fon» and function are a l l  harmonious and In seme sense unified. 
To l iv e  in  an organic house, with its  sense of space, shelter, and in te­
gration with nf ture maximises the happiness of the indwellers. The sense 
o f space also brings with i t  a tense of d ign ity  which is  in perfeot accord 
with the American ideal of democracy, where freedom and the happiness of 
the individual ore the theoretical 'summum bonum'. Only with the coming of 
Srosdaore c ity , composed of tlsonlan houses w ill  the American dream become 
a rea lity , and America come to  have a true, indigenous cult ire  o f lta  own.
This vision of a Usonlar TTtopla may seem a long way from the idea o f 
truth to materials, but in fa c t the doctrines ore simply and closely
(52)
rela ted . The ideal c ity  is  composed o f 0sonlan houses, and a necessary 
condition for being such a house is  that the K te r ia ls  o f which i t  is
built be used according to th e ir  own nature, end ere not amae to  look 
or function lik e  anything other than what they are. escribing his early 
evolution as an arch itect, he writes)
" I  began to learn to see brick as brick. I  learned to a e concrete 
or glass or raetal each fo r I t s e l f  and a l l  as themselves. Each 
d ifferen t material required a d ifferen t handling, and each 
d ifferen t handling as w ell as the material i t s e l f  had new possibil­
i t ie s  of use peculiar to  the nature o f each. Appropriate designs 
fo r  one material would not be at a l l  appropriate fo r  any other 
m aterial."(31 )
The materials o f  which Wright 3peaks most often are glass, s tee l, and 
wood. Obviously, the most strik ing property o f  glass is  it s  transparency, 
which allows great spaces to be connected.(32) Advantage is  taken o f th is 
when glass is used properly, not merely to f i l l  in  holes punched in the 
walls to le t  in l ig h t , but used ao the v a il :
By means o f glass..the f ir s t  great in teg r ity  may find prime 
means o f rea lisa tion . Open reaches of the ground may enter as 
the building and the building in terior may reach out and associate 
with those vistas o f the ground."(33)
The most important properties o f stee l are lightness, tenuity, and 
f le x ib i l i t y  (34), and its  proper use, according to Wright, is  that which 
fu lly  exploits it s  ten s ile  strength, which allows the spanning of large 
areas without the need for oolumns.(35) I t  a lso allows the rea lisation  o f 
continuity in architecture, fo r beam and poet as separate en tities  can be 
dona away with. Wall, flo o r , and ce ilin g  can become one, thanks to  steel 
welding.(36) Again, the freer, more open spaces allowed by stee l further 
the sense o f healthfulness permitted by g lass.(37) Wood in I t s e l f  has, 
"beauty o f marking, exquisite texture, and de lica te  nuances o f  colour,"(38)
(53)
and the appropriate uses of wood are those in vhloh these features are 
allowed to  show -  elaborate carving, join ing, painting, e tc . ,  destroy the 
natural beauty of the Material and are inappropriate to i t .
The use o f paint and pepers to change the surfaoes o f materials 
v io la tes the rules o f organic architecture. The only treatment allowed 
is  that which tends to  preserve things ae they are. What is  not allowed 
iB , for any ¡notarial, to , "change the character o f its  natural expression."
(39) This principle is  vio lated when,
"In our so-called sky-scrapers..,good granite or Bedford atone 
ie  out into the fashion of the Ita lian  fashion of Phidias and his 
Ireek slaves. Blocks so cut are cunningly arranged about a 
structure o f steel beams and shafts (which structure secretly robs 
them of their meaning), in order to  make the finished building 
resemble the a rch itec t;» depicted by Palladio and V itruvius.."(40)
I t  is  violated also in John Wellborn lo o t 's  Monad nock building. In this 
structure, bricks are spec ia lly  raede in order to follow  a curved line;
'The brick,.was carried across openings on concealed steel angles and the 
flowing contours, or p ro file , unnatural to brickwork, was got by forcing 
the material -  hundreds o f special mold a for special bricks being made -  
to work out the curves and s lopes ."(¿1)
ie  Corbusier subscribes to  similar views, though putting them forward 
in leas de ta il, in hi* early book, "Towards a New Architecture" ( 'Vers 
Une Arch itecture'.)t
" . . . in  the last f i f t y  years steel and oonorete have brought new 
conquests, which are the Index o f a greater aapaclty fo r  con­
struction, and of an architecture In which the old codes have 
been overturned. I f  we challenge the past, we shall learn that 
's ty le s ' no longer ex is t for us, that * style belonging to our 
own period has come about; and there has been a revolution."(42) 
vteel and concrete must not be used In imitations o f the buildings o f the 
pest, but os their nature demands and allows. They permit new forms,
(54)
concrete leads to the suppression o f the roo f and Its  replacement by 
terraces (43 ), and new appearances, for these new materials "evade the 
attentions o f the decorative a r t is t . "(44)
Again, the Ita lian  specia list in concrete architecture, Pier Luigi 
Nervi subscribes to the view that materials have a nature to be respected, 
and make3 the exercise o f such respect a necessary condition fo r a good 
building:
"A structure that does not fo llow  the simplest and most e ffic ie n t  
schemes or a construction deta il that does not consider the 
sp ec ific  characteristics o f the material with which i t  is  bu ilt 
w i l l  only with great d if f ic u lty  achieve good aesthetic expression. 
"The hew materials, in particular reinforced concrete and stee l, 
have form-giving poss ib ilitie s , derived from their technological 
characteristics, that are completely d ifferen t from those o f wood 
or masonry materials o f the past."(45)
At one stage of his career, Henry Moore laid great stress on truth to 
materials as a necessary condition for good sculpture: "Every material has 
its  own individual qua lities...S tone, for example, is  hard and concentrated 
and should not be fa ls if ie d  to  look lik e  flesh  -  i t  should not be forced 
beyond i t s  constructive build to a point o f weakness. I t  should keep 
its  hard tense stoniness." ( 46) Sim ilarly the American sculptor Jack Uch, 
in a textbook on materials claims that, o f a ll  the material available to 
the sculptor,
"Each..has its  individual color, texture, and hardness; each 
possesses capacities and lim itations peculiar to i t s e l f ,  
determined by its  physical characteristics. Materials are 
therefore not interchangeable...The camouflaging o f one substance 
in imitation o f another manifests lack of respect for the 
medium."(47)
Common to a ll these w rite rs  iB the view that for any m aterial, i t  
ha8 an in tr in s ic  nature, and that th is nature should be taken account o f
(55)
and In some sanae respected In each and every use o f the moterial.
"a llu re to  comply with th is principle is  held to result in a work leas 
impressive that any work in which the principle is  respected. The 
question is  w: ether th is principle is  as Interesting and informative aa 
i t s  advocates allow.
There are certain ly d if f ic u lt ie s  connected wl.h i t .  In the f ir s t  
place, the principle is  often interpreted by those who hold i t  to en ta il 
that the covering o f one surface by another -  with paint, paper, stucco, 
or whatever -  is  aesthetically iapermlaaible i f  maximum e ffec t is  to be 
achieved, lut there are so many examples o f works o f agreed greatness 
where th is  rule is  broken that i t  appears to  be without foundation -  how 
many great buildings are stuecoed, extensively painted, and decorated 
in other ways, and how many o f them would not su ffer i f  the decoration 
were absent? Again Moore claims that because stone is hard and fleeh la 
so ft, stone should not be used to model im itations of flesh. On this 
principle i t  is hard to aee what sculpturally viable materials are allow­
able fo r im itating flesh j bronze, marble, plaster o f Paris are a ll excluded, 
a l l  being hard. Only impermanent media such as wax or plasticine are 
l e f t ;  and once again there are legions o f counterexamples of works o f 
agreed greatness which deprive the recommendation of a l l  its  force.
Perhaps Moore himself came to see th is, since in a pieoe written some years 
a fte r  the one quoted above, he writes that truth to materials should not 
be made the criterion  of aesthetic merit, since i f  i t  were a snowman 
made by a child would have to be pr ised ot the expense o f a \odin or a 
Bernini. (¿3) In the ea r lie r  passage, Moore also says that material should 
not be used in a sculpture i f  the form is  such that use o f the particular 
material w i l l  result in structural weakness; but th is is  surely nothing 
more than common sense, not a profound recommendation the observance o f 
which guarantees success in sculpture.
The pri olple of 'truth to materials' thus appears to degenerate quickly
(56)
Into banality o f falsehood* Why then should I t  have had such a vogue, 
and been held by artists  o f the oallbre o f Wright, Le Corbusier, and Moore? 
The reason might be as fo llows, at least so fa r as the architects are 
concerned. loth '’right and Le Corbusier reacted against that brand o f 
architecture which consists In Imitating 's ty le s ' o f the past, the result 
being a vulgar botch. They both saw that In order to  be impressive, a 
building must be conceived in response tc the demands o f the age in which 
I t  is  created, and be In soma sense in harmony or o f a piece with Its  
l i fe - s t y le .  Le Corbusier writes acutely that sty le , " is  a unity of 
principle animating a l l  the work of an epoch, the resu lt o f a state o f 
mind which has its  own special oh racter,"(49 ) I and Wright ergues In 
much the same velnt " ...e v e ry  people has done it s  work, therefore evolved 
Its  art as an expression o f its  own l i f e ,  using the best to o ls ."(50)
The present age Is Industrialized, possessed of incomparable machines and 
materials, and to use these to produce works o f art In Imitation o f the 
styles o f the past Is insuthentlo. What Is a necessary condition fo r good 
art Is not so much a naive truth to materials as truth to  the l l fe - s ty ls  
o f Its  own epoch. Of course this is  a fa ir ly  nebulous thesis, and 
d if f ic u lt  to argue for with great precision; but there la  far more to 
be said fo r  I t  than for the iklse or uninformative va r ie ties  o f the truth 
to materials thesis.
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-h lle there is l i t t l e  to be said for the truth to materials thesis,
I t  does not follow  that the role o f the material In a work of art Is neglig­
ib le . In architecture and sculpture, the material determines the form 
within certain brood lim its , and Insofar as expression depends on form, 
determine I t  also. In painting, not only does the medium embody the a l l -  
important colour, but sl.io to 3ome extant conditions the quality o f lin e , 
and insofar as expression and meaning depend on line and colour, influences 
them Iso. Tlnally end most obviously, the colour, texture and pattern
(57)
o f the materials o f each o f these arts play a role In the tota l 
aesthetic e ffe c t . These claims need support*
right ¡» in ts  out that, "The materiels o f which a aullding Is  b u ilt 
w i l l  go fa r  to  determine i t s  appropriate maso, i t s  outline and, especia lly  
proportion."(51) Of cours'', the materials determine also what the building 
looks lik e  i "A stone building w ill  no more be nor w ill  i t  look lik e  a 
s tee l building. A pottery, or terra ootta  building w ill  not nor should 
i t  look lik e  a stone bu ild in g..."(52) "he textures o f  materials can 
enhance the forms they partia lly  determine! "In architecture, expressive 
changes o f surface, emphasis on line end especially textures o f material 
or imaginative pattern, may go to make facts more eloquent -  form more 
s ig n if ic a n t..."  (53) The tensile strength of a tee l ia mentioned abovet 
th is allows the architect to use the cantilever principle, and so to  
create forms unthinkable in the past. In general, "Just as many 
fascinating d ifferen t properties as there are different materials that 
may be used to build a building w ill  continually and naturally qu a lify , 
modify, and utterly change a l l  architectural form whatsoever."(54)
Kervi shows how the nature o f materials together with the elementary 
state o f the knowledge o f statics in tho past la rge ly  explains the forms 
of Jreek, .oman, and Jothlc buildings. The pediments o f Ireek temples are 
the clearest examples o f  building limitations imposed by the nature o f  
materials. The space between columns is  determined bv the spanning 
capability o f the monolithic architraves. Nervi thinks that the lesser span 
between the end columns, which is  agreed to improve the look of the 
building greatly, is probably the resu lt o f the oonstruotlonal expediency 
o f leaving the end architraves the same length as the others, rather than 
lnoreaalng them by half the width o f a column.(55) Th* doraan invention 
of thrusting roofs -  simple vault, groined vault, dome -  and the 
consequent introduction o f powerful horizontal foroes in the static 
Interplay o f structures m dloally  modified the planlmetrio distribution
(58)
nnd at tha same time made possible internal shapes and dimensions 
unimaginable In preceding structure* based or the architrave-column system, 
'o  see how d ifferen t Is the expression produced by the two sty les , one need 
only compare the colossal hypostyle h e ll o f Ksrnak with the great (Oman 
baths.
To support th eir vaulted and domed roofs, the tomans uaed massive 
masonry walls, needed to take the horizontal thrust o f  the roof. The 
progress from th is simple solution to that o f the lo t  hie architects is  
miraculous. The equilibrium o f heavy masses o f  masonry is  replaced witl 
the equilibrium of forces created by the interplay o f  thrust and countei 
thrust o f slender ribs built o f good materials. The weight o f the roof 
over the central nave o f a Gothic cathedral is  carried down to  the 
foundations by the slender fly in g  butreaaes. The change in expression, 
as compared to  the toman buildings, is  too obvious to  need comment.(56)
Wright, Smrvl, and Ie  Corbusier a ll emphasize the liberating effect 
o f the new materials o f the last hundred years or so , steel and relnforc 
concrete. They make possible forms undreamt of on the past. Their 
immense strength makes possible a great reduction in  the mass o f materia 
used in a building, with a consequent e ffec t on i t s  emotional impact.
In architecture then, the ro le o f materials Is both obvious and 
important. The purpose to be served by the building, together with the 
properties o f the materials used, suggest and lim it the form, and so the 
expression to pome degree. This lim iting or conditioning must not of 
course oe overstressed, sines there is quite p la in ly  room fo r individual 
genius, taste or the lack of them. Nervi sums up the point clearly«
"..th e  ob jective data o f the problem, technology and statics 
(empirical or s c ie n t if ic ),  suggest the solutions and forms) the 
aesthetic sen s itiv ity  o f the designer, who understands their 
intrinsic beauty and va lid ity , welcome the suggestion end models
(59)
i t ,  emphasizes i t ,  proportions i t ,  in a personal manner which 
constitutes the a rt is t ic  element in architecture."(57*)
The situation in sculpture is  roughly similar -  material directing 
form end so expression to  some degree, and contributing i t s  own pattern, 
colour, end texture, though the lim itation  on form is  less crucial. 
Sculptors and writers on sculpture agree that carving from stone lim its 
the forms available to the sculptor« the designs are o f necessity 
re la t iv e ly  c ompset, and are associated with such expressive properties as 
timelessness and repose. Stone oarvinga tend to be Isolated in their own 
envelope o f space, and do not enter fre e ly  into relations with the 
surrounding space.(53) Henry Moore writes, compering atone and bronze«
" i t  (bronze) enables me to  do things I  couldn't do in stone. I  
was wanting to do upright figures. Ho stone figure..can stand on 
its  own ankles..That'8 why the ireeks supported th e ir  standing 
figures with tree trunks, the Egyptians placed theirs against 
tsmples, and so on. Hut bronze has tremendous ten s ile  strength.
You oan msjee your figures Io n ' and thin, wider at the top than 
at the bottom, giving them u p lift , a soaring fe e l in g ."(59) 
ironze figures are usually oast from a f ir s t  version which has been made 
by modelling -  building up the work In clay or wax around a wire armature. 
The modelling method, in contrast to  that o f  serving, allows greater 
freedom o f design. The forms are less hermetic than those arrived at by 
oarving. Again, the hardness o f sculptural material is  important, for 
the harder a material is , the more d if f icu lt  i t  is to produoe a naturalistic 
treatment, where this la desired. Marble la more suited to detailed 
treatment than granite.
The materials of painting e f fe c t  not only the a ll -important colour, 
but also the quality of line. T a p s n , the standard medium in Europe 
before o ils  were introduced, is s t i f f e r  than o i l  paint, and dries quickly. 
The quick drying of the medium resu lts in the lim itation that the painter
(60)
cannot work fr e e ly  In wet colour but must g iln  e ffe c ts  o f  tone and 
modelling by separate touches laid side by side or superimposed. I t  
there fort* denies the a rt is t  the richness and depth of o i l  painting, 
neecludin* e f fe c t iv e  ehairoseuro and the painterly lin e .(60 ) The 
virtues o f tempera are the strong linear composition and b rillian t 
colour contrast which i t  allows. O ils , allowing the e ffe c ts  precluded by 
tempera, d i f fe r  among themselves according as they are 'long* or 'sh o rt '. 
Modern tube paint has an additive, aluminium stereate, which e f fe c t iv e ly  
counteracts the viscous condition of the paint used by the a rtis ts  o f 
the past. This viscous condition, that o f being polymerised, Is caused 
by the action o f the a ir  on the linseed o i l  in the paint. IJonvlacous 
paint Is short, viscous paint, long. Because o f the constituency o f 
short paint, brush strokes made with i t  tend to have a b r it t le  appearance } 
those made with long paint are smoother and suppler. In each esse, lin e  
and texture are d if fe re n t .(61*)
The cases o f  music and literatu re are s ligh tly  d iffe ren t, since in 
the strai ghtforward sense o f 'm aterial' in use in th is section, there is  
only one material for each of these artss the sounds made by an 
indefin ite number o f instruments, and words, -’urther, there are no 
restrictions on form in these arts imposed by the materials analogous to  
those in architecture and sculpture. Yet there are obvious and important 
links between the material and the expressive properties o f the works i 
change the instrumentation o f a pieoe, in e ffe c t  changing the timbre 
o f the sounds, and the expression of the melody oan be wholly altered, 
even I f  played a t the same pitch and speedi think o f a flu te  and a 
harpsichord* There la a parallel e ffe o t In litera tu re , especia lly in 
poetry, where sound and rhythm (qu a lities  o f the medium) are as important 
as meaning, and indeed Interact with i t .  A change o f word for a synonym 
o f d ifferent sound, rhythm, and overtones oan change the whole meaning 
and expression o f  a poem or part o f a poem. I t  la precisely this fact
' ■•••" .-»vv .a, *.,. t-sr Tmmmw'*??*
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that, in a poem, the intrinsic qua lities  of the language are maximally 
exploited that makes poetry d if f ic u lt  i f  not impossible to translate.
Toe conclusion to he drawn fr o *  this cursory surrey of materials in 
the arts is  thst Santayana is right to stress th e ir  pervasive and 
funde»»ntel influence on other features o f the work. The medium is  not 
tha message, but i t  a ffects its  impact» in varying degrees in the various 
arts, the materials a ffect form, expression, and meaning, both d irectly  
by their ovr. qualities and ind irectly  by their lim iting effeots  on other 
properties o f the work, iantaynna oan have the la at word»
"The beauty o f  material is  thus the groundwork for a l l  higher 
beauty, both in the object, whose form and meaning have to be 
lodged in something sensible, and in the mind, where sensuous 
ideas, balm; the f ir s t  to  emerge, are the f i r s t  that oan arouse 
dellgnt.»i& 2)
(62)
ghgjrtffS.lU; .rs™i? °.i».agAs.„&*vt aa,..^ aai
The concept o f  fora figures in a more diverse and extensive set of 
problems than perhaps any other In eosthetlcs. aiiteyans's treatment o f 
I t  Is s ilen tly  se lec tive . "“or examole, he Joes rot deal with the notion 
o f organic form (1 ), with the distinction between form and content, or 
with the outlines o f the development of form within a s ty le . hat he does 
Is  to o ffe r  a defin ition  of fora, a c lass ifica tion  o f forms, both natural an 
a r t is t ic , under three headings, and a discussion of the psychology and phy­
siology of their perception, making general comments about certain a r t is t ic  
forms en route. More than in any other chapter o f "The danse of Beauty", 
he reveals his debt to the German psychologists of the nineteenth century, 
and shows how deeply impressed he was by the theory o f evolution.
Santayana's tendency to nonchalance in exposition is  a marked feature 
o f  the third chapter o f "The Sense o f Beauty", where almost a l l  his 
remarks on form are set out. Philosophical and csyohologic&l discussions 
alternate, end the discussion o f typos o f fora is  not only Interrupted 
by lengthy digressions but is incomplete, '.gain, the concluding six 
sections on lite ra ry  aesthetics have l i t t l e  to  do with fora as understood 
in the preceding part o f the chapter, and are dealt with in a la ter 
chapter of the present thesis. In the interest o f c la r ity  and consequent­
ia l  exposition, 'ontayane's argument has been re-arranged. 'hat he 
does in a fa ir ly  disorderly way is  to  give his answers to  three o f the 
basic questions in the aesthetics o f form:
( I )  what le  fora?
( I I )  how are forma to be classified?
( i l l )  why is  there an aesthetic pleasure in form?
The explanations whioh make up the answer to this third question are 
themselves o f two kinds, psychological and physiological.
An Important point concerning form ean be dealt with here, namely
(63)
the relation  o f Santayana's views on for® to the body of classic theory 
whloh can be called formalism, i . e .  a set o f be liefs gravitating around 
the central tenet that the form o f  a work o f art is  i t s  so at important 
feature snd/or defining property, Formalism in the theory o f beauty, to 
which Santayana emphatically does not subscribe, has been dealt with in 
'’ hspter T, above? °antay»ns does not believe that beauty is the result 
always and only o f formal properties o f aesthetic objeots; or, put in 
terms o f conceptual relations, he does not believe that the ascription 
o f the predicate ’ beautifu l’ is  or ought to be supported elwaya and only 
by reasons referring to formal properties o f objects.
The most recent occurrence of the doctrine o f formalism in the theory 
o f art, is  c lass ica lly  associated with Whistler, Clive 3ell and loger 7?y,
(2 ) and varieties o f i t  occur in other writers o f the present century.
Tor example, announcing the doctrine of Purism in 1920, 1.« Corbusier and 
AM&ee ¡¡enfant claims "In true and durable plastic work, i t  ia  form which 
comes f ir s t  and everything else should be subor dinated to i t .  verything
should help estaolish the architectural achievement."(3) In 19£1 and 
subsequently, fuaanne Longer set out a theory o f music according to whioh 
music and human fee lin g  share the sa.me morphology, and hence the former 
is  one way -  in faot the only way, i f  the theory is  correct -  o f articu l­
ating, formulating, and communicating these fe e lin gs .(¿ ) Again in 1961,
Eva Sehaper in her paper, 1 Significant ^orm1, argues, with cautious 
Imprecision and an acknowledged debt to Ianger, that, " it  belongs to the 
function o f art (but it  Is by no means the only function of a rt ) to 
articu late ’ s ignificant forms’ . " (5 )
n’he vhLstler-ie 11- 'ry formalism consists in subscription to  some or 
a l l  of the following be lie fs  (3 e ll is the most thorough-going o f the thres, 
Whistler the lea s tj fry  hovsrs gingerly around most o f the doctrines, 
coming olose to complete agreement with 3ell in the last essay, • tetro- 
spect’ , in "Vision and Design.*)» ( i )  as already mentioned, that the most
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Important and/or defining property of a work o f art la  I t s  form, 'form* 
being understood to Include combinations o f colour as w ell as line (6) ;
( 1 1 ) that the subject-matter of e work o f art Is o f  next to  no Importance 
(7 ), end hence (111) being representational Is neither a necessary nor 
a su ffic ien t condition fo r aesthetic merit (d e l l  In fact considers 
representational accuracy to be a hindrance to  the creation o f significant 
form) ( 8) j  ( I t ) that formal properties alone are capable o f  cousin?; 
ecstatic aesthetic experiences, and ought to  do so. Kot to  be thus moved 
is  to exhibit lack o f sensib ility  -  I t  is  easy to  see that the dootrlne 
runs the risk o f becoming irrufutable. Like the ¡¡¡oral intuitions o f 
Prichard, :<oore and ¡toss, la ok o f which marks us as morally blind, so 
fa ilu re to experience quasl-aystleal ecstasy before Ita lia n  Primitives 
or Post Impressionists marks us as devoid o f  real sen s it iv ity  to vlattal 
a rt. Since form alone Joes not appeal to our humdrum emotions, some 
feeling must be found for I t  to  appeal to, hence the doctrine (v) that 
there Is a special emotion stimulated always and only by formally 
excellent works o f art, snd having this emotion Is both a necessary and 
su ffic ien t condition for aesthetic experience. This la the aesthetic 
emctioc.(lO)
The fa lla c ie s  and falsehoods Involved In these views are by now well 
known. For example, "Sell makes the essen tia llst assumption that a l l  
members o f the class "works of art" have some feature In common; his view 
about the nature o f aesthetic experience is  fa lse , and he himself admits 
to whet grotesque c r it ica l verdicts he Is lead by his views on repres­
entation (11*). The ohief defect o f formalism, however, as o f a l l  theories 
which try  to define art In one word -  Expression, Communication, and so 
on -  is that, not only Is I t  false to the loglo o f talk about art and 
open to ready refutation by counter-exam pies, but, i f  taken seriously must 
Impoverish aesthetic experience. To approach a ll works o f art looking out 
only for form, or expression, or representational accuracy, is  to miss much
o f what la  there to be seen or heard, and I t  usually leads to  the 
dismissal o f whole periods as poor s tu ff or 'not a r t . '
Here Is the relevance o f this b r ie f consideration of formalism to 
:ant8yan&, at least as fa r as his ea r lie r  period Is concerneds he 
accent» none cr ♦ hese doctrine a { form is  "or hie one factor In aesthetic 
experience and o f aesthetic objects, and an lnpartant one, but I t  is  not 
tte  most important or defin ing property o f either. One o f the sanest 
features o f "The lense o f fleauty" as a whole Is Santayana's »rasp of the 
contribution made by each aspect of the aesthetic object to aesthetic 
experience. To make i t  a virtue in Santayana not to be a formalist is 
therefore neither so odd nor ao t r iv ia l os i t  sounds. His giving due 
emphasis to each aspect o f  the aesthetic bjeot is  especially creditable 
in a w riter working in the eighteen-nineties, 
ix f, ;:hp ¿atf.ye of r a a
To write a chapter on the beauty o f form is  to presuppose that there 
is such a species o f beauty, i .e .  that i t  is  irreducible to beauty 
resulting from other properties o f the aesthetic ob ject. I t  is with a 
defence o f this assumption that "antayana begins his treatment o f  form.
He bothers to do so beoauee he thinks the e ffe c t o f form is more 
mysterious than either the sensuous delight we take in an object because 
of it s  materials, or the pleasure we take in an object which has pleasant 
associations (he considers that expression is  a species o f association).
The e ffe c t o f form is  to  be found, ’where sensible elements, by themselves 
Indifferent, are so united as to please in combination."(12) So 'unexpected 
is  th is phenomenon that some -  he does not say who -  attempt to deny the 
existence o f formal beauty. The attempt to  reduce beauty o f  form to 
beavty o f neterials la ea s ily  refuted -  one need only re-arrange the 
same materials in order to  disprove the thesis j and moreover the 
reduotioniat view haa a fa lse  oonsequenee, alnoe, " i t  would..follow to 
the comfort of the vulgar that a l l  marble houses are equally beau tifu l".(13)
(66)
More plausible Is the attempt to reduce beauty o f fora to  that of 
expression. I t  is  as wall to be clear at th is  point, even at the expense 
of repetition , whet antayana understands by expression. Objects and 
fee lin gs  which repeatedly co-occur are associated in the mind, and waen 
one o f a pair or *reur> o f such associated feelings occurs in  Isolation, 
our experience o f i t  is  modified by the fa int recurrence o f the associated 
experiences o f those objects with which i t  has occurred:
"The hushed reverberations of these associated feelings continue 
in the brain, and by modifying our present reaction, colour the 
imnge upon which our attention is fix ed , ’'he quality  thus 
acquired by objects through association is  what we c a ll  their 
expression." (H )
The d if f ic u lty  which Santayana finds in the attempt to reduce formal to  
expressive beauty is  that i t  entails a fa lse consequence, namely that 
there are no immediate aesthetic values whatever, since a l l  values would 
necessarily become suggestions o f moral good -  i t  w ill be remembered 
that, for antayana, a l l  In trinsic goods a re aesthetic, and a l l  
instrumental goods moral; moreover he also holds the converse of each of 
these b e lie fs : a l l  aesthetic goods are in tr in s ic , and a l l  moral goods 
instrumental.
The argument to establish the entailment o f  the fa lse consequence 
alleged by dantayana is  as follows (15):
( I )  formal beauty is  reducible to beauty o f  expression;
( I I )  therefore, wherever a form appears beautiful, i t  rea lly  derives its  
beauty from some association which is expressed.
( i l l )  but the expressed object ( i .e .  that which is assoclnt-’d and so
expressed) cannot I t s e l f  be formally beautiful, fo r  ex hypothesi 
there is  no such thing as formal beauty.
( lv )  therefore, the expression must be o f some practical or moral good, 
for at some point the expression must be o f something other than
beauty.
Santayana objects that the conclusion o f this argument is  clearly
M
i'lass. Innumerable aesthetic e ffec ts  are: -d irect transmutations o f 
pleasures and pains) they express nothing extrinsic to themselves, much 
less »o ra l excellences."(16) Straight lin es and curves produce d ifferen t 
impressions on us which are "almost emotional"(17 )i
"The quality of the sensation is d iffe ren t, like that o f  various 
colours or sounds...There is a d is tin ct quality and value, often 
a singular beauty, in these simple lines that is  in trinsic in the 
perception of their form."(18)
'antayena is  confused in his argument here. What is so strange is  
thist the argument of "The Sense o f Seauty" as a whole is designed to 
establish two major theses: ( 1 ) that beauty is  value positive, in trinsic 
and ob jec tified , and ( i i )  that three aspects o f the aesthetic object can 
have the e ffe c t of causing us to  project and ob jectify  our pleasure, 
namely, its  material, i t s  form, and whatever i t  expresses, from this i t  
o f course follows that ob jectification  occurs in the presence of any one 
(or conjunction) of these three f  otors, and hence i t  occurs whenever we 
find an object expressive, further, i t  follows from Santayann ’ s defin ition  
o f aesthetic value that expressive value is  intrinsic, and so immediate.
In the course o f the foregoing argument Santayana appears to  contradict 
th is, assuming that i f  a l l  beauty is expressive, no values are immediate. 
Vhat he does is to assume that i f  what is expressed does not i t s e l f  have 
aesthetic value, then no values ere lonwdiste, a conclusion which does 
not fo llow  from the premisses to which he subscribes — indeed, i t  w ill  be 
seen in the next chapter (on expression) that he there assumes the 
correct position, with regard to his own premisses at any rate, on this 
matter. The nature of the value of what is  expressed does not a ffect 
the aesthetic nature of the en tire expression, and therefore, even i f  a l l  
formal beauty could be reduoed to  expressive beauty, the immediacy o f the
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value would be unaffected.
While "s-ntayana's argument la  thus unacceptable, the conclusion which 
he seeks to establish, l . e .  theirreduoib ility  o f formal to expressive
beauty, is  surely true. To claim that the former can be reduced to the 
la tte r  Is to  claim t.hat a l l  propositions specifying formal features o f 
an aesthetic object can be reduced to or in some way accounted fo r In 
terms o f propositions specifying expressive features of the object, 
further, the reductionist would have to maintain that anyone who takes 
pleasure in the form of an aesthetic object anc denies that he finds the 
object expressive ie  deceiving himself. I t  is  hard to believe that any of 
the required propositional equivalences could be found, or that s e lf-  
deception in  aesthetic experience has occurred so constantly and so 
massively.
The form o f an ob ject, then, can contribute a species o f  beauty 
peculiar to I t s e l f .  Can anything be said about the nature of form in 
general? Santayana believes that i t  can, and approaches his de fin ition  
via two preliminary observations, "he f i r s t  is  that:
"a fora is an aggregation, i t  must have elements, and the manner 
in which the elements are combined constitutes the character of 
the form. A perfec tly  simple perception, in which there was no 
consciousness of the distinction and relation of parts, would net 
be a perception o f form; i t  would be a sensation."(19)
Modern psychology supports Santayana here. In her well-known book or the 
psychology o f perception, "lorothy Vernon writes that, i f  a fie ld  o f view 
is  completely homogeneous, and no part o f i t  is in any way d ifferen t from 
the remainder, then the figure-ground experience, fundamental to the 
perception o f shape or contour, ie impossible. The percelver sees only 
whet psychologists ca ll film -colour, which has no de fin ite  position in 
apace.(20) Thera is  also a highly general philosophical point here which 
can surely be allowed, ¡following Santayana in restricting attention to
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sight, I t  is  a necessary and su ffloiant condition fo r an experience to 
count as an axparianca of visual fora that tha fie ld  o f vis ion  ba othar 
than an undifferentiated nmo; aromatic patch. An example is not hard to 
think o ft supposa I  aa lying on ay back outdoors on a summer day, looking 
at a cloudless sky overhead, with no nearby trees or t a l l  grass at tha 
edge o f tha fie ld  o f vis ion , such a visual f ie ld  does not provide an 
axparianca of fora in  any ordinary sense of tha word. But i f  a cloud 
appears anywhere in my fie ld  o f vision, than immediately I  may be said 
to ba experiencing forms -  there are 'elements' in my perception.
Tha second preliminary point is less successful. Santayana claims 
that form is  what sp ec ifica lly  appeals to an aesthetic nature, and what 
sp ec ifica lly  does not appeal to the 'unattentlve'. ^he unattentive are 
those fo r  whom objects are merely stimuli to private reverie, or those 
who consider objects so le ly  with regard to their function. The true 
aesthete, by implication, is  he who has the inclination to stop and study 
the parts and their relations. Santayana evidently considered that the 
'unattentlve' were in the majority at the time when he wrote*
"The indulgence in sentiment and suggestion, of which our time is  
fond, to the sacrifice  o f formal beauty, marks an absence of 
cultivation as rea l, i f  not as confessed, as that of the barbarian 
who revels in gorgeous confusion."(21)
Santayana is here exhibiting his taste for art in the best Greek manner 
in preference to  the (r e la t iv e ly ) formless productions of thm Romantics.
Of course, the a b ility  to appreciate form, and to take a genuine aesthetic 
pleasure in i t ,  are necessary conditions fo r fu l l  and rich aesthetic 
experience, but there is no philosophical reason to think that they are also 
su ffic ien t. This quirk o f taste  runs throughout "The Sense o f  Beauty"* 
Santayana is at pains to show how material and expression can also be 
sources o f  beauty, but his own favourites are clearly works in  which the 
commanding element is tha form.
Santayana's defin ition  o f form is  that form is the unity o f a manifold*
(70)
"The synthesis...which constitutes form Is an a ctiv ity  o f 
the mind; the unity arises consciously, and is  an Insight into 
the relation  o f sensible elements separately perceived."( 22)
This synthesis d iffe rs  from set cation ir. that i t  is conscious, and from 
expression in that its  elements are homogeneous, and also simultaneously 
present to sense.
Commenting on this, Qeorge 3oss writes that the de fin ition  o f  form os 
a synthesising a c tiv ity  o f the mind reveals the influence o f the Id ea lis tic  
tradition  on Cantayana. He goes oni
" . . . i n  1392 i t  was too much to ask o f a young profeasor to  sae 
mind detached from its  rank in the hierarchy o f values. To have 
doubted its  superiority -  not merely its  difference -  to body would 
have been to a lly  oneself to vulgmr m aterialists and aesthetio 
hedonists."(23)
This is badly inaccurate. Sven as a 'young professor1, Santayana had a 
m aterialist theory o f the mind, witness the scattered remarks in "Thm 
3or.se of beauty" (about which boas is  w riting, and which inciden ta lly  
appeared in 1396) about brain processes. Santayana evidently did not find 
the theory vulgar and moreover never changed his mind about i t .
As fo r  influences, the vocabulary o f Cantayana's defin ition  is  very 
close to that i f  Kant, rather than an Id ea lis t; sc close indeed that one 
is  tempted to speculate that ha must have had the former in mind. In the 
"Critique o f Judgment", Kant writes that the, »formal (element) in  the 
representation of a thing" is "the agreement o f the manifold with a unity.."
(21) Moreover, th careful stress on the consciousness o f the a c t iv ity  
and o f the separate perception of the data reveals the influence o f the 
o f Herbert and Totse. Tor both these thinkers, we construct 
the world out o f disorete sensations by means of acta o f mer.tal synthesis 
whloh are introspeotlble, and have emotional overtones.(25)
'evere l d if f icu lt ie s  ere involved in  fantayana'e defin ition o f form.
'here are several general d if f ic u lt ie s  over the representationalist theory 
o f perception involved, for example over the iden tity  conditions o f the 
sensations cut o f vhich we uuild the world, end over the presupposition 
that whatever is  complex is  made up of discrete simples. This la tter 
point is  assumed, not proved. Again, i t  is  assumed by Santayana in common 
with other representatlonaliata that there are unconoeptuallsed data. This 
hypothesis is  unnecessary and improvable, for whatever is experienced is 
experienced as something, and therefore the assumption that there are 
unconceptualised data is  » »v e r if ia b le . There is  a further d ifficu lty  also. 
?ha sensible elements o f  vhioh Santayana speaks must themselves have forms, 
since otherwise i t  would follow from Santayana's premisses that expetiense 
o f them would be o f undifferentiated sensations rather than experiences o f 
a plurality o f elements. Yet i f  th is Is so, Santayana is committed to the 
view that every experience which la  an experience o f form is  aocompanled 
by an aot o f synthesis which is  conscious, introspeotible, and possessed 
o f a de fin ite  emotional tinge. 3ut such a thesis is  obviously false -  i f  
Santayana were right, then almost the whole of our conscious activ ity  would 
be taken up with these posited mental acts. Of course, where the forms o f 
works of art are temporally extended, there is  a sense of fulfilment when 
the formal design is  successful» when the work has the beginning, middle 
and end recommended by A ris to tle  (26 ), th *th ere  can be a deliberate and 
re fle c t iv e  relating o f formal features by the mind. ?ufc Santayana's thesis 
is  on a for higher plane o f generality than th is. He is making a claim 
about the wey we unify the bussing, boosting confusion, the less than 
dreamlike experience o f  unooneeptuallsed sensation.
Having given a de fin ition  o f form, fJantayane turns to consider further 
basic questions in the aesthetics o f formj can forms be subdivided in a 
systematic way? Can anything be said in general about claaaes of forms 
with regard to their contribution to aeethetio experience? '.antayana 
believes that eaeh of these questions oan be given an affirmative answer.
(72)
I I I »  The llaaa lfloa tlon  of 'arm
The physicist turned psychologist 'ustnv 3eohner, having published 
his great psychological work, »Klemente der Psychophysik" in 1360, cam  
la te  on in his l i f e  to be interested in aesthetics* In 1876 he published 
"Vorsehul* der Aesthetik", and in one of his rare footnotes, Santayana 
acknowledges that his c lass ifica tion  o f forms is  suggested by a passage 
in that work.(27*) I t  is  assumed in accordance with what has been said 
about the defin ition  o f form and perceptions o f form that whatever has 
a form has elements, and that these elements are related . The c la ss ific ­
ation is according to the type o f relation which holds between the 
elements, and the type o f elements:
( i )  forma whose elements are a l l  a like. In such oases the diversity  o f 
elements is  merely numerical. ( I t  is evident from Santayana's main example 
-  the stars -  that the relations between the elements need not be identical.)! 
( l i )  elements d iffe r in g  in kind, but 30 as to compel the mind to  no partic­
u lar order in their c lass ifica tion .
( i l l )  elements so constituted as to  suggest inevitably the scheme o f their 
unity: "in th is case there is  organisation in the object, and the synthesis 
o f  it s  parts is one and pre-determinate."(28)
This olaasi''lcation is intended to be applicable to both natural and 
a r t is t ic  aesthetic objects, extended both in apace and time.
The f ir s t  and most obvious comment is  that the second and third 
classes o f forms are defined in a more subjective way than the f i r s t .  Cna 
can imagine a large number o f disagreements about whlah forms are to be 
considered compelling and whlah are not. I t  is  probably too much to ask 
o f  any c lass ifica tion  o f aesthetic forms that i t  be absolutely water­
t igh t; but this division by "antaysna openly invites Important disagreement. 
There are d if f ic u lt ie s  too over the innocuous-looking f ir s t  class, and 
these are brought out la ter on.
'antayana nowhere defines what is to  count as an element. One might
(73)
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perhaps expect, In view of his defin ition  of form as the unity of a manifold 
that he would continue to operate on a plane o f high epistemological 
generality, and take sense as his elements. In fact he does not do th is ; 
nor oes he, as for example "endlneky does In "Point and line to  Plane", 
seek to find a special set o f basic elements common to visual or other 
forms.(29) He seems to have had no special notion o f an element in mind -  
In hie examples, he uses ordinary physioal-objeot-descrlptlons to Iden tify  
the elements in the oomplexes o f which he speaks.
He says (30) that he w i l l  discuss each type of form in succession, 
together with the e ffe c ts  proper to each. In fact he does not do so -  he 
discusses the f i r s t  and second classes o f fbrms, which he corner to r e fe r  to 
as examples o f  m u ltip lic ity  In uniformity, and forms o f Indeterminate 
organisation, respectively. There is no discussion o f the third class of 
forms, those whose elements Inevitably suggest the scheme o f th e ir  unity, 
and thl3 omission, as w ell as oonfuslng certain commentators (as Is noted 
below) Impoverishes his argument. C learly, most works of art f a l l  into 
tills class, and by neglecting to consider I t ,  he deprives himself o f the 
opportunity to discuss the most aesthetic* i ly  Important type o f form.
Santayana begins his consideration of m ultip lic ity  In uniformity with 
the assertion that we have a "perception of extension" and that th is Is  
a rudimentary perception of form In which the elements are a l l  a like and 
d i f fe r  'so lo  numero'. This perception o f extension Is alleged to be a 
species o f fe e lin g  o f relation !
"The easense o f (the sense o f spaoe) is  the realisation o f a 
variety o f directions and possible motions, by which the relation  
of point to point Is vaguely but Inevitably given."(31)
The sensation has the further negative property that i t  is a sense o f the 
unbounded! "..w e ean have the aense o f apaoe without the sense o f boundaries; 
Indeed, th is intuition is what tempta us to  declare apaoe In fin ite ."(32) 
(There is an obvious sim ilarity with the seoond o f Kant's arguments in
( U )
Section I  o f the 'rnnsoer.dental Aesthetic in the "Critique o f Pure reason", 
a24=338-9) Since he says no »ore about i t ,  i t  is  net clear whether th is 
claim about our experience of space -  i f  i t  i s ,  then he should make i t  
d e a r  that the concepts o f motion and apace ere related by mutual en ta il- 
menrt: neither is  prior to the other. P.qually important is  the apparent 
inconsistency between this claim and his above view that, fo r  any percept­
ion to count as a perception o f form, i t  must be other than an undifferent­
iated sensation. This is to assume, o f course, that th is posited 
intuition of space is undifferentiated} but i f  i t  is not undifferentiated, 
this perception must surely be o f a spatial ob ject, and not of space 
'tout court'. There is  a further d if f ic u lty  here. At the end o f 
Chapter I I  o f "The Cense o f Beauty", Santayana asserts that form cannot 
( lo g ica lly ) be the form of nothing} but o f what is  the form experienced in  
th is pure intuition the fora?
There is  a closely related d if f ic u lty  carer consistency in Santayana's 
next claim, which is  that the aesthetic appeal o f extensiveness is  
en tire ly  d ifferent from that o f particular shapes, "he a ffect o f surface 
is  not necessarily that o f either material or oolourt
" ...th e  evenness, monotony, and vastness of a great curtain of 
colour produce an e ffe c t vAiloh is  that o f the extreme o f uniformity 
in the extreme o f sim plicity} the eye wanders over a flu id  in fin ity  
of unrecognisable positions, and the sense of th eir numberlessness 
and continuity Is precisely the source of th# emotion of extent."(33 ) 
I f  th is example of perception o f a monochromatic coloured surface counts 
as an example o f the perception of form, than the above distinction between 
synthetic and undifferentiated sensations collapses, fo r one could pick 
out points or positions in any colour f ie ld .
With the mention of what he ca lls  here, "the emotion of extent", 
Santayana sh ifts his ground from the highly general pure sensation of 
space to the less contentious subject o f the e ffects  o f large objeats,
(75)
notably buildings, In aesthetic experience. He draws a d istinction  
between the emotion of extent end the Idea of size, "he former is  primary, 
era "unaouoteuiy ass a pnysioi.ogi.otu. ground," wnsreas tn « la tte r  is 
secondary, and involves associations end inferences. A photograph Sf 
3t. e ter 's  w ill  t e l l  us its  s iz e , always granted that we know the scale o f 
the representation; but, "the value of size only becomes immediate when 
we are at close quarters with the ob ject."(34) Of course, associated ideas 
also e ffe c t the Impact a building or other large object has on us,
"but the pure sense o f extension, based upon the attack of the 
object on the apperceptive resources o f the eye, is  the truly 
aesthetic value which i t  concerns us to point out here, as the 
most rudimentary example of form."(35)
'from th is unooctentious claim, in concluding his f i r s t  example o f 
m u ltip lic ity  in uniformity 'antayar.a moves to some equally safe general 
it ie 3  about the relation  o f form to material. I f  the aim of th* artia t 
is  to  highlight the beauty o f the material -  and this proviso is important -  
then the form must be le f t  as simple as possible: " . . . o f  a l l  forms, 
absolute uniformity in extension is the simplest and most a llied  to the 
m ateriel; I t  gives the la tte r  only Just enough form to make i t  real and 
perceptib le."(36) Again, rloh materials are generally beat le f t  simply 
formed: "You w il l  spoil the beauty you have by superimposing another; as 
i f  you make a statue of gold, or flu te a Jasper column, or bedeck a velvet 
cloak."(37) Iranted the Important proviso concerning the aim o f the a rt is t , 
these generalisations can stand. I t  might be objected that they are liab le  
to refutation by counter-example, c iting highly wrought works In fine 
materials, such as »b a rg e 's  jewelled trinkets; but Santayr.na can reply 
that the aim in such creations is  not simply to hi fclight the beauty of 
the material.
A second example o f form In which there is  a uniformity in multiple 
elements is the starry sky. I f  asked why they are affected by this sight.
(76)
the majority would probably seek the cause of th eir fee lin g  in the ideas 
associated with the stars, as regards th e ir  distance, s ize , and possible
habitation.. S ich an explanation, antayana contends, involves the 
fa llacy  o f fa lse  cruse, for these ideas are inessential to our admiration: 
" ‘te fo r- the days o f *ep l«r the heavens declared the glory o f 'lodj 
and we needed no calculation o f s te lla r  distances, no fancies 
about a plurality of worlds, no Image o f In fin ite  spaces, to  make 
the stars sublime." ( 38)
This is  a curious argument, slnoe i t  gives the associationist against 
whom Santayana is  arguing a perfect rep ly: what set of ideas more lik e ly  
to s t ir  the heart than that the heavens are the week of an omnipotent 
creator?
However, Santayana is  insistent on the point that the emotion produced 
by the stars is  not in any way to be accounted for by associated be lie fs , 
but by the '’ sensuous character o f the ob ject" which is  "sublime in i t s e l f . *  
(39) I t  might be argued that the sublimity of the experience is  due to 
the arousal o f the in tellectual idea o f  in f in ity , but this cannot be so, 
3ince the same ides is aroused by in fin itesim al objects lik e  grains o f sand. 
The expertenoe is in fact to be accounted fo r on a sub-personal leve l, in 
terras o f the physiology o f seeing:
"Tvery point on the retina is evenly excited, and the loca l signs 
o f a l l  are simultaneously fe l t .  This equable tension, this balance 
and e la s t ic ity  In the very absence o f f ix i t y ,  give the vague but 
powerful feeling that we wish to  describe." ( 40)
This set o f contentions is unconvincing for at least two reasons. The 
asaooiationist can plausibly deny that the same idea is associated with the 
sky and e grain of sand -  the one is  associated with the idea of the 
ln fin ito ly  great, the other with the idea of the in fin ite ly  small. Moreover, 
the physiological description is  inexact. I t  is  wall-known that the rods 
and oones which make up the lig h t-sw s lt lv e  surfaoe o f the retina have
(77)
d ifferent properties, the rods having greater sensitiv ity  in bad ligh t, 
the cones giving higher d e fin ition .
iue ounoluaing rum-rits of tula example o f the stars are iuore convincing. 
Tiie heavens are, "very happily d es ired  to intensify the sensations on 
which their beauties must re s t ."(41) Thera are two factors to be considered 
here: (1) the breaking up o f the continuum o f spaoe by points so vivid 
that i t  is  impossible not to remain aware o f their Individuality! and 
( i i )  the contrast o f  the dark background to  the "palpitating f i r e " (42) of 
the stars themselves is  an important material element o f the e ffect. To 
see how important these elements are i t  is  necessary only to  imagine their 
absenoe: the second is absent in photographs of the stars! and as an 
alternative to the facts  described in ( i )  Santayana invites us to imagine 
the etars in the 3hape o f a Latin cross, surrounded by the motto, "In hoc 
signo vinoes". As in the less Intense experience of the ligh ts  of a c ity  
seen across water, what a ffects  us is precisely m ultip lic ity  in uniformity.
(43)
The experiences o f which Santayana speaks in this example do undoubtedly 
occur! and he is  also right to stress the e ffe c t  o f a rter ia l properties 
in them -  though in doing so, he should be less eager to claim that the 
source o f the e ffe c t is purely the formal arrangement o f multiple repetit­
ion of uniform elements. What is not aonvinoing in his argument is  his 
insistence that related be lie fs  are o f no sonsequenoe in these aesthetlo 
experiences.
Santayana considers that aesthetic principles have s fa r  wider 
application in our experience than merely to  those works o f art or natural 
phenomena whose beauty arrests our attention, and he finds an e ffect of 
m ultip licity in uniformity in  the appeal o f  the p o llt lo e l ideal of 
democracy. Every a c t iv ity  o f the human mind, every emotion, la in some way 
related to pleasure and pain. Often these a c t iv it ie s  precipitate 
"psychical solids called ideas o f things"( 44) and when th is occurs, tha
(78)
cora omit ant pleasures end peine are incorporated into the objects, and 
thus the things acquire an aesthetic colouring. Usually this goes 
unnoticed, especially in objeots o f practical concern) but nevertheless 
i t  is  present, and accounts for a great deal in our »ora l and p o lit ic a l 
attitudes, ("antayana is  once again using the psychological notion of 
pro jection ).
Of course, the democratic ideal gained support f i r s t ly  in a s tr ic t ly  
practical context, as a remedy to in justice and oppression, but as time 
went on i t  began to acquire ar. in trinsic value. Democracy consists 
la rge ly  in love of uniformity. Usually, th is  fact is  disguised by the use 
o f  a moral label -  love o f democracy is  claimed to be a love o f justice -  
but occasionally the beauties o f  democracy are presented to ua undisguised. 
According to Santayana, the moral disguise is  most completely absent in 
Whitman's poetry»
" 'e v e r , perhaps, has the charm of uniformity in m u ltip lic ity  
(s ic )  been fe l t  so OMpletnly and so exclusively. Everywhere i t  
greets us with a passionate preference; not flowers but leaves 
o f grass, not music but drum-taps, not composition but aggregation, 
not the hero but the average man, not the c r is is  but the vulgarest 
moment . . . " (¿ 5 )
We find a "resolute marshalling of n u l l i t ie s " . (¿6) Santayana is  undoubtedly 
rather unfair here to  the idee of democracy -  in principle at any rate i t  
is  not incompatible with advanced cu ltivation  of the individual o f the 
kina o f which M ill speaks.(47) Mors Important is  the point that no-one 
who dissents from Santeyana's assumptions about value and aesthetic 
experience need accept th is ; and a ;ain, th is  set o f olalme about democracy 
exemplifies a general defect of this chapter, l . e .  Santayana's readiness 
to  wander o f f  the point, fo r assuredly the idea o f democracy has nothing 
to  do with the aesthetics of form.
This f ir s t  type o f form -  in liiloh identica l elements are repeated -  
has two major lim itations or inherent defeots . The f ir s t  o f these is
(79)
monotony, and th is i t s e l f  can take two formai ( i )  i f  the repeated 
impressions are acute, the monotony becomes painful. The constant require­
ment fo r  the same reaction is  wearying) end ( l i )  i f  the repeated stimul­
ations ere not very acute, we become unconscious o f them, lik e  the ticking 
o f a clock.
The second defect is that the capacity fo r  association o f th is type 
o f form is  lim ited! "Whet is  in i t s e l f  uniform cannot have a great 
d ivers ity  of re la tion s ."(¿8 ) Works o f art involving such forms tend to 
be dry, crisp, and de fin ite . Santayana gives two examples o f what he 
considers to be such farms: ( i )  the heroic couplet: " Its  compactness and 
inevitableness make i t  excellent fo r an epigram and adequate i t  for a 
sa tire , but its  perpetual snap and unvarying rhythm are thin fo r  an epic, 
and impossible for a song,"(49) j (11) the Sroek colonnade. I t  has a finished 
arid restrained beauty but is incapable o f development! """he experiments o f 
.oman architecture su ffic ien tly  show i t ;  the glory o f which is  their 
: toman frame rather than their Hellenic arnament.*(50)
The d if f ic u lty  here concerns the justice o f classifying the couplet 
and the colonnade as examples o f m ultiplicity in uniformity. In neither 
case is  there s t r ic t ly  unrelieved repetition ! caesura variation and 
enjambement are available to the writer o f coupleta, and as to  the 
colonnade it  is  well known that the interval between the end pairs of 
columns is less than that between those in the centre. Moreover, i t  is  
surely more than defensible to  class, for example, many of the works of 
Dryden and Pope, as w e ll as surviving colonnades as examples o f organic 
forms, or, as Santayana prefers to  say, forms which "compel the mind" to 
order the elements in only one way. That Santayana's c lass ifica tion  
should break down over such major examples is  a grave defect.•
The second major class o f forms is that in  which the elements are 
diverse but yet do not compel the mind to order them in only one way.
nntayana comas to re fer to  them as forms o f  indeterminate organisation -  
the actual vocabulary of the c lass ifica tion , in  terms o f elemsnts and
th e ir  relations, never recurs in the form in which it  is  introduced.
Indeterminate objects -  the incoherent, suggestive, and variously 
interpretable -  stimulate the free exercise o f the nativ ity  o f apperception, 
and i t  is  this which elves them their value. (The concept o f apperception 
is  discussed below, '/hat he means is  that an indeterminate form is  one 
which requires the spectator or auditor to  enrich I t  with contributions 
from his own memory and mental habits.) Works involving such forms are 
not enjoyed by those who have poor and l i t e r a l  minds, fo r  they lack the 
necessary resources. On the other hand, the a rt is t  who is  not a rtis t 
enough, who has too many irrepressib le ta len ts , is sure to  produce in­
determinate works. The consciousness that accompanies this type o f form 
is  that o f profundity or mighty significance 5 nor need th is be an illu s ion , 
"ven in the finest art there is  an appeal to the spectator to do some work -  
tile nature o f our media (words, sounds, p la s tic  materials) w ill  not allow 
exhaustive representation o f experience. Thus even where there is  real 
profundity, "when the liv in g  core o f things is  most firm ly grasped,"(51) 
there w ill  be fe l t  to be some inadequacy o f expression, dut this occurs 
only when the resources o f a well-learned art «re  exhausted; otherwise 
what peases as depth is merely incompetence and confusion. Such 
incompetence, Santayana claims, is  widespread in "the present age". The 
d istinction  Santayana is  concerned to make hare, between mare obaourlty 
and ree l profundity, is of course genuine, though usually only established 
by the test o f time. What is  strange is  his assumption that a l l  art 
aspires to 'exhaustive representation o f experience". In the f ir s t  place 
i t  is  fa lse to claim that there is one elm that a l l  art has, and aeoondly, 
that exhs uatlveneas la even a oommon aim. Moreover, it  la tru la tle  to 
point out that the artia t muataleot, and that this la not a defect, since 
by seleotlon he oan hi f l i g h t  the a ffect he wants to make, whatever i t  nay 
ba.
(30)
(31) 1
The nature! landscape is  an example o f indeterminate forms
" . . i t  almost always contains enough d iversity  to  allow the eye 
a great lib erty  in selecting, emphasising, and grouping it s  elements, 
and i t  is furthermore rich in suggestion and vague emotional 
stimulus."(52)
He insists that pleasure in  landscape is largely  associative. A landscape 
w ill  seem beautiful to ua I f  we have learned to see in i t ,  "hints o f a 
fairyland o f happy liv in g  and vague adventure."(53) He is  as much con­
cerned to stress the associative element in the experl«ics o f indeter­
minate form as he is  to exclude i t  from any role in the experience of 
repetition  of identical elements, end perhaps does more Justice to the 
facts o f Introspection as a resu lt. Yet i t  is odd that he should not even 
countenance the poss ib ility  o f  pleasure in pure shape and colour in the 
natural landscape, since i t  is  form which he is ostensibly discussing.
Turning to painted land soaps, Santayana remarks that the a rtis t has 
selected and emphasised, but from th is draws the inference that i t  is  
therefore vastly  in fe r io r  to  painted landscape. Ho doubt there is  l i t t l e  
indeterminateness (in  Santayana's sense) in painted landscape, even in a
ft
work which exemplifies the baroque characteristics which W olfflin  describes} 
yet i t  is  strange to consider painted landscape In ferior (especia lly  in 
a chapter on beauty of form) for more nearly having organic form. Moreover, 
i t  has been fo rc ib ly  argued (e .g . by ¡lark in "landscape into irtf) that 
the way in which human beings see and appreolate landscape follows the 
way in which landscape is  depleted in painting) 'nglish gentlemen in the 
early eighteenth century wanted their landscapes to look like Poussin's 
painted landscapes. Granted the truth o f th is, i t  is hard to see a 
Justification for Santayana's assertion as to the in fe r io r ity  of painted 
landscape to its  natural counterpart.
Evidently Santayana could find l i t t l e  to please him in landscape 
painting, sinoe he oondemns 'in  to to ' both Impressionistlo and what he
(32)
ca lls  highly rea lis tic  works. The extreme o f Impressionism (he says) tr ie s  
to f ix  a momentary view on canvas. The result Is that, i f  the beholder 
has hlmBelf been struck by that aspect, the ploture has extraordinary 
force and emotional value. On the other hand, such a work Is t r iv ia l  In 
the extreme. I t  Is as i t  were the photograph o f a detached impression, not 
followed as In nature by many variations o f I t s e l f .  Highly r e a lis t ic  land­
scape painting, despite it s  accuracy o f representation, often seems unreal 
and uninteresting; and this is  because i t  is  formless lik e  those objects 
I t  depicts, while i t  lacks that sensuous intensity which might have made 
the rea lity  interesting. (54) I t  is  hard to agree with anything Santayana 
says here. ?*rom his f ir s t  claim i t  would follow that a l l  Impressionist 
landscapes appear t r iv ia l  to a l l  persons who have not glimpsed exactly 
the same scene as the painter, whioh is  absurd. I f  the second assertion 
were true, i t  is a mystery why landscapes were ever considered a f i t  
subject fo r  painting at a l l .  Moreover, Santayana contradicts himself, 
for the formlessness which above was claimed as a strength o f natural 
landscape is now a weakness, and the determinateness above attributed to 
painted landscape is now denied o f i t .  Again, he here makes the appeal 
o f landscape depend on material properties and not association as above.
(He makes its  appeal depend on anything, in fa ct, exoept form.) One can 
only suppose thnt a personal indifference to landscape in art is the 
reason fo r  this en tirely undistinguished theorising. (?or a possible 
reason fa r  this indifference, c f .  note 188* to Chapter VTI, below).
He continues that our attitude to landscape has changed for the better 
over the centuries, formerly, i t  was obligatory fo r painters to introduce 
ruins or figures into their landscapes, to give thou iwman association:
"The lndetermin; teneaa of the suggestions o f an unhunanissd scene was then 
fe lt  as s defect; now we fe e l it  rather as an exaltation .’•(55) This is  an 
advance beoause we can now see beauty where we did not see it  before, and
(83)
aesthetic education consists in nothing but train ing ourselves to  see 
the maximum o f beauty. Commonly we ere in a state o f aesthetic 
uiiOvuBoiuw>u»»o towards meet o f tuoee oojeetn that are determinate and 
nsturslt "We treat human l i f e  and environment with the same u tilita r ia n  
eye with which (the peasant lacking aesthetic sense) regards the fie ld  
and mountain."(56) He is  assuredly on anfe ground aa regards the truth 
o f this last remark, but in contrasting the aesthetic with the u tilita rian  
attitude, he approaches the dlsinterest/distance view o f aesthetic 
experience ostensibly rejected in the f ir s t  Chapter o f "The Cense o f Teauty" 
One o f the characteristics o f Santayana's unsatisfactory chapter on 
form in "The Sense of Beauty" is  the t  ndenoy to assimilate subjects 
which are not in fact c losely  related. The section on the aesthetics o f 
democracy is  one example of this| a second is  the assimilation o f the 
aesthetic experience o f the natural landscape to the highly general 
subject o f the conceptualisation o f data by the mind. In contemplating 
landscape, the mind is  alleged to impose an unstable series o f forms on 
its  experiencei but, Santayr.na continues, th is is  not the only ares. o f 
experience in which sueh unstable oategorl sat ions o f nature are made. The 
seme process is  exemplified in theories o f h istory, re lig ion , and moral 
and natural philosophy. He goes on to argue, very b r ie fly , that a l l  
theories are simply conceptualisations of experience, and firm ly embraces 
the sceptical position to which a representationallst theory o f perception 
so easily  leads -  there is  no possib ility  o f testing the truth o f any 
theory, since this would Involve a comparison o f oonceptuallsed data and 
stimuli which is  in prinoiple Impossible.(57) This excursion into the 
upper reaches o f the theory o f knowledge has no rea l relevance to  the 
aesthetics o f indeterminate form; ite  presence here, like that o f  an 
embryonio form of the theory o f poetry and re lig ion  at the end o f the 
chapter, is  simply an indication o f the unfinished state o f Santayana's 
philosophy at the time at which he wrote "The Sense of Beauty" -  he 
retained this theory o f knowledge throughout his career, though he slab-
<ao
orates i t  fu lly  only in "Scepticism and knimal ’’alth" (1923)» twenty- 
seven years 3a te r .
’.«turning to  indeterminate form, Jantuyana claims that the f ir s t  o f 
the inherent venknessea of this species o f form is  ambiguity. 3elng 
ambiguous, such forms, when used to convey a moaning, cannot do ao 
unequivocally, '.’here a meaning is  not to be conveyed, as 13 the case, he 
thinks, in landao&pe, architecture, and music, illusivenesa o f form is  not 
so objectionable, though even here the tendency to observe the form is  
a sign of Increasing appreciation -  th is last remark repeats a claim also 
made at the end o f the second chapter of "The Sense o f ’Beauty", namely 
that formal features o f an aesthetic object are usually the last to be 
appreciated, material and associative ( i .e .  fo r Santayana, expressive) 
properties preceding them in the process of aesthetic education. Clearly 
the most staggering claim here is  that no meaning is conveyed by music, 
architecture and landscape. "Meaning" is  a term which can be applied to 
music without log ica l impropriety. ?or example, the f i f th  symphony of 
Beethoven, the fourth and f i f t h  o f Tchaikovsky, and the f ir s t  o f Brahms 
can a l l  be said to  have the same meanings the progress o f the sp ir it from 
depression or despair to renewed hope, fa ith , or determination. Other 
symphonies have a roughly contrary meaning, showing the sp ir it crushed by 
events and unable to overcome them, e. g ., the fo rtie th  symphony o f 
Mozart, the sixth o f Tchaikovsky, or the sixth of Mahler.
Santayana continues that in literature, where the sensuous value o f 
the material is  comparatively small, indeterminateness is fatal to beauty, 
and i f  extreme, to expressiveness also« "For meaning is  conveyed by the 
fora and order o f words, not by words theaselvea, and no precision o f 
meaning can be reached without precision o f s ty le ."(58) This is  a 
curious remark, since i f  taken l i t e r a l ly  i t  must be fa lse -  antayana 
seems to be asserting that words do not have meaning. What he says must 
presumably be an e llip s is  fo r  something like the assertion that the order
(84)
oratea i t  fu lly  only in "Soepticism and Animal ^aith" (1923), twenty*- 
seven years la te r .
’.«turning to  indeterminate form, J&ntayana olaias that the f ir s t  o f 
the inherent weakness*« of th is species o f form is  ambiguity. Being 
ambiguous, such forma, when used to convey c moaning, cannot do so 
unequivocally. 'here a meaning is  not to be conveyed, as is  the case, he 
thin s, in landscape, architecture, and :-.usic, illusiveness o f form is  not 
so objectionable, though even tiers the tendency to observe the fora  is  
a sign o f increasing appreciation -  th is last remark repeats a claim also 
made at the end o f the second chapter o f "The Sense o f Beauty", namely 
that formal features o f an aesthetic object are usually the la st to be 
appreciated, material and associative ( i .e .  for Santayana, expressive) 
properties preceding them in the process o f aesthetic education. Slearly 
the most staggering claim here is  that no meaning is  conveyed by music, 
architecture and landscape. "Meening" is  a term which can be applied to 
music without log ica l Impropriety, -'or example, the f i f t h  symphony of 
Beethoven, the fourth and f i f t h  o f Tchaikovsky, and the f i r s t  o f Brahms 
can a l l  be said to  have the same meaning: the progress o f the sp ir it  from 
depression or despair to renewed hope, fa ith , or determination. Other 
symphonies have a roughly contrary meaning, showing the sp ir it  crushed by 
events and unable to overcome them, e. g ., the fo rtie th  symphony o f 
Mozart, the sixth of Tchaikovsky, or the sixth of Mahler.
Santayana continues that in literatu re, where the sensuous value of 
the material is  comparatively small. Indeterminateness is  fa ta l to beauty, 
and i f  extreme, to expressiveness also: "For meaning is  conveyed by the 
fora and order o f words, not by words themselves, and no precision of 
meaning can be reached without precision o f s ty le ."(58) This is  a 
curious remark, since i f  taken l i t e r a l ly  it  must be fa lse  -  Santayana 
seems to be asserting that words do not have waning. What he aays must 
presumably be an e llip s is  fo r  something like the assertion that the order
(35)
o f words Is  Important In meaning; but Santayana is  gu ilty  at least o f  
writing extremely loosely at tn ls point.
A second defect o f indeterminate form is  that it  is  indeterminate in  
value; i t  demands completion by the mind of the observer, and w ill  con­
sequently vary in value according to his a b i l i t ie s .  This is  s simple 
consequence o f the conjunction of the d e fin it ion  of indeterminate fbrm 
and the in terest theory o f  value.
Thirdly and fin a lly , indeterminate form is  unprofitable, even to  the 
mind which takes i t  up; i t  is experienced under the forms of apperception 
which the mind already has, and does not enrich the mind by providing a 
new form. Of course, a creative mind, given such a stimulus, may produce 
such a new fo ra , "but the fe r t i l is in g  seed came from elsewhere, from 
study and admiration of those d e fin ite  forms which nature contains or wnich 
a rt, In Im itation o f nature, has conceived and brought to  perfection ."(5 9 )
I t  is  hard to see how th is particular Informal psychological generalisation 
can be ve r ified  or fa ls if ie d  in any s ign ifican t degree. There is  su rely  
evidence, however, fo r the assumption Santayana mnkea in the coureaof these 
remarks, namely that works of art enrich the mind, leorge 'telner describes 
the phenomenon in the opening words o f his "Tolstoy or Dostoevsky":
"In a manner evident and yet mysterious, the poem or the drama 
or the novel seizes on our lma^Lnlngs. We are not the same when 
we put down the work as we were when we took i t  up. To borrow 
an image from another domain: he who has tru ly apprehended a painting 
by Cezanne w ill  thereafter see an apple or a chair as ha had not 
seen them before. Ireat worke o f a rt pasa through us lika storm 
winds, flinging open the doors o f perception, pressing upon the 
architecture o f our be lie fs  with th e ir  transforming powers."(60 ) 
Whether th is sort o f experience oan be or eannot be oeueed by works of 
Indeterminate organisation surely varies with the individual.
(86)
The concofA o f Indeterminate organisation leads Santayana to  
discus a what he ca lls  the illu sion  o f in fin ite  perfection . Jacques Duron 
(61) is  surely r igh t to  olaim that Absolute Idealism, especia lly  that of 
Schelling, farms the background of ideas in opposition to which this 
section is  conceived -  Santayana ( i t  may be repeated) was thoroughly 
acquainted with Id ea lis t systems, not least because o f the presence o f 
Royee at Harvard. In his ’’ System des transcendentslen Ideali3¡itua*(1800), 
Schelling writes as follows: (the two a c t iv it ie s  o f the f i r s t  sentence are 
the conscious a o t iv lty  of freedom and the unconscious a c t iv ity  o f nature) 
"Every aesthetic production starts from an essen tia lly  in fin ite  
separation o f the two a c t iv it ie s  vribich are separated in a l l  free 
productions. 3ut as these two n a tiv itie s  are to be represented in 
the product as in union, this product represents an in fin ite  in 
f in ite  form. Kow the In fin ite  represented in  f in ite  form is  beauty. 
The fundamental character o f every work o f a r t ,  which comprehends 
in i t  the two former characters is  therefore beauty, and without 
beauty there is  no work o f a r t ."(62) 
antayana begins with more psychological generalisations. While 
indeterminate forms can stimulate the in te lligen ce and imagination, yet 
the e ffo r t  involved in contemplating th 'se fu g itiv e  forms would become 
wearisome i f  unrelieved. This is because the e f fo r t  o f our a c t iv ity  is  
aimed at achieving deterainateness. (63) This preference we would a ll 
c learly  admit to  ourselves, were I t  not for an illu s io n  proper to the 
romantic temperament (fo r  wfaioh Santayana has a marked d is lik e ) which 
lends a mysterious charm to things indefin ite and indefinable. This 
romantic preference Is the illu sion  of in fin ite  perfection. The idea 
contains a philosophical error, since, he argues,
"In rea lity , perfection is  synonym few fln itu de . »«’either in 
nature nor In the fancy ean anything be perfect except by rea lising 
a de fin ite type, which excludes a l l  varia tion , and contrasts sharply
with every other p o ss ib ility  o f being."((wO 
A l l  perfections ere f in ite  and d e fin ite , and these f in ite  perfections are 
incompatible:
rt...every  age, every country, each sex, has a peculiar beauty, 
f in ite  and incommunicable; the better i t  is  attained, the more 
completely i t  excludes every other. The same is  evidently true 
o f schools of a rt, of s ty le s  and languages, and o f every e ffe c t
what soever. " ( 65)
I t  is unlikely that these claims would be contested now -  with the decline 
o f  Absolute Idealism, the problems to which i t  gave r is e , and which were 
matters of concern to  Santayana in  1396, have disappeared from the centre 
o f aesthetics.
Tot unusually, bantayana gives a psychological account o f the origins 
o f the b e lie f in in fin ite  perfection . There is  a certain state o f mind 
in  which we are incapable of rea lis in g  a given thought w ith absolute 
c la r ity . One reason why the idee cannot emerge is that i t  is  not alone 
in  the brain -  e thousand other tendencies simmer in oonfuaion there, and 
when some defin ite  image is  presented to us, we fe e l i t  to  be inadequate, 
precisely because i t  is  perfec t. In this mood, ve are incapable o f serious 
attention to one thing, of sinking into i t  and enjoying I ts  harmonies. 
Instead we are besst by imprecise thoughts and vague yearnings. The sum 
o f these incoherences has an imposing volume, and what delights us is  not 
a precise exemplification of on* poss ib ility , but that which, while i t  
instantiates none perfectly , suggests many. The illu s ion  here, however, 
la obvious -  Santayana repeats h is  phlloaophioal claim on a psychological 
le v e l -  fo r from our emotion a l l  that would emerge, could they do so, 
would be a host o f determinate forma. In fact, the emergence o f a 
d e fin ite  form from this fluid sta te  is  precisely what happens, Santayana 
claims, in the creative act. The conclusion o f his treatment o f 
indefin ite form is a re-assertion of the superiority o f the fin ite  and
(37)
(88)
de fln lts :
" harever beauty is  rea lly  seen and loved« i t  has a de fin ite  
embodimenti the eye has preolslon, the work has style, snd the 
object has perfection .''(66)•
This is  a l l  dantayana has to say about the olaasifie&tion o f forms. 
There is  no treatment of the third class o f forms which he specifies 
in his in i t ia l  c lass ifica tion , thosr in which the elements are so arranged 
as to suggest Inevitably the aaheme o f th eir unity. This is a grave 
defect o f omission, since, as has been mentioned above, almost the entire 
class o f vfoet one wants to oa ll works of art would be included in i t .  
Despite th is , however, and despite some hasty generalisations, Santayana 
undoubtedly deserves credit for attempting a c lass ifica tion  of forms. He 
does at least try  to answer an important question about form whioh by 
no means a l l  writers on the subject consider.
Having discussed the nature o f forms and attempted a class ifica tion  
o f them, Jantaynna continues ids aesthetics of form with a Jisoussion o f 
a third fundamental question! why do human beings take pleasure in form?
His answer is in two parts! physiological and psycho lo g ica l.
17; „¡yminetry and ,,h.9 o f tfrf . » rm & ^ n
Santayana quite r igh tly  feele no hesitation in Introducing the findings 
o f scier.oe in to  his aesthetics whenever he considers than relevant. In 
his answer to the question o f why we take pleasure in form he considers 
b r ie fly  the physiology o f visual perception -  he believes that audible 
form could be given a paralle l treatment, but preacinds from a discussion 
o f I t  on the grounds of the technicality o f the subjeot. (67) I t  is  
necessary to re fe r  to physiology because, in  his view, "The charm o f a 
lin e evidently consists in the rela tion  o f its  parts; in order to under­
stand this In terest in spatia l relations we must inquire how they arm 
perceived."(68 ) Only the presence o f the lens in  the eye makes possible
(39)
representation of an object point by point -  otherwise, eaoh point of the 
object would send rays o f light to  every pert o f the retina ; eyes without 
lenses give consciousness only o f diffused ligh t, without boundaries or 
diversions in the fie ld  o f  view. This has ‘ he coro llary that the abstract­
ion o f fora fro *  colour is  no a r t i f i c ia l  d istinction , fo r , by a sim plifica­
tion of. the organ o f sense, one can be perceived without the other.(69)
The d if f ic u lty  here 1b obviously that the in it ia l  assertion is fa lse . Eyes 
without lensoa would provide experience o f forms which were blurred, but 
which were forms nevertheless.
fantayana continues that reception of a distributed image on the 
retina ( l . e .  o f an eye with a lens) does not o f I t s e l f  explain why we 
perceive an object as a manifold o f parts juxtaposed In space. The parts 
o f the retina might have sent to the brain detached impressions, comparable 
perhaps, but not neoessarlly in terms o f spatial positions.(70) He 
believes that the further explanation required can be given in terms of 
the movement o f the eye. iy  an instin ctive  movement, the eye seeks to 
bring every Impression near to the centre o f the retina, to thst point (the 
macula) which is most acutely sensitive. Thus a series of muscular move­
ments always follows the conspicuous excitation o f any outlying retinal 
point, further, as the eye moves to taring the object into the centre of 
vision, the object excites a series o f points along the retina, and the 
fee lin g  proper to each point i3 associated with the series o f muscular 
sensations. On the occasions o f future stimulations, these feelings 
revive together. Any peripheral stimulation w ill  excite the associations 
of muscular movement and the feelings proper to the retin a l points between 
the excited peripheral point and the centre o f vision. A network o f 
associations is thus set up whereby the sensation o f each retina l point 
is  connected with a l l  the others in the manner of points In a plans:
"Our notion of visual space has th is orig in , since the manifold o f retinal 
Impressions is  distributed in a manner which serves as the type and
(90)
exemplar o f what we mean by a surface."(71)
Santayana aaya that he takes over this view from "various psychologists"
(72),  out In accordance with his declared policy of leaving his text 
uncluttered by scholarly apparatus (73) does not disclose his sources.
'he ch ie f o f them must have been otse. Having published his "Metaphysik"
In 1841 end his "Togik" ln I 843, Totee turned to  psychology. we pres»nt»<J 
his opinions In his "Medizinische Psychologie" in 1852.(74") He was 
convinced o f the importance o f physiology fo r psychology, and sought 
unify both In a systematic manner. His ch ief Illu s tra tion  of the 
relevance o f physiology to  psychology was his theory o f the percept! 
space: there la no point In setting out the theory again, since 3ant 
has token I t  over almost without a lte ra tion .(75)
These physiological b e lie fs  are assumed as premisses in Santayan 
remarks on tlie values o f geometrical figures. The sense o f the post 
o f any point consists in the tensions o f the eye, which not only ten
to bring that point to the centre o f  vis ion , but fe e ls  the suggestio 
a l l  the other points related to the given one in the web of experien 
?rom th is, Santayana in fers the truth o f the de fin ition  o f space as 
p o ss ib ility  o f motion, "since the <ost direct and native perception 
space we can have is the awakening o f many tendencies to  move our or
(76) While i t  is true that the conoepts o f space and motion mutuall 
imply one another, Santayana is  not ju s tified  in his inference. The 
alleged physiological point does not entail the logica l truth which 
takes i t  to en ta il: the statement, "Movements o f the eye lead to our 
o f spece", does not en ta il, "The oonoept 'spaae* is  definable in te r  
of th" concept of motion."
imong geo netrleal figures, the c ir c le , Santayana cl dims, 1» du ll 
and stuplfying. Vhile simple and pure, i t  lacks any stimulating qua: 
The reason is alleged to  be physlologioal (one wonders why It is  not 
least partly psychological) t the eye naturally centres on the centre
(91)
the c irc le , and no setter whloh way I t  more» encounters sameness of 
sensation, "'he e llip se  Is less stupifylng, sines it  is  d iffe ren t in 
d ifferen t d irect ions. .¡mall c irc le s , like buttons, sre less in danger 
o f  being ugly, sine» the eye considers them as points, and they help to 
divide and d iv e rs ify  surfaces. (77) (Again, th is  point seems fa r  less 
incontestable than Santayana appears to assume. Is i t  even true that, say, 
buttons are regarded as points? Are they not as liab le to be ugly as 
larger c irc les? Santayana gives no evidence whatever in favour o f his 
assertions.) He also considers the straight lin e , zig-zag, and curves 
which we c e l l  graceful, "hese la s t involve the optic muscles (he claims) 
in a natural and rhythmical set o f movements. These movements Involve, 
sb i t  were, rhymes and assonances: "We find ourselves at every turn re­
awakening, with a variation, the sense of previous position.” (78) Such 
movements are pleasurable. Avoiding a discussion of the physical basis 
o f pleasure, he writes: "Suffice i t  that measure, in quantity, in Intensity, 
and in time, must involve that physiological process, whatever i t  may be, 
the consciousness o f which is pleasure."(79)
The foregoing physiological principles are also used to explain the 
value o f symmetry, or to be more exaot, b ila tera l symmetry -  '.antayana 
is  conoerned only with th is  one species o f symmetry. (The mathematician 
Hermann ,‘eyl gives a systematic catalogue o f the natural and a r t is t io  
occurrences o f this d iversified  phenomenon, t i l l *  is to be found even in 
molecular structure.(30 ).)
The head and eyes, Santayana continues, survey an object more easily  
from side to side than from top to  bottom, and therefore, i f  an object 
is  b ila te ra lly  asymmetrical, i t  tends to males us fe e l restless* We ea s ily  
notice asymmetry o f this kind: henoe the need far b ilateral symmetry in 
the objects by whloh we are habitually surrounded: "The comfort and eoonotgy 
that come from muaoular balance in the eye, are therefore in some oases 
the source o f the value o f symmetry."(81) In other oases, symmetry
(92)
appeals through the charm of recognition and rhythm. When the eye rvrna 
over a regular facade, finding objeota that appeal to  i t  spaced at 
regular in terva ls, an expectation la aet up the non-aatiafaction o f which, 
i f  i t  la uncompensated by the emergence o f some interesting object, w i l l  
lead to a sense o f ugllresa and incompleteness. Pvmmetry, "qui*t beauty"
(82) as Santayana ca lls  i t ,  gives pleasure because symmetrical objects 
have "fitness to be perceived" (almost a 'fa cu lty  explanation', one notes)« 
" I t  contributes to that completeness Wiich delights without stimulating, 
and to which our Jaded senses return gladly, a fte r  a l l  sorts of 
extravagances, as to a kind o f domestic peace."(33*)
Not only, however, is symmetry a condition for beauty» i t  is  also vhst 
the metaphysicians ca ll a principle o f individuation. The recurring 
elements are each regarded as one individual. I f  thaw were no recurrent 
points, no recurring impressions,
"the f ie ld  o f perception would remain m flu id continuum, without 
defined and recognisable d ivisions, "he outlines o f most things are 
symmetrical because we ohoose what symmetrical lin es  we find to  be 
the boundaries of ob jects."(84)
Of course, we do learn to regard asymmetrical objects as wholes! but this 
is  only because we recognise in them associated elements, and the symmetry 
o f these parts, or their composition as wholes, may enable us to f i x  their 
boundaries and observe their number. He concludes» "The category o f unity, 
which we are constantly Imposing upon nature and ita  part a, has symmetry, 
then, fo r one o f its  instruments, fo r one o f it s  bases o f  application."(85) 
Later work in psychology abundantly confirms at least some of what 
San ays tie says here a propos o f symmetry. Dorothy Vernon sums up 
experimentation tfclch has exhibited a tendency in human beings to perceive 
the simplest and moat stable configurations o f  date possible, 'yimaetrlcal 
forms are eminently stable, and there is  expcrlmsntsl confirmation o f
(93)
the expected corollary that we find ay mmetry wherever poaslblei subjects 
shown s ligh tly  asymmetrical displays and asked to draw them produced 
symmetrical representation! and people shown a solid object, hem!spherical 
on the side facing them, but f la t  on the hidden aide, a l l  decided that 
the object was s sphere, e b e l ie f  which persisted ever, when they were 
allowed to touch the hidden s id e .(36*) Thenomena o f th is kind were 
extensively documented and canvassed by les t a I t  psychologists frosn 
Ehrenfels onwards, who found in them confirmation of their claim that the 
data o f experience are not d iscrete sensa but organised wholes or 
• le s ta lten '. KShier fa ith fu lly  records symmetry among 1 lea ta ltqualita ten '
(37 ), as does Arnheim (38 ). Again, fo llow ing Wertheimer, K Shier reports 
among his laws o f perception the claim that equal and sim ilar items tend 
to fora units, and to be separated from sim ilar items, Simple and regular 
wholes, also closed areas, are formed more readily and more generally than 
irregu lar sad open wholes.(39)
This is not the place to  debate fu l ly  the philosophical or 
psychological merits of the lesta lt or other psychological sohoola.(90)
I t  is  su fficien t in the present context, following Vernon (91)» to  point 
out that ths experimentally established tendency to  see symmetrically 
Is explicable in another way, and moreover a way which is  coherent with 
the psychical distance view o f aesthetic experience. One o f the essential 
claims o f the distance view is  that the undlstanoed attitude is  governed 
by practical, humdrum, wants and needs. We are as a rule concerned to 
see only so much aa w ill  enable us to id en tify  what we seej and i f  shapes 
are symmetrical, they are comparatively easy to see because only parts 
o f them need to be seen. The remainder is  fredundant', easily  Inferred 
from what has been perceived. Hence the observed tendency to perceive 
symmetry.
.¿antayuna concludes his treatment o f  symmetry by f ir s t  raking the 
readily admissible claim that where an object is so large (or smell, one
(93)
the expected corollary that we find symmetry wherever poM lblet subjects 
shown s lig h t ly  asymmetrical displays and asked to draw then produced 
symmetrical representation! and people ehovn a so lid  object, hemispherical 
on the side facing them, but f la t  on the hidden side, a l l  decided that 
the ob ject was a sphere, a b e lie f which persisted ever, when they were 
allowed to  touch the hidden s id e .(86*) Phenomena o f th is  kind were 
extensively  documented and canvassed by Oestalt psychologists from 
Ehrenfela onwards, who found in them confirmation o f their claim that the 
data o f experience are not discrete sense but organised wholes or 
'le s ta lt e n '.  K&hler fa ith fu lly  records symmetry among 1les ta ltqu a llta ten '
(37), as does ¿rnhelm (38 ). Again, following Wertheimer, KShier reports 
among his laws of perception the claim that equal and sim ilar items tend 
to form units, and to be separated from similar items. Simple and regular 
wholes, a lso dosed areas, are formed more readily aid more generally than 
irregu lar sad open wholes.(39)
This is  not the place to debate fu lly  the philosophical or 
psychological merits of the Sestalt or other psychological schools.(90)
It  is  su ffic ien t in  the present context, following Vernon (91)* to  point 
out that the experimentally established tendency to  see symmetrically 
Is explicable in another way, and moreover a way which is  coherent with 
the psychical distance view of aesthetic experience. One o f the essential 
claims o f  the distance view is  that the undlstanoed attitude is  governed 
by p ractica l, humdrum, wants and needs. We are as a rule concerned to 
see only so much as w i l l  enable us to iden tify  what we seej and i f  shapes 
are symmetrical, they are comparatively easy to see because only parts 
o f them need to be seen. The remainder is  »redundant' ,  easily  Inferred 
from what has bean parcelvad. Hence the observed tendency to perceive 
symmetry.
.¡antayana concludes his treatment o f symmetry by f ir s t  making the 
readily admissible claim that vh va  an objaot is so large (or small, on#
(94)
supposes) that symmetry on not contribute to the unity of our perception, 
then I t 8 being symmetrical Is  o f  no value.(92*) Turning to  symmetry In 
r«i4ree«intfetioAfcl a rt, he argues that aalael «  ves« t - - lo  Is ran 0« l i .  nothing 
from being symmetrically displayed, I f  what Is Intended or wished is  to 
convey their l i f e  or motion. On the oth»r hend, i f  i t  is intended to 
use th eir forms as decoration, then symmetry is  required to  aacentuate 
th e ir  unity and organisation«
"This ju s t if ie s  the habit or conventionalising natural forms, 
and the tendency of some kinds o f h e ira tic  a rt, lik e  the Byzantine 
and Egyptian, to a ffe c t s r ig id  symmetry o f posture. Ve can thereby 
increase the unity and force of the image without suggesting that 
individual l i f e  end m obility, which would in terfere with the religious 
function of the object, as symbol and embodiment o f an impersonal
fa ith ."(93)
Certainly, as w S lfflin  noted independently (94 )» symmetrical composition 
in painting tends to produce a monumental e f fe c t ;  but the main point to 
notice here is  the link ante yarn sees to ex is t  between the form or 
sty le o f an image end its  function, a link so convincingly explored by 
iombrlch.(95) Santayana, however, simply states the matter here, and le ts  
i t  drop. As was the cl  a e with some o f his best ideas about the materials 
o f a work of a rt, this sharp insight remains an isolated 'aper^u'»
V? -'frUpgraAggA j ’BJfgft»Aag Sf ’^ rMPtlgn of
The preceding section is the f ir s t  stage o f Santayana's attempt, to 
explain why there is  an aesthetic pleasure in form; but th is is  only a 
part o f the story. Pleasure in form is not restricted to  the conscious 
rspurcuasions o f the optic or other muscles; we also deliberate consciously 
about forma, regarding them, fo r example, as remote from or approaching 
our aesthetic ideals. He .«pends a good deal o f time in the third chapter 
o f ""he enae o f Seauty" on giving an account of the processes involved in 
formal appreciation on a second leve l o f  explanation, that o f personal
consciousness
(95)
Whan In the perception o f an object a notable oontrlbutlon la made 
by memory and mental he b it ,  the value o f  the perception w ill  be due, not 
only to the pleasantness o f the external stimulus, but also to the 
pleasantness o f what Santayana ca lls  the apperceptive reaction .(9 *0  
He does rot define what he aoaee by "apperception” but his usege makes I t  
clear that his meaning fo r  the term is more c losely  related to that o f 
Herbert than to that o f Leibniz or Kant. Tor Herbert, apperception is  
the mingling, thanks to association and recollection , o f the image or 
representation derived from the past experience o f the observer. (97») Tills 
is  much the same sense as thst In which the term is  used by antay&na, who 
goes on to stress thst apperception o f fora varies with age, health, 
constitution, and genius.(93)
Santayana asserts thst the recognition of a form is  an act of the 
mind which occurs as fo llow s: the form which is  the stimulus has the 
e ffe c t o f reviving a more or less de fin ite  set o f images: "th is  revival 
constitutes the recognition, and the beauty of form is  the pleasure of 
that rev ive l." (9 9 ) In connexion with th is  process, Santayana uses the 
example (from 'Hamlet') o f a cloud whose shape gradually changes from 
that o f a camel to a whale. While in the indefin ite intermediate state -  
that Is ,  while having no particular shape -  there Is very l i t t l e  appercep­
t iv e  a o t lv ity j while as soon as we say, "Yea, very like a whale," appercep­
t iv e  reaction begins. Santayana stresses that he does not mean the 
associations which whales may have for us, o f fisherman's yarns and the 
sea, but s t r ic t ly ,  "the in trinsic value o f the form o f the whale, of its  
lin es, it s  movement, i t s  proportion."(100)
This example o f the Protean cloud has caused some confusion in 
writers on Santayana. Irvix.g Singer thinks i t  is  an example o f the third 
aless of forms -  those whose elements inevitably suggest the scheme of 
their u n ity .(101) "here is  no textual basis whatever for this view» in 
Santayana's tex t, the philosophical psychology is placed between the
discussions of the f i r s t  and second classes o f forms. (S in ger 's  treatment 
of Santayana's views on form is  in general misleading. He lays  a great 
deal o f Btrass on remarks which are incidental in the tex t, and omits to 
consider those diatinotions which are developed at length .(1 0 2 * ).) More 
understandable is  Jacques Duron's mistake that the cloud is  an exsmpls o f 
the second class o f forms, those whose elements d if fe r  from ore another 
but are not inevitably arranged.(103) Duron fa l ls  to  notice that neither 
the form o f a camel nor that o f a whale could be said to f a l l  into th is 
class o f indeterminate forms -  no-one is tempted to re—arrange the 
eleiwnts o f these forms at vd.ll. In fact the example is intended to 
illu s tra te  simply what Santayana means by apperoeptive reaction.
He continues that the stimulus which has revived images in  the brain 
can eithsr reinforce or con flic t with those images. I f  the revived images 
are reinforced, the object is  beautiful) i f  the stimulus co n flic ts  with 
the memory images the object is ugly. (101) Ths aesthetic value o f form 
therefore depends on two factors: ( i )  "the acquired character o f the 
apperceptive form evoked: i t  may be a cadenza or s t r i l l ,  s major or a 
minor chord, a rose or a v io le t, a goddess or a dairy-maid) and as one or 
other o f these is  recognised, an aesthetic dignity and tone is  given to 
the ob jec t."(105) At th i3  at; ge o f the apprehension o f form -  that o f 
mere recognition -  there is  very l i t t l e  pleasure to be had, since 
aesthetic types in the abstrset d if fe r  very l i t t l e  in in tr in s ic  beauty)
( i i )  the relation of the particular impression to the form under which i t  
is  appereeived. This is  more important of the two factors, since i t  
determines tha value o f the object as an example o f its  c la s s . (106)
Accordingly, the formation of the concepts, or "types" as Santayana 
ca lls  them in this argument, by which we Judge particulars, is  fo r him 
s most important feature o f our perception of form. Ths mental type ie  
the residuum of particular experience«:
"Our idea of an individual thing Is a compound and residuum o f 
our several experiences o f i t )  and in  the same manner our ides o f
(97)
a class la a compound and residuum o f the particulars which compose 
I t .  Particular impressions have, by virtue o f their in tr in s ic  
s im ila rity  or o f the iden tity  o f th e ir  relations, a tendency to 
be merged and iden tified , so that many individual perceptions leave 
but e single blurred memory that stands fo r them a ll. . .w e  have a
general resultant -  a composite photograph -  of these impressions."
(107)
Probably, in Santayana's view, there is  a cerebral basis fo r tb<* type- 
formation he describes: "The new percept — the generic idee -  repeats to 
a great extent, both in nature and loca lisa tion , the excitement constit­
uting the various original impressions."(108)
The vocabulary of th is theory, with the use o f the terms, "image" 
and "photograph", Is reminiscent o f the naive theories o f concept fo r­
mation o f the Empiriolst classics; but 'antaynna la  at pains to make i t  
clear that he is  not so naive as that. The idea o f an object has few i f  
any o f the properties o f the partioulars which are subsumed under i t .  
Often, an a r t i f ic ia l  symbol, the sound o f a word, is  the only element 
which the generic image clearly  contains. Perhaps with people whose 
thinking is  highly imagietlc various ideas are accompanied by d e fin ite  
images; but this is  neither Invariable nor essen tia l.(109) In general, 
a gensrio idea usually gives a biassed or Inadequate view o f the f ie ld  
i t  means to cover. With Locke and Berkeley in mind, he writes:
"When I remember, to  use a c la ss ica l example, that the triangle 
is  not scalene, nor rectangular, but enoh and a ll o f these, I  
reduce my peroept to the word and I t s  defin ition , with perhaps a 
sense o f the general motion o f the hand and eye by which vs trace 
a three-cornered f ig u r e " ' 10*)
This theory o f concept formetlon does st least avoid the grossest o f 
the sim p lic ities  to which philosophers in the past have committed them­
selves. Santayana is fa r oloser to the fa c ts  o f introspection when he 
stresses the non-lmagistio nature o f most conceptual thinking, thouj£ his
choloe o f vocabulary in the earlier stages o f hla exposition la at odds 
with this accuracy. However, his theory Is not without Its  d if f ic u lt ie s .
In the f ir s t  place end most obviously, a word, l ik e  't r ia n g le ',  la not a 
compound or residuum of impressions o f Individual things. The word is  
learnt by examples of I ts  use In language, not produced (somehow' by the 
merging o f particular Ideas o f triangles. Again, he claims that a 
stimulus revives an Individual set of Images, that the rev iva l constitutes 
recognition, and that the pleasure o f revival constitutes the beauty o f 
form, further, this recognition is  said to be an aot o f the mind. One 
d if f ic u lty  In this is  that to make beauty o f form depend on the objBon­
ifica tion  of the pleasure o f  an alleged aot o f recognition makes i t  
Impossible fo r me to take pleasure in the form o f an object I  have never 
seen before, l .e .  an object which *ex hypothesl' I  cannot recognise as 
belonging to a class with some members of which I  am already acquainted.
The only way around this la  for 'anteyana to accept a fa lse corollary 
(as Indeed he does la te r  on ), namely that, since a l l  conceptualised sense- 
experienoe of objects Involves recognition under some formal descriptions, 
and since therefor# the a lleged act o f recognition must be recurring 
ceaselessly, then a l l  ob jects are to some degree beautifu l. The converse 
of th is objection is  also a d if f ic u lty  fo r Santayana. I f  beauty o f form 
is  the pleasure produoed by recognition, then surely, i t  must either 
increase with increased fa m ilia r ity  with the form in question, or must at 
least remain constant. Yet this is  psychologically fa lsa i frequent 
acquaintance with even a beautifu l form is  l ik e ly  to dull the response, 
and Induce boredom -  a fte r  a oertain number o f repetitions -  as i t  is  to 
induce greater pleasure, or to induce a oonstant response. Again, Santayana's 
account o f concept formation as the production o f a blurred image a fter 
repeated sense-experiences only has p lau sib ility  in  the aese o f the 
concepts o f physleal ob jects. I t  is c learly  a non-starter as an account 
o f the formation o f the concepts o f log ica l connectives. " In a lly  (from
(98)
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choice o f vocabulary in the e a r lie r  stages o f hla exposition la at odds 
with th is  accuracy. However, hla theory la  not without Its  d if f ic u lt ie s .
In the f ir s t  place and most obviously, a word, lik e  't r ia n g le ',  la not a 
compound or residuum of Impressions o f Individual things. The word la  
learnt by examples of I t  a use In  language, not produesd ( somehow' by the 
merging o f particular ldees o f  triangles. Again, he claims that a 
stimulus revives an individual set of images, that the rev iva l constitutes 
recognition, and that the pleasure o f rev iva l constitutes the beauty o f 
form, further, this recognition is  said to be an act o f the mind. One 
d lf f lo u lty  in th is is  that to make beeuty o f form depend on the object­
if ic a t io n  of the pleasure o f an alleged act o f recognition makes I t  
Impossible for me to take pleasure In the fora o f an object I  have never 
seen before, l . e .  an object which ’ ex hypothesl' X cannot recognise as 
belonging to a class with some members o f which I  am already acquainted.
The only way around this is  fo r  danteyana to accept a fa lse  corollary 
(as Indeed he does la ter on), namely that, since a ll conceptuallstd sense- 
experlenee o f objeota Involves recognition under some formal descriptions, 
and since therefore the alleged act of recognition must be recurring 
ceaselessly, then a l l  objects are to some degree beautifu l. The converse 
o f th is  objection is  also a d if f ic u lty  fo r  "Santayana. I f  beauty o f form 
is  the pleasure produced by recognition, then surely, i t  must either 
increase with inci-r.ased fam ilia r ity  with the fbrm In question, or must at 
lea st remain constant. Yat th is is  psychologically fa lsa « frequent 
acquaintance with even a beautifu l form is  l ik e ly  to du ll the response, 
and Induce boredom -  a fte r  «  certain number of repetitions -  as I t  la  to 
induce greater pleasure, or to  induce a constant response. Again, Santayana's 
account o f concept formation as the production o f a blurred Image a fter 
repeated sense-experiences on ly has p lau sib ility  in the oase o f ths 
concepts o f physical objaots. I t  is c lea r ly  a non-starter as an account 
o f the formation of the concepts o f lo g ica l connectives. *'lnally (from
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the philosophical point o f view) Santayana has omitted to  consider
certain lo g ica l .¿uestle&a of sousi-er-ble importance» the neoes**<> and 
su ffic ien t conditions for having concepts, and the log ica l re la tion  o f 
having concepts to the a b ility  to make judgment 3.
Again, while Santayana has made some advance on the psychology to be 
found in  ea r lie r  philosophical works, his theory is not a complete aooount 
o f concept formation and use. Vo doubt i t  is the ease that cerebral 
events occur 'which in some sense correspond to  or underlie whst emerges 
in oonceptual thought; but to say merely this is  to leave almost every­
thing to  be explained. Not that '.ant a yarn oan be censured at a l l  heavily 
fo r these gaps, glaring as they are. The psychology o f ooneept formation 
and use, and the corresponding part o f neurophysiology are proving to be 
of great complexity -  tobert Thomson provides a synopsis o f the work of 
Bruner and Piaget (111), and 3rsy Valter indicates the state o f the 
knowledge with regard to the cortex. (112)
Next, Santayana turns from the formation o f concepts in general to 
a sub-set o f conoepts, aesthetic ideals . I t  hes been sai thst a 
general idea is  seldom i f  ever an unbiassed compound o f the objects o f 
which i t  is  the generic image. One reason fo r  th is is  that our observation 
is i t s e l f  not impartial but directed by some interest, we tend to  notice 
qua lities  in which we have some in terest, and these are the qua lities  
which stand out in our general Ideas. Analogously, lantayana claims, our 
aesthetlo ideals are modified by our aesthetic interest« the average is  
modified in the direction o f pleasure:
"Not a l l  parts o f an object are equally congruous with our 
perceptive facu lty; not a l l  the elements are noted with ths 
same pleasure. Those, therefore, which are agreeable are ch iefly  
dwelt upon by the lover o f beauty, and his percept w ill  give an 
average o f  things with a great emphasis laid on that part o f than 
which is  beau tifu l."(113)
(100)
?he d if f ic u lty  here arises from the assumption, a corollary o f the object­
if ic a t io n  theory, thet the aesthetic attitude is  comparable in kind and 
d if fe rs  only in direction from other in teres t«. The psychical distance 
view has a d ifferen t corollary, fo r  the distanced attitude d iffe rs  fro* the 
undist&noed precisely in not being at the service o f any particular want 
or need; the f ir s t  vocabulary in  which the theory was expressed makes 
th is perfectly  ex p lic it : i t  is  d is-in terested. 'urther, the direction o f 
our aesthetic preferences is not to  be explained in  the simple way 
Santayana proposes. V o lf f l in  pointed out that in  respect o f style in art, 
not everything is  possible at a l l  times (114); the same is  true o f taste 
in a rt. The direction of taste at a given time depends on the facts of 
individual psychology which lombrich has explored in "Art and Illu s ion "} 
on the stage which a style has reached in i t 3 h is torica l development, and 
on the imponderable idiosyncrasies o f personal genius which operate within 
the s ty l is t ic  lim its  of a perlou.
From this point about the formation o f aesthetic ideals, antayans 
draws the corollary that th is explains why the world is  so much more 
beautiful to a rtis ts  than to ordinary men, l . e .  because the types or 
ideals in the mind o f the a rt is t  a l l  have beauty es their ch ief 
characteristic. Not that the a rtis t finds Individual people or objects 
more beautiful than does the non—a rtis t : quite the contrary, only the 
very bast sa tis fie s  his developed aesthetic sense. Tet his general ideas, 
biassed strongly by pleasure, are o f far more beautiful types than those 
o f the non-artist.(115) This is  a strange view for "antayana to adopt.
He says in his general theory o f concept application that the ch ief pert 
of the pleasure in form comes not -rom recognition but from comparison 
of the present particular with the general type In the mind. I f  i t  le  the 
case, as Santayana here asserts that it  Is , that only s very few things 
sa tis fy  the aesthetically cultivated man, then surely suoh a m«in la lik e ly  
to find the world much less beautiful than the unaeathetlc man -  the point
(loi)
about the beauty o f the typea In the mind la  irrelevant, on Santayana's 
ovn premiaae8.
In general, he continues, in  any Ideal type, those elements are 
Indispensable which are generally  orecent In our experience -  for example, 
a human being aust have a nose and ears, and must have nails on fingers and 
toes* Absence o f these common attributes makes the objeot appear repulsively 
ugly to us.(116») This Is surely correct! I t  Is another way o f saying 
that we find ugliness where we find deformity -  an ugly object does not 
have the form I t  ought to have.
Moreover, where an aesthetic Ideal d iffé ra  from the average o f i t s  
class, i t  must be (granted Santayana's premisses) that the d ifference la  
due to  the in trinsic pleasantness or impressiveness o f the formal feature 
exaggerated. The ideal human form, he claims, d iffe rs  Immensely from the 
average, and is  indeed near the extreme, sinoe tallness Is part o f the 
Ideal o f beauty. The reason is  obvious« greater sise makes things stand 
ou t.(117*) I t  is  strange that Santayana should pick so contentious and 
personal an Ideal a3 that o f the human body, where Ideals vary so much 
from person to pe-son, even In the same race at the same time. Were 
ta llness so ubiquitously admired as Santayana thinks, there would surely 
be some Indication o f I t  in language: we would a l l  3ay -  what we do not -  
that a woman la beautiful, but o f average height. The oddity o f th is  
qualification  shows how unfounded Santayana's generalisation Is.
Trora his general theory o f  concept formation, iantayana derives his 
answer to a question he considers crucial to any aesthetic, namely whether 
or not a l l  things are In some degree beau tifu l.(118) The question Is  no 
longer crucial: "antayana In a l l  probability Inherited I f  from Schopenhauer, 
whose pessimism, along with that Leopardi and Musset he absorbed as a 
young man.(119) Tor Schopenhauer, sinoe everything la to some degree an 
ob jeotlfloa tlon  o f the w i l l ,  everything is in some degree characteristic 
and In some degree beautifu l. (129)
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•bout the beauty o f the types In the mind is  irrelevant, on Santayana'■ 
own premisses.
In General, he continues, in any ideal type, those elements are 
indispensable which are generally present in our experience -  for example, 
a human being must have a nose and ears, and must have nails on fingers and 
toes. Absence of these common attributes makes the object appear repulsively 
ugly to u s.(116*) This is surely correct| i t  is  another way o f saying 
that we find ugliness where we find deformity -  an ugly object does not 
have the form It  ought to have.
Moreover, where an aesthetic ideal d iffe rs  from the average o f I ts  
class, i t  must be (granted Santayana's premisses) that the difference is  
due to the in trinsic pleasantness or impressiveness o f the formal feature 
exaggerated. The ideal human form, he claims, d if fe rs  immensely from the 
average, and is indeed near the extreme, since tallness is part o f the 
ideal o f beauty. The reason is obvious« greater size makes things stand 
ou t.(117*) I t  is strange that Santayana should pick so contentious end 
personal an ideal S3 that o f the human body, where ideals vary so much 
from person to person, even in the same race at the same time. Were 
tallness so ubiquitously admired as Santayana thinks, there would surely 
be some indication o f i t  in languages we would a l l  say -  whet we do not -  
that a woman is beautiful, but of average height. The oddity o f this 
qu a lifica tion  shows how unfounded Santayana' s generalisation is .
;-’rom his general theory o f concept formation, Jantayana derives tils 
answer to s question he considers crucial to cny aesthetic, namely whether 
or not a l l  things are in some degree beautifu l.(118) The question is  no 
longer cru cia l) "antayana in o i l  probability inherited i f  from Schopenhauar, 
whose pessimism, along with that Leopardi and Musset he absorbed as a 
young man.(119) for Schopenhauer, since everything la to some degree an 
ob jectifica tion  of the w ill ,  everything is in some degree characteristic 
and in some degree beautiful.(129)
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Jantayana retains the Schopenhauerlan conclusion, but fo r  reasons 
quite other than those o f  systematic metaphysics. No object is  sssentia lly 
u¿ly: " I f  impressions srs painful, ¿hey are oojsovifiou with dliViouatyj 
the perception o f a thing is  therefore, under normal circumstances, whan 
the senses are not fatigued, rather agreeable than disagreeable."(121) 
further, when repeated perception hs s given r ise  to an ideal o f that type 
o f object, the recognition of that norm w ill  give pleasure. This set of 
claims is surely fa ls e : as i f  every case of ugliness were the result of 
fatigue on the part o f the parcelver. Nor again is  th is  consonant with 
Santayana * s own general theory o f subsumption under types: recognition 
per se involves next to no pleasure; i t  is  the relation  o f particular to 
type which determines beauty.
He continues by emphasising that the view that a l l  things are 
beautiful does not commit him to what he aalls the mystical view, that 
a l l  things are equally beautifu l, and that we would rea llae  th is oould 
we transcend our human constitu tion .(122*) He o ffers  two criticism s of 
th is view, the f i r s t  o f whioh is  that it  sntails the destruction o f tssts 
altogether: i f  we could so modify our taste as to find beauty equally 
everywhere, then there could be no discrimination in beauty. There is  
l i t t l e  bite in th is : the :ystical view does not en ta il either that there 
could be no aesthetic Judgment (though there would be only one aesthetic 
judgment) or that there could be no aesthetic attitude. I f  'antayana is 
complaining that there oould be r.o exhibitions o f fin e discrimination, 
the mystic would no doubt rep ly that the loss is t r iv ia l  oompared with 
the gain in beatitude.
"'he source o f the second criticism  o f the mystic is  the Interest 
theory of value. .e la tlv lty  to our partial human constitution is ,  
"essentia l to a l l  our thoughts, Judgments, and feelings.
And when once the human bias is  admitted as s legitim ate, beoause 
far us a necessary, basis o f preference, the whole wealth o f
(103)
nature is  at once organised by that standard into a heirarchy of
values."(123)
This is  rea lly  an evasion o f the central issue with the mystio, whose basis 
b e lie f  is  that self-transcendence can and does occur in moments o f un­
questionable and s e lf-c e r tify in g  authority, ’-.'her. Santayana states that 
the human scale o f in terest is a necessary component in a l l  our views, he 
begs the question, assuming the denial o f the mystic's b e lie f without 
argument.
His concluding qualification  to th is  point is  much less contentious.
To say that human nature conditions our aesthetic prefer-roe 8 is  not to 
be committed to a fa lse b e lie f in a universally shared ta s te .(124) I t  is 
not the case that, granted an ideal enlargement o f sen s ib ility , a l l  men 
would admire the same things. The reason Is simply that, "human nature 
is  a vague abstraction; that whioh is  common to a l l  men is  the least part 
o f their natural endowment."(125) S c ien tific  confirmation o f th is probable 
guess must await the realisation of what is yet a very distant idealt a 
universal psychology. •
Having considered the formation o f formal types and Ideals at some 
length, Santayana turns to the second theme in his discus sion o f the role 
o f apperception in the experience of form. The second then.9 is  that o f the 
orig in  o f types.
lo t  surprisingly, he begins with the thesis that Nature is  the source 
o f  apperceptive forms. According to the theory o f  evolution, meohanioal 
necessity has brought it  about that certain systems o f atoms move together 
as units, and that these organisms reproduce themselves and occur so often 
in our environment that our senses become aoeustomsd to view th e ir  perta 
together: "An order and sequence is established in  our imagination by 
virtue o f the order and sequence in whioh the corresponding impressions
(104)
have come to our senses." ( 126) "he mechanical organisation o f nature Is  
thus the source of apperceptive forms In the mind.
These forms o f apperception would degenerate Into lndlstlnetness did 
not sensation constantly renew them. (127) In the arts , thla process o f 
renewal and enrlohment Is quite evident In the well-known development of 
Ireek sculpture, from the archaic forms o f the seventh and sixth  centuries, 
through the classic phase to the Hellenic period of the second century. 
This development o f sty le  is  to be explained psychologically, Santayana 
thinks, as a process o f enriched apperception o f the human body. I t  is  
an example.of, "the gradual penetration o f nature Into the mind, of the 
slowly enriched apperception of the ob ject."(128) The acceptab ility  o f 
th is doctrine depends on exactly what i t  Is taken to mean. I t  was once 
customary to explain why there are styles In art with the far-fetched 
hypothesis that the sense-experience of men o f d ifferen t countries 
equipped them with d ifferen t data, which they a lleged ly copied in  works o f 
a rt. Santayana's doctrine o f apperception doea not commit him to  so 
strange a theory as th is ; but there is no hint that he saw the Importance 
o f the schema (as Sombrloh ca lls  i t )  In the process of creation. His view 
is simply icd lo is iv e . ( I t  is  only fa ir ,  however, to note that much la ter 
in his l i f e ,  he la id  stress at least on the importance o f trad ition  in 
a rt is t ic  creation. In his autobiography, he writes that c re a t iv ity  is 
"helpless without trad itiona l mod e ls . "(129))
There is  a lim it to the process o f enrichment (he continues)« there 
is a moot beautiful and inolusive apperception, and onee atteined, there 
seems nothing more to do. Prom its  summit, art declines in  one o f two 
directions, hither i t  degenerates into empty invention, abandoning the 
study o f nature, or i t  forsakes beauty, and sinks into e taste less and 
unimaglnltlve technique. (133) Art eacapea from degeneration In these two 
ways when a rtis ts  go heck to  looking at rea lity , rather than other works 
o f a rt. I f  such reawakenings do not oocur, then our apperceptions become 
worn and merely trad itiona l, ""oo great a study o f past art oar. hinder
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a r t is t ic  developmenti "...we cannot work out our owa style because we are 
hampered by the beauties o f ao many others."(131 ) What results is  eclec­
ticism , without aesthetic unity or power to  please.
These last remarks at least are acceptable. In breeding in art -  con­
centration on technique, and too exclusive a devotion to  copying the 
achievements o f the pest -  produces the same unhealthy e ffe te  ness as does 
i t s  counterpart in l i f e .  I t  is  a recess ry condition fo r avoiding th is 
effeteness that art be authentic, i . e .  the result o f the a r t is t 's  response 
to some liv in g  problem, fe l t  on the pulse -  th is  is  what Santayana means 
when he speaks o f going back to  rea lity . As to  the hindering power of 
the styles o f the pest, the object of Lloyd '-‘r igh t 's  protests is  a perfeot 
example -  the o f f ic ia l  style o f architecture which aa.umcB as a premiss 
that you have only to stick classica l features onto a building in order 
to produoe a classic result -  whatever has a cornice, a cupola, and a 
colonnade, must be good.
"he principle by which natural forms are ordered is  what Santayana 
ca lls  u t i l i t y ,  by which ho means maximal adaptation in the struggle for 
survival. Those forms survive which are in  harmony with the prevailing
forces o f the environment. (132) Iranted th is , some thinkers have concluded 
that u t i l i t y  is  the essence o f beauty. I t  is  said that we c a ll  objects 
beautiful when we are conscious of the practical fitness o f their forms, 
e .g . the legs o f n horse are said to bo beautifu l because they are f i t  to 
run.
lantayana refutes tills  doctrine o f functionalism in the theory of 
beauty: "The beautiful does not depend on the usefulj i t  is  constituted 
by the imagination in ignorance and contempt o f praotlcal advantage.."(133) 
fhe relation o f use and beauty is  rather th is : only well-adapted forms 
survive, and so our ideal is  necessarily derived from oxper nee o f such 
well-adapted forms. Hence, the beautifu l, " is  not independent of the 
necessary, fo r  the necessary must also be the habitual and consequently the
(106)
basis o f the type, and o f a l l  its  variations. "(134) Aesthetic ideals are 
refinements on the forms conditioned by causal necessity. The aesthetic 
eye, studying natural rorma, "Lenaa...oo aring ¡.«e type wituiw eve», 
narrower lim its  than do the external exigencies o f  l i f e . "(135) On the 
conceptual le v e l, th is appears as follows! when the tern "beautiful" is  
used in its  central aesthetic sense, grounds fo r  i t s  ascription do not 
include, "because the object is well-adapted to i t s  function."
Santayana also re je c ts  the converse o f the functionalist account, 
which he ca lls  the metaphysical theory, the view, "that would make the 
beauty o f  in trinsic rightness of things the source o f their e ffic ien cy  and 
o f th eir power to  eurvive."(136) He must reject th is , since i t  presupposes 
an ob jec tiv ls t theory o f value, and is  therefore incompatible with his 
own subjectivist in terest theory.
"rom his sane and acceptable rebuttal o f formal Isa, Santayana moves 
to some erra tic  views about a rt. As he has s a il, not a ll natural Coras 
are beautifu l, and hence there ia room fo r art, fo r , "art organises objects 
in ways to which nature, perhaps, has nevsr condescended."(137) The 
ohief feature which the im itative arts add to nature is permanency} and 
therefore, he considers, the forces which determine natural Corns also 
determine those o f the im itative a rts .(138) This is  a staggering 
inference. He has Just been at pains to stress -  quite correctly -  that 
natural forma are determined by a l l  the Screes operative in evolution. I t  
ia absurd to go on to  suggest that the forms o f a rt which Imitate nature 
are determined in the same wayi and doubly absurd to in fer th is from the 
premiss that art is  permanent.
More reasonably, he continues that non-lmltative arts genera lly  have 
their forma suggested by u tility  t "Architecture, for instance, has a l l  
lte  forma suggested by practical demands.."(139) The presenee o f the 
qualification  'gen era lly ' w ill  deflect the objection that th is view baa 
l i t t l e  p lausib ility  where musio is oonoerned. He expends the point on
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architecture as followst houses and temples evolve like animals and 
plants. The f i r s t  forms are stringently determined by mechanical necessity, 
and tho eye becomes used to  them: "The line o f use by habit o f apperception, 
becomes the line o f beauty."(140) He rea lises, however, that habit oannot 
be the sole faotor determining the forme of buildings. Appeals to the 
in tr in s ic  suscep tib ilities o f the human imagination and eye are also 
important. According as forms are grateful or painful to eye and mind 
they may be called for that reason In trin s ica lly  better or worses "Herein 
l ie s  the superiority o f a Greek to a Chinese vase, or o f  Gothic to Saracenic 
construction."(141) There are two main fau lts here, both of which have 
ooourrad elsewhere In the course o f Santayana's argument a about form: in 
the f i r s t  place, he is  too ready to make universal claims about wbmt la 
grate fu l to the Imagination, underrating cultural conditioning; and 
secondly he has a tendenoy to  believe that th is universal taste coincides 
with his own, witness the exaltation of the Greek case.
He turns fin a lly  to consider ornament. Presupposing the truth of his 
claim that u t il ity  conditions both natural and a r t is t ic  forme, he writes 
that there are two sources o f  e ffe c t  in works or a rt. f i r s t ly ,  there la  
the useful form, which generates f ir s t  the type, and then, by exaggeration 
o f i t s  in tr in s ica lly  pleasing features, the aesthetic Id ea l; secondly, 
there is  the beauty o f ornaisettt, "which comes from the excitement of the 
senses, or of the Imagination, by colour, or by the profusion o f d e ta il."  
(142) There la , o f course, a great deal o f room fo r variaty and compromise, 
fo r  some a rtis ts , dsooration is  the M in concern, and form is  made sub­
servient to i t ;  while others, mors austere, "allow ornament only to 
emphasise the main linns of the design, or to conoeul such inharmonious 
elements as nature or u t i l i t y  may prevent them from elim inating."(143)
One o f the moat striking examples o f the use o f ornament to turn a 
mechanically necessary feature in to an element of beauty is the Gothic 
fly in g  buttress and pinnaol* (needed to carry the load o f the va lla  down
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to the foundations). Applied ornament makes the transformation possible!
"A moulding on the arches; a flo r id  oanopy end statue amid the 
buttresses; a few grinning monsters leading out o f unexpected nooks; 
a lea fy  budding o f the topmost pinnacles; a piercing here and there 
o f some l i t t l e  ga llery , parapet, or turret, into laoevork against 
the sky -  and the building becomes a poem, an inexhaustible 
emotion. ” ( 144)
Santayana evidently anticipated trouble from objectors o f a functional­
is t  persuasion. He states again that there is no reason to suppose that 
a cultivated taste w ill  find a l l  natural forms, conditioned by u t i l i ty ,  
to be beau tifu l. lueh beauty as there is  in nature is,
"a result o f the functional adaptation o f our senses and imagination 
to the mechanical products o f our environment, ’ his adaptation is  
never complete, and there is , accordingly, room fo r the fine arts, 
in which beauty is  the result o f  the intentional adaptation o f 
mechanical forms to the functions which our senses and imagination 
already have acquired. This watchful subservience to  our aeethetie 
demands is  the essencs of a rt. t'ature is  ths basis, but man is 
the goa l."(145)
This is the nearest Santayana comes to a general contrast between the 
forma o f nature and the forms made by men. The bio logist 5.H. Vaddir gton 
draws d iffe ren t lines of d istinction . (H 6 ) Ths main point is  that the 
unity o f natural forms is  fa r subtler than that o f  man-made forms. Ths 
reason fo r th is  is  two-fold t in the f i r s t  place, natural forms are the 
result o f the interplay o f a great number o f forces, b*th Internal and 
external -  fo r  example, the oe lls  in a liv in g  oreatur*» are controlled by 
several hundreds of hereditary factors. In the second plaoo, natural forms 
must be adapted to a large number o f functions. A limb-bone, for example, 
must be adapted to  walking, running, jumping, s itt in g , and leaping sideways 
and backwards. Only very rare ly  do man made forma, even in a rt, approach
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the subtlety and m ulti-functionality o f natural ones. The produots of men 
are simpler, fo r man Is  usually Tore single-purposed than nature; and
further, he has a lik in g  for simpli flo a t ion and patterns.
VI; 1 prolusion
This third and longest chapter o f "The dense o f leauty” is  divided by 
Santayana into twenty-nine seat Iona, of which twenty-three have been 
considered above. The last six, as has been mentioned, concern literatu re , 
and are barely connected with the ea rlie r pert of the argument. This is  
a further indication o f the prevailing feature o f th is chapter, i . e .  the 
unusual degree of disorganisation evident in  the ariangesent o f the 
material. The impression given is that the data are less completely 
assimilated than in the rest of the book. There is a lack o f the origin­
a lity  one finds in the other chapters; rather, tb re is  a fa ir ly  even 
distribution o f scattered merits and fa ilin gs* Santayana avoids the 
sim plistic varieties o f formalism in the theory o f beauty and o f a rt; does 
set out to  treat the problem of form in several of it s  most important 
aspects (nature, c lass ifica tion , e tc . ) and does produce Isolated insights, 
e.g. the link between sty le  and function. On the debit side, the 
class ifica tion  o f forms is  incomplete and breaks down importantly in other 
ways, and there are some surprisingly hasty generalisations about a rt. 
Santayana's views on form are perhaps not especia lly distinguished; but 
unlike much classic w riting associated with th is subject, his treatment 
of the subject at least attempts a philosophical scrutlny of the idea o f 
form on the most fundamental leve l.
(110)
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hxpression, Ilka form, Is  a tarm which has found ita  way into a larvae 
;.umb«r o f aesthetic theories, and, again lik e  form, has been claimed to be 
the essential or distinguishing property o f art, Tor example, Wordsworth 
and Tolstoy both hold that expression is the d is tin ctive  mental prooeaa o f 
the a r t is t ,  and being a result o f th is process is  a necessary and su ffic ien t 
condition fo r something to be a work o f a rt . Wordsworth w rites:
"A ll good poetry is  the spontaneous overflow o f powerful fe e lin g s ... 
i t  takes its  orig in  from emotion recollected in tra n q u illity : the 
emotion is contemplated t i l l ,  by a species o f reaction, the 
tran qu illity  disappears, and an emotion, kindled to  that which was 
before the subject o f contemplation, is gradually produced, and does 
i t s e l f  actually ex is t before the mind." (1 )
Tolstoy, speaking of art in general a.d not merely poetry, claims that:
"Art is  & human a c t iv ity  consisting in this, that one man 
consciously by means o f certain external signs, hands on to  others 
feelings he has lived  through, and that o.hera are infected by 
these feelings and also experience them."(2 )
Tolstoy insists that, In order for a work to  be a work of a r t , the a rtis t 
aiU3t  himself have experienced the fee lin g  he deliberately expresses and 
transmits -  a view which involves attributing an unlikely gamut of 
experience to certain major artists, notably and obviously Shakespeare.
'’’he only true test fo r a rt, Tolstoy argues is  infectlousness, and the 
greater the lnfeotiouneas, the greater the work of a r t . (3)
There are defects enough in both views. Wordsworth's psychology is  
naive: a state of emotional agitation is  hardly l ik e ly  to produce a good 
work o f art, where the deliverances o f the unconscious must be sorutlnlsed 
by the conscious ln telllgenoe. Tolstoy makes no attempt to describe the 
psychology o f expresaioni moreover his examples o f what counts as genuine
( I l l )
art are astonishing. In the name o f the br other hood-of-man ethic which he 
la tte r ly  adopted, he dismisses a l l  art which is  not in te llig ib le  to  the 
Ill-educated masses. (In  feet he cones fa ir ly  close to the aesthetics of
Soviet Tieallsm.) Philosophically, both share the defect o f esBentialiet 
assumptions, i .e .  that wherever there is  poetry or art, some common quality 
is  present also. Again, both views would seem to make the expressed 
properties of the work o f art external features of i t ,  to be in ferred 
from i t  rather than experienced in i t .  Santayana would reject suoh views, 
by implication from his arguments in "The Penes o f Oeauty". He g ives due 
weight to  the influence o f expression in aesthetic experience and to  
expressed properties in works o f a r t ; yet, as also with formal properties, 
he declines to give them essential or defin itiona l status. Expression is 
v ita l in a rt, and accounts fo r  a part o f its  value to us; but i t  La not 
a necessary condition for art.
Croce's expression theory is  e x p lic it ly  cr itic ised  by .antaymna in 
several places. In Croce's view, art is  intuition or expression, and an 
expreasion is a r t is t ic  only when, " i t  has a v ita l principle which animates 
i t  and msc.es fo r  complete unity." (4 )  What lends unity and coherence to 
in tu ition  is intense feeling. I t  can arise only when this la t te r  is  its  
source and basis. Further, art is  the same as language, the le t t e r  term 
being used in a broad sense. I t  is  not limited to articulate language, 
but includes its  tonal, im itative and graphic forms. Hence the science 
o f art is  the same as the science o f  language.(5)
'Santayana takes exception to  this defin ition  o f aeethetlc es general 
lin gu is tic  in hie 1904 paper, "what is  Aesthetics?" Concerned to  answer 
the question of the t i t le ,  Cantayann remarks that one way o f doing so 
would be to give a stlpu lative d e fin ition . The d if f icu lty  with th is  
approach is  that, flawless and symmetrical as such a defin ition  might be, 
i t  "would absolve i t s e l f  fro * any subservience to  usage, and would ignore 
the H istoric grouping and genealogy o f existing pursuits." (6 ) Croce's
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defin ition  fa l ls  in to th is class, since fo r him aesthetics, as has been 
said,
" is  purely and simply the science o f expression; expression being 
i t s e l f  sn d*<*treJ *s to  be identical vith  every form o f apperception, 
intuition, or imaginative synthesis. This Imagined aesthetics 
includes the theory o f speech and of a ll  a tten tive perception, 
while i t  has nothing in particular to  do with art or with beauty, 
or with any kind of preference. Such system-making may be a most 
learned game, but I t  contributes nothing to  knowledge." (7 )
A second critic ism , from the point o f view o f Santayana's Interest 
theory o f value, is  put forward in a 1913 paper, "Plotinus and the lature 
o f E v il" . According to the interest theory, we value those things which 
sa tis fy  our wants and needs, and d is value whatever thwarts th e ir  sa tis ­
faction . further, since aome wants and needs are o f more Importance than 
others, not a l l  positive ly  valued objects or experiences are equally 
valued. Therefore Santayana cannot accept any doctrine which regards a ll 
perfections as o f equal value. (We ca ll an object perfect when i t  sa tis fie s  
a given want or need in an exemplary o f paradigmatic way.) Perfections
must be graded in their importance. Renoe he w rites that,
"..when Mr. lenedetto Croce te l ls  us that a l l  expressions, i f  
successful, are equally perfect works o f a rt, and that a perfect
Keapolitan sigh is  aesthetically equal to the Iliad , I should be
far from wishing to contradict him; only I  should fe e l that the 
aesthetic quality so defined was interesting to aesthetes only, and 
that man must continue to value and to  compare works of art on far 
more humane and oomplex principles. Just because goods are re la tive  
to liv in g  interests, eaoh Interest may establish a hierarchy among 
the several goods i t  recognises, according to the depth and force 
of its  need fo r th e*."(8 )
fantayana also finds a logica l fault in Croce's concept o f expression.
( U 3 )
(In  hia paper, "Tbs Mutability o f  Aesthetic Categories", 1925) According 
to Crooe, So lrit la the primary r e a lity ,  and exoresslon the primary form 
o f  sp ir it. 3ut, 'antayans asks, what oar expression be the expression 
of? Cy defin ition , nothing can be ontologieally  prior to S p ir it , and 
therefore i t  is  not easy to  see what could possibly be expressed. Tor 
Croce, any term lik e , 'nature', 'f e e l in g ',  ' l i f e *  etc, alleged to  be prior 
to  Sp irit and expressed by i t ,
'
" is  merely a hypocritical term, used Instead o f apparition, in an 
instinctive e f fo r t  to disguise the solitude and groundlessness o f 
the Sp irit, as a consistent id ea lis t would coneeive i t . " (9 )
Santayana is  here too hard on Crocei the id ea lis t oan reply in te l l ig ib ly  
that sp ir it oan express i t s o l f .
Three further criticism s o f Croce are put forward in Santayana's review 
o f  the f ir s t  edition of the former's ’’Aesthetic"(1903)• Croce’ s cardinal I
tenet, i t  may be repeated, ia that nothing la aesthetic except the art o f 
In tu ition , and that nothing is  a work o f art except the inner momentary 
product o f fancy. This polemic, Santayana comments, while i t  exhibits 
Croce's firm grasp of the transcendental conditions o f aesthetle 
experience, only serves to  make manifest the barrenness o f any s t r ic t ly  
transoendental philosophy. ThiB is  because, by insistence on the 'formal 
truism' that a l l  art or beauty, to  be appreciated, must fa l l  within a 
transcendental unity o f apperception, and by reducing a l l  aesthetic theory 
to this truism, most o f the problems with which c r it ic s  deal are banished 
from aesthetics without being solved or c la r if ie d .(10 )
Secondly, i t  follows from Croce's views that, when expression is 
successful, beauty la perfect, no matter whet the fe e lin g  i8 that is  
expressed. The expression o f pain and e v i l ,  I f  i t  is  adequate, is  aa 
deligh tfu l aa the expression o f good and o f pleasure. A good deal of 
problematic aesthetics is  avoided aa a raault. (What Santayana has in mind 
here w ill become dearer from the sections below on tragedy, comedy and
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the sublime, top ics which Involve Santayana In a considerable amount of 
d if f ic u lty . )  Such conclusions, Santayana comments, lead one to suspect 
that the system under consideration must be a r t i f ic ia l  in some respect. In 
the case o f Croce, the a r t i f ic ia l i t y  results from his three-fold d ivision  
o f the mind; ( i )  sensation or animal consciousness, in which flux is 
absolute and nothing can be discriminated from other things} ( i i )  appercept­
ion or in tu ition , in which attention and synthetic imagination have 
generated de fin ite  ideas or expressions, and ( l i i )  thought, the le v e l o f 
•anomyts or unlversals. Thus on this view, art (expression) is  anterior 
to thought and independent o f i t .  Santayana objects -  and surely quite 
correctly -  that this iso lation  o f the aesthetic is  fa lse : u lterio r 
judgment, practica l and moral, w ill  inevitably colour every perception 
given to a rational animal. I t  is not true that such simultaneous reactions 
have no e f fe c t  on aesthetic fe e lin g . The d ivision  of the mind is  untenable 
anyvayi man does not fe e l without distinguishing nor distinguish and see 
without thinking and knowing. I f  intuition has nothing to do with sense or 
reason, so much the worse for in tu ition .(11)
The situation is  w ell illu stra ted , Santayana continues, by what 
Croce says about language. A word, being an expression, a synthesis 
reached by creative genius, is  not a sign. However, Santayana coimnents, 
Crooe would presumably admit that i t  osn become a sign; and i t  is precisely 
in doing so that i t  becomes useful. Discourse without concepts (Santayana 
writes) is  "singularly tedious to the sensitive, p o lit ica l and thinking 
animal properly called man."(12) I f  there is  a d if ficu lty  in this last 
objection, i t  is only that Santayana has understated the case: i t  is  not 
clear just what 'discourse* without concepts might be -  in the ordinary 
philosophical acceptation of the terms, discourse without concepts is 
lo g ica lly  impossible.
Santayana's theory of expression, i t  w ill  be clear, is  to  be sharply 
discriminated from essentla list and idealist accounts. His own non-
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essen tia list and m aterialist account begins with a de fin ition  of expression.
of, I^ g re s s^ c  anfl hr altgrnft.H™ XI¡H
Santayana subscribes to several widely held b e lie fs  in philosophical 
psychology. One Is that the mind constructs sensible objects out o f the 
data o f experience. In his theory o f expression, he r e lie s  on another 
commonplace, the fact o f association)
"We not only construct v is ib le  unities and recognisable types, but 
remain aware o f their a f f in it ie s  to whet is  not at the time 
perceived; that is , we find in them a certain tendency and quality, 
not original to them, which upon investigation we shall see to  have 
been the proper characteristics o f other objects and feelings, 
associated with them once in our experience. The hushed reverber­
ations of these associated feelings continue in  the brain, and by 
modifying our present reaction, colour the image upon which our 
attention is  fixed . The quality thus acquired by objects through 
association is  what we ca ll their expression."(13)
In cases of beauty o f material and form, there is involved only the objeot, 
which stimulates pleasure in the observer; in cases o f expression, by 
contrast, there are two terms, the object present to the observer, and 
the associations which this object has in the observer's mind. Expressive 
beauty may co-occur with the two other species of beauty, or i t  may occur 
in iso lation .
I t  is to be emphasized thst, in Santayana's account, the second term, 
(that wiiich is exfr eased) is  not i t s e l f  fu lly  present to consciousness 
during the experience o f expression -  were i t  to be so, then the value o f 
the f ir s t  term (that which expresses) would l ie  so le ly  in its  associations, 
and would not i t s e l f  express. The experience whose residue makes up the 
second term must fade and blur, and "remain simply as a halo and suggestion 
of happiness hanging about a scene."(14) An important d if f ic u lty  is  
indicated by the term happinessi why should the blurred association be
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always a suggestion of happiness? Santayana presumably has in mind his 
theaia that beauty is ob jectified  pleasure. Since expressive beauty is  a 
species o f beauty in general, i t  must, on Santayana's premisses be pleasant 
T f th is is  his reason ror r ”s t r ie t t r »  associations to happiness '"antayana 
is  gu ilty  f i r s t l y  o f equating happiness and pleasure} and secondly, main­
taining that what is expressed is  always pleasant, a thesis which is 
simply fa lse  to  the facts of experience. How much d if f ic u lty  th is second 
consequence causes him is  c learly  shown in the sections on acaedy and 
tragedy, balow.
Santayana’ s theory is  fle x ib le  enough to  allow fo r  the variety of 
objects which express, and the va rie ty  o f things that can be expressed by 
them: "in  a l l  expression we may thus distinguish two terns: the f i r s t  is 
the object actually presented, the word, the image, the expressive thing} 
the second is  the object suggested, the further thought, emotion, or 
image evoked, the thing expressed...These l i e  together in the mind, and 
their union constitutes expression."(15)
This de fin ition  o f expression in "The Sense o f Heauty" is  the most 
detailed o f  those whioh occur in Santayana’ s w ritings. In "Reason in A rt", 
he argues that expression and beauty are present,
"whenever the outer stimulus agreeably strikes an organ and thereby 
arouses a sustained image, in which the consciousness o f both 
stimulation and reaction is  embodied."(16)
The intention here is  evidently to  restate the ob jeotifioa tlon  theory: the 
dlffiou lty 'Ts^thatssthe phrasing Is  inexact. I t  la not clear, for example, 
how consciousness can be said to be embodied in an image.
The development o f the philosophy of the lealms o f 9elng committed 
Santayana to  a denial o f the ob jeotifioa tlon  theory o f beauty, and since 
ob jectifica tion  is  a necessary condition fo r expression in the theory under 
consideration, he is  committed to  abjuring at least that condition from 
his theory o f expression. How he would have accommodated expression in
his la ter philosophy mast remain a matter for conjecture, since he does 
not discuss the subject at any length elsewhere. One short passage occurs
in tne la te  paper, "The Mutability o f Aesthetio Categories" (o f .  a lso  Gh. IX 
below), but it  adds nothing to the ea r lie r  views:
"Expression fo r an observer, as by gesture or language, is  such 
a modification o f one object that i t  suggests or seems to be 
pregnant with quite another sort of thing, perhaps incapable of 
appearing at a l l  in the same medium, as a v is ib le  smile expresses 
pleasure or amusement, which are in v is ib le  things."(17)
While Santayana is  lo g ica lly  committed to  a change in his theory o f  
expression, he l e f t  no record of a developed view compatible with his later 
philosophy.
Heturning to  the earlier theory o f expression, Santayana stresses, 
concerning the associative process i t s e l f ,
"that the process o f association enters consciousness as d ire c tly , 
and produces as simple a sensation, as any process in any organ.
The pleasures end pains o f cerebration, the delight and fa tigue of 
i t ,  are f e l t  exactly lik e  bodily impressions} they have the same 
directness, although not the same loca lisa tion ."(18)
Whatever might be the h istorica l conditions or causes o f my state o f mind, 
when i t  exists, i t  exists,
"immediately and absolutely; each of its  distinguishable parts 
might conceivably have been absent from i t ;  and its  character, as 
well as i t s  existence, is a mere datum o f sense...The pleasure that 
belongs to consciousness of relations is therefore as immediate as 
any other."(19)
This emphasis on immediacy is the result of Santayana's need to make the 
theory of expression consistent with the defin ition  of aesthetic experience 
as immediate experience.
A consequence o f his de fin ition  to which Santayana draws attention is  
that what an object is taken to express w ill  vary a good deal from person
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to persons
"Expression depends upon the union of two terms, one o f which must 
be furnished by the imagination; and a mind cannot furnish what i t  
does not posses». The expressiveness o f everything accordingly 
increases with the in telligence o f  the observer."(20)
This again is  a point to  which he returns in "Reason in A rt". When reading 
poetry,
"What a line suggests at one reading, i t  may never suggest again, 
even to the same person. For th is reasofi, among others, poets are 
partia l to th e ir  own compositions; they tru ly  discover depths of 
meaning which ex ist fo r nobody e ls e ." (21 )
The d if f ic u lty  involved in  this last remark is  a result o f it s  ambiguity.
I t  is  not clear whether Santayana intends th is proposition to be necessary 
or contingent. In the la tte r  case, it  would mean that the depths f e l t  by 
the poet are not as a matter o f fact usually f e l t  by others; in the former, 
that these depths cannot be fe l t  by other». The contingent proposition, i f  
true, would not be o f any ;reat in terest; while the necessary proposition 
could be of very great interest indeed, depending on what arguasflb» were 
used to support i t .  ( Tt  might be part o f an argument to prove the possible 
lim itations of communication via  poetry, fo r example.) Santayana, however, 
does not indicate the exact t »a ie  which he attaches to his remark, and so 
the d if f ic u lty  remains.
While the in defin ite  association of two terms described above is  a 
necessary condition fo r expression, i t  is not su ffic ien t; there is  a second 
necessary condition, which with the f ir s t  is  a lleged to be Jointly su fficien t 
This second necessary condition (as has been indicated) is  that o b jeo tifio -  
ation must occur. In this instance, the ob jec tifica tion  theory lead*, 
lantayana to stress an important feature o f aesthetic expression, namely 
that the expressed properties appear to be in the expressing object:
"The value o f the second term must be incorporated in the f i r s t ;  for
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the beauty o f expression is  as inherent in the object as that o f 
material or fo r i ,  on ly  i t  accrues to that objeot not from the here 
act o f perception, but from the association with i t  o f further 
processes, due to the existence of former impressions.*(22*)
(The undefined term ’ incorporated* is evidently to be understood as a 
synonym for 'o b je c t i f ie d '. )
I t  is  ob jectification  which distinguishes expression from what 
"Santayana ca lls  expressiveness:
"Sxpressiveneso is . . . . th e  power given by experience to any image 
to ca ll up others in  the mind; and th is expressiveness becomes an 
aesthetic value, that is , becomes expression, when the value 
involved in the associations thus awakened are incorporated in the 
present ob ject."(23 )
An obvious corollary to th is  which 3antaya.no might have mentioned but did 
not is  that, on th is d e fin ition , everything can be expressive, since 
every experience can in it ia te  the reca ll o f others to the mind.
One possible misunderstanding should be cleared up. I t  might be 
thought that, by making the peroeiver the source o f the expressed proper­
t ie s  of the aesthetic ob ject, Santayana had committed himself to a highly 
subjectivist theory which is  fa lse to the facts of aesthetic experience.
The objection might be th r t , i f  the expressed properties o f the aesthetic 
object are in fact associations i t  half-evokes in the mind o f the perceiver, 
then i t  would be impossible to derive from the experience o f an aesthetic 
abject any fee lin g  we have not already experienced. This, i t  could be 
argued, denies the p o ss ib ility  of one of the major sources o f  the value 
o f  art, namely that it  furnishes us with awareness of more possib ilities  
o f l i f e  than one human being could normally come by in the course o f one 
life tim e; moreover, among these poss ib ilities  of l i f e  are modes of fe e lin g , 
moods and attitudes, which i t  is often the oase that we learn of through 
art, by means of i t s  power o f expression. Santayana is  not in fact
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committed to the view here objected to , though th is Is not made clear 
In the tex t of "The Sense of Beauty" I t s e l f .  In the course o f his 
discussion of the nature and function of poetry (discussed fu lly  in the 
next chapter), he asserts that poets can arouse feelings fin er than any we 
have known, by s k il l fu l ly  evoking those objects associated with comparable 
fe e lin gs . He goes on,
"Expression is  a misleading term which suggests that something 
previously known is  rendered or im itated; whereas the expression 
is  i t s e l f  an original fa ct, the values o f which are then referred 
to  the thing expressed...So the charm which a poet, by his art of 
combining images and shades o f emotion, casts over a scene or an 
action, is  attached to the principal actor in i t ,  who gets the 
benefit o f a well-stocked mind."(24)
Santayana does not therefore wish to say that what we take to be expressed 
in an aesthetic object is  always something we have experienced before. The 
poet, and there is  no reason why he should not extend the doctrine to the 
other a rts , can combine elements In his works so as to express new feelings
*
Turning to criticism  o f th is  theory, i t  is  now to be argued that the 
major d if f ic u lty  in Santayana's theory of expression is  that i t  makes the 
perceiver the source o f the expressed properties of the aesthetic object, 
since, though on Santayana’ s view these properties appear to be in the 
ob ject, they are in fact alleged to be projected by the perceiving subject. 
Tn opposition to thi3, i t  Is argued that a more economical hypothesis is 
that the expressed properties are in the expressive object, arousing 
fee lin gs  In the peroeiver by th eir analogy to  certain features o f human 
beings. I t  is also argued thet this same d if f ic u lty  is fa ta l to another 
well-known type of expression theory involving the notion of projeotion, 
i . e .  the "Einfühlung" theory. (Both Santayana's view and that o f the 
"Einfühlung" theorists appear to  have beer foreshadowed to some degree
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tuskin's notion of the Pathetic fa l la c y . (25*)) In conclusion, a synoptic 
account o f the meaning o f statements ascribing expressive properties to 
aesthetic objects is  put forward, a subject Santayana omits to consider, 
though i t  is  an omission for which i t  would unhlstorical to  blame him.
*
The most extreme form of "itinfuhlung" view is  that o f Lipps. He 
contends that i t  is  the defining property o f aesthetic experience that the 
d istinction  between the perceiving subject and perceived object in some 
sense collapses:
"Aesthetic satisfaction  oonsists in th is : that i t  is  satisfaction  
in an object, which yet, just so far as i t  is  an object of 
satis faction , is  not an object but myselfj or i t  is  satisfaction  in 
a s e lf which yet, just so fa r  as i t  is  aesthetically  enjoyed, is  not 
myself but something ob jective . This is what is meant by Empathy: 
that the distinction  between the s e lf  and the object disappears or 
rather does not yet e x is t ." ( 26)
This Iden tity  o f subject and object is  to  be taken absolutely l i t e r a l ly :  
" . . i t  comes about that I  fe e l myself carrying out the movement in the 
other's movement..."(27) and th is id en tity  extends even to the sense of / 
spatial location:
" . . . I  am absolutely incorporated in the moving body. T am even 
sp a tia lly  in its  position, so fa r  as the se lf has a spatial 
position; I am transported in to  i t .  So far as my consciousness 
goes I  am absolutely iden tica l with i t . "(28) 
further, a distinotion is  to be drawn between the practical and contem­
p lative selves. The inner im itation I  a lleged ly  experience in the 
aesthetic state is  indeed mine, yet i t  is not experienced by the s e lf  o f  
humdrum, extra-aesthetic a c tiv ity , but by my contemplative s e lf, "which 
only exists in the lingering contemplation of the ob jec t." (29) He 
describes a lleged ly typ ica l empathio experience as follows:
"There is a distinotion between empethlc feelings -  those which I
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have 'ln  an ob jact' -  and those which I  have about an o b je c t . « . . I f  
I  fe e l my e ffo r t  In a column, my e ffo r t  Is that o f  the column, and 
th is la quite d ifferen t from my e ffo r t , fo r  Instance, to erect or 
ruin the column. Or again, i f  I  «ranathically fe e l my gaiety or 
cheerfulness in the blue sky, then the blue sky smilea. My gaiety 
is  in i t ,  belongs to i t . " (30*)
less radical in phraseology and contention is  the principal British 
Empathist, Vernon Lee. 3he writes that there is  a tendency in the mind 
to merge its  a c t iv it ie s  as a perceiving subject with those o f the 
perceived object, and i t  is th is tendency which is  the root of the 
phenomenon of expression. V.'hat is  i t ,  fo r  example, that causes us to make 
a mountain the subject o f a verb of action, as when we say, "The mountain 
rises?" To begin with, we have to raise our eyes to see i t ,  and so an 
a c tiv ity  o f rising is  going on in us. Yet in so fa r as we contemplate the 
mountain, we cease to be aware of ourselves, and so o f our a c t iv ity  o f 
rising. The result is  that we attribute our a c t iv ity  to  the contemplated 
ob ject.(31) However, what we transfer to the mountain is  not merely our 
own present single act of rising, but rather the whole complex of 
memories and anticipations o f these a c t iv it ie s , what Lee ca lls the 
"general idea o f r is in g " . (32) A ll th is  is  transferred to the mountain.
There is  no shortage o f d if f ic u lt ie s  with these views. To begin with, 
i t  is  plain that they are not, as they purport to be, exhaustive 
descriptions o f aesthetic experience. At best, they would serve as 
theoretical explanations of certain rather hectic experiences. They w ill  
not account for pleasure in material and form, the point which the Earl of 
Liatowel makes in criticism  of "Einfühlung" views:
"Our disinterestedness and detachment from practical and ideal 
interests in the contemplation of beauty, the glow of pleasure 
with which i t  suffuses the heart, the immediate joy o f the senses 
in the delioate perfume and b r illia n t colouring of a flower, the
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calm delight we fe e l  in a balanced, harmonious and symmetrical 
structure, these, a fte r  a l l ,  are v ita l aspects of our aesthetic
experience fo r  which a rt is t ic  sympathy o ffers  no substitute and 
no explanation,"(33*)
Yet th is  is not a l l .  Not only w i ll  Empathy theory not explain pleasure 
in material and form, but i t  w i l l  not explain calm expressed properties 
e ith er. The third movement o f Beethoven's last quartet, op.135, is  
extraordinarily serene. How can Lipps account fo r this -  am I  to  be said 
to project my in activ ity  into the work of art? This leaves Empathy theory 
as at best an explanation o f a sub-class o f a sub-class o f aesthetic 
experiences, those o f dynamic expression.
Yet even in this lim ited area, there is a fact o f experience which 
Empathy theory cannot account fo r, the same fact to which Santayana's 
theory of expression is  also inadequate, namely that, even where a work of 
art is  intensely expressive of passions which might without strain be 
ca lled  dynamic -  paintings by El Ireeo and Toya are ready examples -  i t  
is  possible to  recognise the expression and yet not share i t .  There are 
two rep lies which the determined projection theorist can make, the f i r s t  
being that anyone who is  thus unmoved is aesthetically speaking as insensit­
ive  as a block, and has never had a genuine aesthetic experience. Such 
a rep ly runs the risk  o f rendering the theory irrefu table, since nothing 
w i l l  be admitted as counter-evidence against i t .  A lternatively, the 
projection theorist can adopt another psychological premiss, namely that 
projection is not only involuntary and Instantaneous, but also unconscious; 
hence i t  would be possible forthe conscious mind to remain detached. The 
objection to th is is that i t  Infringes a rule for the construction of theor­
ie s , namely that the explicans be iden tifiab le  independently o f the 
explicandum. The only evidence fo r the postulated process would be the 
fact i t  is alleged to account fo r; nothing else could either confirm or 
disconflrm i t .
In view o f the d if f ic u lt ie s  Involved in views which make the perceiver
the source o f expressed properties In aesthetic objects, especia lly over 
the fact that I t  Is  possible to recognise expression and yet remain 
detached from I t ,  a more economical hypothesis to adopt Is  that expressed 
properties are In some sense In the aesthetic ob ject. The next step, 
therefore, is  to consider explanations o f how th is is  possible. One 
obvious thesis which suggests I t s e l f  is  that there are elements o f works 
o f art such that they have an Intrinsic significance. A variety o f th is 
style o f explanation o f expression is extensively explored by leryck Cooke 
in "The Language o f Music."
Cooke's theory, simply enough, is  that music is ,  as has often been 
claimed, the language o f emotion, whereby a composer communicates a given 
fee lin g  or group o f feelings to an audience. The feelings communicated 
constitute the meaning of the work in question. The basic terms o f the 
vocabulary o f the language of music are the notes o f the major, minor, and 
chromatic diatonic scales, which each have an inherent emotional character 
(34) This conclusion is  established, in  Cooke's view, by a survey o f the 
usage o f notes, in terva ls, and certain phrases by European composers of 
the last four centuries. ?or example, the major third always expresses 
pleasure, (35) while the minor third always expresses the wrongness o f 
g r ie f . (36) Again, the phrase, l- (2 )-3 - (4 )-5  (major) has consistently been 
used to  express an active, outgoing emotion o f jo y  (37), whereas 
5 - (4 )_3 - (2 )- l (minor) expresses a yield ing to g r ie f, passive suffering and 
despair.(38) A l l  these inherent significances are modified by other 
musical elements» volume, time, timbre, pitch, and texture, to produce a 
language o f marvellous subtlety. (39)
’or present purposes, i t  is  enough to note the main d if f ic u lty  with so 
simple a version of the inherent algnlf icanoe view, namely that there are 
cases where the modification by other features is  so great as to remove 
any Justification  for saying that there are elements with a sign ification  
anything lik e  so constant as Cooke maintains. Hanalick points out that,
"many of the moat celebrated airs from 'The Messiah', including 
those most of a l l  admired as being suggestive o f p iety, were taken
from secular duets, (mostly ero tic ) composed in the years 1711-12...
(40)
The importance of context is  evidently much greater then Cooke thinks.
Curiously enough, there are views on the significance of colour in 
Lipps's work which bear some resemblance to  those of Cooke on music -  o f 
course, for Ilpps, the 'constant sign ificance ' must come from the invariant 
projection of the same fee lin g  onto the same colour, but in any case the 
feelings he associates with colours are commonly so associated, and 
whether the significance be in trinsic or projected, his views are worth 
rebutting. Yellow, he says, is  fu l l  o f joy j dark blue o f deep seriousness, 
and v io le t  fu l l  o f longing. (41) Counter-examples once again demonstrate 
the importance o f context. I t  is hard to find the alleged profundity and 
seriousness in "The 31ue 3oy"; and again, much of the oanvas area o f 
"L'Tjr,barque merit pour l '^ le  de Cythere" o f Watteau is  yellow, yet the 
pervasive fee ling, as so often with Watteau, is  serious and sadi l i f e  is 
ephemeral, and so the pursuit o f pleasure must be taken seriously.
I t  seems, then, -hat while expressed properties are ob jective, their 
nature and the experience o f them is  o f some degree o f complexity. With 
regard to the question of context, Comb rich has pointed out how important 
i t  is  to teke note o f the lim its  o f the sty le  in which a work o f art is 
conceived -  what might be the extreme o f anguish in Haydn might be a 
mild irr ita tion  in Cartok. There is  indeed a problem here, pointed out 
by Wollhelm (42), namely that even granting Combrich's olaints about the 
need to know an a r t is t 's  repertoire, yet there s t i l l  remains the question 
of why the repertoire is  as i t  is . The most reasonable answer seems to 
be that there must ultim ately be some natural basis in the elements of a 
work o f art for expression -  the alternative is  to claim that repertoires 
are set up en tirely  by convention, which is  about as plausible as to  find
the h istorical origin  of a ristocratic government in a social contraot. To
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deny any natural foundation to  expression is  to  create very grave 
problems in explaining why ultimately the conventions are es they are. I t  
is  to be committed to denying the thesis advanced below, that ( fo r  example) 
sad works o f art are sad either because they represent or because they 
resemble sad people in  some respect. While i t  may not be easy to  specify 
the relevant respects o f resemblance, to  deny any ro le to resemblance is 
surely to leave the conventions unexplained. While this is  so, however, 
i t  does not involve a commitment to  a naive 'in tr in s ic  s ign ificance ' 
account such as that of Cooke. H istorica lly  i t  seems that, however 
naturally based expressive procedures may be, they can and do become 
conventional, or almost so. Knowledge of the repertoire is  v i t a l j  and 
th is has the corollary that a large number o f b e lie fs  about the history 
o f art are relevant to the experience o f expression.
The next question to face is th is : granted that expires ed properties 
are ob jective features of aesthetic objects, how in general do works of 
art express? A fter a l l ,  emotions, attitudes, b e lie fs  and so fo rth , a l l  
the types o f property expressible in  a r t , are primarily predicated of 
human beings. How do they gat into works of art? As has been indicated, 
there seem to be two major ways in which this can be explained. Where 
representation is  involved, the mechanism o f expression does not seem 
so mysterious or problematics save fo r  the important complications 
introduced by the distanced attitude, and the relevance of knowledge o f 
the h istory o f a rt, we can react to represented people and events as we 
can to th e ir  rea l l i f e  counterparts.
More mysterious are the cases o f non—representational a r t , primarily 
architecture and music. The most economical hypothesis is  surely that 
we find expression where there is  some resemblance or analogy to  human 
beings (not forgetting also the probable physiological aspect o f the 
response to arch itecture). Perhaps th is is  what Wittgenstein meant when 
he saids " I f  I  say o f a piece o f Schubert's that i t  is  melancholy, that
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Is  lik e  giving i t  a fa ce ."(A3) Arnheim takes exception to  th is w e ll-  
worn view. He considers that expression in  human beings can only be a 
special case of a more general phenomenon. A weeping willow is  sad not 
because i t  resembles a sad person in  some respects; th is comparison 
imposes i t s e l f  only secondarily. His claim is  that expressed properties 
are in tr in s ic  to lines and shapes which are expressive in people when they 
happen to instantiate these lines and shapes with th eir bodies.(AA) I f  
this were true -  i f  the comparison with human beings were as advenitious 
as Arnheim claims -  then i t  is d if f ic u lt  to  explain why our entire 
vocabulary for describing expression should assimilate objects to persons, 
and not vice versa. I f  what Arnheim says is  true, then i t  is  in principle 
as l ik e ly  that the comparisons would be the other way round -  we should 
be Just as lik e ly  to  say that a weeping person is  lik e  a willow as to  say 
that the willow is  weeping.
I f  the above is  an acceptable outline o f the mechanism o f expression, 
there s t i l l  remains a major philosophical problem regarding this feature o f 
aesthetic experiencet what analysis is to be given to  propositions in which 
expressive properties are ascribed to works o f art? In view of the fa c t 
that I  can remain detached from an expressive object while regarding i t  at 
the same time as expressive, i t  is  clear that analyses which make such 
propositions overt or covert references to  the emotional condition o f the 
perceiver must be rejected. One such is  that o f Hospers. For him, to  say, 
"Tnie composition expresses melancholy" is  to  make an incomplete statement, 
since I  always mean, "expresses melancholy to me."(A5) Equally unacceptable 
are analyses which replace, "to  me" with "to  me on most occasions", or 
"to  most experienced listeners."(A& )
The correct analysis must in some way allow for the ob jec tiv ity  o f  
expressed properties. Granted th is , i t  is  Immediately obvious that the 
predication of emotions, be lie fs , and so forth , of works of art, cannot be 
a l it e r a l  usage, but must diverge in some way from the paradigm asoriptions
(128)
o f such predicates to persons. Wittgenstein at on* point believed that the 
d ifference in usage lay in the tra n s itiv ity  or otherwise o f the verb. In 
"The Brown Book" he writes that the log ica l grammar o f ,  "Every one o f these 
colour patterns says something" is  d ifferent from that o f, "'Very one of 
these men says something". Moreover, musical expression d if fe rs  from that 
o f words. He wishes to say, not that music conveys feelings to us but that, 
"Music conveys to  us i t s e l f l "  This is  d ifferen t again from, "The whole 
face expresses bewilderment", where the verb "expresses" is  used transit­
iv e ly . (¿7) This suggestion as to the difference in  usage must be rejected. 
Were W ittgenstein's suggestion true, then i t  would be considered lingu ist­
ic a l ly  very odd to  use the verb "express" tra n s itiv e ly  with a work o f art 
as i t s  subject. Tor example, i t  would be considered strange to say that 
Mozart's fo rtie th  symphony expresses a state of deep dejection; or that 
many o f Wilfred Owen's poem's express b itte r  d is illu s ion  and horror of 
war. A ll such uses ascribing expressed properties must be considered 
aberrant on W ittgenstein's view; yet such uses are surely commonplace and 
in tu it iv e ly  free  from any sense of lingu istic  unease. Later on, i t  is  only 
fa ir  to add, Wittgenstein came to doubt his ea r lie r  view. In the 
"Investigations", he puts a question to  himself: "What would i t  mean to 
say, 'What this musical theme te l ls  me is  i t s e l f ? "  (¿8)
The most plausible account o f propositions ascribing emotional 
qua lities  to works o f art seems to be that o f loodman, i . e .  that to 
express p is metaphorically to possess p. The f in a l problem, then, is  to 
give an account o f what i t  is  fo r  a property to be possessed metaphorically. 
Possession is  sw iftly  dealt with: for any subject o f qualities x, and any 
property p, x possesses p i f  and only i f  "p" tru ly  applies to x. Possession 
is  l i t e r a l  or metaphorical according as "p" is  used l i t e r a l ly  or meta­
phorically. (49) Ooodman, believing that ■ work o f art must symbolise, i .s .  
denote, considers metaphorical possession only a necessary condition for 
expression, a further necessary condition being jo in t ly  su ffic ien t: this 
second necessary condition is  that the work o f art must denote what i t
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expresses. The double relation  which results is  called exem plification .(50)
There seems to be no reason, however, to  aocept the second neosssary 
conditions the last movement o f Beethoven's ninth symphony does not denote 
joy  (only the word "joy" does th a t), i t  embodies i t .  Is metaphorical 
possession then both neoessary and su ffic ien t fo r  expression in art? The 
question rests on whether a work of art metaphorically possesses any 
qua lities  i t  does not also express. I f  there are any such properties, 
then the analysis can be completed by the addition of a second necessary 
condition, which would be su ffic ien t in conjunction with the f ir s t ,  
specifying classes o f  properties which are expressed, e.g . b e lie fs , 
attitudes, world-vlew3, etc. The l is t  would be open-ended, to allow fo r 
changes o f usage.
loodman is  illuminating on the question of what makes a usage meta­
phorical. (51) To begin with, to  apply a predicate *etaphorioally is to 
defy a ta c it  or exp lic it prior denial of the app licab ility  o f the predicate 
to the object. Secondly, there must be attraction as w ell as resistance; 
a metaphorical predicate must have two ranges of application! emotion- 
predicates like 'gay ' and 'sad* have two such ranges, to persons, and to  
inanimate objects. Moreover, the application in the metaphorical range 
must be guided by the application in the l i t e r a l  range. Habit is at once 
deferred to and departed from. Agreed, "guided by" is  a vague phrase, 
but its  presence is  Justified in  the present context, in that no exactly 
statable rules govern a l l  metaphorical applications. C learly, objects to 
which predicates apply metaphorically must have some properties which are 
shared by or which resemble those o f objects to whioh the predicates apply 
l i t e r a l ly .  The common features can be few, and a metaphor can be recherche 
without our protesting! conceits are a species o f metaphor o f th is kind.
•
This concludes the present very b rie f sketch of a theory o f expression 
Intended as an alternative to that put forward by Santayana. Much o f 
what he says on expression is  perfeotly acceptable! his theory oan
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accommodate more o f the data concerning expression in art than many others 
which have been put forward on this subject. He is  ju stly  emphatic on the 
at least apparent ob jectiv ity  o f expressed properties; end aan account fo r 
the variety o f things which can be expressed. He is moreover free from any 
tendency to use expression in an over-simple description of the psychology 
o f c rea t iv ity . That i t  should have been necessary to  correct his views on 
one point and expand them in another direction  is therefore not so serious 
a defect as i t  seems. Moreover, the d e fin ition  of expression is  only a 
part o f what he has to say on the subject. Other valuable doctrines are put 
forward in la te r  sections o f the argument.
n i l  Types o f  " » lue in the Second Term; Varieties 0f  -ps itive  IfoliM
I t  is  easiest to take up again the thread of Santayana's argument by 
reco llecting his major claim so far: expression consists in the embodiment 
of a blurred association in a present perception. The present perception 
he ca lls  the f ir s t  term o f the expression; the blurred association, the 
second term. The second step in the argument is  the affirm ation that 
the iieoond term can have any one of several kinds of value. The most 
striking fa c t about the phenomenon o f expression, in Santayana's view, ia 
that, "the value acquired by the expressive thing is often o f an en tire ly  
d ifferen t kind from that which the thing expressed possesses." ( 48) (There 
is  a alight d if f ic u lty  here. Santayana's arguments, i t  w i l l  be seen, 
hardly ju s t ify  the claim that en tire ly  disparate things can express and 
be expressed by one another.) According to  Santayana, beauty is value 
positive, in tr in s ic , and ob jectified ; yet the value o f the second term 
(that which is  expressed) is  often physical, practical, or even negative.
In cases o f expression, these non-aeathetic species o f value are meta­
morphosed in to  aesthetic values. The most striking o f these transformations 
is that o f negative into positive values, which has,
"given rise to various theories o f the comic, trag ic , and sublime.
Tor these three species of aesthetio good seem to please us by the
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accommodate more o f the data concerning expression in art than many others 
which have been put forward on th is subject. He is  ju stly  emphatic on the 
at least apparent ob jec tiv ity  o f expressed properties; an] can account for 
the variety o f things which can be exoreased. He is  moreover free from any 
tendency to  use expression in an over-simple description of the psychology 
o f c rea tiv ity . That i t  should have been necessary to  correct his views on 
one point and expand them in another direction is  therefore not so serious 
a defect as i t  seems. Moreover, the de fin ition  o f expression is  only a 
part o f what he has to say on the subject. Other valuable doctrines are put 
forward in la ter sections o f the argument.
I l l :  Types of 'alue in the Second Term; Varieties of Positive Yalua
I t  is  easiest to take up again the thread of Santayana’ s argument by 
recollecting his major claim so far: expression consists in the embodiment 
o f a blurred association in a present perception. The present perception 
he ca lls  the f ir s t  term of the expression; the blurred association, the 
second term. The second step in the argument is  the affirmation that 
the second term can have any one o f several kinds of value. The most 
striking fact about the phenomenon o f expression, in lantayana’ s view, is 
that, "the value acquired by the expressive thing is often o f an en tirely  
d ifferen t kind from that which the thing expressed possesses." ( 48) (There 
is  a sligh t d if f ic u lty  here. Santayana's arguments, i t  w i l l  be seen, 
hardly ju s tify  the claim that en tire ly  diaparate thing« can express and 
be expressed by one another.) According to fiantayana, beauty is value 
positive, in trinslo , and ob jec tified ; yet the value o f the second term 
(that whioh is  expressed) is  often physical, practica l, or even negative.
In oases o f expression, these non-aeethetic species o f value are meta­
morphosed into aesthetic values. The most striking o f these transformations 
is  that of negative Into positive values, which has,
"given rise to various theories o f the eomio, trag ic , and sublime.
Tor these three species of aesthetic good seem to please us by the
suggestion o f e v i l ;  and the problem arises how a mind oan be made 
happier by having suggestions of unhappiness stirred within i t ;  
an unhappiness i t  cannot understand without in some degree sharing
in i t . "(53)
"Iranted that the aesthetic e ffects  produced by the suggestions of e v il in 
tragedy, comedy, and the sublime are amongst the most profound of a l l  
aesthetic e ffeo ts , philosophers have not been slow to use this paradox as 
an argument to demonstrate the necessity o f e v il ,  and have used i t  to 
prop up th e ir  theodicy.(54)
Santayana has no patience either with the theodicy or with the 
aesthetic which attempts to demonstrate the in ev itab ility  (in  some sense) 
o f  the e v i l  In the world. This is  one aspect o f his opposition to 
Romanticism, at the philosophical heart o f which he perfectly correctly 
discerned the b e lie f that the 'rerum natura1 is  inherently contradictory 
and disturbed by s t r i fe  or discord o f some kind. As Isaiah Serlin once 
put i t ,  in the Snglightenment, i t  was assumed that the answers to  a l l  
co rrectly  formed questions would be compatible; the Romantics repudiated 
th is  view. Santayana's rejection  o f Romanticism (as he understands i t )  is 
evident right from the f i r s t  chapter of "The 'ense o f 3eauty", in his 
stipulation that one o f the d ifferen tiae o f aesthetic value is  that i t  is 
always positive, i . e .  aesthetic experience is  always the consciousness 
o f something good.
He is  well aware that th is b e lie f Involves him In serious d if f ic u lt ie s  
over tragedy, comedy and the sublime, where i t  seems evident that 
suggestions of pain and terror -  negative velues in his terminology -  
play a major role in the aesthetic e ffe c t . He is committed to explaining 
away the apparent indispensability of these negative values. Adoption of 
a psyohioal distance view, which does not Include the stipulation about 
positive value, eases the problem somewhati there is  no need to  explain 
how pain becomes pleasure. I t  oan continue to be painful, though mitigated
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by the distanced attitude.
However, th is is  to anticipate s l i^ i t ly .  before dealing with these 
cases o f  negative value in  the second term, Santayana aeals with species 
o f positive value. Throughout his discussion he deliberately  neglects 
the f i r s t  term, since, in his view, i t  does not contribute to  the 
expression, though i t  may contribute greatly  to the beauty o f the ob jec t.(55) 
I t  is  possible fo r the value o f the second term to be i t s e l f  aesthetic. 
The Homeric poems are expressive objeots o f th is kind. Of course, the 
Oreek verse i t s e l f  (the f i r s t  term) is  o f great beauty, but
"the tendency o f his poetry is  nevertheless to  f i l l  the outskirts 
o f our consciousness with the trooping images o f things no less 
fa ir  and noble than the verse i t s e l f .  The heroes are virtuous....The 
palaces, the arms, the horses, tne sacrifices , are always excellent. 
The women are always stately  and beautifu l."(56)
Aesthetic value in the second term is  also the reason fo r the demand that 
stories and comedies should end w ell, that hero and heroine should be 
young and handsome, and 30 fo rth .(57)
Santayana somewhat overestimates the purity o f the Homeric world -  
is  i t  so noble and pure that Agamemnon should steal Brlseis, or that 
Ach illes should sulk about it?  But more Important than this is  a logica l 
d if f ic u lty  involved in his proposition that the second term can have 
aesthetic value. Aesthetic value is  positive, in tr in s ic , and ob jectified , 
and according to Santayana has three speolest material, formal, and 
expressive. Therefore, i f  the second term in an instance of expression has 
aesthetic value, i t  must be one o f these species. I t  is  hard enough to 
make sense o f the idea that a blurred halo o f association, a mental 
content, has formal or material beauty, or again that pleasure may be 
projected onto i t .  Moreover, i f  the value o f the second term is  i t s e l f  
expressive, there must be a third term, an association of the association 
(because a l l  expressions have two terms) and so on. In order to stop the
I ,
regress, Santayana must claim that a l l  values In this third term are 
practical or negative, not aesthetic. le t  he seems committed Ir. some cases 
to th is bizarre hierarchy of at least two associations. These consequences 
are unwieldy.
Tie continues with a less objectionable piece of psychological general­
isation . The expression o f pure, unalloyed beauty very quickly becomes 
cloying to  us:
" . . .a s  contemplation is  actually a luxury in our liv e s , and things 
in terest us ch ie fly  on passionate and practical grounds, the 
accumulation o f values too exclusively aesthetic produces In our 
minds an e ffe c t of closeness and a r t i f i c ia l i t y . "(53)
The charm o f such Idealisation is  undeniable,
"but the other important elements o f our memory and w ill  cannot 
long be banished. The thoughts of labour, ambition, lust anger, 
confusion, sorrow and death must needs mix with our contemplation 
and lend their various expressions to  the objects with which in 
experience they are so closely  a l l ie d ."(59)
Cases in which the second term has aesthetic value, however, are 
rare; more frequently the value is  practical or u tilita r ian . Practical 
value is  expressed,
"whenever the second term is  the idea o f something o f practical 
value to  us, the premonition of which brings aAtisfactlon; and 
th is satisfaction  prompts an approval o f the presented object...The 
tone o f our consciousness is  raised by the foretaste o f a success; 
and this heightened pleasure is  ob jectified  in the present image, 
sinae the associated image to which the satisfaction properly 
belongs often fa i ls  to become d is tin c t."(60)
The ease which most resembles th is is that in which the second term is  sn 
interesting piece o f information, a theory, or other in tellectua l datum. 
Usually our interest in such things is  practical; but curiosity can become
(m)
disinterested and ideas come to be prised for their own Bakes. (One notes 
again how in unguarded moments Santayana tends toward the equation o f the 
aesthetic attitude with the disinterested attitude» an equation ostensibly- 
rejected in the f ir s t  chanter o f "The Sense o f Seauty".)
3sntayana gives an example of th is . Suppose we have before us a map, 
giving details o f climate, population, and so forth. Usually we would 
not regard the map as an aesthetic object, but only as a mere symbol; in 
the contemplation o f i t ,  the mind might be f i l le d  with imaginings o f i t s  
scenery and inhabitants. Ko ob jectification  of pleasure occurs in such a 
case:
"And yet, le t  the tin ts  of i t  be a l i t t l e  subtle, le t the lines 
be a l i t t l e  delicate, and the masses o f land and sea somewhat 
balanced, and we rea lly  have a beautiful thing; a thing the charm 
of which consists almost en tire ly  in it s  meaning, but which neverthe­
less pleases ua in the same way as a picture or a graphic symbol 
might please."(61)
I f  the symbol has aesthetically  pleasing form, line and colours (Santayana 
asserts) the values of whatever facts i t  symbolises w i l l  be projected onto 
i t ,  and I t  w i l l  come to  have value as an example o f aesthetic expression.
The d if f icu lty  with th is is  the apparent assertion that s picture and a 
graphic symbol please In the same way. Santayana does not define either 
o f the key terms "picture" or "graphic symbol", 'fhat he has in mind in 
making the distinction is  presumably that a picture may represent, whereas 
a symbol does not. I f  so then I t  follows from the conclusions arrived at 
in the preceding section that the response aroused by the one w i l l  be 
aroused in a d ifferent way from that occasioned by the other. A symbol 
w i l l  be aesthetically expressive by virtue o f i t s  analogy to human beings, 
a representation by virtue o f its  resemblance to them.
The paradigm instance o f practical value is surely cost, and Santayana 
believes that i t  too can contribute to aeathetio e f fe c t .  He is w ell aware
(135)
o f going against received opinion in naking such a claim, and has an 
argument to support his thesis, "he reason why cost is  usually considered 
not to  be an element of aesthetic e f fe c t  (he contends) is  not that i t  is 
unaesthetic but that it  is  abstract. The mind o f the economist works with 
numerical abstractions. In order to convert cost into an aesthetic e f fe c t , 
one should convert the cost back in to the factors which account fo r its  
ra r ity  o f material, amount o f labour expended, and the distance from which 
the object is brou^it. A ll these features appeal greatly  to the imagination, 
and supply the object with picturesque associations. (62*) Our da ily  
experience contains examples o f cost as an element o f e ffects  gems, great 
as Is th eir sensuous beauty, are the more distinguished by our attention by 
virtue o f their ra rity  and price, than they would ever be i f  they were 
cheap.
There is  only a small element o f truth in th is. High cost might make 
us more ready to stop and contemplate an ob ject, i f  only to  find out why 
i t  cost as much; but beyond th is, cost is  not an element in aesthetio 
e f fe c t , and Indeed this is  so by d e fin ition . I f  what Santayana says were 
true, than, "x is  beautiful because i t  costs a lo t"  would be an aesthetic 
judgment, whereas such a judgment does not contain an aesthetic term o f 
appraisal. Santayana would have done better to  repeat a distinction he 
had made in an earlier papers " I t  is  vulgar to  esteem things for their 
cost, but not vulgar to  esteem them fo r  the qualities which make them 
co s tly ."(63) The predicate "costly" can be used in aesthetic judgment, 
especia lly  as a favourable comment on the quality o f materials. A^ain, 
the example o f gems is  a poor one. They are not distinguished by our 
attention simply because they are expensive) Santayana should have asked 
himself more closely why they come to  be expensive in the f ir s t  place.
Sheer ra r ity , distance and so forth  w ill  not explain why bits of coloured 
mineral are so relentlessly pursued. The sensuous beauty which Santayana 
dismisses as subordinata la o f the f ir a t  Importance, though even th is alone
(136)
w ill  not explain their appeal. Perhaps as Huxley wrote (in  "Heaven and 
H ell") they remind us of the landscape o f dream and visionary experience: 
certain ly the a v id ity  with which they are sought invites some such 
explanation, '’ in a lly , one may note that some o f the aesthetic judgments 
which would result from the adoption o f Santayana's view would be strange 
indeed: "This diamond expresses the labour o f slaves in an African mine, 
and a series of crimes."
Cost, in Santayana's view, contributes to aesthetic experience by 
furnishing a background of associations to the present object: the same 
principle explains the e ffe c t  which evident cleanliness, security and 
economy have on us, what Santayana ca lls  the expression o f economy and 
fitness. This Dutch charm (as he ca lls  i t )  hardly needs explanation: 
waste is  so extremely discomforting to  the mind, and its  v is ib le  manifest­
ation offensive. The manifestation o f it s  contrary is  reassuring, and 
the force o f our approval o f practical fitness becomes half aesthetic, 
when the f i t  form becomes embodied in a type, to the lines o f which we 
are accustomed.( 64)
This piece o f  informal psychology is  expanded by Santayana into a 
generalisation about the rela tion  of aesthetic to  non-aesthetic interests 
in our liv e s . (The pleasure we take in economy and fitness is  an example 
o f the intrusion of the non-aesthetic into the aesthetic sphere.) In 
order to survive, our lives  must be ordered to a certain degree. The 
heart and the be lly  demand constant satisfaction . What we term our higher 
instincts, those of the understanding, are in  tension with these dominant 
lower instincts , and i f  allowed free rein, would disorder our lives :
" 7or th is  reason, u t i l i t y  keeps close watoh over beauty, les t 
in her w ilfulness and r io t  she should offend against our practical 
needs and ultimate happiness. And when the conscience is keen, this 
v ig ilance o f the praetleal imagination over the speoulative oeases 
to a pear as an eventual and external check."(65)
(137)
Any work or object in which there is  a suggestion of luxury, waste, or 
impurity, which threatens disorder, seems to us horrible and no beauty 
can ever be discovered in i t .  The practical imagination dominates the 
aesthetic.
This whole passage is  oddly optim istic. The conclusion is  patently 
fa lse , and one wonders how, in the 1890's, Santayana could have written i t .  
I f  the conscience were active in the way he describes, then i t  is  impossible 
to explain why Beardsley's drawings, or "Lea Chants de Maldoror", or even 
perhaps the "Satyricon" o f Petronius are regarded as works o f a rt, le t  
alone classics.
Vhile on the subject o f the relation of aesthetic and non-aesthetic 
interests, Santayana discusses b r ie fly  the relation  of moral considerations 
to aesthetic ones. He states here b r ie fly  the normative ethical doctrine 
which nine years la te r  was to form the fundamental principle o f "The 
L ife  o f ieason " .  The function o f practical reason is  "to compare, combine, 
and harmonise a l l  our interests, with a view to attaining the greatest 
satisfactions o f which our nature is  capable."(66) The rational position 
to adopt with regard to aesthetic pleasures -  the amount o f time, e f fo r t ,  
and sacrifice  we should devote to them -  varies from person to person, 
proportionately with the amount o f pleasure the individual obtains from 
them. The harmonisation of a l l  interests in ord r to maximize pleasure 
is  the L ife  o f ¿eason. Aesthetic interests are treated in  principle 
exactly lik e  any other human interest in the rational l i f e .  This is  one 
way in which mo a l interests dominate those o f aesthetics.
There is a second way, equally obvious, fo r, "Our sense of practical 
benefit not only determines the moral value of beauty but sometimes even 
its  existence as a moral good."(67) The point is  th is: i f  the centre o f 
consciousness is  occupied by urgent and compelling practical mattere, then 
aesthetic features which would be a d e l i c t  in a state o f contemplation 
are merely an irr ita n t: " I f  things o f  moment are before us, we cannot
(138)
stop to play with symbols and figures o f speech."(68) This Is  an 
undoubted fact o f psychology. I t  accords perfec tly  with the psychical 
distance view which Santayana re jects .
Santayana once again generalises on the place o f art In l i f e t  "(the 
arts)appear only as unstable, superadded a c t iv it ie s , employments o f our 
freedom, a fter the work o f l i f e  is  done and the terror o f i t  a llayed ."(69) 
Yet though they are thus precarious, i t  does not follow  that art and the 
aesthetic attitude are insign ificant features o f existencei
"There is  no situation so te rr ib le  that i t  may not be relieved 
by the momentary pause o f the mind to contemplate i t  a es th e tica lly ... 
by finding grandeur in our disasters, and merriment in our mishaps, 
the aesthetic sense thus m o llifie s  both, and consoles us fo r the 
frequent im possib ility o f a serious and perfect beauty."(70) 
Santayana thus arrives at the idea of the contemplation o f painful 
experienoe, a feature o f the aesthetic experience o f the tra g ic , comic and 
sublime. To these he turns next.
U i Types o f Value in The Second Termi negative Values» ( i )  Tragedy and the
sublime
The major topics in  the theory o f tragedy were set up almost entirely  
by A ris to tle : the de fin ition  of tragedyj the nature o f the trag ic  hero; 
the nature o f the response to tragedyj the need or lack o f i t  fo r  chorus 
and unities, for • peri p it elae •, •anagnorisis* and suf faring. To these 
Hegel, Kierkegaard and Nietzsche added the notion that tragedy might be 
a llied  to  a fa ir ly  restricted set o f presuppositions. I f  to  have views on 
a l l  these topics is  to have a complete theory o f tragedy, then Santayana 
does not have a complete theory in this sense. In "The Sense o f 3eauty", 
he addresses himself so le ly  to the description o f the traglo response; 
elsewhere he makes fa i r ly  b rie f comments on a few o f the matters from the 
l i s t  above.
Nearest to a description of the tragic hero is a passage in a 1936
(139)
paper, "Tragic Philosophy".(71») Santayana seas the origin o f tragedy in 
the con flic t o f ideas with the truth, or, put in another way, in maladapit— 
ation o f the man to his environment. L ife  is adverturous and combative, 
and where this is  so, "Ideas, however spontaneous, w i ll  then claim to be 
knowledge o f u lte rio r facts, end w ill  be in constant danger o f being 
contradicted by the truth. Experience, from being ly r ica l, w ill  become 
trag ic ; fo r  what is  tragedy but the con flict o f inspiration and the 
tru th?"(72) This is  the core o f the tragic situation: we run our lives 
according to be lie fs  or passions which blind us to the true circumstances, 
and eventually these circumstances take their revenge:
"?rom within, or, as we may fancy, from above, some passionate 
hope takes shape in the mind. We fa l l  in love or hear a voice 
from heaven; new energies seem to leap within us; a new l i f e  
begins crowding the old l i f e  out, or making i t  seem dreary or 
wicked...Yet not fo r long, nor far ever...The more profound and 
voluminous that f ir s t  inspiration was, the more complete at last 
w ill  be our astonishment and despair."(73*)
This description might be stretched to  f i t  the oases o f Lear, Othello and 
Macbeth, but not Hamlet: i t  is  hardly true to  say that new energies leapt 
within him, making his old l i f e  seem dreaiy or wicked. The truth in his 
case is more nearly the exact reverse of th is : he lacks energy and longs 
fo r his old l i f e  in Wittenberg. Moreover, Santayana's description f i t s  
several o f Moliere’ s 'maniaques' quite as w ell as tragic heroes -  
Monsieur Jourdain and the 'femmes savantes' are as much in the grip o f 
fa lse  belie fs in  the wcy described as are Lear, Othello or Macbeth, 
lantaynna has picked a feature neither necessary nor su fficien t fo r a 
trag ic  hero.
Lass wide o f the mark la an earlier passage (in  "lesson In A rt") in  
which he seems to make some sort o f inner con flic t, resulting in the 
wasteful destruction of what la  valuable, a characteristic o f the trag ic
situation:
(HO)
"Death and change acquire a traglo character when they Invade a 
mind which is  not ready for them In a l l  it s  parts, so that those 
ej.eia«M4bS in i t  wuioh are a t i l l  vigorous, and voulu maintain somewnat 
longer th e ir  ideal id en tity , su ffer violence at the bands o f others, 
already mastered by decay and w illin g  to be se lf-d estru c tive ."(74) 
This is  'a fo r t io r i ' true o f Hamlet, and certain ly i t  is  the weak or 
wicked aspects o f Othello, Lear and Macbeth which destroy them and 
consequently what is  good in  them. Yet this description hardly suits the 
protagonists o f some Greek plays. I t  is  hardly weakness or wickedness 
which leads to the death o f Antigone, rather her devotion to her brother's 
memory, matched against arson's devotion to  Thebes. This is  perhaps the 
only situation vfaich f i t s  Hegel's thesis that the tra g ic  situation 
consists in the con flic t o f right with righ t.
With regard to the presuppositions o f tragedy, Santayana is  squarely 
in the trad ition  which argues that the universe in  which a tragedy occurs 
must be ind ifferent to man. There must be no suggestion o f an a ft e r - l i fe  
and o f consolations beyond the gravej a tru ly  Ghristian tragedy is  
impossible:
"Tragedy must end in death; for any immortality which the poet 
or hero may otherwise believe in is  irrelevan t to the passion 
that has absorbed him...The poss ib ility  of u lte rio r liv e s  or 
alien interests destined in future to ag ita te  the world makes no 
difference to the drama in this soul; and the mention o f those 
irrelevant sequels to this ruin, would t in k le  with a ghastly 
mockery at this supreme moment, when a man is  entering eternity, 
his measure taken and his prtde en tire ."(75 )
That is  why Seneoa and Shakespeare, though Platonism was at hand fo r the 
one and Christianity for the other, both stuck fa s t to a disillusioned 
philosophy. Again, that is why in the seventeenth oentury, when Christian 
orthodoxy was dominant, severe, and in te llectu a l, Christianity was neverthe­
less banished from the stage:
(H I)
"Both Christian and pagan personages talked and fe l t  throughout 
lik e  thoroughly unregenerate mortals. To have allowed re lig ion  
to sh ift the scenes, override the natural passions o f men, and 
reverse the moral o f the story, would have seemed an intolerable 
ant i-clim ax."(76»)
I f  Santayana is  at fault here, i t  is  only through omission. Vhat is  true 
o f Christian ity is  also true o f  Marxism, a point made by George Steiner, 
for example, in his, "The Peatk of Tragedy".(77») Tor the Marxist, tragedy 
must be a re lic  from the museum of the moral past. There is  no such 
inevitable disaster as true tragedy portrays« Necessity is  blind, said 
Marx and Engels, only where i t  is not understood. To encompass both 
Marxism and Christianity, the point about presuppositions needs to be 
generalised« tragedy is  impossible «¿thin .ny world-view which is in a 
certain sense optim istic, i . e .  which regards human l i f e  as other than 
fu t i le ,  whether the reason fo r  tills  be the possib ility  of salvation, or a 
conviction o f the inevitable progress o f society toward moral perfection.
"or Christian and Marxist a lik e , death has no sting.
Turning to Santayana's main interest in the theory o f tragedy, the 
nature of the aesthetic experience it  provides, i t  is  clear by Implication 
that, while he apparently accepts the doctrine of catharsis, he regards 
i t  as only a 3mall part o f the complete description o f the trag ic response. 
There is  no analysis of the catharsis theory in "The Sense o f 3eauty", and 
only a b rie f passage in "Reason in A rt". Acceptance o f the views in this 
la tte r  passage depends la rg e ly  on acceptance of the epiphenomenalist 
theory o f the mind, and ob jec tifica tion  theory wfaicu i t  so c learly  re flec ts « 
" . . .a  man whose physiological complexion involves more poignant 
emotion than his ideas can absorb -  one who is  sentimental -  w ill  
yearn fo r new objects that may explain, embody, and focus his dumb 
feelings] and these ob jects, i f  art can produce them w ill  re lieve  
and g lo r ify  those fee lin gs  in the act o f expressing them. Catharsis 
is  nothing more."(78 *)
(H 2)
In "The 3ense o f Beauty", Santayana begins by pointing out that i t  has 
been found paradoxical that human beings should taka pleasure in  the 
contemplation o f  tragedy, where what is portrayed would be acutely painful 
in a non-eesthetic context. I t  has also been said -  and the paradox is  
thereby increased -  that we are pleased by the suggestion o f e v i l .
Santayana begins by denying the second claim (and surely he is  right to do 
so): the fact o f the matter is  that we do not fe e l pleased in the contempla­
tion o f trag ic  suffering. I f  we are pleased, i t  is  in spite o f and not 
because o f the suffering portrayed, father, the experience o f  tragedy is  
a complex one, " i t  must contain an element o f pain overbalanced by an 
element of pleasure; in our delid» t  there must be a distinguishable touch 
o f shrinking end sorrow ..."(79*) This is  made possible by the painful 
nature o f the subject-matter being o ffse t by various compensatory factors, 
aesthetic, moral, and in te llectu a l, end i t  is  these which must be studied 
i f  the fu l l  complexity o f the tragic experience is  to be properly under­
stood. 3efore going on, i t  is as well to be clear about the position 
Santayana is  defending. As has been pointed out above, he must sustain 
his position that a l l  aesthetic values are positive, i . e .  an aesthetic 
experience is  always the experience o f something good. He is  not so naive 
as to wish to  hold that any and every aesthetic experience is  o f unalloyed 
delight; but what he must prove is  that no aesthetic experience is  more 
painful (on the whole) than i t  is  pleasant; and further that where there 
is a painful element -  a negative value, in  his terms -  i t  is  never in 
any way essentia l to the aesthetic e ffe c t . He must prove this three times 
over: fo r  tragedy, the sublime, and for comedy. He himself reviews his 
position at the end of his whole argument; and a consideration o f this 
major issue o f  internal consistency is reserved fo r that point.
There ie  one theory o f the tragic response ( jantaymiia begins) which 
would obviate the need fo r any detailed investigation o f the components o f 
that response. This theory holds that a l l  moderate excitement ie  pleasant,
(H 3 )
and therefore, since in  the aesthetic experience o f tragedy, e v i l  is  seen 
from a distance and is  therefore not peinful, i t  is  not surprising that 
we should find tragedy pleasant, Santayana's perfectly  just rejoinder 
is  that anyone who does not fe e l pain when watching tragedy is  lik e  a 
child who vetches e shipwreck and, ignorant of the pain and suffering 
Involved, merely fe e ls  pleasantly excited. The sympathy o f the observer 
must be aroused:
"The intensity of the impression must not be so sligh t that its  
painful quality is  not f e l t }  for i t  is  this very sense of pain, 
mingling with the aesthetic excitement o f the spectacle, that 
gives i t  a tragic or pathetic colouring,"(30)
The f ir s t  o f the compensatory factors which in  Santayana's view conjoin 
to make the portrayed su ffering bearable is the aesthetic value o f the 
f ir s t  tern i t s e l f ,  the expressing object:
" ...w h ile  we are saddened by the truth we are delighted by the 
vehicle which conveys i t  to  u s . . . i f  ever the charm o f the beautiful 
presentation sinks so low, or the vividness o f the represented e v i l  
rises so high, that the balance is in favour o f pain, at that very 
moment, the whole object becomes h o r r ib le .. ."(81)
Santayana records in his autobiography an instance of such a deficiency in 
the expressing object, an experience which stayed in his memory fo r over 
six ty years. As a young man of nineteen or twenty, he had watched a 
performance o f Vletorlen Sardou's "La Tosca":
" . . in  the scene where Mario is  being tortured, I  found the strain 
intolerable, and slipped o u t... fo r  fear o f fa in ting. This 
experience led me to  understand that there is  a lim it to the 
acceptable terror and p ity  that tragedy may excite. They must be
excited only speculatively, in te llectu a lly , re lig iou s ly : i f  theyi
are excited m aterially and deceptively, you are overcome and not 
exalted. "(82)
A
(144)
To see how important is the effect of the f ir s t  term in tragedy, one 
need only Imagine the following experiments
* (amove i'rom any drama -  say from 'O thello ' -  the charm of the 
medium of representation; reduce the tragedy to a mere account 
o f the facts and of the words spoken, such as our newspapers almost 
da ily  contain; and the tragic dignity and beauty is  entirely  los t. 
Kothing remains but a disheartening item o f human fo l l y . ..* (83 ) 
Further, the more te r r ib le  the experience described, the more powerful is 
the art needed to  transform i t  into an aesthetic ob ject. For this reason, 
Santayana believes, verse is more necessary in tragedy than in comedy.
Metre, r  lyme, and so forth,
"enable the mind swept by the deepest cosmic harmonies, to  endure 
and absorb the s h r ill notes vkiich would be intolerable in a poorer 
setting...The afflatus o f rhythm, even i f  i t  be the pomp of the 
Alexandrine, sublimates the passion, and c la r i f ie s  its  mutterings 
into poetry. "(84)
There is  a good deal o f truth in this. In tragedy, perhaps above a l l  other 
art-forms, the attitude of psychical distance is  v ita l,  and at the same 
time, because o f the subject-matter o f tragedy, more fra g ile . The 
a r t i f ic ia l i t y  o f veree is one o f the features which helps to preserve i t ,  
as also do the conventions o f staging. The buskins and masks o f the dreeks, 
with th e ir  origins perhaps as much in the configuration o f the Ireek 
theatre as anything else, must also have helped to maintain the necessary 
distance.
A second compensatory feature in tragedy is  that no tragedy is  
en tire ly  without the suggestion o f beautiful things; and indeed this 
suggestion is  continual. This is  why, "we have palaces for our scene, 
rank, beauty, and virtue in our heroes, nob ility in th eir passions and in 
their fa te , and altogether a sort of g lo rifica tion  o f l i f e . .." (8 5 ) Too 
wicked a character or too unrelieved a situation we would find revolting and 
not tra g ic . Even the scene o f the storm in ">ing Lear", one o f the very
(U 5)
bleakest episodes ir. tragedy. Is not en tire ly  without ita  suggestions o f 
goodness. Lear says to his loyal Fooli "Art sold? There is  a part o f me 
sorry fo r thee y e t ."(86*) "King Lear" exhibits another, rather d iffe ren t 
principle! so manifold are the miseries portrayed that the mind cannot 
become too absorbed in  any one of them.
There is  some truth in this also; yet to  attribute the fact that 
tragedy is  usually concerned with men and women o f high rank to simple 
aesthetic necessity is  unhlstorioals the choice o f subject-matter is 
related to the prevailing class-structure of society, the extent o f 
lite racy , the conditions o f patronage o f a rt is ts , and accepted beliefs 
about wh’ oh classes o f society are o f importance. I t  is  fa ir ly  well 
accepted that by the end o f the nineteenth century, tragic vision in 
European litera tu re  had ceased to be cast in the form of dramas and 
instead appears in the novel. The heroes and heroines needed no longer 
to  come from the aristocracy, quite the reverse in the obvious cases o f 
Hardy and M elv ille , especia lly  the la t te r 's  'S illy  3udd.
Third and more important among compensatory features is the fact 
that tragedies express truths, sad and painful but truths nonetheless, 
and human beings would rather know the truth than be subject to the 
torment o f ignorance. Santayana points out that this craving for truth 
is  not an aesthetic pleasure, and that other conditions fo r beauty must 
be fu l f i l le d !
"3ut the satisfaction of so imperious an in tellectua l instinct 
insures our w illin g  attention to the tragic object, and strengthens 
the hold which any beauties i t  may possess w ill  take upon us.
An In tellectual value stands ready to be transmuted into an 
aesthetic one.. . " (8 7 » )
Closely related to th is is  the compensation which follows on recognition, 
l . e .  of situations portrayed in tragedies which we take to be similar to  
Incidents in our own l i f e .  Thus in the response to tragedy there is ,  "the
(H6)
sentimental (pleasure) of nursing our own griefs and dignifying them by 
assimilation to a less inglorious representation o f them."(3d) There is 
surely a good aeax oe suiu fo r  at least the f i r s t  o f these points. I t  
is  hard to see why an audience w i l l  undergo the experience o f "King Lear" 
i f  i t s  members do not believe that i t  is  profoundly relevant to  their 
own liv e s , and i t  is  hard to see how i t  could be relevant (in  th is  instance) 
i f  not in respect o f dramatising some important truths, especia lly about 
the movements of fe e lin g , and human motivation. ( I t  should be noted also 
that the passing comment Santayana makes in this context about the 
non-aesthetic nature o f the desire to knew the truth is  by no means a l l  
he has to say about the question of truth in a rt. His various more sub­
stantia l comments on th is subject are considered in Chs. V and V II, below.)
Santayana continues that a l l  the factors so fa r  advanced neither 
exhaust the experience of tragedy, nor provide a fu l l  explanation of why 
fo r oenturles human beings have written and watched them. The response as 
so fa r described might be occasioned by a work which was merely pathetic, 
and i t  is ,
" fa r  too passive and penitential to  contain the louder and sublimer 
o f our trag ic moods. In these there is  a wholeness, a strength, 
a rapture, which s t i l l  demands an explanation. "(89)
The f ir s t  step in this explanation is  to examine the idea of the s e lf. 
Hume's introspective discoveries had evidently not been lost on ¡antayana: 
"The impulses, memories, principles, and energies which we 
designate by that word ( i . e .  the s e lf )  b a ffle  enumeration; indeed, 
they constantly fade and change into one another; and whether the 
s e lf is  anything, everything, or nothing depends on the aspect of 
i t  we momentarily f ix ,  and especially on the de fin ite  object with 
which we contrast lt »" (9 0 )
The most remarkable fact about the experience o f beauty is  that i t  so 
harmonises these numerous and diverse mental contents as to  bring
harmony to the soul. 3ut there are two methods of attaining harmony) the 
f ir s t  is  to harmonise a l l  the elements present) the second is  to exclude 
whatever refuses to he so harmonised. Unity by inclusion produces the 
experience o f beauty; unity by exclusion, opposition and isolation gives 
us the sublime. The experience o f beauty id en tifies  us with th is world) the 
sublime raises us above i t . (91)
With th is in mind, i t  becomes easier to see, Santayana claims, how the 
presentation o f what is  e v i l  or painful can produce the rarer aspects o f 
the experiences produced by tragedy. The e v il is  f e l t ,  yet at the same 
time, the sense that i t  cannot touch us may stimulate extraordinarily the 
sense o f our own wholeness. Another condition fo r  sublimity is  the 
im possibility o f actions the e v i l  must be beyond our power to  correct.
When th is is so, "a strong sp ir it has the sublime resource o f standing 
at bay and of surveying almost from the other world the vicissitudes of 
th is ."(92)
When these conditions are fu l f i l le d ,  tragedy occasions one o f the 
profoundest and enriching of a l l  the varieties of aesthetic experience. I t  
is  a state o f mind in which we fe e l l i f t e d  above the vicissitudes o f 
existence, out o f the grip o f the in terests in the pursuit o f which we 
consume most of our liv e s . We a ta in , however temporarily, a view o f 
experience at once elevated, detached and comprehensive, jantayana ca lls  
th is state the liberation of the soul or s e lf:
"There remains l i t t l e  in us...but the in tellectu a l essence, 
which several great philosophers have called eternal and iden tified  
with the d iv in ity ...Th is  comprehensive and Impartial view, th is 
synthesis and ob jectifica tion  of experience, constitutes the 
liberation o f the soul and the essence of sublimity...Our p ity  and 
terror are indeed purged; we go away knowing that, however tangled 
the net may be in which we fe e l  ourselves caught, there is  liberation  
beyond, and ax ultimate peace."(93)
The experience has a quasi-raystlaal character!
"The surprised enlargement o f our vis ion , the sudden escape 
from our ordinary interests and the id en tifica tion  of ourselves 
with something permanent and superhuman, something much more 
inalienable than our changing personality, a l l  th is  carries us 
away from the blurred objects before us, and raises us into a 
sort o f ecstasy." ( 94* )
In thus doing fu l l  justice to the complexity of the trag ic  response, 
Santayana concludes by making use o f one o f the trad ition a l doctrines 
from the aesthetics o f  the sublime, i .e .  the doctrine that there is  an 
aesthetic experience at once elevated, comprehensive and ecsta tic . This 
idea is  present in the treatise ascribed to  Longinus, who writes that, 
" . . . .b y  some innate power the true sublime u p lifts  our souls; we are 
f i l le d  with a oroud exaltation and a sense o f vaunting joy, just as though 
we had ourselves produced what we had heard."(95) Or againt "...su b lim ity  
carried one up to where one is  close to the majestic mind o f Sod." ( 96)
The idea o f elevation is  much stressed also by Schopenhauer, by whom 
Santayana was greatly  influenced at the time when he wrote "The Sense of 
Beauty''. For Schopenhauer, the sublime is  the supreme illu stra tion  of 
freedom from bondage to the w il l ,  fo r here a man is  conscious o f events and 
objects which stand in  a hostile relation to his w i l l  and which normally 
would Inspire intense fear. Yet he is  able, "through a free and conscious 
transcendence of the w ill  and the knowledge rela tin g to i t " ,  to  contemplate 
them in complete calm, "raised above himself, his person, hia w illin g, 
and a ll w il l in g ." (97 »)
While ho can retain  that part o f the trad itiona l dootrine which 
specifics exaltation as one o f it s  d ifferen tiae , the dootrine that a l l  
aesthetic values are positive demands that Santayana reject and indeed 
refute those other central doctrines which make pain or fear a necessary 
condition fo r the experience o f sublimity. 3urke sets out a variety  of
th is views
"Whatever Is f it te d  in any sort to  exoite the ideas o f pain, and 
danger, that is  to  say, whatever is  in any sort te r r ib le , or is  
conversant about te rr ib le  ob jects, or operates in a manner 
analagous to  terror, is  a source o f the sublime; that is , i t  is 
productive o f the strongest emotion which the mind is  capable o f 
fe e lin g ."(98)
Or again, the experience o f the sublime is , "not pleasure, but a sort o f 
d e ligh tfu l horror, a sort o f tran qu illity  tinged with te rro r } which, as 
i t  belongs to self-preservation, is  one o f the strongest o f a l l  the passions. 
(99) Again, Kant makes pain and fear necessary conditions fo r the experience 
o f the mathematical and dynamic sublime respective ly .( 100»
Santayana's objection is  that to make pain, fear or terro r  a necessary 
condition fo r  sublimity is  to confuse the sublime with i t s  usual aause.
The true sublime consists in the state o f liberation  and detachment 
described above; the suggestion o f terror merely makes us withdraw into 
ourselves, and when consciousness o f our own safety supervenes, we 
experience the fe e lin g  o f the sublime.(101») In order to  reinforce this 
view, he specifies other causes o f the same experience.
?or example, the Immense is sublime as well as the te r r ib le . In fin ity , 
l ik e  h os tility , makes us conscious o f our independence o f things. "The 
simultaneous view of many things, innumerable attractions fe lt  together, 
produce equilibrium and indifference, as e ffe c t iv e ly  as the exclusion of 
a l l . . . I n  this suspense, the mind soars into a kind o f heaven, benevolent 
but unmoved."(102) This is at best a very Incomplete description; i t  is 
an obvious fact of psychology that the simultaneous experience of many 
stimuli is  quite as lik e ly  to cause confusion, to be overwhelming, as i t  
is  to be liberating. Consequently, the presence o f Innumerable stimuli 
can only be a necessary condition fo r  the experience o f exaltation here 
under discussion. Moreover, not just any oolleotion o f objects w i ll  dot
(150)
the objects o f th is  experience of sublimity must have attractive  formal 
and material properties. (Perhaps Santayana has something lik e  th is in 
mind» indicated by the choice o f the term, "a ttraction s".) The starry 
night sky is  the best example o f the type o f aesthetic object Santayana 
is  looking fo r here. There is  surely no need to dispute that i t  can 
occasion the type o f elevated detachment o f which he speaks.
More dubious i s  the third route to the sublime, which Santayana ca lls  
the Epicurean route to detachment and perfection. This approach consists 
in ,
"the mutual cancelling o f the passions in the breast that includes 
them a l l ,  and their fin a l subsidence beneath the glance that 
comprehends them ...It is  thus possible to be moved to  that s e lf-  
enfranohisement which constitutes the sublime, even where the 
object contains no expression o f e v i l . "(103*)
The d if f ic u lty  here is  to see how th is prooess o f cancelling can produce 
the exaltation which Santayana has retained as a defining property o f the 
sublime. Surely i t  must rather produce calm.
This is a l l  Santayana has to say about the sublime. What in e ffe c t 
he -oea is  to redefine the word -  i t  is obvious that fo r  many previous 
writers, the presence o f some sort o f pain or fear in the mind figures 
in the very de fin ition  of the term "sublime". Whether th is conceptual 
leg is la tion  saves his consistency is  a question to  be considered below.
7: Types o f Value in the r.eoond Tenet Negative Values ( U ) ‘-:he Somlc and
delated Concepts
The theory o f comedy is  In a more confused state than that o f 
tragedy, perhaps because A ristotle either fa iled  to write about i t  in 
d e ta il, or because what he wrote has beer; lo s t. I t  is  clear enough, 
however, what a theory o f comedy would contain: (1) an investigation o f 
the situations we find comic, to  look fo r  common features whiab might 
serve as necessary and/or su fficien t conditions, remarks on incongruity,
(151)
degradation, the presupposition of idea ls , the castigation o f e rro r , 
happy endings, and so fo rth , come under this branch o f the theory; ( i i )  a 
theory o f laughters it s  place in  the economy o f human nature and the 
re la tion  o f laughter to  the comic. Human beings do not laugh so le ly  at 
comic situations. We laugh when we are tick led, or sometimes when we are 
simply happy, th is last being presumably what Hobbes means when he gives 
as one o f the causes o f laughter in  people, "some sudden act o f th e ir  
own, that pleaseth them." ( 10 4)
In both departments o f th is projected investigation, Santayana's treat­
ment consists in individual insights rather than a complete theory. Taking 
the second part f i r s t ,  he records in  various places the varied causes of 
laughter: t ick lin g  (as w ill  be seen below) and again, in "Soliloquies in 
England and Later Soliloquies" he finds a second cause in sheer high 
sp ir its :
"The clown is  the prim itive comedian, Sometimes in the exuberance
o f animal l i f e  a sp ir it  o f r io t  and fr o l ic  comes over a man; he
leaps, he dance3, he tumbles head over heels, he grins, shouts, or
leers, possibly pretends to ,50 to pieces suddenly, and blubbers lik e
a child. A moment la te r  he may look up wreathed in smiles, and
hugely pleased about nothing. A ll th is he does h ysterica lly , without
any reason, by a sort o f mad inspiration and ir r e s is t ib le  impulse."
(105)
Of course 3uch laughter is  not laughter at what is  comic; nor i s  the clown 
(in  his sense of the term) a comedian. Santayana sees perfectly  correctly 
that the specios o f laughter occasioned by what is  comic presupposes 
re flec tion  and ra tion a lity , both on the part o f the spectator and on the 
part o f the comedian, ''hen th is  happens, "the muse o f re flec tion  follows 
in the train o f Dionysus, and the revel or rude farce passes in to humane 
comedy. "(106")
■"he question of what i t  is  that a rational animal laughs a t , when it  
laughs at what Is oomic, involves an investigation of what features, i f  any.
(152)
comic situations have in common. In his autobiography, Santayana writes:
"The happy presence of reason in human l i f e  is  perhaps better 
exemplified in comedy than in tragedy. In comedy we see no 
te rr ib le  sub-human or super-human fa ta lity  to  render reason vain. 
Reason can therefore make its  l i t t l e  runs and show its  comic 
contradictions and clever solutions without disturbing the sound 
and ve getative substance and free flowerings o f human society. In 
comedy we laugh at our foolish errors, correct them with a word, 
and know no reasons why we shouldn't be happy ever a f t e r . "(107*)
This is  in e ffe c t to specify some presuppositions o f comedy, and its  subject- 
matter. Quite absent from comedy is the sense o f fa ta lity  or determinism 
which pervades tragedy; there is  no suggestion that the 'rerum natura' is  
in terna lly  strife-ridden , and there is  no reason why the happy state 
arrived at in the denouement should not be In de fin ite ly  prolonged. What 
is  portrayed and mooked in comedy is "foolish  erro r", rather, one supposes, 
than crime, or any disorder which involves serious pain. 3y implloation, 
Santayana is  committed to  the further position that a comic figu re is  
comic partly because he fa i ls  to fu l f i l  an ideal or come up to  a standard, 
3ince an error, fo lly , or mild vice, involves auoh a fa ilu re by defin ition .
This is  surely quite aeeeptable -  i t  is  hard to think o f a play by the 
Greek or Aoman writers, or by :hakespeare, Jons on, or Molière, for 
example, to which these descriptions do not apply. Tet these views are 
hardly o rig ina l. Some o f them are put forward by the dramatists thsm- 
selves. For example, in the Prologue to the "Captivi", Plautus bans 
serious and painful matters from the oomic stagei " . . . I  did mention that 
Aetolia and E lis  are at war; but don't 1st that frighten you; the battles 
a l l  take place o f f  stage. Wall, i t  would be practica lly  cheating, wouldn't 
i t ,  for a comedy company to present you with a tragedy without warning?"(108) 
And 3en Jonson t e l ls  the audienee that they w i l l  find, in "Every Man in
His Humour"«
(153)
"..persons, such as comedy would ohoose,
When she would show an Image o f the times,
And sport with human fo l l ie s ,  not with crimes."
(Drologue, 11.22-4)
Again, the idea that no serious harm is involved in what is  comic (and 
consequently in comedy) is  present in the theory of comedy from Plato 
onwards. In the "Philebus", Socrates argues that the ridiculous is  a 
defect which consists in vain se lf-dece it in a weak person -  the last 
proviso is  needed, since in a strong person such a fee lin g  occasions hatred 
and fear. ("Philebus", 48-9) A risto tle  writes in a sim ilar way:
"As for Comedy, i t  is . ..a n  imitation o f men worse than the average; 
worse, however, not as regards any and every sort o f fau lt, but 
only as regards one particular kind, the iidiculous, which is a 
species o f the ugly. The Hidiculous may be defined as a blunder or 
deformity not productive o f harm to others..."(109 )
In his la ter writings, then, Santayana is happy to aceept some w ell- 
worn be lie fs  about ooandy; in the concluding sections of "The Sense of 
3eauty", he cannot allow himself a parallel concurrence with the equally 
well-worn thesis that comic e ffec ts  result from situations involving 
incongruity and degradation. (By implication, therefore, he presumably 
could not have accepted Bergson's idea that situations are comic when they 
exhibit, " le  mecanisrae plaqurf sur 1  a v ie ,"  fo r  this is only a sophisticated 
variant o f the inoongrulty/degradation thesis. (110»)) To accept this view 
would be to  allow that some unpleasant suggestion, a negative value, is  
a necessary condition for the experience of beauty.
He approaches the problem via several preliminary points describing 
further features o f comedy and the comic response. In the f i r s t  place, 
comedy puts before us scenes which are not en tire ly  impossible and yet 
which could not occur lr. ordinary l i f e .  I f  a scene o f this kind is  
agreeable.
(154)
"we allow ourselves to  dream i t  true. We forget I ts  re la tions; 
we forb id  the eye to wander beyond the frame o f the stage, or 
the conventions of the fic t io n . We Indulge an illu s ion  wnieh 
deepens our sense o f the essential pleasantness o f t h in g s . " ( I l l )  
Again, the situations o f comedy, thus impossible in da ily  l i f e ,  administer 
shocks to  our habits o f apperception, stimulating the imagination. A fter 
the shock, returned to  common sense and r e a lity ,  we fe e l,  "cheated, 
relieved , abashed, or amused, in proportion as our sympathy attaches more 
to the point o f view surrendered, or to that hktained."( 112) This is  an 
unenlightening remarks the varie ty  of states specified makes i t  true o f 
the responses induced by modes of drama other ttamoomedy.
As to  incongruity and degradation themselves, Santayana's f ir s t  point 
(which can be allowed him) is  that they are at most necessary conditions 
fo r amusement, since contradiction and deterioration are not always 
amusing. However, he seems in th is early work to want to say that to  make 
incongruity and degradation necessary conditions fo r amusement is , as is  
a lleged ly the ease with pain and sublim ity,to confuse cause and e ffe c t .
We .aay laugh without any reason at a l l ,  when we are tick led , or laugh 
in sympathy with others, er at the simple repetition  o f something not 
i t s e l f  amusing. Therefore, he concludes, there must be some nervous state 
on which emu3ement depends, an excitement generally set o f f  by incongruity 
or degradation.(113) This is  hardly consistent with the la te r  passages 
quoted above, d iffe ren tia tin g  the varieties o f laughter. The la ter view 
is  surely the better one: the quality o f the experience occasioned by the 
causes o f  the fa ir ly  mindless varieties of laughter Santayana here specifies 
is surely markedly d iffe ren t from that produced by the highest of aomedies, 
works which, as Donr.eau de Vise"’ said, "font r ire  dans l'âm e".(114*) Cause 
and e f fe c t  are not so independent as Santayana here wishes to  maintain.
He continues that certain crude oases o f the oomlc seem to  consist of 
l i t t l e  more than a shock o f surprise: a pun, an aooident to  a d ign ified
(155)
person, the casting o f f  o f a disguise, wild exaggeration. Yet such 
-*ances o f comedy are o f the brie fest duration, and (he maintains)
.leave an uncomfortable a fter-taste , an impression of foolishness.
Santayana thinks i t  quite obvious why th is should be so: the comic incident 
is  an absurdity} i t  starts a wrong analogy in the mind} but, "mar*, being 
a rational animal, can lik e  absurdity no better than he can like hunger 
or co ld ."(115) In a l l  cases, "the qualm remains, and the pleasure is never 
p e r fe c t." (116)
The reason fo r this optim istic and perhaps questionable psychology 
appears in the fo llow ing paragraph. The absurd is  good ( i . e .  pleasant) 
only when i t  spoils nothing better} the best piece fo r  i t  is  in the midst 
o f other absurdities: "Things amuse us in the mouth o f a fo o l that would 
not amuse us in that o f a gentlemen} a fact which shows how l i t t l e  
incongruity and degradation have to  do with pleasure in the comic." (117) 
The incongruous and degrading are always unpleasant} I t  is  not they which 
please in comedy. They may indeed stimulate a pleasant passion, such as 
scorn or cruelty or se lf-sa tis faction , fo r  the sense o f fun has a good 
deal of malioe in i t .  Yet, Santayana claims (as he has to ) the main 
pleasure in  comedy, "comes from the inward ra tion a lity  and movement of 
the fic t io n , not from it s  inconsistency with anything e ls e ."(118) The 
consistency o f this manoeuvre is  considered below.
Santayana continues, less oontentioualy, to analyse wit, where he 
claims we have the greater satisfaction o f comedy without incongruity. Wit 
has been sala to consist in quick association by sim ilarity . But with 
wit the substitution must be va lid , the s im ila rity  rea l: i t  Is the 
unforeseen justness which makes w it. This is  linked with the fact that 
wit is serious: " I t  1b characteristic o f w it to  penetrate to the hidden 
depths of things, to pick out there some t e l l in g  circumstance or relation , 
by noting which the whole object appears in a new and clearer l ig h t ."(119) 
The reason why wit is so often said to be malicious is  that in an example
(156)
o f w it, I t  is  usually the case that the categories o f common sense are 
juxtaposed in unaccustomed ways. A w itty  analysis,
"in  discovering common tra its  and universal principles 
assimilates things at the poles o f beings i t  can apply to  cookery 
the formulas o f theology, and can find in the human heart a case 
o f the fulcrum and lever . " ( 12 0 )
Yet wit need not be destructives i t  b e lit t le s  one thing only to dign ify  
another. The only d i f f ic u lt y  with th is  analysis is  why Santayana should 
consider that incongruity and degradation are absent from w it, fo r on his 
own analysis, they are obviously present, e .g . in  the cookery/theology 
case.
He correctly  d iffe ren tia tes  humour from wit or the merely comics
" .. . th e  essence o f what we c a l l  humour is  that amusing weaknesses 
should be combined with amicable humanity. Whether i t  be in the 
way o f ingenuity, or oddity, or d ro llery , the humourous person must 
have an absurd side, or be placed in an absurd situation. Yet this 
comic aspect, at which we ought to wince, seems to endear the 
character a l l  the more," ( 1 2 1 * )
Once again, consistency demands that Santayana claim that, as with tragedy, 
we are not pleased by the painful suggestions, but in spite o f them. The 
painful suggestions are fe l t  as painful, but the pain is  overbalanced by 
the pleasant aspects of the experience. These are themselves o f two kinds» 
the aesthetically  pleasing aspects o f the work, and the sympathetic 
reaction to the character*
last among the concepts related to comedy to be considered by 
Jantayana is  the grotesque. He considers that the grotesque is  an e ffaot, 
"produced by su:h a transformation o f an ideal type as exaggerates one 
o f i t s  elements or combines i t  with other types."(122) Such reoastlngs 
of form oan become accepted -  the centaur and the satyr are no longer 
regarded as grotesque. I f  the new fora is pleasing enough, wo w ill  
disregard the discrepancy from the natural which f ir s t  makes us ca ll i t
(157)
grotesque. When we f i r s t  perceive i t ,  however, the new form requires 
e ffo r t  o f the imagination to grasp i t s  unity. Henoe the grotesque is ,
"the half-formed, the perplexed, and the suggestively monstrous."(123)
The stress Santayana lays on the eventual acceptance of the grotesque 
leads hla to find a strong analogy between i t  and the w itty» "Good wit is  
novel truth, as the good grotesque is  novel beauty".(124) There is  
surely not much evidence to ju s t ify  so persistent a stress on the eventual 
acceptance of the grotesque as beautiful; the gargoyles o f the Gothic 
style are grotesque by de fin ition ; but they are by no means universally 
regarded as beautifu l, even now.
•
F ina lly , i t  is  now appropriate to review the argument o f the la s t 
two sections, to consider the important point o f internal consistency 
defended in them: has Santayana shown that, "no aesthetic value i s  
rea lly  founded on the experience or suggestion o f e v i l , "(125)? In  fact, 
i t  is  clear that Santayana has not made out his case. With regard to 
tragedy, i t  is  plain that unless the subjcot-matter were o f a painful 
kind, the aesthetic experience i t  produces would be quite d iffe ren t; in 
the case o f the sublime, he himself admits that fear is  the main route 
to the experience of sublimity (as he conceives i t ) ,  even i f  not the only 
one, and therefore, experiences such as these must be 'founded on ' the 
experience or suggestion of pain. Again, i t  is  obvious that in the 
experience o f comedy we can and do take pleasure in the pain of another -  
he himself admits that the sense of fun has a good deal o f malice in i t .  
mo claim as he does that incongruity and degradation are always unpleasant, 
and that we are pleased in spite o f and not because of them is simply not 
true.
This conclusion comes as no surprise. The classification  o f 
aesthetic experience under the single heading 'pleasant* is  rather too 
simple to cover a l l  the varied and subtle varieties of experience by
(158)
which art enriches l i f e .  Moreover, i t  is  quite c lea r that Santayana 
responded to  art with much greater sen sitiv ity  than his theoretical 
commitment to pleasure would alone suggest -  in uia  discussion o f tragedy, 
comedy, and the sublime, he refutes himself. Doing more than usually fu l l  
ju stice in most esses to  the states o f mind he describes, he shows the 
inadequacy o f his own theoretical scaffold ing. I t  seems that at th is 
stage o f his oareer, two elements in his in te lle c tu a l make-up conflicted 
with one another! he was too fine-grained and r e f le c t iv e  not to respond 
fu lly  to art, and yet also so eager to refute the style of lomantlc 
pessimism he encountered especially in toyee's philosophy that he was 
w illin g  to impose the simple category of pleasure on to aesthetic 
experience. Hence he presence of his fine introspective reports together 
with an important inconsistency in his arguments on values in the second 
term of expressions.
V I! Conclusion
The foregoing remark about fin e deta ils in an over-rigid framework 
can be generalised to cover the whole of "The Sense o f beauty" and 
'antayana's other scattered remarks on the subjects he considers in that 
book. Several o f his major claims have been found to be questionable, 
e .g . two of the proposed d ifferen tiae o f the experience o f beauty, 
positiveness and ob jectification , have been re jected . While this is  so, 
however, i t  should be emphasized that Santayana f i t s  many fine insights 
into his t l lo re t ica l framework« his views on the material o f a work of 
a rt, his a b ility  to accommodate many o f the data of the problem of 
expression, and his treatment of the response t o  tragedy, fo r exanmla.
Most refreshing of a l l  the characteristics o f th is  f ir s t  book is  it#  
freedom from the essentialism which takes one aspect of tha work o f art 
and in the teeth o f counter-examples makes th is aspect the defining 
property of a rt. Santayana's sane and clear-sighted vision, which does 
justice to a l l  the properties o f a work o f art, has not been a l l  that w idely 
shared In the history of aesthetics.
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Chapter V: Poetry and tellg ion  
I ; Introduction
^¿antayiu. * 1 a views uu beauty, the materials of a worn of a rt , form uuu 
expression, are located Mainly in one place, the four chapters o f "The 
Sense o f Beauty". I t  is  otherwise with his views on re lig ion  and poetry, 
which are the subject not only o f two fu l l  length books ("Interpretations 
o f Poetry and le lig ion ", 1900, and "Three Pnilosophical Poets", 1910) but 
also of a number o f scattered essays and sections o f other books, dating 
from 1392 onwards. Moreover, there is  a plainly v is ib le  development in 
these views, fa llin g  into three phases: ( i )  adumbrations of the mature 
view, 1392-1896, ( i i )  fu l l  statement o f the mature view, 1900-1913; and 
(H i )  a major revision of the doctrine o f phase ( i i ) ,  in 1921. These 
considerations make i t  desirable to separate exposition and criticism  in 
dealing with th is subject; otherwise the argument would straggle.
A further reason fo r th is  procedure l ie s  in the fu l l  emergence, in the 
second phase o f the development, o f a doctrine only adumbrated in "The 
•Sense o f 3eauty", l . e .  that the principal a c tiv ity  o f  the imagination is  
to idea lise . This doctrine plays a major role in Santayana's theory o f 
re lig ion , his interpretation of Platonic philosophy in  a l l  i t s  va rie ties , 
and his doctrines o f poetry and on art in general. Curiously enough 
commentators on Santayana do not give th is doctrine the place i t  deserves 
in their expositions of his philosophy. His numerous but scattered remarks 
need to be brought together and ordered.
In the following exposition, tte mature doctrine of phase ( l i )  is  set 
out in six sections, and th is  is  followed by a statement o f the early and 
late variants on i t .
I I :  ''deposition o f the Mrtur« doctrines 
(1) Mental ^aculti»» and th e ir  Celatjone
The most important presuppositions o f Santayana' s theory o f poetry 
and relig ion  are in the philosophy o f mind. ^epreBentatlonalism in the 
philosophy of perception ia  assumed throughout, and ao accordingly is some
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version i f  the distinction between immediate, unconoeptualiaed data, and 
the mind’ s construction on them. I t  is  also assumed that no comparison o f 
data ana stimuli is  possible in princ ip le ! the only guarantee o f truth o f 
be lie fs or ve r id iea lity  o f perception which is lo g ica lly  possible is  • 
pragmatic ones be lie fs  and perceptions which lead us to deal successfully 
with the environment ( i t s e l f  a posited existent) are the ones we accept 
as true and verid ica l.
Considering the lim itations o f the human mind, and it s  few channels of 
contact with rea lity  (Santayana begins) i t  is surprising that reason has 
done as w ell a3 it  has in the construction of idee*. Of the senses, sight 
is  the best for forming permanent notions, yet before satisfactory 
conceptions can be extracted from the data of th is the most Informative 
o f senses a good deal of analysis and correction is  needed. Fortunately, 
we have the right too l for this, understanding. This term is  defined by 
lantayana only via an imprecise l i s t  o f  functional "We have memory and we 
have certain powers o f synthesis, abstraction, reproduction, invention.. . " (1 )  
Understanding has hardly begun its  work, however, when i t  is  distracted by 
another faculty, imagination. The mind is no mere passive receptor, 
receiving impressions like the wax from the seal. On the contrary, " ..p e r­
ceptions fa l l  into the brain rather as seeds into a furrowed fie ld  or ever, 
as sparks into a keg o f powder. Each image breeds a hundred more, sometimes 
slowly and subterraneously, sometimes (when a passionate train is  started) 
with a sudden burst o f fancy."(2 )
With this small equipment, the mind tr ie s  to fu l f i l  i t s  enormous ambition 
which is  nothing less than to construct a complete picture o f the universe, 
and o f i t s  own orig in . The mind is  inadequate to  this ambition, which, 
however, i t  cannot abandon, '.ranted th is, a l l  we can do is  to take care 
with our ideas, "to  arrange them according to th e ir  derivation and measure 
them by their applioab lllty to l l f e . » " ( 3 )
The inadequacy o f each of our facu lties is  what occasions the intrusion 
of some other facu lty into its  f ie ld .  Thus i t  is that imagination is  made
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to 3erve sense and Instinct, and made to do the work o f in te lligen ce. The 
substitution is eas ily  made, fo r  Imagination and in telligence (a synonym 
fo r  'underst&Luing' in  ^nntaynna' a vocabulary) d if fe r  wuLy in va lid ity , 
not in origins
"Understanding is  an applicable fic tion , a kind o f wit with a 
practical use. Common sense and science liv e  in a world o f expurgated 
mythology...a world where the objects are imaginitive in their 
origin  end essence, but useful, abstraot, and beneficent in their 
suggestions. " ( )
Conceptions which, "prove serviceable In practice, and capable o f v e r ific a ­
tion in sense" (5 ) we c a ll ideas o f the understanding; others are ideas o f 
the imagination. Granted Santayana's philosophy o f perception, th is 
attempt to distinguish the products of imagination from the products o f 
sensation by characteristics other than their causes is inevitable.
Usually i t  is  the profounder minds that yield to the imagination, fo r 
they fe e l the greatness o f the problems o f l i f e ,  and the inadequacy of the 
understanding, with I ts  present resources, to oope with them. Such a 
mind can take refuge from its  d issatisfaction only by making use o f the 
imagination, the only faculty le f t  to invoke. I t  Is the imagination which 
provides the materials for poetry and re lig ion .
( i i )  Tne Imagination and its  A ctiv ity  o f Idealising
Human beings are almost never in complete accord with th eir environ­
ment. To be fu lly  In accord with the environment would consist In that 
state in which the environment satisfied  a l l  human in terests. We have 
concepts and be lie fs  which embody our notions of what th is state o f to ta l 
accord would be lik e . They are our ideas o f perfection, of s better state 
o f things: our idea ls . Ideals cannot be products o f the understanding, 
since by defin ition , ideas o f  the understanding are thosewhich most 
accurately record what is the case, rather than what we would prefer to 
be the case. Therefore, Ideals must be products of the imagination. I t  
is evident from a l l  that dantayana writes on th is subject that he regards
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the formation of ideals as the most important function o f the imagination. 
He regards idealis ing as a constant and healthy feature o f  human mental 
l i f e .  He speaks thus o f "man's indomitable idealism ." ( 6 * )
Our ideals are determined by our in terests«
"We can have no pleasure or pain, nor any preference whatsoever, 
without im p lic it ly  setting up a standard o f excellence, an ideal, 
an Ideal o f what would satisfy  us there. To make these im plielt 
ideals ex p lic it , to catch their hint, to work out their theme, 
and express clearly  to  ourselves and to the world whnt they are 
demanding in  the place o f the actual -  that is  the labour o f reason 
and the task o f genius."(7 )
"'he formation o f ideals is thus frequent and natural. Phe nearest Santayana 
gives to a description of the process o f their formation is  ss follows:
The Imagination,
"generates as w ell as abstracts; i t  observes, combines, and csncels; 
but i t  also dreams. Spontaneous syntheses arise in i t  which are 
not mathematical averages o f the Images i t  receives from sense; 
they are the e ffects  o f diffused excitements l e f t  in the brain by 
sensations."(3 )
Ideals are general ideas modified by pleasure: "We know what the ideal 
Is because we observe what pleases us In the r e a lity ." (9 ) Thus to refuse 
to modify an ideal in the ligh t o f what pleases us in new experiences would 
be to substitute ideas for feelings« "Ideals have th e ir  uses, but their 
authority is  wholly representative. They stand fo r spec ific  satisfactions, 
or else they stand fo r nothing at a l l . " ( 10 )
’rom the doctrine that ideals are general ideas modified by pleasure 
follows the claim that the ideal is the union o f a l l  we prise in a l l  
creatures. Cnee coticeived, the ideal forbids to ta l allegiance to any 
Imperfect instance o f i t «  " .. .th e  mind that has once f e l t  the irres is tib le  
compulsion to oreate this ideal and to believe in i t  has become incapable
(163)
o f unreserved love o f anything e ls e . " ( 1 1 )
A tendency to impersonality is  essential to ideals: they could not 
fu l f i l  a l l  their functions i f  ahoy retained too many of the tra its  o f one 
individual. Too much subjection to another personality, for example, makes 
the expression of our own impossible, and the ideal is nothing but a 
projection o f the demands o f the imagination. I f  the imagination is 
overpowered by too strong a fascination, we form no ideal at a l l . ( 12 )
The adequacy o f ideals is  to  be measured so le ly  by their f id e l i t y  to 
our interests: th is is  the sole ground of their authority. Hence the 
further doctrine that existence, s t r ic t ly  speaking, is irrelevant to an 
ideal, i . e .  an ideal gains nothing, in Santayana's view, by the attribution 
to i t ,  by hypostasis, of an imagined r e a lity . (13) (The relevance o f this 
doctrine w ill  become clearer la te r on.)
.11 moral l i f e  and moral Judgment involve idealising, for in  making a 
moral judgment, we "assert a private ideal in the face o f an intractable 
and omrilpotent world -" (1 /,) dome moralists fe e l the attraction o f "untasted 
and ideal perfection"(15 ). Plato is  an example o f such a moralist, who is 
apt to despise this world. Others rebel against some particu larly  galling 
aspect of rea lity , and frame more fragmentary ideals, such as lib e r ty , 
equality, and fra tern ity . They possess no visions fo r l i f e  as a whole, as 
is to be found, by contrast, in P la to 's  " Republic."(16)
Granted the divergencies o f  human temperament, ideals w ill  be many and 
varied; but not so varied, Santayana thinks, as to preclude a l l  hope o f 
co-operation:
" I  talk a great leal about the good and the ideal, having learned 
from Plato and A risto tle  (since the liv in g  have never shown me how 
to l iv e ) that, granting a numan nature to which to appeal, the good 
and the ideal may be defined with some accuracy. Of course, they 
o an not be defined immutably, because human nature is  not Immutable; 
and they oainot be defined in such a way as to be transferred without 
change from one raoe or person to another, because human nature is
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various. Yet any re fle c tiv e  and honest man, in expressing his 
hopes and preferences, may expect to find  many o f his neighbours
agreeing witn aim, and when tney agree, they may wori p o lit ic a lly  
together."(17)
Our Ideals are not continually present to  us, at the “ront o f the mind} 
but th is does not in any way m ilitate against their rea lity  and authority. 
The most important elements o f our l i f e  are subject to the brevity o f our 
attention"..we are not uninterruptedly conscious of ourselves, our physical 
environment, our ruling passions, our deepest conviction."(18) Yet the 
idea l Implied by our desires always exercises its  authority over our lives : 
"..ou r whole l i f e  is  an act of worship to th is  unknown d iv in ity ; every 
heartfe lt prayer is offered before one or another o f its  images."(19)
Schopenhauer's view that a good once attained los:s a l l  i t s  value >8 
nonsense. The in s tab ility  o f our attention, and the need o f rest and repair 
in our organs, does indeed bring i t  about that we do not long at a time 
contemplate even our most cherished possessions. Yet the actions o f these 
high points on our lives  is  not for that reason as ephemeral as Schopen­
hauer would have us believe. We do not lose their benefit in those 
intervals between contemplating them:
"The tone o f the mind is permanently ralaed; and we liv e  with that 
general sense of ste dfastness and resource which is perhaps the 
kernel o f  happiness. Knowledge, a ffeo tlon , re lig ion , and beauty are 
not the less constant influences in a man's l i f e  because his 
consciousness of them is interm ittent. Even when absent, they 
f i l l  the chambers of the mind with a kind o f fragrance. They have 
a continual efficacy, aa w ell as a perennial worth."(20)
Moreover, bo long as we have the same organs and desires, so muut we 
pursue the same goals. The ideal is forever Immanent In us, and realisation 
o f i t  constitutes perfection. This ideal i s  not the abstract vision o f a 
metaphysician, but, "the natural vision of the imagination, and the
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rational goal o f the w i l l . " ( 2 1 )
To be without Ideals Is  to  live  an irrationa l l i f e ,  to f a l l  to  
rea lise the highest p oss ib ilities  of human attainment, which in Santayana1 s 
view ere dependent on the exercise of reason:
"Were no ideal conceived at a l l ,  men would be the horses harnessed 
to their own chariot, docile perhaps and hardworking, but neither 
knowing where they go, nor Indeed going ¡ywhere. A ll l i f e  in the 
world is  also, i f  rational, l i f e  in the id e a l . . . " ( 22)
Hence, as he says elsewhere,
"!!o atheism is so te r r ib le  as the absence o f an ultimate ideal, 
nor could any fa ilu re  o f power be more contrary to human nature 
than the fa ilu re o f moral imagination, or more incompatible with 
healtigr x ife . fo r we have facu lties, and habits, and impulses.
These are the basis o f our demands. And these demands, although 
variable, constitute an over-present in trinsic  standard o f value 
by which we fe e l and judge. The ideal is  immanent in them; for 
the ideal moans that environment in which our facu lties would 
find their freest employment, and their most congenial world. 
Perfection would be nothing DUt l i f e  under these conditions."(23)
The finest moments o f our liv e s  are those in which our ideals are attained.
These views on ideals are taken from works written between 1396 and 
1922. Santayana retained them until the end of his l i f e .  In the f ir s t  
volume o f his autobiography, "Fersons and Places" (1944) he expresses 
the same opinions in the vocabulary o f his metaphysical system, "The 
iealmsof leing". By 'psyche', he means the d e fin ite ly  organised human 
body with its  various wants and needs, physical and emotional; by 's p ir i t ',  
consciousness, which is  capable, in flavoured moments, o f contemplating 
the entire universe, including its  own osyehe, with detachment. (The use 
o f the term 'sp ir it*  does not imply a new allegiance to dualism in the 
philosophy Bf mind. S p irit is  an epiphenomenon of bodily s ta tes .) He
rational goal o f the w i l l . " ( 2 1 )
To be without Ideals Is to  liv e  an irrational l i f e ,  to f a l l  to 
rea lise the highest poss ib ilities  o f human atta inment, which in iantayana' 
view are dependent on the exercise of reasoni
"Were no ideal conceived at a l l ,  men would be the horses harnessed 
to  their own chariot, docile perhaps and hardworking, but neither 
knowing where they go, nor Indeed going i.yvhere. A ll l i f e  in the 
world is  also, i f  rational, l i f e  in the id e a l, . . " ( 22)
Hence, as lie says elsewhere,
"Ho atheism is  so te rr ib le  as the absence o f an ultimate ideal, 
nor could any fa ilu re o f power be more contrary to human nature 
than the fa ilu re of moral imagination, or more incompatible with 
healtly l i f e .  For we have facu lties, and habits, and impulses. 
These are the basis o f our demands. And these demands, although 
variable, constitute an ever-present In trin sic standard o f value 
by which we fe e l and judge. The ideal is  immanent in themj for 
the ideal means that environment in which our facu lties would 
find their freest employment, and their most congenial world. 
Perfection would be nothing Dut l i f e  under these conditions."(23) 
The fin est moments o f our liv e s  are those in which our ideals are attained 
These views on ideals are taken from works written between 1396 and 
1922. Santayana retained them until the end o f his l i f e .  In the f ir s t  
volume o f  his autobiography, "Persons and Places" (1944) he expresses 
the same opinions in the vocabulary o f his metaphysical system, "The 
Realms of Being". By 'psyche', he means the d e fin ite ly  organised human 
body with its  various wants and needs, physical and emotional} by 's p ir i t ' 
consciousness, which is  capable, In favoured moments, o f contemplating 
the en tire  universe, including it s  own payehe, with dataehment. (The use 
o f the term 'sp ir it*  does not imply a new allegiance to dualism in the 
philosophy ttf mind. Spirit is  an epiphenomenon of bodily sta tes.) Ha
writes that i t  Is  easy to discover what i t  is  that one loves -  one has 
only to enumerate one's hatreds and in fer the contrary. He goes on, a propoa
o f psyche and s p ir it :  "Hatred and love are imposed on the sp ir it  by the 
psyche.." (24 ) and the good, the object o f love, when e lic ited  by the process 
of self-inspection just noted, "when discovered to the sp ir it w i l l  become 
an id e a l."(25)
( i l l )  The Hypostasis of Ideals in philosophy and 'e lis ion
V'hile existence is  in a s t r ic t  sense irrelevant to the appropriateness 
and authority o f an ideal, very few human beings (Santayana believes) are 
emotionally equipped to accept th is  truth. Human beings have almost always 
found i t  more satisfying to believe that their ideals have some sort o f 
existence. 3y defin ition , they cannot be instantiated in the world as i t  
is ;  therefore, i f  they are to be both real and contemporary with us, they 
must ex ist in  another world. This is Santayana's explanation for the 
widespread occurrence o f re lig iou s belie fs in another world, and o f a l l  
two-world metaphysics. Hath sty les o f thought he regards as the result o f 
the hypostasis o f the ideals o f the imagination. As so often with 
Santayana, a great deal of argumentation is  absent, and philosophically 
important conclusions are merely assumed to be true. In his theory o f 
re lig ion , he assumes the truth o f atheism as a premiss, and in his view o f 
Platonism (fo r  example) he assumes the fa ls ity  of this metaphysic, as 
l i t e r a l ly  interpreted. I t  w i l l  be clear that his views on re lig ion  do not
i
constitute a philosophy o f re lig ion  as that subjeot is  now conceived, i . e .  
in terms of the analysis o f the log ica l properties o f predicates and 
statements in relig ious discourse» lather, his theory is  more in the 
manner o f Feuerbach, a psychological account o f why relig ion  should be so 
persistent a feature o f the human condition, an account in which the fa ls it y  
o f religious beliefs is assumed as a datum.
P la to 's  idealism is  a product of the idealising a c tiv ity  o f the 
imagination, together with the postulated tendency to hypostatise. What
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Plato does is  to  formulate, "myths that present the Ideal suggestions of 
human l i f e  in pictures. These he sometimes leaves general and pale.
ca lling tnem iaeaaj but at other times he embodies them in de ities , or 
in detailed imaginary constructions, lik e  that o f his • iep u b lie '.* (26)
The concepts o f  absolute beauty and love, for example, »re  perfectly  
natural ideals: " .. .th e  imagination and the heart behold, when they are 
le f t  free to expand and express themselves, an absolute beauty and a 
perfect lo v e ." (27) iranted his views on the cen tra lity  o f idealising in 
the l i f e  o f the imagination, i t  is  no surprise that Santayana should regard 
Platonism, in an extended 3ense o f the term, as a common attitude o f mind: 
"The Platonic idea lis t is  the man by nature so wedded to perfection that 
he sees in everything not the rea lity  but the fau ltless  ideal which the 
rea lity  misses and suggests."(28 »)
Plotinian neo-Platonism is  dealt with in the same way: " I t  is a 
system of morals inverted and turned into a cosmology."(29) Once again, 
the Ideas are ideals hypostatised: "Those Ideas which the psyohe is  able 
and predestined to discern are such as are illu stra ted  or suggested by its  
own l i f e ,  or by the aspects whioh nature presents to  i t .  Sach Idea w ill 
be the ideal o f  something with which the psyche is  naturally conversant; 
but the good o f a l l  these psychic labours w ill  l i e  precisely in c larify ing 
and rea liz in g that id e a l."(30) As an example o f hypostasis, Santayana 
takes the Plotin ian notion o f the One, that whioh lends excellence to the 
Ideas. This is  "the mythical counterpart o f moral harmony in the 
s p ir i t . , "(31)
The great religions of the world are likewise made up of hypoatatlsed 
ideals:
"When natural phenomena are conceived as the manifestation o f 
diwine l i f e ,  human l i f e  i t s e l f ,  by sympathy with that ideal 
projection of i t s e l f ,  enlarges it s  customary bounds, until i t  
seems capable o f becoming the l i f e  o f the universe. A god is  a
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conceived victory o f the mind over nature. A v is ib le  god is  the 
consciousness o f such a victory momentarily attained. The vision
soon vanishes, the sense o f omnipotence is  soon d ispelled by 
recurring con flic ts  with natural forces} but the mom»ntary illu sion  
o f that realised good has le f t  us with the perennial knowledge of 
good as an idea l. Therein lie s  the essence and function of 
re lig io n ."(32)
Regarded s c ien tific a lly , re lig ion  is  fa lse ; but i t  is  ju s t if ied  i f  
regarded as, "a kind o f poetry that expresses moral values and reacts 
beneficently upon l i f e . "(33) A re lig ion  is  to be judged by the quality 
o f i t s  moral doctrines« ".■ »o ra l significance, while not the source o f 
re lig ions, is  the criterion  o f th e ir  value and the reason why they 
deserve to endure."(34) Those who create and believe in re lig iou s 
doctrines do not think o f themselves as merely projecting moral Ideals 
and hypostatising them} they consider themselves to be making, fo r example, 
factual statements about the d iv in ity « "Good relig ions are therefore the 
product o f unconscious ra tion a lity , of imaginitive impulses fortunately 
moral."(35*)
Santayana gives examples o f hypostases from several re lig ion s « two 
from Christianity are enough to illu stra te  his views. Of what rea lity  is 
Christian eschatology the imaginitive rendering? What was i t  in the live3 
of men that made them think of themselves as hanging between eternal bliss 
and eternal perdition? Partly, in Cantayana's view, the desire to  make 
ideal values stand out starkly in contrast with real values; but deeper than 
this was the genuine m oralist's sympathy with a philosophic and log ica l 
view of immortality rather than with a superstitious and sentimental one. 
(36) Again, the doctrines o f Heaven and Hell, and that what one does now 
helps to decide one's eternal destiny are an imaginitive projection o f the 
b e lie f in the absoluteness of moral distinctions. The moral decisions we 
make can in a few years a ffe o t our lives irrsvooably, and therefore the
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ideal fora o f th is  doctrine, in terns o f eternal salvation or damnation,
is  J u stified .(37*)
yiYi, ¡k *  frigas&t», «mt yf
The doctrines o f the proceeding three sections are a l l  presupposed in 
Santayana's most important thesis concerning the nature and function o f 
poetry: "..p oe try  and re lig ion  are identical in  essence, and d if fe r  merely 
in the way in which they are attached to p ractica l a ffa ir s . ?oetry is  
called re lig ion  when i t  intervenes in l i f e ,  and re lig ion , when i t  merely 
supervenes upon l i f e ,  is  seen to be nothing but poetry."(38*) To be 
s t r ic t ly  in terna lly  consistent, Santayana should have said here that the 
Pest poetry is  identica l in essence with re lig io n . His view is that there 
are three types o f poetry, composed (confusingly enough) from four elements, 
in varying combinations. I t  is only the th ird  and finest type o f poetry, 
in which a l l  four elements are present, which is  identical in essence with 
re lig ion .
The f i r s t  le v e l o f poetry, that o f, "mere sound and virtuosity" (39) 
is distinguished by the presence of metre, rhyme, and other devices which 
maximize the e f fe c t  o f the purely material properties o f words. These 
devices are included by Santayana under theheading of euphony, the f ir s t
o f the four elements o f poetry.
Measure or metre is a condition for perfection, since perfection 
requires that not only the whole before us should have a form, but that 
every part o f i t  should have a form, and that the parts should be eo—ordin» 
ated among themselves. Thus i f  in despair o f  giving a serious de fin ition  
o f poetry, a c r it ic  says that i t  is metrical discourse, the account, while 
Inadequate, is  not one he need be ashamed o f. I f  language is  to be made 
perfect, i t s  materials must be made beautiful by being themselves subjected 
to a measure, and endowed with a form.(¿0)
Earlier, in "The er.se o f loauty", Santayana had written that the 
ju s tifica tion  o f rhyme seems to be not only that i t  contributes to melody, 
but i t  also gives an a r t i f ic ia l  relationship to the phrases between which
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i t  obtains, which, but for i t ,  would run sway from each other in a rapid 
and irrevocable flu x . In the sonnet, fo r example, a real unity is  foroed 
on the thought -  or at lea s t, i f  i t  is  not, the poem has no excuse for 
being a sonnet. The sonnet, by virtue o f this inter-relationship o f parts, 
is  the 'non plus u ltra ' o f rhyme.( 41)
Thus Santayana writess
"A tolerable d e fin ition  of poetry, on its  formal side, might be 
found in th is: That poetry is  speech in which the instrument counts 
as well as the meaning -  poetry is  speech for its  own sake and for 
its  own sweetness. As common windows are intended only to  admit 
the ligh t, tut painted windevs also to dye i t ,  and to be an object 
o f attention in themselves as w ell as a cause of v is ib i l i t y  in 
other things, so, while the purest prose is s mere vehicle o f 
thought, verse, lik e  stained glass, arrests attention in its  own 
in tricacies, confuses i t  in i t s  own g lories , and is  even at times 
allowed to darken and puzzle in the hope o f casting over us a super­
natural sp e ll. "(42)
I t  w ill be objected at once that this doctrine would be better cast as 
a de fin ition  lite ra ry  as opposed to non-literary language, rather than 
merely as a means of distinguishing poetry from prose. In " teason in Art", 
Santayana does recast the doctrine in th is  way. Literary prose, he says, has 
a double allegiance: " I t  must convey in te lligen ce, but in telligence clothed 
in a language that lends the message an in trinsic value, and makes i t  
de ligh tfu l to apprehend apart from its  importance in ultimate theory or 
practice. Prose is  in that measure a fine a rt. I t  might be called poetry 
that had become persuasively represen ta tive..."(43) Poetry would then be 
differentiated from a r t is t ic  prose by Its  metrical structure.
The sensuous beauty o f  words and their utterance in measure suffice 
for the f ir s t  type o f poetry. There is no d e fin ite  meaning, but only 
speech euphonious and measured. Such euphony is  a neces >ary condition for
the greatest achievements in poetry, "and even without an in te l l ig ib le  
superstructure these sensuous qualities su ffice  to give that t h r i l l  o f
exaltation , that suggestion o f an ideal world, which we fe e l in the 
presence o f beauty."(44 )
The second le v e l o f poetry is  that o f, "fancy, o f observation, and o f 
passion"(¿5 )• Two more elements o f poetry are present in works in this 
second class, euphuism, and the re-categorisation o f experience.
3y euphuism. Santayana means, "the choice o f coloured words and rare 
and e l l ip t ic a l  phrases." (¿ 6 ) In euphuistic poetry, there is  more than 
mere euphony, "there is  the colour and choice o f words, the fanc ifu l, rich, 
o r « )u is i t e  juxtaposition of phrases."(¿7) Such euphuism, "would seem to 
be necessary as w ell as metre, to the formal essence o f poetry,"(48) The 
argument to establish th is consists in the assertion that euphuism is  
absent from the verse o f Pope, that on th is ground we hesitate to c a ll 
such w riting poetic, and that therefore euphuism is  a necessary condition 
for poetry .( 49*)
The second feature o f the second le v e l o f poetry is  the re-categorisat­
ion o f experience. The poet, iantayana contends, has the innocent eye. He 
is  c loser to the data o f experience than most o f us aver are, we who use 
only the practical abstractions o f da ily  language, and ignore half our 
experience, as we must i f  the world is  to  be in te llig ib le s  "Poetry breaks 
up the t r i t e  conceptions designated by eurrent words into the sensuous 
qu a lities  out of which these conceptions were orig in a lly  put together.
We name what we conceive and believe in , not what we see; things, not 
images; souls, not voices and silhouettes."(50 ») The poet, by oontra3t ,  
"d isintegrates the fic tion s of common perception into their sensuous 
elements, gathers these together a!jiin into chance groups as the accidents 
o f his environment or the a ff in it ie s  o f his temperament may conjoin them." 
( » • )
The poet restores to  notice those elements o f perception whioh are 
ignored in ordinary, humdrum existence. These neglected elements Include
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thoughts and images, but also and more Importantly, emotions. A ll 
perception, Santayana claims, is  accompanied by emotion, and th is emotion 
ia  the f ir s t  thing that is  ignored by the in te lle c t : "The link  that binds 
together the ideas, sometimes so wide apart, vfcieh (the poet's ) wit 
assim ilates, is  most often the link of emotion; they have in common some 
element of beauty or horror."(52)
Kmotion is o f the f i r s t  Importance in poetry:
"The poet's art is  to a great extent the art o f Intensifying 
emotions by assembling the scattered objects that naturally arouse 
them...As the guiding principle of practical thinking is  some 
interest, so that only what is  pertinent to that interest is  
selected by the atten tion .. .so in poetic thinking the guiding 
principle is  often a mood or a qu a lity  o f sentiment."(53)
Moreover, as has been Indicated in  Ch. IV, above, by th is union of 
objects disparate except fo r a common overtone of feeling, the poet can 
create new fee lings : "Poets can,.arouse sentiments fin er than any which 
they have known, and in the act o f composition become discoverers o f new 
realms of delightfulness and g r ie f . "(54)
As a result of this restoration to experience o f those elements in i t  
commonly ignored, "the outer world is bathed in the hues o f human fee lin g , 
the inner world expressed in the forms of th ings," a state which according 
to ’¡antayana, " is  the prim itive condition o f both before the in telligence 
and the nrmsaic c lass ifica tion  of objects have abstracted them and assigned 
them to their respective spheres."(55) The poet, then, reminds us of the 
primitive state o f our experience, before the rejection o f those elements 
o f i t  which are useless fo r  the understanding of material r e a lity . This 
reminder is  beneficia l: "...w e see more and fe e l the more for that 
exercise; we are capable o f finding greater entertainment in the common 
aspects o f nature and l i f e . " ( 56)
As so fa r  described, poetry would be nothing to us but a relaxation; 
no spiritual d iscip line could be obtained from i t ,  and therefore the
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greatest function o f poetry is  yet to  be found.(57) The poetry vhich 
fu l f i ls  th is  function is  that o f the third kind, "the poetry o f creative
reason"t>a) r'oetry on th is  nignest piane embodies a comprehensive world­
view or vision of the universe and the place o f man in  i t ,  a vision which 
is  moreover oongerl-1 to  the mind. Tn other words, the greatest poetry 
embodies a comprehensive and worked-out set o f id ea ls . Referring back to 
the re-categorisation of experience, Santayana continues! "Our descent 
into the elements o f our being is thnn ju s tified  by our subseauent ascent 
toward its  goal} we revert to sense only to  find food forreason; we destroy 
conventions only to construct id ea ls ."(59*)
In connexion with th is  third type o f poetry, Santayana spends some 
time discussing the re la tiv e  importance o f characterisation and p lo t. The 
construction of characters, he maintains, is not the ultimata taak of 
poetry. The reason is  that a character can never exhaust i t s  own materials: 
i t  ex ists by idiosyncrasy. In order to do justice to  the profusion o f our 
observations, we must put the characters in their setting. The great 
poet must render a l l  nature, the circumstances which surround his 
characters: "the poet o f larger mind envelops his characters in the 
atmosphere o f nature and history, and keeps us constantly aware o f the 
world in which they move."(60)
¡Squally important is  the dramatic situation in which the characters 
are involved. The substance o f poetry is  emotion, and th is  is  in no way 
surprising. The passions are the ch ief basis o f a ll  in terests, even the 
most idea l, and the passions are seldom brought into play except in the 
contact o f man with man. Hence the importance o f the dramatic s ituation .(61)
The greatest satisfaction  provided for ua by fic tion  is that which 
arises from vicarious experience. The»# Is  a certain  disorder in our 
psychical organisation. We have, in a sense, an in f in ite  w ill ,  but only 
a lim ited experience, "an experienoe sadly inadequate to exercise that 
w ill  either in its  purity or its  strength."(62) The main device by means
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o f which the post furnish«3 us with vicarious experience is tha plot:
" i f  (the poat) gives us a good plot, we can readily furnish 
the characters, because each o f them w ill  be the rea lisa tion  of 
some stunted potential s e lf  o f  own own. I t  is  by the p lo t, 
than, that the characters w i l l  be v iv if ie d , beoause i t  is  by 
the plot that our own character w ill  be expended into i t s  latent 
p o ss ib ilit la s ."(63 )
I t  is  not the case, Santayana claims, that the description of an alien 
character can supply vicarious experience as e ffic ie n t ly  as a good plot, 
since "the presentation o f the circumstances in which that character 
manifests i t s e l f  w i l l  make description unnecessary, since our instinct 
w ill supply a l l  that is  requisite fo r  the impersonation."(64*)
(•turning to the general description of the highest form o f  poetry, 
Santayana argUf s that pootry is  not at its  best when, as is  the case 
with iomeo's love, i t  describes a single passion, l i f e  in one o f its  
phases. I t  is  at it s  best when i t  gives meaning to the passions i t  
describes, by virtue o f a commanding and unified vision o f the entire 
order o f th ings.( 65)
The highest example o f this kind o f poetry is re lig ion . I t  is often 
misunderstood by literal-minded men, who, thinkin ; thereby to  establish 
tha importance o f th e ir  b e lie fs , attribute to them lite ra l tru th , and 
hypostatize their ideals. Here they fa l l  into error, fo r, "value lies  
in meaning, not in substance; in the ideal which things approach, not in 
the energy which they «■body."(66) Moreover, when poetry,
"comes to the consciousness o f its  highest function, that of 
portraying the ideals of experience and destiny, then the poet 
beoomea aware that he is essen tia lly  a prophet, and e ith er devotes 
himself, lik e  Homer and Dante, to the loving expression of the 
relig ion  that ex ists, or l ik e  tuoretlus or Vordsworth, to the 
heralding of one which he believes to  be possible."(67 *)
I f  poetry is  to be o f the greatest <^ lnd, "the experience imagined should
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be conceived ae a destiny, governed by princip les, and Issuing In the 
discip line and enlightenment of the w i l l . " (6 8 * )
iantaysna draws two conclusions from these doctrines, tne f i r s t  o f 
which is  his complete defin ition  o f poetry: ”ve  may say that poetry is 
metrical and euphuistic discourse, expressing thought which is both sensuous 
and id ea l."(69) 3ecordly, i t  follows that,
" teligion is poetry become the guide to  l i f e ,  poetry substituted 
for science or supervening upon i t  as an approach to  the highest 
r e a lity . Poetry is  re lig ion  allowed t o  d r if t ,  l e f t  without points 
o f application in conduct and without an expression in worship and 
dogma{ i t  is  re lig ion  without practica l efficacy and without 
metaphysical illu s io n .*(70)
(v ) torberlsT; home Critical Verdicts, and Qootrjne on the length o f poems 
I t  has been pointed out (in  ( i i )  above) that for Santayana the 
possession o f a comprehensive and thoroughly worked-out set o f ideals is 
an index of mental health and rationa lity . His special term fo r  the state 
o f humanity in  which there are either no Ideals or only few and fragment­
ary ones is  barbarism:
" ’ or the barbarian is  the man who regards his passions as their
own excuse fo r  being; who does not domesticate them either by
understanding their cause or by conceiving their ideal goal. He
is  the man who does not know his derivations or perceive his
tendencies, but who merely fee ls  and acts, valuing in his l i f e
its  foroe and its  f i l l in g ,  but being careless o f i t s  purpose
and i t s  form ...H is delight is  in abundance and vehemence; his art,
lik e  his l i f e ,  shows an exclusive respect for quality and
splendour o f materials. His scorn fo r  what is  poorer and weaker
than himself is only surpassed by hia Ignorance o f what is  higher."
(71")
The barbarian has a characteristic m orality: he conceives o f l i f e  as 
an adventure, not a discip line; and the exercise o f energy is  the absolute 
good, irr"noeotlve of motives or consequences. The barbarian is  unwilling
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to  learn from experience, has contempt fo r ra tion a lity , carelessness 
about perfection, and admiration fo r mere fo rce . I t  w i l l  come as no 
surprise, in view o f the d is lik e  o f the romanticism expressed in  'The 
Sense o f Beauty', to find  that for Bantayana the tomantic and the 
barbarian are identical figu re** Teethe's ’ aust is  in Santayana's view 
a perfect instance o f barbarism, a worshipper o f W illing for i t s  own sake. 
(72»)
The theory o f the elements and function o f poetry o f the preceding 
section is used by Santayana as the underpinning for his critic ism  o f 
poetry. Poets are c la ss ified  and evaluated by him according a3 th e ir  work 
fa l ls  into the three classes o f poetry he has distinguished.
Walt Whitman's poetry is that o f a rich , spontaneous and absolutely 
lazy fancy. I t  is  the most sincere confession of the lowest ( i . e .  the 
most prim itive) type o f perception. We find the swarms o f men and objects 
rendered as they might s tr ik e  the retina in a sort o f waking dream:(73) 
"This abundance of d e ta il without organisation, th is wealth o f perception 
without in telligence and of information without taste, makes the singularity 
o f Whitman'3 genius."(7 4 *) He portrays common l i f e  absolutely without 
any starjdard of judgment by which to evaluate i t .  Whitman's poetry Is 
barbarian in Santayana's sense, and must f a l l  into the lowest o f the three 
classes he distinguishes.
Also an example of barbarism, but th is time in the second of the three 
classes o f  poetry is  that o f Browning. Browning is indeed a w riter o f 
genius, a master o f the expression o f emotion; but his thought and art are 
inchoate and ill-d ig es ted . He fa ils  to approach even a recognition of the 
trad itiona l ideals of poetry and re lig ion . In Browning, there Is no 
description o f passion from the vantage ground o f the in te lle c t; on the 
contrary, hie art is  a l l  s e lf—expression and sa tire . His art was inspired 
by ends less simple and universal than the ends o f imagination i t s e l f :
"Ho conception could be farther from bis thought than the 
essential conception of any rational philosophy, namely, that
(177)
fe e lin g  is  to  be treated as a raw material fo r thought, and 
that the destiny o f emotion is to  peas into objects which shall 
contain a l l  i t s  value wbile losing a l l  i t s  formlessness. The 
transformation o f sense and emotion into objects agreeable to the 
in te lle c t , into clear ideas and beautiful things, is  the natural 
work of reason ..."(75*)
3y contrast, Dante is  the type of the consummate poet, and the 
"Divine Comedy1 is  a successful example o f the highest species of poetry: 
in i t ,  Dante gives a unified rendering o f the whole of l i f e .  He is  the 
supreme poet o f the supernatural, the unrivalled exponent, a fter Plato, 
o f that phase of thought and fee lin g  in which the supernatural seems to  be 
the key to nature and to happiness. He presents the most complete idea l­
isation  and comprehension of things yet attained by human beings.(76)
/part from Dante, Dantayana accords the highest praise to Homer, 
Iucretius and Goethe (as the author of "Tauat".) One obvious feature 
which th e ir  works have in common is substantial length; indeed to put 
forward a comprehensive world-view of the kind Santayana admires, a long 
poem is  a necessity. Consequently, he can have no sympathy with the 
doctrine that a long poem is  a contradiction in terms, or at least, that 
long poems by nature tend to be patchy and bad. He argues against th is  
view in  "Three Philosophical Poets."(1910) The three poets in question 
are Lucretius, Dante, end Goethe.(77»)
Sach of these poets is  typ ical o f an age, and taken together, (in  
Santayana's view) they sum up a l l  European philosophy. Lucretius adopts 
materialism in natural science and humanism in ethics; because of th is he 
ty p if ie s  Greek, lennaissance, and contemporary philosophy. Dante, as has 
been said, is  the superlative poet o f supernaturaliom, a view which 
regards happiness as impossible here and only to be hoped fo r in a 
future l i f e .  Goethe's "Faust" is  the greatest monument to yet another 
s p ir i t ,  that o f lomantlciam. The w ill summons a l l  dangers and a ll  
opportunities out o f nothing, to feed it s  appetite for action; and in that
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ideal function l ie s  th e ir  sole rea lity . Once attained, these things 
are transcended lik e  the episodes o f a spent dream. The sp ir it  that
created them remains undefiled and passes on to new fic t io n s .(78)
Is i t  an accident, Santayana continues, that the most adequate and 
lasting exposition» of these philosophies ere by poets? Ts philosophy 
in the end nothing put poetry? I f  one considers philosophy as an in v es t i­
gation into truth, or reasoning upon truths already discovered, there is  
nothing in philosophy akin to  poetry. But in philosophy, investigation  
and reasoning are only serv ile  and preparatory stages to  the attainment 
o f the f in a l sublime vis ion , "theoria", "a steady contemplation o f a l l  
things in  their order and worth. Such contemplation is  im aginitive. No 
one can reach i t  who has not enlarged his mind and tamed his heart. A 
philosopher who attains i t  is ,  for the moment, a poet; and a poet who 
turns his practised and passionate imagination on the order o f things, 
or on anything in the ligh t o f the whole, is  for that moment a 
philosopher."(79)
Those, therefore, who maintain that the poet is  o f necessity short- 
winded, simply te s t ify  to  the inadequacy o f their own imaginitive powers: 
" I f  i t  be a fa c t, as i t  often is ,  that we find l i t t l e  things pleasing and 
great things arid and formless, and i f  we are better poets in a lin e than 
in an epic, that is simply due to  lack o f faculty on our pert, lack of 
imagination and memory, and above a l l  to  lack o f d is c ip lin e ."(80) The 
d if f ic u lty ,  a fte r  having the experience to  symbolise, lie s  only in having 
enough Imagination to hold and suspend i t  in thought.(81) Far from short- 
windedness being a necessary condition forpoetry, poetry is  a l l  the more 
poetry for having breadth and range. The argument o f "Three Philosophical 
Poets" is  designed to back up th is theoretical argument by a c r it ic a l 
consideration o f "he Serum Nature", "The Divine Jomedy", and "Faust".
I I I !  variants on These hoctrlnes. Early and I,at.«
In the May, 1890 number o f the "Harvard Monthly" ( l . e .  ten years before
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the publication o f "Interpretations o f Poetry and R e lig ion "), Santayana 
published, "Walt Whitmans A Dialogue". The in terlocu tors, Van Tender and 
Me3tout, argue about the merits and demerits o f Whitman's poetry. The 
g is t o f Van lender's argument is  that Whitman's Doetry conveys a unique 
emotion, " I t  is  the voice of nature crying in the wilderness o f convention." 
(33) The mere enumeration o f objects gives a sense o f soaoe, o f a 
m u ltip lic ity  o f things spread endlessly around.( 84.) 3y not passing any 
verdict on the things he names, Whitman does ju stice  to th eir in trinsic  
l i f e  and nature.(35)
Neither interlocutor is c learly  victorious in  th is  dialogue, indicating 
perhaps th-.t Santayana had not at the time arrived at a general view o f 
poetry. The opinions here put into the mouth o f MeStout, however, can be 
construed as admittedly Imprecise fore shadowings o f the mature doctrines. 
MoStout objects, for example, that Whitman's l is t s  o f names have nothing 
to do with poetry, since poetry deals with illu s ion s , not fa cts ! " I t  seems 
to me that the illu sion  is poetic, and the fact is  30 only when in fancy 
we assimilate i t  to the fic tion ..P o e try  deals with sensuous attractions 
found nowhere on the map. To see them you must have a passport into 
fa iry  land."(36) This passage is  consonant with the la ter doctrines that 
the poet can create new feelings by uniting objects o f identical emotional 
overtone, and that poetry ought to be informed and indeed is  informed by 
idea l3 8 in both these cases, poetry deals with things not to be found 
•on the map', /.gain, MeStout objects that, " i t  is  immoral to treat l i f e  
as a masquerade, as a magic pantomime in which acts have no consequences, 
and happiness and misery don't e x is t ."(87) MeStout c learly  thinks that 
poetry should be Informed by a set o f  moral b e lie fs , and in Santayana's 
la te r theory, having moral belie fs involves having ideals.
In, "The Sense o f Seauty" (1396), Santayana puts forward a two-fold 
div ision  o f poets into musicians and psychologists. The musicians are, 
"masters o f significant language as harmony; they know what notes
to sound together and in succession; they can produce, by the 
marshalling o f sounds and images, by the figure o f passion and 
the snap of w it, & thousand b rillian t e ffects  out o f  old 
materials . " ( 38)
''he psychologists, on he other hand, gain their e f f «e t  not by the 
mastery o f the in tr in s ic  properties o f language, but by a closer adaptation 
o f i t  to things. In the class o f  musicians, Santayana Includes the 
Ciceronian orator, and epigrammatic, ly r ic , and epic poets, dramatic 
poets, by contrast, are the natural example o f the psychologists.(39)
This distinction is  quite incidental to the argument of "The Sense o f 
Seauty", and is not mentioned again by Santayana. Nor is  i t  a loss: as 
i f  Chakespeanvere not a musician as well as a psychologist.
Twenty-seven years a fter, "The Cense o f Seauty", Santayana published 
his essay, "On My friend ly  C r itic s " ("The Journal of Philosophy", v.18, 
no.26, Pec. 22nd, 1921; subsequently reprinted in "Soliloquies in England 
and Later Soliloqu ies", 1922) In this essay he makes an important 
modification to the theories o f "Interpretations o f Poetry and ie lig ion " 
and "Three Philosophical Poets":
"3o anxious was I ,  when younger, to find some rational ju stifica tion  
for poetry and re lig ion , and to show that their magic was s ig n if i­
cant o f true facts, that I  insisted too  much, as I  now think, on 
the need o f relevance to  fact ever, in poetry ...I maintained that 
the noblest poetry also must express the moral burden o f l i f e  and 
must be rich in wisdom. Age has made me less exacting, and I  can 
now find quite su fficien t perfection in poetry, l ik e  that o f the 
Chinese and Arabians, without much philosophic scope, in mere grace 
and fee lin g  and music and cloud-castles and f r o l i c . "(90)
This revision does not fo llow  merely from a change o f taste, but 
from a change in Santayana’ s philosophy o f mind. In the version of the 
theory of Section 2, above, i t  is  assumed that the mind is  only, "a 
system of successive ideas, the la ter ones mingling with the survival
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o f the e a r lie r , and forming a cumulative experience, lik e  a swelling 
musical movement,"(91) This is  accompanied by the further assumption 
that, "an idea could have depth and richness only i f  somehow redolent of 
former experiences o f an overt kind."(92 ) "he rest o f the argument to the 
conclusions o f the mature view would then presumably be this* sign ificant 
ideas are those with multiple associations. In order to  be great, poetry 
must be sign ifican t, and to be s ign ifican t, i t  must embody these ideas, 
sad the more o f  them, the better. The wider the range o f experience 
covered, the greater w i ll  be the significance o f  the poetry. Hence the 
greatest poetry has the scope o f a complete philosophy.
3y 1921, Santayana had adopted an additional b e lie f in the philosophy 
o f mind, which he states, however, only with great inexactness: " I  have 
learned ...to  re ly  more on the substructure, on the material end psychical 
machinery that puts the conscious show on the stage, and pulls the w ires". 
(93) This leads him to adopt a second, alternative condition fo r  poetic 
significancet "When liv in g  substance is  thus restored beneath the surface 
o f experience, there Is no longer eny reason fo r  assuming that the f ir s t  
song o f a bird may not be in fin ite ly  rich and as deep as heaven, i f  i t  
utters the v ita l  impulses o f the moment with enough completeness."(94)
This new position does not involve a denial o f the former one. The change 
of view car. be summed up as follows: In the "Interpretations o f i hilosophy 
and Religion"/ "Three Philosophical Poets" period, Santayana believed that 
the greatest poetry has philosophic scope; by 19 22, he believed that the 
greatest poetry is either of philosophic scope, or fu lly  expressive of 
the present condition o f the organism.
#
Santayana thus has a theory of the nature and function of poetry and 
o f re lig ion  from which i t  follows that poetry and re lig ion  have in common 
the property of expressing ideals, and d if fe r  only in our attitude towards 
them. The following assessment o f his views is  organised in three sections:
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F irs tly , a consideration of his necessary conditions for poetry; secondly, 
a review of his theory o f re lig ion , and f in a lly , in the ligh t o f these, 
an examination o f his conclusion as to tb e irre la tion .
IV! -Necessary Jonoitlona fo r Poetry
;hyrv. and '-C trlre or. the fetu rc o f L iterary jacguagg
Santayana contends that metre is  a necessary condition fo r  poetry. He 
considers i t  to be a necessary condition for perfection o f form: only i f  
m etrically organised can every part of the whole poem have a for®, and a l l  
the parts be co-ordinated.
This doctrine o f the necessity of metre has been long contested, and is 
denied in some h is to r ic a lly  important essays in poetics. Thus fo r example, 
Sir Philip Sidney, in his "Apologie for Poetrie" (1581) writes: " . . . i t  is  
not ryming and versing, that maketh Poesie. One may bee a poet without 
versing, and a v e r s if ie r  without Poetry." (95) cat her, he contends, follow^* 
ing Horace, " i t  is  that faynlng notable images of vertue3, v ices , or what 
e ls , with that d e ligh tfu l teaching which must be the right describing note 
to know a poet by.. . " (9 6 * ) On the other hand, equally important writers 
take up the contrary stanoe. S ir Walter Scott ("On Ballad Poetry", 1820), 
writing o f poetry in general, claims that poetry is  formed by refining 
ordinary speech. I t  has, "A more ornate diction, modulated by certain 
rules o f rhythm, cadence, assonance o f termination, or recurrence of sound 
or le tte r ...(an d  i t  is )  a d ia lect more solemn in expression"(97) than 
ordinary speech. Or again, Coleridge ("3iographla L iteraria ", 1817) 
stipulates thet in a poem, a ll the parts should be organically related,
Hone should be dispensable, and each should act upon the others» " . . a l l  in 
their proportion harmonising with, and supporting the purpose snd known 
influences of metrical arrangement."(93)
The cause o f th is  debate seems to be a sh ift in the meaning o f the 
term, ' poetry '• W riters, such as Sidney, for whom the Creek root of the 
terra determined its  meaning, use 'poetry ' in what now appears as an extended
(133)
sense to  cover most ct  a l l  o f imaginitive lite ra tu re . Equally c lass ioa lly  
minded was Hen Jonson, who answers the question, 'what is  a poet?' as 
fo llow «: (Discoveries upon Men and Matter", posth., 1641) " ..th e  word-»roieTV 
s ign ifie s  to make or fayne. Hence hee is called a Poet, not h«e which 
writeth in measure only, but that fayneth and formeth a fab le , and writes 
things like the truth. For the r’able and Fiction is , as i t  were, the 
forme and Soule o f any Poetica ll work or Poems."(99) This etymology is  
c lea r ly  reflected also, o f course, in the Middle English noun "maker" 
fo r poet, and the verb, "to  make" in the sense o f to compose or im itate. 
(100») Since the Pennaissance, the term seems gradually to have changed 
its  meaning, and now denotes only a sub-clsss o f the class o f works o f 
lite ra ry  art, i . e .  l ite ra ry  works m etrically organised. This sh ift is  
indicated in  the existence o f terms lik e  "prose-poem" to re fe r  to 
l i t e ra ry  works which are non-metrical end yet share properties typ ica lly  
associated with poems, e.g . ly r ica l in tensity, and highly metaphoric 
language. ?!or is  the change in meaning restricted to English. Mallarmé 
fe l t  the need to re fer to one of his works as "Poemes en Prose".
Granted the present meaning of "poem" in tngllsh, then, one can accept 
Santayana's f ir s t  necessary condition fo r poetry, i .e .  that a poem should 
be in metrical language. For the sake of completeness, i t  is  to be noted 
that being metrical is  not of course a su ffic ien t condition fo r  poetry: 
fa iled  poems are commonly denigrated by the description, "mere verse".
Verse must have certain aesthetic virtues, before i t  qu a lifies  fo r the 
t i t l e ,  "poem". (The implications o f  this for the logioa l grammar o f the 
term 'poem' and it s  cogne.te3 are taken up below.)
With regard to rhyme (not o f course a necessary condition for poetry), 
Santayana says merely that i t  contributes to melody, and acts as a binding 
agent for the phrases between which i t  obtains. These views are not 
untypical. In his classic "Defence o f Hyme" (1602) Daniel argues in 
favour o f the mnemonic value of rhyme. I t  gives, "both to the Eare an 
Coeho o f a d e ligh tfu l! report and to the Memorie a deeper impression of
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what is  delivered there in ".(101) Again, he claims emotive power fo r  rhyme, 
as one o f it s  three functions, which are, "delighting the eare, s t irr in g  
the heart, and sa tis fy ing  the iudgement in such sort as I  doubt whether 
euer single numbers w ill  do in our clim ate.."(102) In general, " . .  ’yme 
(which is  an excellencie added to this worke o f measure, and a Harmonic, 
fem e happier than any proportion Antiuqitle could euer show us) dooth adde 
more grace and hath more delight than euer bare numbers, howsoeuer they can 
be forced to runne in our slow language, can possibly y ie ld ."(103) In a 
modern work, Wellek and Warren distinguish three functions for rhyme: ( i )  
i t  has a merely euphonious function in the repetition  or near -  repetition  
o f sounds, ( i i )  i t  signals tbs end o f a line o f verse, and car. organise 
stanzaic patterns, and ( i i i )  i t  has a semantic function -  words are 
brought together by rhyme, and either linked up or contrasted.( 10 4 ) Home 
o f these arguments are obviously too imprecise and subjective to be tested 
or worth testing (rhyme gives more 'delight* than blank verse), and others 
claim only t r iv ia l  virtues fo r rhyme (mnemonic power). To the claims that 
rhyme adds to euphony, and has an organising function, one need only add 
the qua lification  that these are properties o f successful rhyme, rather 
than automatic benefits which follow  from it s  use. Santayana's views on 
rhyme are correct, i f  not especia lly orig ina l.
The aesthetic doctrine which Santayana associates with these f i r s t  
reflections on poetry, i .e .  that poetic language is  language whose in trin sic  
properties are an object o f aesthetic in terest, is  surely acceptable. One 
o f the features o f  the aesthetic as opposed to the instrumental or 
u tilita r ia n  attitude is  that one contemplates features o f an aesthetic 
object which would be passed over in a non-sesthetic context. Common to 
our attitude to the non-aesthetic uses to which language is  put is  our 
minimal regard fo r  it s  In trin sic  properties, suoh as sound and formal 
arrangement, and i t  is  precisely these whioh are notioed in th“ distanced 
state. Th is!is not, obviously, to imply that in literatu re, semantic
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properties are o f secondary in terest or o f no interest At a l l ,  simply 
that our in terest in lite ra ry  language embraces both its  semantic and
its  in trinsic properties.
To neglect the in tr in s ic  properties, to tr^at lite ra tu re  as a means 
so le ly  o f obtaining information, is to impoverish the aesthmUm 'esponse, 
and to diminish the pleasure which literatu re can give. One men who must 
have suffered from impaired aesthetic experience ir  this way was Lamotte.
verything good in a poem, he believed, delights the reason, and reason 
does not need verse, He wrote a prose version of the f ir s t  scene o f 
taeine's "M ithridate", which he claimed waa in no way in fe r io r  to  the 
o rig in a l. He fe lt  ju s t ified  in doing so by his c r it ic a l b e lie fs :
” u 'est-ce qui constitue la solide bonti d'un ouvrage, s i ca 
n 'est pas la juatesse des penskes, li^es entre e lle s  par le
meilleur arrangement. . et le  choix des expressions le  plus 
propres a fa ire  passer dans l 'e s p r it  des autres, des id£es 
qu'on veut leur donner. Voilà la raison, vo ilà  l'eloquenee, 
vo ilà  le  connaissance parfa ite et le  seul usage légitim e 
d'une langue. Apres ce la , que rest i r a i t - i l  à estimer dans un 
ouvrage du cote de l'in te llig en ce? " (105)
The perversity of th is doctrine, omitting as i t  does so many d istinctive 
features o f literature and the fu l l  aesthetic response to i t ,  points up 
by contrast the rightness o f the contrary doctrine, embraced by 'Santayana.
C iV> 1 upr.ulsm'
T’he very choice o f th is term, having the h istorical reference i t  does, 
and Santayana's defin ition  of i t  ("the choice of coloured uords and rare 
and e ll ip t ic a l phrases") suggest that th is imprecise doctrine is  to be 
interpreted as a claim that the vocabulary and syntax of poetry is  and ought 
to be mark id ly d ifferent and remote from that o f non-poetic language.
I f  th is ia so, than two comments are in order. In the f i r s t  place,
Pope ia by no means the happiest choice as an example o f a non-euphuistle 
w riter. Whatever might be one's evaluation of th is sty le, the a r t i f ic ia l i t y
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o f the heroic couplet and conventional periphrases surely separate th is 
type o f poetry from the language o f ordinary speech.
¿eoonaly, this aoctrine, lik e  that o f the necessity o f metre, has been 
contested by v r ite r «  on poetic*. Daniel, fo r  example, holds the contrary
position:
"Next to  this deformitie stands our a ffection , wherein we alwayes 
bewray our selues to be both vnkinde, and vnnaturall to our owne 
n&tiue language, in disguising or forging strange or vnvsuall wordes, 
as i f  i t  were to make our verse seeme an other kind of speach out o f 
the course of our vsuall practice, displacing our wordes, or 
inuesting new, onely vpon a s in gu la ritie i when our owne accustomed 
phrase, set in the due plaoe, would expresse vs more fam iliarly  
and to  better deligh t, than a l l  th is  id le  affectation  o f antlqu itie , 
or noueltie can euer doe."(106)
Again, Wordsworth gives what is h is to r ica lly  the most celebrated statement 
o f the same view "..every  good poem, even o f the most elevated character, 
must necessarily, except with reference to  the metre, in no respect d if fe r  
from that o f  good prose...there neither is  nor can be, any essential 
d ifference between the language of prose and metrical composition."(107) 
There is  surely no reason to accept either Santayana's view, or that 
o f Daniel and Wordsworth, a l l  three o f whom are gu ilty of that sort o f 
parochialism o f taste (on this point) which so often attends change o f 
fashion in the literary  world. Neither euphuism nor plainness Is necessary 
for poetry, nor for good or great poetry. I t  is  a commonplace that poems 
and indeed good and great poems have been written in both plain and exotic 
sty les.
( i l l )  fhg ppft and,„the p?ta 9f
Santayana aecepta a representational theory of perception. He holds 
that there are perceptual ultlmates, irreducib le data immediately given and 
known by acquaintance, out of which the mind constructs the sensible world. 
He accepts a distinction between the immediately given, and our mediate
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constructions out of i t .  In his dssoriptlon o f the creative process he 
re lie s  on this d is tin ction , holding thrt the poet Is able In some way to 
approach the immediately given, «nd to recomoiae the data in ways other 
than those with which we operate in almost a l l  our a c t iv it ie s .  The 
'innocent eye ', in .iantayana1 s use, is  the eye which is  acquainted with 
immediate data.
The d if ficu lty  with th is  doctrine is  that the iamediate/medlste 
distinction on which it  rests is  untenable. One way o f showing its  
untenability is  to examine one o f it s  consequences: from Santayana's 
position, i t  follows that in any experience where I  see something as 
something else, the experience is  in a certain sense eomplex, and 
acalysable into two sub-experiences, namely, ( i )  apprehending the data, 
and ( i i )  interpreting them, l . e .  in some way f it t in g  them into a 
coherent pattern of knowledge. The fa ls it y  o f this analysis has been 
shown by 'ittgenstein .
In the "Brown 3ook", Wittgenstein gives the example o f a square with 
both diagonals drawn in . This might be seen, not only under the descript­
ion of a square with both diagonals drawn in , but also as a swastika.
His point is that in each case, there is  no comparison made between what I
see and something else in my mind which I  subsequently see i t  as. He
considers the very form o f words, "seeing as* to be misleading, inviting 
us as i t  does to think that we are making a comparison: " .. 's e e in g  
dashes as a face ' does not involve a comparison between a group o f dashes 
and a real human facej and, on the other hand, this form of expression 
most strongly suggests that we are alluding to a eomparison"(108) In 
other words, when I  see something as something else, there is  only one 
thing that I do, i .e .  see i t }  I  do not both see something and compare i t  
with an inner entity.
Other lines o f argument »merge in the "Philosophical Investigations". 
Just before introducing the duck-rabbit, Wittgenstein gives as an example 
a perspective drawing o f a glass cube. We can see i t  as a glass cube, an
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Inverted open box, a wire frame, or three boards forming a solid angle; 
and we see i t  as we interpret i t .  Someone might want to  say that the 
description o f whet is  got inmediately, i .e ,  the visual experience, is  
arrived at ind irectly . Thus, ’ I  see the figure as a box' would on th is 
view mean, ' I  have a particular visual exD*ele*ee which T have e0,lw5 that 
I always have when I interpret the figu re as a box or when I  look at a box.’ 
Yet, he points out, i f  th is were ¿ «a lly  whst were meant, then I  ought to 
know i t .  I  ought to be able to refer to  the experience d irec tly , not otoly 
in d ire c tly , as I  can speak o f red without ca llin g  i t  the colour o f blood.
The nerve o f the argument Is : i f  the experience o f seeing as is complex, 
then i t  is  curious that we should not be fa r better able than we are to 
re fer to the alleged components.(109)
Again, suppose I  experience the change o f aspect o f the duck-rabbit.
-hat is  d ifferen t? Is i t  my impression or my point o f view? Wittgenstein 
comments: '1  describe the a lteration  lik e  a perception; quite as i f  the 
object had altered before my eyes."(110) The point is  that I  do not 
describe the change as a «-hange o f the interpretation of the same datum; 
rather I  describe two d ifferent perceptions. Or, as Wittgenstein himself 
puts i t :  " I f  you search in a figure (1 ) for another figure (2 ), and then 
find i t ,  you see ( 1 ) in a newway. Kot only can you give a new kind o f 
description o f i t ,  but noticing the second figure was a new visual 
e x p e r ien ce ." (Ill) The experience changes, not the Interpretation of 
something common to two experiences.
At one point, Wittgenstein seems to  hint at the most te llin g  argument 
against the lamediate/medlate d istin ction , i . e .  that the hypothesis that 
there are immediate data is  unverifiable and redundant. In sense-datum 
talk about ' iesta lt '-switches such as those produced by the duck-rabbit, 
i t  is  perfectly  legitim ate to ask: "And is  i t  rea lly  a d ifferen t 
impression?" Wittgenstein comments: "In order to answer this I  should 
like to  ask myself whether there rea lly  is something d ifferent there in me.
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3ut how can I  find out? -  I  describe what I  am seeing d if fe re n t ly ."(112)
The syntax is  ambiguous, but this passage w ill  bear interpretation as
saying that, even i f  there were data, we could never be aware o f then, 
for whatever we experience, we experience as something, i .e .  under some 
description, '’’he very description, "immediate experience", as i t  is  used
by sense-datum theorists, is  oxymoronic.(113) The 'innocent eye' as 
Santayana conceives,it, is  an incoherent suggestion.
This part of Santayana's theory o f poetry is  therefore unacceptable as 
i t  stands. Yet i t  would be unjust to dismiss i t  completely, ihrensweig 
has shown that a certain re-ordering of experience is  indeed a Dart o f  
the process of a r t is t ic  creation in general, snd perhaps Santayana had 
some idea of th is . Or. the other hand, in comparison with Ehrenzweig, his 
description of the process is much too briefs there is no hint that the 
process might be as complex as that described in Khrenzweig's schizoid -  
manic -  re-introjaction schema.( 1 1 4 ) !.or Is Santayana precise as to 
whether the creative process is  conscious or unconscious.
( iv )  ircat . oetry and fne .xprg.slQ.n of Id ea lj
Santayana holds that i t  is  a necessary condition fo r greatness in  a 
poem that i t  express a comprehensive philosophic vision o f the universe, 
that i t  be informed by a fu lly  worked-out set o f ideals fo r  l i f e .  In , 
"Soliloquies in England and la te r  Soliloqu ies", he Introduces an alternative 
condition, that o f  being a complete expression of the present state o f  an 
organism.
The d if f ic u lty  with th is la ter alternative is that i t  is so imprecise« 
we are given no detailed description o f what i t  is  fu lly  to express that 
stete o f an organism. Even so, however, it  is  clear that the change o f 
opinion represented by the la ter doctrine is considerable. Santayana's 
la te r  view is compatible with the ascription o f greatness to short, ly r ica l 
poems, which the ea r lie r  doctrine, with its  demand fo r philosophic 
comprehensiveness, would exclude from the highest rank o f poetic attainment.
(190)
I t  is  surely impossible to leg is la te  'a p riori* about which theory o f 
poetic greatness is  to  be preferred, i f  any. Our ascription o f greatness 
to poetry depends ultimately on the aesthetic sa tis fection  which i t  affords 
us: whether this satisfaction  be derived from philosophic breadth or ly r ic  
in tensity  is  a -natter fo r the individual to  se tt le «
With regard to the early doctrine i t s t l f ,  there is  undoubtedly some 
truth in i t .  I t  is  a commonplace o f the critic ism  o f  poetry, as o f some 
other arts, that breadth o f vision is  a virtue in a work o f a rt } and i t  
would be d if f ic u lt  to find a c r it ic  to disagree with Santayana in finding 
comprehensiveness in the poets whom he rates most highly: Homer, Dante, 
Lucretius and Doe the. There are however, certain d i f f ic u lt ie s ,  f ir s t ly ,  
though i t  is  properly a question of critic ism , i t  should at least be 
indicated that th is thesis that Shakespeare lacks a philosophy is  
highly Questionable. The tragedies and la te  plays at least may be said to 
imply world views; moreover, as is  indicated in the preceding chapter, 
above, "antayana maintains th 't  tragedy necessarily Involves certain 
metaphysical assumptions. Again, Santayana assumes that a great poet must 
be a philosopher o f some stature; or, put in another way, that greatness 
in a poem depends on certain properties o f it s  subject-matter. Yet this 
is  surely not the case: unless a thinker were able to present his views 
in  a fin e sty le and in a well-ordered sequence ( fo r  example), he would 
hardly be called an a rt is t  at a l l .  A rtis try  is  displayed in treatment, 
rather than content. (C f. Ch.VII, below, where Santayana makes the same 
assumption in discussing rational poetry) This point is closely related 
to  the question o f truth in poetry, s problem discussed in the next 
section. •
I f  the foregoing remarks are correot, then Santayana's fin a l defin ition 
o f poetry, as metrical discourse expressing thought that is at once 
sensuous and ideal, muet be rejected, only the assertion that metre ie s 
necessary condition fo r poetry being acceptable as i t  stands. Obviously,
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I t  is  surely impossible to le g is la te  'a p r io r i ' about whioh theory o f 
poetic greatness is  to be preferred, i f  any. Our ascription o f greatness 
to poetry depends ultimately on the aesthetic satisfaction whioh i t  affords 
us: whether th is satisfaction  be derived from philosophic breadth or ly r ic  
in tensity  is  a -natter fo r the Individual to se tt le .
With regard to the early doctrine t tsS lf, there is  undoubtedly some 
truth in i t .  I t  is  a commonplace o f the criticism  o f poetry, as o f some 
other arts, that breadth of v is ion  is a virtue in a work of a rt ; and i t  
would be d if f ic u lt  to find a c r i t ic  to disagree with Santayana in finding 
comprehensiveness in the poets whom he rates most highly: Homer, Dante, 
Lucretius and loethe. There are however, certain d if f ic u lt ie s , f i r s t ly ,  
though i t  is  properly a question of criticism , i t  should at least be 
indicated that th is thesis that Shakespeare lacks a philosophy is  
highly questionable. The tragedies and la te plays at least may be said to  
imply world views; moreover, as is  indicated in the preceding chapter, 
above, lantayana maintains th t  tragedy necessarily involves certain 
metaphysical assumptions. Again, Santayana assumes that a great poet must 
be a philosopher o f some stature; or, put in another way, that greatness 
in a poem depends on certain properties o f its  subject-matter. le t  th is 
is  surely not the case: unless a thinker were able to present his views 
in a fin e style and in a well-ordered sequence (fo r  example), he would 
hardly be called an a rt is t  at a l l .  A rtistry is  displayed in treatment, 
rather than content. (C f. Ch.VII, below, where Santayana makes the same 
assumption in discussing rational poetry) This point is  c losely  related 
to the question o f truth in poetry, a problem discussed in the next 
section. •
I f  the foregoing remarks are correct, then '.antayana's fin a l de fin ition  
o f poetry, as metrical discourse expressing thought that is at once 
sensuous and ideal, must be rejected , only the assertion that metre is  a 
necessary condition fo r poetry being acceptable as i t  stands. Obviously,
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this leaves almost everything in the aesthetics of poetry s t i l l  to  be 
said. The follow ing section is  an attempt at an outline o f an analytic
aesthetics o f poetry, incorporating what is  acceptable in  Santayan&'a views, 
(v ) Analysis and the Nature and /’unction of Poetry
fa) 'Poem1 an honorific term. In 4. ( i )  above, i t  has been argued that 
verse is  a necessary but not a su fficien t condition fo r  poetry. In order 
to quality fo r  the t i t l e ,  "poem", a piece o f  verse must have certain 
aesthetic virtues in a su fficien t degree. This is  one way o f saying that 
"poem" is  an honorific term: to c a ll a piece of verse a poem is  to say 
that i t  has certain aesthetic excellences. To ca ll a poem a good or great 
poem is  to say that i t  has certain aesthetic excellences to a high or 
superlative degree.
The aesthetic virtues which verse must have in order to quail y as 
poetry make up a fam iliar set: organic form; blending o f  form and content; 
authenticity; expressiveness; o r ig in a lity ; appropriateness o f diction to 
subject, and so on. Great poems, as has been said, car exhibit these 
virtues to  a superlative degree.
Just how much importance is  attributed to each v irtu e , and In what 
degree each is thought desirable in poetry, varies with time, taste, and 
individual: one could draw up a history o f taste by l is t in g  which virtues 
were most highly regarded in which epoch. Cultural conditioning applies 
here as elsewhere as a major factor determining aesthetic response.
"Poem", then, is  an honorific term, whose ascription is  bound bytfae 
necessary condition of being composed in vers ified  language, and by the 
posseasion by the verse o f any combination o f a lim ited number o f 
aesthetic virtues.
( b) Poetry and "ruth. Cne term omitted from the above l is t  o f aeathetio 
virtues is  truth, which demands separate consideration. I t  has been 
denied, by Iaenberg fo r example, not only that truth ia  an aesthetic virtue 
at a l l ,  but also that questions o f truth and fa ls ity  even arise in the 
evaluation and Interpretation of poetry.(115) The fo llow ing arguments
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attempt to  establish these conclusionst that considerations o f truth and 
fa ls it y  do arise in the interpretation o f poetry; that some statements in 
Koetiy are truth-functional and are naturally interpreted ns such; that 
some groups o f statements in some sense imply general truths which are 
taken to be such; but that where a poem states or implies a world-view, i t  
is comprehensiveness lending unity to  vision, rather than truth, which is 
valued aesthetically.
ome writers deny that a poem can be concerned with truth on the 
grounds that no poem can be tru ly  creative which refers to anything which 
exists before its  composition. Hepburn eas ily  refutes th is view: a poem 
can re fe r , fo r instance, to the poet's  birthplace. Here the referent does 
ex ist, and what is said o f i t  may be true or fa lse . Yet the poet may s t i l l  
say many highly individual things about i t ,  linking i t ,  for example, with 
the idea o f men-in-general and th e ir  birthplaces. Such a work can be 
creative and s t i l l  be made up o f truth-functional atatements. Ona need 
not say that truth and fa ls ity  are matters o f the internal relations of 
it s  elements.(116)
Again, l.K. a l l io t t  gives the follow ing example from "tonne's, " love 's
Srowth"s
"As princes do in times o f action get 
New taxes, a nd remit them not in peace,
No winter shall abate the spring's increase." (L I. 26-8)
I f  as «  matter of fa c t princes tended to abolish taxes in wartime and not 
to re-introduce them in times of peace, the meaning and emotional 
character o f the poem would be d rastica lly  changed. We would, in that 
case, have to regard the poet as intending the insincerity o f the last 
lin e . Thus our interpretation o f these lines depends on how we estimate 
the truth or fa ls ity  o f the f i r s t  two o f than. Further, on the no-truth 
view, the f ir s t  two lines must be satire merely on the possible behaviour 
o f possible princes; but i f  they are not a satire on the actual behaviour 
o f actual princes, they lose most o f their pungency.(117)
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further, E l l io t t  points out, the no-truth theory cannot aocoramodate 
tn a c t iv ity  which c r it ic s  accept as poetic, namely that o f stating neatly,
economically, and in te llig en tly  what is  the c~.se. Thus the lines:
" 5o well-bred spaniels c iv i l ly  delight 
In mumbling o f the. game they dare net b ite ," 
g ive pleasure not only because o f their neatness and economy. The poet 
has accepted truth as an additional norm -  one need only envisage how 
d iffe ren t would be the reaction i f  the poet had written "wolfhounds" 
rather than "span ie ls".(113)
This same example can be used to rebut one of Iaenberg's assumptions, 
namely that understanding the meaning o f a poetic statement is  in a l l  
cases independent o f the method o f its  v e r if ic a t io n .(119) In th is example, 
we admire the term " c iv i l ly "  because in its  context i t  hits o f f  exactly 
the quality o f the Ingratiating demeanour which spaniels tend to display 
in  the situation described. We extrapolate from the ordinary contexts in 
which 'c i v i l l y '  is  used, aix3*»ie to admire the poetic use insofar as we 
recognise its  aptness. Meaning and method o f verifica tion  are here one 
and the same. ( 12 0 )
In view o f Santayana' s interest in id ea l3, i t  is  relevant to consider 
a epecial class o f propositions in poetry, i . e .  optatives: statements 
about how we wish the world were, rather than how we think i t  is .  Accord­
ing to  Hepburn, the appropriate questions to  ask in appraisal o f an 
optative are: does the poet persuade us o f the attractiveness o f the ideal? 
Is  he open to the objection of one-sidedness? (121) This requires only 
a l i t t l e  f i l l i n g  out fo r i t  to become oleer now truth is  involved in 
optative—appraisal, for how can an ideal f a i l  to be persuasive except by 
being incompatible with, or fa ilin g  to take account o f, important relevant 
truths about the condition o f the evaluator -  truths about his nature and 
circumstances?
Home of the statements in a poem, then, are truth-functional, and our 
opinion of th e ir  truth-value affeats our interpretation of the poem.
(194)
Poetry and truth are related in  an other way. In narrative poems, fo r  
example, there occur descriptions o f individuals, their inner l i f e ,  and the 
circumstances in which they find themselves, and these descriptions we 
often take to be typ ica l. Using them as Instances, we formulate universal 
propositions, usually re ferr in g  t,o human psychology. These general be lie f*  
we regard as valuable. I t  must be stressed, however, that implying truths 
is  not properly speaking an aeathetio merit. Certainly knowledge o f 
human psychology is  valuable, but not aesthetically so: i f  i t  were 
aesthetica lly  valuable, then surely psychological textbooks would be 
highly regarded as works of a rt. We esteem the works which imply these 
truths, but this type of esteem is  not aesthetic.
( I t  should be stressed in this connexion that i t  is  the implied belie fs 
only which are considered truth-funetionally. The propositions describing 
fic t io n a l persons and plaoes, propositions containing proper names void 
o f  referents, are not so treated. The reader does not allow the 
questions o f truth and fa ls i t y  to arise; the test applied to  these 
propositions Is that o f internal consistency.)
The same distinction between types o f esteem is involved where what 
Is  Implied, or indeed stated, In a poem is  not merely an isolated generaJ- 
isatlon about the inner l i f e ,  but a complete philosophy, a view o f the 
universe and of the place o f human l i f e  in i t .  I f  a b e lie f in the truth 
o f the world-view stated or implied in a poem were a necessary condition 
fo r a rich aesthetlo experience o f that poem, than a l l  readers o f poetry 
would be able to gain rioh aesthetic experiences only from poems which 
express th e ir  own philosophy. Yet th is is  not viiat happens, .leaders, like 
Santayana himself, may gain rewarding experiences from great poems express­
ing the most varied philosophies, Christian or a theistic, epicurean or 
.omantic. Vhat lends power to great works like "The lvtne Comedy" or 
"Faust" is  not the truth o f the philosophy expressed, but the comprehensive­
ness o f the vision necessary to view l i f e  and the world on th is le v e l of 
generality. This comprehensiveness lends wholeness or unity -  an aesthetio
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merit -  to the work. This is a point of view which Santayana himself 
takes up on one oooaaiont
"...what Is  required for theoretic wholeness la not th is or thet 
system but some system. Its  value is  not the value o f truth, but 
thet o f victorious imagination, ’tnlty o f conception is  an 
aesthetic merit no less than a log ica l demand. A fine sense of 
the dignity and pathos o f l i f e  cannot be attained unless we conceive 
somehow its  outcome and i t s  relations. Without such a conception 
our emotions oar,not be steadfast ad enlightened. Without i t  the 
imagination cannot fu l f i l  its  essential function or achieve its  
supreme 3ueoess."(122)
(c ) Logical ch- racter nr.d identity conditions of individual poems. An 
individual poem is  not identica l with any o f i t s  copies, i .e .  i t  is not 
a physical object or class of them. I f  it  were, then i t  would follow 
that, i f  any copy o f the poem were lost, then the poem i t s e l f  would be 
lo s t. (This applies where the copy lost is  the author's manuscript copy.) 
Anticipating the success o f the arguments of the next chapter, i t  is  
necessary fo r completeness' sake to point out that an individual poem is 
a log ica l type, copies o f i t  being tokens.
As is  also the case with pieces of music, fo r example, Identity 
conditions fo r  poems are imprecise. One can imagine oases where changes 
to a few words would make one say that one was dealing with a different 
poem: suppose that, for example, instead o f "C rose thou art sick", ilake 
had written, "0 rose thou art w ell", likewise reversed the sense o f the 
last lin e , "Does they l i f e  destroy", and changed the t i t l e  o f the poem.
On the other hand, i f  a new manuscript o f this poem were found, with a 
thematically consistent third stanza, one would perhaps say that this would 
be a copy of the same poem. With longer poems, the number of lines which 
could be added or deleted while Identity remains intact is impossible to 
gauge 'a p r io r i ' }  once again, however, thematic consistency would be an 
important te s t .
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(d) defin ition  o f Poetry; its  Function« While considerations such ea 
theae perhaps go som e way to c la r ify in g  some points in the aesthetics o f 
poetry, yet toe most important pro olein reoai.ua: tuat o f saving what poetry 
is  and what i t  does for us.
I t  is  easy enough to provide a defin ition  of poetry which isolates it  
both from a l l  non-arts and from the other arts: poetry ia the art-form 
whose medium is  versified  language. To f i l l  this out, i t  is  once again 
necessary to assume dogmatically the success o f arguments in  the next 
chapter. The term ’’art" is  bound by one necessary condition (the other 
non-necessary grounds for its  ascription are irrelevant at present): 
whatever is a work of art is an object of aesthetic in teres t. Aesthetic 
interest is defined non-circularly as the attitude of d is in terest or 
psychical distance. Granted th is , in conjunction with the above partial 
account o f the log ica l grammar o f 'poem' as an honorific term, the following 
emerges as a complete account o f the conditions governing the use o f this 
term: f ir s t ly ,  i t  is bound by two necessary conditions; whatever is  a 
poem is  both in the medium of vers ified  language and is an object o f 
aesthetic in terest. And secondly, th« further grounds fo r  the asorlption 
o f the term 'poem' are a range o f specificatlonsof aesthetic virtues.
F inally, there is the question o f why poetry is  regarded as valuable, 
o f what poetry does for us. The answer involves several points. There is  
aesthetic pleasure to be had from the properties of the material, enhanced 
by the devices referred to by Santayana as euphony; again, there is  
aesthetic pleasure given by the form, "xpressive properties and subject- 
matter, in so far as they are separable from one another and from the 
form and the material, not only give aesthetic pleasure, but oar. expand 
one's knowledge o f fee lin  , o f ideas, and o f oneself. Such learning can 
be accompanied by a sense o f re lm oe. The e ffects and benefits o f poetry 
are in this way complex.
Perhaps i t  w ill be objected that this is  merely to restate Horace's 
doctrine: poetry is "dulce et u t ile " . Yet this is surely to play on the
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imprecision o f Horace's terms. The notion of psyohioal distance Is quite 
absent from Horace's Idea of what I t  is  to  be "dulse" 5 and when he speaks
of poetry as "u t i le " ,  he has In mind ex p lic it  Jldactlclsm: the poet 
should provide useful maxims to help us on the hard road o f l iv in g . Ko 
doubt the knowledge to be gained fro *  poetry can be and is  in a sense 
useful, yet i t  is hardly necessary that i t  be presented by e x p lic it  
didacticism. A poet is  expected to and can provide something much subtler 
than worldly maxims.
»
With these views on poetry in mind, i t  is  now appropriate to  turn to 
Santayana's views on re lig ion .
Vi Santayapa and lellglon
I t  is  evident that fo r Santayana, the centrally important feature o f 
any re lig ion  is  its  corpus of dogma. He regards dogmas as statements of 
ideals: moral recommendations and optative b e lie fs  about an imagined state 
o f perfect happiness. Ideals are evaluated so le ly  according as they are an 
adequate formulation o f the interests which underly them. There is  nothing 
to suggest that relig ion  should provide any satisfactions other than those 
which are rational and imaginative.
Tills account of re lig ion  is  obviously defective in two ways. In the 
f ir s t  place, not a l l  religious be lie fs  can be plausibly regarded as 
hypostatisations o f moral recommendations and descriptions of a state of 
b liss , dome be lie fs  are intended to g ive an in te llec tu a lly  cogent account 
o f the orig in  of the universe, i.e . cosmogonies. I t  is  hard to  believe 
that such doctrines are projections of imagined satisfactions fo r  a better 
l i f e .
¡gore important is the omisaion o f what is to many the most important 
type o f relig ious satisfaction, i .e .  mystic experience. In fa c t , i t  is 
more appropriate to speak of rejection than omission, since Santayana 
regards mystic experience as a betrayal o f ra tiona lity . I t  is  worth
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repeating two fundamental be lie fs  in 3antajana's ethical theory» f ir s t ly ,  
that happiness is  the good; and secondly, that happiness is  to be secured 
oy the maximal uajnsonisation o f one's in terests , a harmonisation which 
is  attained by the use o f reason. To cu ltiva te non-rat Iona 1 states o f 
mind is  therefor» fo r  r>antayana a r»jeo tion  o f our priaary means of 
securing happiness.
I t  w ill be recalled  that, in Santayana's view, the ambition of the 
mind is  to construct a complete account o f the nature o f things; that the 
understanding is  inadequate to th is task, and is  supplemented by the 
imagination. Some imaginitlve constructions are fa lse starts and in fact 
hinder the progress o f reason in its  domination over nature. In some, 
such setbacks produce a certain discouragement and sense of the hopeless 
re la t iv ity  of human thought. He finds the o rig in  of mysticism in this 
discouraged state. (123)
Those who s t i l l  wish to attain absolute truth and who are also 
convinced o f the r e la t iv it y  and inadequacy o f human constructions abjure 
these constructions, and pursue only the One, which, according to the 
mystics, is that in  comparison to which everything else is nothing. Thus 
for Santayana, mysticism is the exact opposite of the ideal o f reason. 
Instead o f perfecting human nature, the mystic seeks to abolish i t .
Instead of seeking to  extend the mind, the mystic aspire s to return to the 
condition of protoplasm (Santayana claims), the blessed consciousness o f 
unutterable r e a lity .  Mysticism is  thus a tendency to ob literate the 
distinctions won by reason, and consequently fo r Santayana a rejection 
o f what in his view Is our most valuable facu lty .
I t  is  instructive to compare this view with that o f Henri Brfemond, 
whose doctrines on re lig ion  and it s  re la tion  to poetry are almost exactly 
opposed to those o f Santayana. 7or 3remond, mystic experience is oentral 
to re lig ion ; and i t  is experience o f a non—rational kind» "Profane ou 
surnaturelle, la  v ie  mystLque d lffe re  essentlellement de notre vie
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in te lle c tu e lle , ou l it té r a ir e ,  ou meme morale. Active, sans doute, et 
prodigieusement active, e l le  nous semble un repos. E lle ne s 'a g ite , e l le
ne bouillonne jamais."(125*) While iremond thus affirms the non-rationality 
o f mystic states, he is as fa r  as can be from sharing Santayana's d is- 
▼aluation o f such states; moreover, he regards poetry as valuable precisely 
insofar as i t  ear: evoke quasi-mystioal experience in the reader.
Hremond's central argument is that there are "analogies de forme et 
communautés de mécanisme" (126) between mystic and poetic experience. He 
adopts as a premiss Claudel's d istinction between t«ro elements o f the 
s e l f ,  the Animus and the Ánima. The Animus is  the area o f  reason and 
passion, " le  moi de surface"; the Anima is  the "moi profond", " la  demeure 
la  plus cachée et la  plus in tim e ...la  pointe extrême et le  sommet, la 
moelle de l'shne, le  centre du coeur."(127) At the moments of mystic 
elevation and o f poetic inspiration, the operations o f the Animus are 
temporarily suspended, while the Anima penetrates the v e i l  of appearance 
and is  united with the r e a lit ie s  beyond. The difference between the poet 
and the mystic is  th is: while the mystic has access to God, the ultimate 
re a lity , the poet has access only to created rea lit ie s : " . . . . l a  connaissance 
poétique attein t des réa lité s , unit le poète V des réa lité s . Non pas a 
la  réa lité  souveraine, Dieu lui-meme.. .Le lyrisme serait la  sa isie du moi 
profond, la  poe'sie dramatique et narrative la  sa is ie , par le  moi profond, 
des autres ré a lité s ."(128)
After the quasi-mystioal moment o f Inspiration, the Animus revives with 
renewed v ita l it y .  "Mutatis mutandis", the following description of the 
raystio applies to the poet a lso : "A mesure que se desserre la  possession, 
ré e lle  mais obscure, q u 'i l  avait de l 'ê t r e  des titres, les  puissances du 
mystique, in telligence, imagination, volonté, semblent reoevoir des 
forces nouvelles, prennent leur vo l, assiègent, atteignent e lle s  aussi a 
leur manière cet Etre des Etresavee une vivacité s ingu lière ."(129) A fter 
the moment o f Inspiration, everything becomes easyi history gives numerous
examples o f the gigantic laboura which have followed such experiences.
The mystic experience and the quasi-mystleal moment o f poetic inspira­
tion are s t r ic t ly  apeaiiing in e ffao le ; yet the poet is  impelled to  try in 
some way to communicate his experience to U3. "Le miracle de la poésie" 
is  that he can in fact succeed to cme degree. Since the inspirational 
experience is  ineffab le, i t  is  not the l i t e r a l  sense or content o f a poem 
which conveys to the reader the quality o f the moment of inspiration. The 
situation is  more mysterious: "A travers ces memes mots qui, pris en eux- 
niemes, e 'est^a-d ire, comme signes des idées q u 'ils  représentent, comme 
moyen de communication in te lle c tu e lle , appartiennent exclusivement à l 'e n se i­
gnement ou èi l'éloquence, à travers ces mots, 1 *Anima du poète penetre
' / / \ 
jusqu’ à 1 ’ Anima du le c te u r . . . .e l le  ébranlé ce moi profond, e lle  l 'e le v e ,
e l le  l'a ssoc ie  a sa propre exjnrlence de poète."(130)
It  is  th is  arousal o f the Anima which is for 3remond the central 
element in the aesthetic experience o f poetry, and the most valuable one.
(The statement of a comprehensive set o f  ideals in poetry would on this 
view be valuable only insofar as such a statement could help in the 
communication of the experiences o f the Anima.) 3remond construes the 
doctrine o f catharsis in accordance with these doctrines: "La catharsis, 
en e f fe t ,  n 'es t pas autre chose que ce que les  mystiques appellent le 
passage de la  méditation a la contemplation, que ce que nous avons appelé 
la substitution des a ctiv ités  d'Anima aux activ ité^  d 'Animus; bref le 
passage de la  connaissance ratlonelle \  la  connaissance ree lle  et poétique."
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I t  w i l l  be clear from a l l  this that the relation  which 3remond conceives 
to exist between poetry and re lig ion  is  quite other than that which is  
suggested by 3antayana. le l ig io  us and aesthetic experience have i t  in
common that both furnish valuable, non-ratlonal states o f mind: " (e l le s )  
appartiennent per leur mécanisme psychologique au míeme ordre de connaissance 
-  une connaissance ré e lle , non immédiatement conceptuelle, un itive ..."(132 ) 
More precisely, " l 'a c t iv i t é  poétique est une ébauché naturelle et profane
de l 'a c t iv i t é  mystique.." (133) Poetry does not provide true mystical 
experience, but I v ites  us to  seek i t :  "Chez le  parfait poète lui-meme,
1 ' experience poétique tend à rejoindre, mais ne rejoin t pas la prière;
chez nous, e lle  la re jo in t san3 peine, et grace au poète."(13-4)
Two comments are appropriate here. In the f i r s t  place, Santayana's 
assumption a3 to the higher value o f rational over mystical experience is 
hard to swallow: to a mystic i t  would appear as the foolish  gesture o f a 
man deprived of the rarest possib ility  of experience. To tnose who have 
had mystical experiences, their value is unsurpassable and unquestionable.
In the face o f the absolutely consistent reports from mystics on this 
point one must conclude that the evidence is  against Santayana's evaluative 
assumption.
Secondly, by common consent, a feature o f a l l  worthwhile aesthetic 
experience is oblivious contemplation (the term 'contemplation' i t s e lf ,  
o f course, belongs to the vocabulary o f the mystic): one becomes oblivious 
o f everything but the aesthetic object -  oblivious of one's surroundings 
and o f the passage o f tim». I t  is arguable that, though in fin ite ly  less 
intense in degree, the best aesthetic experience is  of the same kind as 
mystical experience. Moreover, in these experiences a good deal o f what 
Santayana would want to  ca ll our rational apparatus is  in abeyance, and he 
is therefore co-mitted to dlsvaluing these experiences. I t  would be easy 
enough for him to maintain his consistency in the face o f such a criticism , 
by stressing the subjectivity  of his value theory: his high estimation of 
reason, he might say, is purely personal, and he does not maintain or 
demand that others share i t ,  le t  to retreat to this point removes almost a l l  
the b ite from bis philoaophyi instead o f having something important and 
impersonal to t e l l  us about experience, i t  would instead be merely an 
exhibition of idiosyncrasies, an in tellectua l curiosity, and no more.
VI: Conclusion
I f  the foregoing criticisms are just, then there are faults both in 
Santayana's view o f poetry, and in his view o f re lig ion . I t  followB that
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de 1 'a c t iv ite  mystique.." (133) Poetry does not provide true mystical 
experience, but ; vites us to  seek i t :  "Chez le parfait poete lui-meme, 
l'experienee poefcique tend a rejoindre, ;oais ne rejoin t pas la prierej
ehez nous, f i l e  la re jo in t ssn3 peine, et grace au poete. "(134)
Two comments are appropriate here. In the f ir s t  place, Santayana's 
assumption »3 to the higher value o f rational over mystical experience is 
hard to  swallow! to a mystic i t  would appear as the foo lish  gesture o f a 
man deprived of the rarest possib ility  o f experience. To tnose who have 
had mystical experiences, their value is unsurpassable and unquestionable.
In the face o f the absolutely consistent reports from mystics on this 
point one must conclude that the evidence is against Santayana's evaluative 
assumption.
Secondly, by common consent, a feature of a ll  worthwhile aesthetic 
experience is  oblivious contemplation (the term 'contemplation' it s e l f ,  
o f course, belongs to the vocabulary o f the mystic): one becomes oblivious 
o f everything but the aesthetic object -  oblivious of one's surroundings 
and o f the passage o f tim ». I t  is  arguable that, though in f in ite ly  less 
intense in degree, the best aesthetic experience is  o f the same kind as 
mystical experience. Moreover, in these experiences a good deal o f what 
Santayana would want to c a ll our rational apparatus is in abeyance, and he 
is therefore co mitted to disvaluing these experiences. I t  would be easy 
enough for him to maintain his consistency in the face o f such a criticism , 
by stressing the subjectivity of his value theory: his high estimation of 
reason, he might say, is purely personal, and he does not maintain or 
demand that others share i t ,  1st to retreat to this point removes almost a l l  
the b ite from his philoaophyi instead o f having something important and 
impersonal to t e l l  us about experience, i t  would instead be merely an 
exhibition o f idiosyncrasies, an in tellectua l curiosity, and no more.
71; Conclusion
I f  the foregoing criticism s are just, then there are faults both in 
Santayana's view of poetry, and in his view o f re lig ion . I t  follows that
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his thesis as to their re la tion  is  unacceptable. Santayana mistakenly 
makes features o f subject-matter a necessary condition fo r ,-reatness in
poetry, confuting a r t is t ic  greatness witu greatness Bs a pniiosopner. 
Moreover, to  dlsvalue the non-rational satisfactions o f re lig ion  is  to 
denigrate those -xperiences which have been fo r many the most valuable in 
l i f e »  these are not to  be written out o f any account o f what is  'essen tia l* 
to  re lig ion . The links between poetry ar.d r e l i  ;ion are rather d ifferen t 
from those suggested by Santayana: possibly the very much weakened form 
o f Sr^raond's view put forward above can be defended, i . e . ,  that poetry 
and re lig ion  can both provide suprarational experiences d iffe r in g  vastly 
in degree but not in kind; and on the most obvious le v e l, religious 
be lie fs  can become the subject-matter fo r  poems, und in th is way become 
an object o f aesthetic interest. 3ut where the re lig ion  is  a liv in g  
force, such interludes w ill  be fe l t  d e fin ite ly  as interludes: the 
difference in attitude to poetry aid re lig ion , which Santayana makes very 
l i t t l e  o f, is of the f i r s t  Importance. The practical repuroussiona of 
re lig ion  on the lives  o f sincere believers are too many and too obvious 
to need comment, ."’or these reasons, then, Santayana's view of the nature 
and relations of poetry and re lig ion  must be rejected.
This is  not to say, o f course, that Santayana's theory o f poetry is  to 
be considered as o f l i t t l e  value. His views are philosophically more 
satisfy ing than a good deal o f what passes for classic in this area of 
aesthetics. He is systematic, and oes present a set o f necessary condit­
ions fo r poetry; and again, he is  w e ll beyond a l l  the crude forms o f the 
'dulee et u t ile ' view which dominated poetics for so long. This part o f 
his aesthetics deserves to  be better known than i t  is .
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Chapter VI: The Nature o f Art 
11 Introduction
The next three chapiters of the present tnesis aeax w ita "ae.son in 
Art" (1905), the seoo.ud fu ll-length  book by Santayana devoted to 
aesthetics. "Keason in  Art" is  the fourth volume o f a f i v  volume work 
co llec tive ly  t it le d  "The L ife  o f lesson", the most ambitious project of 
the early part o f Santayana's career. In order fh ily  to understand the 
aesthetics of "Reason in A rt", i t  is  necessary to spend some time on 
making clear what "The L ife  o f Reason" is  about, and on the philosophical 
b e lie fs  which are assumed as premisses in the aesthetics.
"The L ife  o f Reason" is  an evaluative survey o f major human institutions 
from a certain eth ical standpoint. Santayana adopts as evaluative prem­
isses the beliefs that happiness is the good for man, and that i t  is  best 
secured by the harmonisation o f human interests by the use o f reason.
Trom this standpoint, he surveys society (Vol I I ) ,  re lig ion  (Vol I I I ) ,  
art (Vol IV ), and science (Vol V), estimating which -  i f  any -  of the 
forms of these institu tions exhibited in history have promoted the 
rational l i f e ;  he a lso  sketches a lternative, rational, ideal forms of 
these institutions. These surveys are prefaced in the f i r s t  volume,
"Reason in Common Cense", by an account o f the birth o f reason: the 
process whereby the buzzing, booming confusion of the immediate flux of 
experience is gradually mastered by the mind, r^om the flux, the mind 
constructs the picture of the world accepted by common sense, composed 
o f physical objects and minds. Moreover, in this process, the mind 
becomes aware of i t s  own iden tity , and progresses from blind, instinctive 
action to the self-conscious pursuit o f idea l3. Hence, Santayana says 
that the subject of "The L ife  of Reason" is progress. He asks himself 
what answer would be forthcoming i f  men were to ask themselves where they 
would acknowledge a gain in mastery over experience:
"What themes would prevail In such an examination of the heart?
(20-i)
In what order and with what emphasis would they be recounted? In 
which o f its  adventures would the human race reviewing its  whole
experience, acknowledge a progress and a gain? To answer these 
questions, as they may be answered speculatively and provisionally 
by an individual, is  the purpose o f  thr follow ing w o rk .'(l)
In a note preserved in a copy o f one o f the ea-ly  editions o f Th e 
L ife  o f ?ieason", Santayana describes the genesis o f the work:
The f i r s t  impulse to write this book came to me in 1889» on 
reading Hegel's ' Phaenomenologie des G eistes '. There, i t  seemed 
to me, was a great idea spoiled by the sophistry and mythology 
that encumbered i t .  The great idea was to review the history o f 
the human mind, picking out certain  crucial episodes in i t ,  and 
showing how insights and habits then gained tod contributed to our 
present moral constitution..The project, however, took shape slowly, 
and i t  was not until 1896» under the influence o f my f ir s t  Platonic 
studies, that I  made a beginning in actual composition." ( 2)
The Greek influence on the doctrines of "The L ife  o f Reason" is  not 
confined to Plato; Santayana is unusually exp lic it about his further debts 
to  Socrates and A ris to tle . Socrates provided him with the principle that 
self-knowledge is the key to the rationa l l i f e ;  and A r is to tle 's  ethics, 
when f i l le d  out with deta ils  from Plato, is fo r Santayana the classic 
explication o f the L ife  o f lesson.(3) (Santayana always refers to the 
centra l doctrine of the work by means o f  capital le tte rs ) The only fault 
Santayana finds with Aristotelian  ethics is  its  reliance on fa lse physics. 
Since knowledge in th is fie ld  has advanced, and since the accidental 
circumstances o f l i f e  have changed, the essential Aristotelian aootrines 
need to oe restated in modern terms:
"What we can adopt from Greek morals is only the abstract principle 
o f th e ir  development; their foundation in a l l  the extant forces of 
human nature and their e ffo r t towards establishing a perfect harmony
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among them. These forces themselves have perceptibly changed, at 
least In th e ir  re la tiv e  power. Thus we are Bore conscious o f wounds
to  stanch and wrongs to figh t against, and less of goods to attain . 
The movement o f conscience h‘ 8 veered; the centre o f gravity lie s  
in another part o f the character." ( 4)
In an essay written in 1930, Santayana confesses:
" . . . I  have never b-en a d iligen t student of either science or art, 
nor at a l l  ambitious to be learned. I  have been w illin g  to le t  
cosmological problems and technical questions solve themselves as 
they would or as the authorities agreed fo r the moment that they 
might be solved. My pleasure was rather in expression, in 
re flection , in iron y .. . " ( 5)
This avowed lack o f  interest in  technicality accounts for what is  
undoubtedly the greatest flaw in "The L ife  o f leaaon" as a whole: the 
tendency to state conclusions without argument, a llied  to the ha >it of 
omitting defin itions of key terms and disregarding the logica l sequence o f 
exposition. (These are the commonest and most just of the criticism s brought 
against this work^(6)
Ij,: Metaphyalcfl
The least developed of the philosophical positions which are adopted 
in "The L ife  of (eason" are those concerning metaphysics. Santayana avoids 
any questions about creation: he begins with nature as i t  ex ists. He 
in s is ts  that existence is irrational in the sense that we can never find 
aiiy reasons or grounds for i t ,  grounds that might l i e  beyond or behind 
nature. Nevertheless, i t  is  quite clear that Santayana adopts the two 
follow ing metaphysical b e lie fs : ( i )  ■m terialistlc monism; and ( i i )  causal 
determinism.
He gives no detailed arguments to support his adoption o f monism. In 
a le t te r  o f 1906, however, he makes i t  clear that ne would defend this 
position with two types of argument: pragmatic and transcendental. He
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explains that his nature compels him to  believe in ,
"material nature with its  animation on the one haa& and log ica l 
or mathematical forms on the other. These are discovered by us, 
starting from sensation, and, in the f i r s t  case, tested by 
pragmatic sanctions. 3ut we look to them in order to  understand 
the orig in  o f our experience (or it s  standard in s ign ifica tion ) and 
I ,  for one, heartily accept them in that r o le ."(7 )
In, "lesson in Ooamon Sense", Santayana expands these views:
"The L ife  o f lesson is  not concerned with speculation about 
gratuitous 'r e a l i t ie s ';  i t  seeks merely to attain those conceptions 
which are necessary and appropriate to  man in his thinking. The 
f ir s t  of these, underlying a l l  arts and philosophies a like, is  the 
indispensable conception of permanent external objects, forming 
in their congeries, sh ifts , and secret animation the system and 
l i f e  o f nature." ( 8)
There is no more detailed argumentation to establish that a m aterialistic 
physical object hypothesis is  either that which enables us to cope best 
with the world, or that i t  is  in some sense a pa-e-condition o f the 
p oss ib ility  o f experience.
I t  is assumed throughout the "L ife  o f reason" that matter is  in a 
flu x . Thus for example, Santayana writes: "In  truth.....man is  an animal, 
a portion of the natural flux; and the consequence is  that his nature has 
a moving centre.. . " ( 9) ?urther properties are ascribed to matter in a 
comparison Santayana makes between his concept of matter and that of 
certain other philosophers. "Matter" is an ambiguous term. Sometimes, it  
is used to mean merely a group o f objects in space; in A ris to tle , by 
contrast, "matter" means something to make other things out o f. Matter 
in th is  sense Is merely a constituent or aspect of existence, and cannot 
ex ist by i t s e l f .  For Santayana himself, "Matter" is  the term used for 
the surd or unconditional element in existence:
"In truth, the surd conditions not merely the being o f objects but
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their possible quantity, the time and place o f th e ir  appearance, 
and th e ir  degree of perfection compared with the Idea 1b they
suggest. These important fmo.ors in whatever ex ists are covered 
by the term matter and give I t  a serious role in describing and 
feeling the world,"(10 »)
I t  is  not made clear whether the link between matter and the qualities i t  is 
said to determine Is log ica l or causal or of some other kind.
I t  is  clear, however, that matter is  governed by causal laws.
Santayana holds that a l l  events are caused, including mental events. He 
does not ju s t ify  th is principle o f universal causation pragmatically or 
transcendent a lly . Rather, he argue 3 that, granted the evidence, i t  is 
the most probable explanation of eventss
""he most inclusive movements known to us in nature, the 
astronomical, are calculable, and sc are the most minute and 
pervasive processes, the chemical. These are a lso, i f  evolution 
is  to be accepted, the ea rlies t processes upon which a l l  others 
have supervened and out o f which, as i t  were, they have grown.
Apart from miraculous intervention, therefore, the assumption 
seems to be inevitable that the intermediate processes are calculable 
too, and compounded out o f the others. The appearance to the 
contrary present in animal and social l i f e  is ea s ily  explicable 
on psychological grounds. Ve read inevitably in terms o f our 
passions those things which a ffect them or are analagous to what 
Involves passion in ourselves; andvhen the mechanism o f them is  
hidden '’ rom us, as is that of our own bodies, we suppose that these 
passions which we find on the surface in ourselves, or read into 
other creatures, are the substantial and only forces that carry on 
our part o f the world. Penetrating th is illu sion , dispassionate 
observers in a l l  ages have received the general impression that 
nature is  one and mechanical."(11)
The conjunction of this s tr ic t  causal determinism with his epiphenomen—
(208)
alisa  commits Santayana to a denial of traditional doctrines on the freedom 
of the w ill} he thus holds a version of the position commonly referred to
«s  Incwibpat io ilisa . un the traditional view, one a oui is  autonomous and 
has the power to initiate action« "A man w ill therefore be no helpless 
slave of his body} his acts w ill not be predetermined physically without 
his soul's leave} they w ill b» determined by the interplay of the physical 
with the spiritual forces in him.."(12) This is incompatible with 
e pi phenomenalism, which has the following corollary with . egard to the 
w ill: "
"...nothing can be les3 absolute or more precarious than the living 
w ill in its existence. A living w ill is the flexible voice of a 
t housand submerged Impulses, of which now one and now another comes 
to the surface} it is responsive, without knowing it , to a complex 
forgotten pest and a changing, unexplored environment."(13)
Santayana regards a belief in causal determinism as evidence that the 
mine has progressed some distance on the path of rationality. Causal 
lews lend unity to nature; what enables men to perceive the unity of nature 
is the unification of their own w ills :!!...le t  some sobering passion, some 
serious interest, lend perspective to the mind, and a point of reference 
w ill immediately be given for protracted observation."(14) He continues: 
"Belief in indeterminism is a sign of indétermination. No commanding or 
3teady intellect flirts  with so miserable a possibility, whioh in so far 
as it actually prevailed would make virtue impotent and experience, in its 
pregnant sense, impossible."(15) This curious v iw  is obviously unaccept­
able, since it entails that a ll indeterminists are irrational, a belief 
which it is difficult to credit.
TIT : Philosophy of Mind
Materialistic monism in metaphysics commits Santayana to a denial of 
a ll  forms of two-substance dualism in -he philosophy of mind. He also 
rejects Spinoza's monistic parallelism. Mind is very far from representing, 
point for point, the determinations of material being:
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"Mind (at least what I tun calling so) is no impartial accompaniment 
of matter, whether in motion or at rest, dead or living; it  is  a
rare, local, and fragile  expression of animal l i f e . . . i f  it  is  
parallel to anything that thing is not matter or space, but 
morphological units or biological processes."(16)
Of the remaining possibilities, Santayana chooses epiphenomenalisai, and 
in doing so explicitly acknowledges his debt to Aristotle:
"I think no other philosopher has conceived the relation of the body 
to the mind that animates it so fairly  and squarely. He saw that 
spirit was something spiritual, an expression and not a substance: 
and as a part of that view he saw that spirit was altogether 
separate from body, and relative to the vital functions it w»3 to 
express."(17*)
Stating his own view, Santayar-a writes:
"A mind seems to be a consciousness o-~ the bo'y 's interests, expressed 
in terms of what affects the body...In other words, mind raises to an 
actual existence that fora in material processes which, had the prooess 
remained wholly material, would have had only Ideal or Imputed being."(13) 
Or, using another vocabulary, " .. .a  mind is the entelechy of an organic 
body."(19) It follows that, "The mind is itse lf ethereal and plays about 
the body as music about a violin, or rather as the sense of a page about 
the print and paper. To look for it within is not to understand what we 
are looking fo r ." (20)
The most important consequence of this position is that mind plays no 
part in the direction of action; a ll mental events and states are caused 
by bodily states, especially brain states; but no causal links operate in 
the other direction:
"...views and intentions (nsmes for mental entities in Santayana's 
vocabulary) have a brief and inconsequential tenure of life  and 
their existence is merely a sign for certain conjunctions in nature,
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where processes hailing from afar have met in a man, soon to  pass 
beyond him. I f  they figure as causes in nature, i t  is  only because 
they represent the material processes that have brought them into 
being. "(21»)
The truth o f th is dcetrin* is alleged to be evident to introspection: 
"That thought is  not se lf-d ire c tiv e  appears best in the most 
immaterial processes...My hand, guided by I  know not wh;t machinery, 
is  at this moment adding syllable to syllable upon this paper, to 
the general fu lfilm ent, perhaps, o f my fe l t  in tent, yet giving that 
intent an articu lation uholly unforeseen, and often disappointing. 
The thoughts to  be expressed simmer half-consciously in my brain.
I  fe e l their burden and tendency without seeing their form, until 
the mechanical tra in  o f impulsive association, started by the 
perusal o f what precedes or oy the accidental emergence o f some new 
ides, lim its the fuse and precipitates the phrases."(22)
This argument from introspection is  the only type o f support brought 
forward fo r the doctrine o f ephphenomenalism. Manifestly, i t  is  quite 
inconclusive, for these psychological commonplaces are compatible with a ll 
the serious contenders in the philosophy o f mind.
Santayana makes several claims about mental events, the f ir s t  being 
that,
"Mental events synchronise with their basis, fo r no thought hovers 
over a dead brain, and there is  no vision in a dark chamber; but their 
tenure o f l i f e  is independent o f their objects, since thought may be 
prophetic or reminiscent and is  Intermittent ever, when it s  object enjoys 
a continuous existence."(23) This is presumably to  be construed as a 
straightforward consequence deduelble from the claim that mind is  the 
entelechy o f the body, i .e .  beoauae presumably mind as the fo r*  o f material 
events must by de fin ition  be simultaneous with the events o f which i t  is 
the form. I f  on the other hand, th is doctrine Is meant to be log ica lly  
independent o f the in it ia l  defin ition  o f mind, then Santayana is guilty
A
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once again of introducing a conclusion ulthout an argument.
Again, he claims that:
'' len til facts are similar to th e ir  objects, since things and images 
have, in tr in s ica lly  rega ded, the same constitution; but images do not 
move in the same plane with things and their parts are in no proportionate 
dynamic relation  to  the parts o f the la t t e r . "(24 ) 7he d i f f ic u lt ie s  with 
th is claim are manifest: 's im ila r ity ' Is the vaguest o f re la tions; and 
moreover, granted Santayana's representationalisra ir, the philosophy of 
perception, he can in principle have no possible evidence to support this 
position, for th is would demand a comparison of mental contents and their 
ooject s which is  'ex hypothesi' impossible.
motions cannot be for Santayana processes in an immaterial mind. 
Instead, he regards them as bodily states. When we are afraid , I t  is 
because we tremble, and not vice versa:
" “’ear is a sensation of actual nervousness and disarray, and confid­
ence a sensation o f actual readiness; they are not disembodied fee lin gs , 
ex isting fo r no reason, the devil ?unk and the angel Courage, one or 
the other of whom may come down a rb itra r ily  into your body and revolution­
ise it . This is  ohilaish mythology, which survives innocently as a figure 
of speech, until a philosopher is  found to take that figure of speech 
seriou s ly ."(25)
Again, it is  clear that epiphenomenalism commits Santayana to a denial 
o f a l l  b e lie fs  in the existence o f an immortal soul. He expresses this 
point clearly  in a la ter work, in the vocabulary o f his metaphysical 
system:
"A ll Is determined by the animal psyche breeding experience; for 
consciousness is no substance, no concrete particular fo rce, but 
only a new status and intensity o f being which certain terms of 
animal l i f e  assume on occasion. S p ir it , then cannot be 
disembodied... "(26»)
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This theory of the mind Involves Santayana in what are the gravest 
d if f ic u lt ie s  concerning "The L ife  o f teason' in general. In the f ir s t  
p i*ce, as has been said, ¿antayana is  committed to  holding that a l l  mental 
events are causally inefficacious; yet, as one o f the reviewers o f "The 
L ife  o f eason" -  Professor A.V. Moore -  pointed out, very often 
Santayana writes as i f  the opposite were the case, and so is  gu ilty  of 
a serious inconsistency, For example, Santayana claims that, "V ita l 
impulse, when it  is modified by re flection  and v»ers in sympathy with 
judgements pronounced on the past, is  properly called reason." (Moore's 
i t a l ic s ) .  Or again« "The l i f e  o f reason w ill ,  then, be a name for that 
part o f experience which perceives and pursues ideals , a l l  conduct so 
lo r tro lled . ( M o o r e 13 ita l ic s ) (27») Ssntayana was disturbed enough 
by this review to w rite a reply to i t ,  "The E fficacy of Thought".(1906)
:{e claims that passages apparently inconsistent with epiphenomenalism, 
such as those quoted by Moore, are to be construed as metaphorical, he 
having assumed that, "their metaphorical character would be obvious to 
the reader."(23) He goes on to  defend his position by what is  in e ffect 
a reaffirmation o f the claim that epiphenomenalism can be ver ified  by 
introspection«
"One may w ell say that 'reason is v ita l Impulse modified by 
re fle c t io n . ' I t  is certain that when a man 'r e f le c ts ' his action 
changes in consequence, just as he turns aside when he 'sees' an 
obstacle in front o f him; but as his seeing was an impression on 
his organs, without which his fancy would have pictured nothing, and 
Ills turning was an instinct or habit o f his org nism, without which 
the ima :e would have sign ified  no danger; so the pause in re flection  
was a physical event, accompanied by an oscilla tion  o f projects 
in the mind (fo r  re flection  cannot decide when re flection  shall 
arise, nor how long i t  shall la st, nor what course I t  shall take,)"
(29»)
by construing apparently inconsistent passages as metaphorical, one
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"One may well say that 'reason is v ita l Impulse modified by 
re fle c tion .' I t  is certain  that when a man 'r e f le c ts ' his action 
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by construing apparently Inconsistent passages as metaphorical, one
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may save lantaysna's Internal consistency; but there are further d if f ic u lt ie s  
connected with the consistent doctrine that remains. One o f  these is  
pointed out by John Iachs; Santayana omits to provide any rule or set o f 
rules governing the change of specific kinds o f  physical state Into 
specific kinds of mental s ta te .(30) This oraie«i<'r constitutes one o f the 
greatest lacunae in  Santayana's early philosophy.
Again, I t  seems that, granted the conjunction of determinism and 
epi phenomenalism, the whole enterprise o f vriting"The L ife  o f tea son" is 
self-defeating. Just as there is a certain absurdity in the Spinozistic 
attempt to put forward moral recommendations o r  rules fo r  the improvement 
o f the understanding ( i . e .  granted 3pinoza's lo g ic a l determinism), so i t  
is  absurd fo r Santayana to recommend the L ife  o f  reason as a moral code, 
since i t  follows from his metaphysics and his philosophy o f the mind that 
we are powerless to  accept i t  or to  choose to l iv e  i t .  I f  ever the L ife  
o f iea3on is  lived  by any human being or group, conscious e f fo r t  w ill  have 
played no part in bringing th is about. This most perfect o f possible liv e s  
must, on Santayana's premisses, be merely an epiphenomenon o f the processes 
o f blind matter causally determined.
This point is a llied  to the most paradoxical o f the consequences o f  
epiphenomenalism. I f  a ll  mental events -  i t  is  s tr ic t ly  speaking improper 
to re fer to them as 'acts ' -  are causally inefficacious, then i t  follows 
that i t  i 3 in principle possible that, eve^ i f  no mental event ever 
occurred the world would be in exactly the same state as i t  now is . The 
absence of consciousness would make no d ifference whatever to the causal 
sequences which occur in the flux of matter.
IVi hpisteaology; The .Urth o f rieajon
Santayana holds a representationalist theory o f perception. A 
distinction is  presupposed between the immediate data of experience, known 
by acquaintance, and the mind's construction upon them. He aooepts the 
Hobbesian position that, "No discourse whatsoever can end in absolute
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knowledge o f fa c t , "(31) since absolute knowledge Is  o f the immediate, 
whereas 'discourse' by d e fin it ion  includes the notion o f the mind's 
constructions out o f the data.(32*) uf the nature o f the immediate, apart 
fro * its  being in a flux, Santayana says very l i t t e .  He does claim that 
i t  is not en tire ly  undifferentiated«
••it is  not quite true that the immediate has no real d ivers ity .
I t  evidently suggests the ideal terms into which we divide i t ,  and 
i t  sustains our apprehension i t s e l f ,  with a l l  the d ivers it ies  th is 
may create. To what I c a ll right and le f t ,  ligh t and darkness, a 
real opposition must correspond in any rea lity  which is  at a l l  
relevant to my experience; so that I  should f a i l  to  integrate my 
impression, end to  absorb the only rea lity  that concerns me, i f  1 
obliterated those points o f reference which orig ina lly  made the 
world figured and v is ib le ."(33)
This argum rt 13 at best incomplete: in order to ju s t ify  these ascriptions 
o f epistemic p riority  to the qualities named, i t  would have to be shown that 
they are conditions fo r In te ll ig ib le  experience; as usual, Santayana assumes 
rather than proves that th is  is the case.
antayana does not discuss the identity  conditions of the immediate 
data; and i t  would be unhlstorioal to expect him to discuss problems such 
as the log ica l relations between statements referring to data and physical 
object statements. The d if f ic u lt ie s  in th is typ- o f philosophy o f 
perception are now common coin. One such d if f ic u lty , the untenability of 
the immediate/medlate d istinction , is  discussed in Chapter V, above.
Using these philosophical presuppositions, Santayana gives an account 
o f the birth o f reason, the process whereby the mind comes to dominate the 
manifold o f perception, and to construct out of i t  the common sense world­
view of an external world o f re la tiv e ly  stable physical objects and minds; 
at the same time, the mind becomes self-conscious and aware o f it s  own 
wants and needs. Santayana's mo t often repeated defin ition  of the function 
of reason is precisely that i t  is a harmony of these wants and needs.(34)
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"Reason in Common Sense" can be construed as a prolonged analysis o f 
what i t  is  to be rational. .Santayana in e ffe c t puts forward three jo in t ly  
su ffic ien t necessary coüuitiona. in order to  qualify as rationna, a 
creature must ( i )  have memory (a precondition of the remaining two 
conditions); ( i i )  be 3»lf-conscious, vMeb includes awareness o f its  own 
wants and needs, and a deliberate attempt to harmonise them; and ( i i i )  have 
representative knowledge o f the world, which presupposes having and applying 
concepts, and holding common sense be lie fs  about the world. Condition ( i i )  
involves the central recomxendation o f Santayana's early ethics, and is 
considered more fu lly  in the next section.
Both self-consciousness and knowledge of the external world presuppose 
memory, since both require that certain items of experience be retained and 
reapplied to the flux. 0nle3s certain experiences were retained, i t  could 
never come about, for example, that spatia lly  contiguous data came to  be 
regarded as representative of the same object:
"Such complications...involve the g ift  o f memory, with capacity to 
survey at once vestiges of many perceptions, and to fe e l th e ir  
implication and absorption in the oresent object, and to be carried, 
by this sense of relation , to the thought that those perceptions 
have a representative 'unction, and th is is  a great s te p .. . I t  
illu stra tes those transformations of consciousness the principle 
of which, when abstracted, we ca ll in te lligen ce ."(35)
In the attainment o f representative knowledge o f the external world,
..he mind employs two main devices. The f ir s t  is  to construct concepts, or 
what Santayana ca lls  concretions lr. discourse, terras employed in thought 
ard language; the second Is to separate from the flux what we c a ll things, 
complexes of spatio-temporal qualities having definable dynamic relations 
and a traceable h istory. These Santayana ca lls  concretions in existence. 
(36) Tollowing ancient usage, studies dealing with the meaning and 
relations of concretions in discourse Santayana ca lls  d ia lec tic , while 
those dealing with ooncretlona in existence are referred to as physics.
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He recognises that physics may be said to presuppose d ia lec tic , fo r before 
concretions in existence can be discovered, the qua lities  which compose 
buoM must oe «rrestea oy Ute ainu and noted, i . e .  concretions in discourse 
are lo g ic a lly  prior to concretions in existence. Yet he Insists, that, 
conversely, every item which d ia lec tic  uses, i . e .  every concept, is , 
"o r ig in a lly  given embodied; in other words, i t  is  given as an element in 
the actual flux, i t  comes by illu s tra tio n ."(37) This last point surely 
cannot be truei in what sense can general concepts be "given embodied", 
except by so stretching the meaning of this phrase as to rob it  o f a l l  
c la r ity  anddsfiniteness?(38")
The formation of concretions in discourse and existence is  explained 
by the postulation o f two fundamental habits or operations of the mind: 
association by sim ilarity  and association by contiguity, o f which the 
former is  the more fundamental, being lo g ica lly  prior to the la tte r . 
Santayana describes association by sim ilarity  as follows. Immediate data, 
" f a l l  together by virtue o f their qua lita tive  iden tity  even before 
th e ir  spatial superposition; fo r in order to be known as repeatedly 
simultaneous, and assoclable by contiguity, they must be associated 
by sim ilarity and known as individually repeated. The various 
recurrences o f a sensation must be recognised as recurrences, and 
th is  implies the collection  of sensations into classes o f similars 
are! the apperception of a common nature in  several data."(39)
A "spontaneous reconstruction" occurs (40), producing the relevant 
universal or concretion in discourse: "Such a liv in g  concretion o f similars 
succeeding one another in time, is  the idea of a nature or quality, the 
universal fa lse ly  supposed to be an abstraction from physical objects, 
which in truth are conceived by putting together those very ideas into a 
spatial and permanent system." ( 41)
The major principle followed in th is putting together is  association 
by contiguity:
" ...when several disparate sensations, having become recognisable in
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their repetitions! are observed to come and go together, or In a 
fixed relation to some voluntary operation on the observer's part, 
they may be associated by contiguity and mergea in one portion of 
perceived space...(A physical ob ject)is  a concretion of my percept­
ions in space..."(A2')
From tills  position, Santayana draw3 the consequence that the concept of 
a spatial object is  posterior to the concepts o f it s  qua lities , and an 
abstraction from these qua lities. A physical object,
" is  a fa r higher and remoter thing than the elements i t  is  composed 
of and that suggest it..These ( i . e .  i t s  elements) are themselves the 
true particulars. They are the f i r s t  objects discriminated in 
attention and projected against the background o f consciousness."(4-3) 
The d if f ic u lty  with th is view is that i t  entails that there log ica lly  
could be a quality not a quality o f a thing, whereas the concepts o f 
thing and quality mutually imply one another.
One concept to which Santayana gives special attention is  that of 
space. He claims that the assumption that there is  one homogeneous space 
is  one of the X'inest achievements of reason:
"This principle, axiomatic as i t  has become, is in no way primitive, 
since prim itive experience is  sporadic and introduces us to 
detached scenes separated oy lapses in our senses and attention. 
These scenes do not hang together in any loca l contiguity. To 
construct a ohart o f  the world is  a d if f ic u lt  feat o f synthetic 
imagination, not to be performed without speculative boldness and 
a heroic insensib ility  to the claims of fancy."(44*)
Tills description h igh li^ its one o f the major weaknesses o f the preceding 
acoount o f concept formation, since i t  is by no means clear how the concept 
o f homogeneous space is to  be explained by either o f the specified types of 
association. The point may be generalised: Oentayana's account o f concept 
form-tion w ill  at best cover concepts o f physical objects. I t  is  d ifficu lt  
to see how i t  oai. be stretched to cover metaphysioal categories such as
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their repetitions, are observed to come and go together, or in a 
fixed relation  to some voluntary operation on the observer's part, 
they may be associated by contiguity and merged in one portion of 
perceived space...(A physical ob ject)is  a concretion o f ®y percept­
ions in space..."(¿2^
From tills  position, Santayana draws the consequence that the concept of 
a spatial object is  posterior to the concepts o f its  qu a lities , and an 
abstraction from these qua lities. A physical object,
" is  a fa r  iiigher and remoter thing than the elements i t  is  composed 
o f and that suggest it..These ( i . e .  its  elements) are themselves the 
true particulars. They are the f ir s t  objects discriminated in 
attention and projected against the background o f consciousness."(43) 
The d if f ic u lty  with this view is that i t  entails that there lo g ic a lly  
could be a quality not a quality o f a thing, whereas the concepts o f 
thing and quality mutually imply one another.
On# concept to which Santayana gives special attention is  that of 
space. He claims that the assumption that there is one homogeneous space 
is  one o f the finest achievements o f reason»
"This principle, axiomatic as i t  has become, is in no way prim itive, 
since prim itive experience is  sporadic and introduces us to 
detached scenes separated oy lapses in our senses and attention.
Tj.ese scenes do not hang together in any local contigu ity. To 
construct a ohart o f  the world lo a d if f ic u lt  feat o f synthetic
f -
imagination, not to be performed without speculative boldness and 
a heroic Insensib ility  to the claims o f fancy."(44*)
This description highlights one o f the major weaknesses o f the preceding 
account o f concept formation, since i t  is by no means clear how the concept 
o f homogeneous apace is to  be explained by either o f the specified  types o f 
association. The point may be generalised: Santayana's account o f concept 
fora-tion w i l l  at best cover concepts o f physioal objects. I t  is  d if f ic u lt  
to see how i t  eai. be stretched to cover metaphysical categories such as
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space and time, or syncategorematle terms. The process o f association by 
s im ilarity  i t s e l f  presupposes the concepts o f unity, sameness, and 
difference, of whose origin  Santayana says nothing. Tn general,
Santayana's account o f the formation o f concepts, an important part o f  
the enterprise o f giving a speculative biography o f the human mind such as 
is supposed to be provided by ".ieason in Sommor. Sense” , is marred by 
incompleteness and lack of system. There la  no attempt at comprehensiveness 
in the description of the formation o f concepts, such as is  found in the 
great jn p ir ic ls ts .(c f. C h .III, above. Santayana had as l i t t l e  suocess in 
his ea rlie r theory of the formation o f types or concepts as he does here.)
Among the stable particulars to be found in the external world is  the 
special sub-class of those which have minds. Santayana spends some time 
on the Justification  of the b e lie f in th e ir  existence. Two theories are 
put forward, he claims, in order to explain and ju s t ify  our b e lie f in 
other minds: ( i )  we in fer the existence o f  other minds by analogy with our 
own, and ( i i )  we are Immediately aware o f them, "we evoke them by dramatic 
association."(4.5) (Santayana nowhere explains what he means by this phrase: 
on the face of i t ,  i t  is  hard to see how he eouL: allow immediate 
acquaintance with another mind.) To the f i r s t  view he objects f i r s t l y  that 
we do not in fact associate our feelings with the behaviour that accompanies 
them, and secondly that the gestures of others reveal passions we have 
never had. To the second theory he objects that i t  leaves our recognition 
o f other minds un in tellig ib le ana without ju stifica tion : it  does not explain 
how we come to make the e ffo r t of imagination. His own view is that our 
b e lie f in other minds is  a r e lio  o f prim itive animism, i . e . ,  the projection 
o f our own experiences onto external objects ae qu a lltl s o f those objects, 
be lie f in other minds is  an example o f puthetio fa lla cy  which is  co rrect.( 46) 
The d if f ic u lty  here is  that while Santayana might have provided an 
explanation fo r  the b e lie f in other minds, he has certain ly not provided a 
log ica l ju stifica tion  fo r  i t :  to assert that the b e lie f is  oorreot is  merely 
to beg the question. His own view is therefore open to the same objection
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as he himself levels at the second of the theories he c r it ic is e s .•
The b e lie f discussed so far in connexion with the birth o f reason are 
a l l  descriptive, concerning general properties o f the external world. The 
possession o f these descriptive b e lie fs , however, is  only a part o f uhat i t  
is to be rational, for reason is concerned not only to describe the world 
but also to evaluate i t .  This leads to the fin a l set of presuppositions, 
those in the theory of value and ethics.
Vi theory o f Value and Kthlos
Santayana's interest theory o f value is  considered in Chapter I ,  above. 
?or the sake of coherence, however, the main points may be b r ie fly  
reiterated here.
The theory of value is  designed to answer the question; why is  i t  that 
evaluation, as opposed to  description of the world, ever occurs? Santayana *b 
answer is that objects are valued because human beings have interests which 
they seek to satisfy . I t  is  a necessary and su ffic ien t condition fo r the 
occurrence of the a c t iv ity  of evaluation that there ex ist beings with both 
consciousness and emotions, loodness is not an objective property of 
particulars in the world; evaluative predicates indicate the relation  to 
our interests o f that to which they are applied. In adopting th is 
subjectivism, Santayana acknowledges the influence o f Spinoaa.
Santayana embraces the consequence, unacceptable to philosophers such 
as Moore and iussell, that, whan people disagree about goodness, they need 
not rea lly  be contradicting one another. (¿7)
As one might except, Santayana does not analyse the meaning o f 
propositions containing ethical predicates, nor deal with questions as to 
their truth-functionality. On the question of the relation o f moral to  
non-moral beliefs he contents himself with the observation that values have 
a nat iral 'b a ils '.  He does not elaborate on the exaot log ica l relation 
between the two types o f b e lie f. (43*)
In Santayana's ethics, the good is happiness. He is an ethical but
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not a psychological eudaemonlsts
"Happiness is  the only sanction of l i f e ;  where happiness fa i ls ,  
existence remains a sad and lamentable experiment. The question.•• 
what happiness shall oonsist in , it s  complexion i f  i t  should once 
a rise , can only be determined by reference to natural demands and 
capacit ie s . . " ( 49 )
I t  might appaar from the last sentence o f th is quotation that in Santayana' 3 
view, there is no a c t iv ity  which is  the good fo r  a l l  men; yet he has 
su ffic ien t fa ith  in the constancy o f human nature to  claim that there is 
one sueh a c t iv ity , betraying once again the influence o f A r is to tle , his 
view is  that this a c t iv ity  is  contemplation; the state of complete 
satisfaction ,
"when anything is loved, understood, enjoyed. Synthetic power is 
then at its  height; the mind can survey its  experience and correlate 
a l l  the motions It  suggests. Power in the mind is  exactly 
proportionate to representative scope, and representative 3cope to 
rational a c t iv ity . A steady vision of a l l  things in th e ir  true 
order and worth results from perfection of function and is  i t s  index; 
i t  secures the gr*atest distinctness in thought together with the 
reatest decision, wisdom, and ease in action, as the lightning is 
b r illia n t and quick."(50*)
The objects of contemplation, at least in Santayana's early philosophy, are 
drawn from areas o f practical a c t iv ity ;
"..w h ile the reward of action is contemplation or, in more modern 
phrase, experience and consciousness, there is nothing stable or 
Interesting to contemplate except objects relevant to action in the 
natural world and the mind's id ea ls ."(51*)
Maximal happiness, Santayana claims, i3 attained by the harmonisation of 
Interests by the use of reason. That there should be a need fo r such harmon­
isation indicates a certain disorder in the human constitution. Man's 
instincts , "in becoming many, became confused, and in growing permanent, grei
A
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feeb le and subject to  arrest and devia tion ."(52) The m u ltip lic ity  of 
in terests brings oon fllo t among then, and hence there is a need for 
d iscip line and order.
The function of reason is  to impose this order. To l iv e  by this rule, 
attempting to  impose maximal harmony on one's interests, is  to liv e  the 
L ife  o f Seasons
"Season as such represents or rather constitutes a single formal 
in terest, the interest in harmony. Vhen two interests are 
simultaneous and fa l l  within one act o f apprehension the desirab ility  
o f harmonising them is  involved in the very e ffo r t to rea lise  them 
together. I f  attention and imagination are steady enough to face 
th is implication and not to allow impulse to osc illa te  between 
irreconcilable tendencies, reason comes into being. Henceforth 
things actual and things desired are confronted by an ideal which has 
ooth pertinence and au thority ."(53*)
One prerequisite o f liv in g  the l i f e  o f reason is  knowledge o f the world 
in which one live s , obviously necessary in order to gauge how propitious 
i t  is to the satisfaction of one's in terests. Squally important is s e lf-  
knowledge, the Sooratic f ir s t  principle o f ethics, before one can gauge 
the propitiousness o f the environment to one's interests, i t  is  necessary 
to know what these Interests are:
"This method, the Soeratic method, consists in accepting any 
estimation which any man may sincerely m ake, and in applying 
d ia lec tic  to i t ,  so as to  le t  the man see what he rea lly  esteems.
Vhat he rea lly  esteems is what ought to  guide his oonduot.."(54) 
Having become aware o f his Interests, and o f their compatibilities, 
the rational man must attempt to decide which actions to perform. Here 
there is a d if f io u lty  which Santayana points out: to compare pleasures or 
pains, we must do so in their absence, by representing them to ourselves. 
This process never reproduces exactly the emotional tone as i t  1b fe l t  on
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the pulse. There is  an in justice inherent in rep resen ttion .(55) However, 
there is  no escape from this predicament. The best that can be done is 
scrupulously to co lla te  a l l  the evidence there is , and on this ground to 
measure values in re flec tion !
"..reason, by attending to a l l  the evidences that can be gathered 
and by confronting the f i r s t  pronouncement by others fetched from 
every quarter of experience, has power to  minimise the error and 
reach a practica lly  just estimate o f absent values."(56)
The interests thus weighed in reflection  need not and should not be 
exclusively one’ s own. Santayana both recommends altruism as a desideratum 
and believes in i t s  psychological poss ib ility , Oenuine altruism is  
natural self-expressioni "Sympathy and justice are simply an expansion 
of the soul's in terests, arising when we consider oth»r men's lives  so 
in ten tly  that something in us imitates and re-enacts their experience, so 
that we vove partly in unison with their movement.."(57)
Santayana varies in his opinion as to the degree to  which the ideal of 
the L ife  o f lesson is  rea lisab le. In " ‘leason in Common Sense" he argues 
that natural goods are attainable and compatible in principle,
"fo r every particular ideal, being an expression of human nature in 
operation, must in the end involve the primary human facu lties and 
canned oe essentia lly incompatible with any other ideal which involve! 
them too..To adjust a l l  demands to one ideal and adjust that ideal 
to its  natural conditions -  in other words to l iv e  the L ife  o f 
Lesson -  is  something perfectly poss ib le ..."(53)
This is barely consistent with certain other passages in "The L ife  of 
lesson". A very d ifferent tone is evident in some remarks in the last o f 
the f iv e  volumes, "lesson in Soienoe":
"A tru ly  rational morality, or social regimen, has never existed in 
the world and is hardly to be looked fo r ...A  rational morality would 
imply perfect self-knowledge, so that no congenial good should be 
needlessly missed..Such knowledge, such defin ition  o f purpose, and
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such perfection o f sympathy are c lea rly  beyond Ban's reach. A ll 
that can be hoped fo r is  that the advance o f science and commerce, 
by fostering peace and a rational development o f character, may 
bring some part o f mankind nearer to that goal; but the goal l ie s ,  
as every ultimate ideal should, at the H a lt  o f what is  poss ib le .."
(59)
I t  is  the second o f these views which case to dominate Santayana's 
opinions as he grew older. In a piece written during the f i r s t  war, the 
establishment o f the L ife  o f Reason is  made to depend on the chance 
collocation of creatures with sim ilar in terests . Knowledge is  only half 
o f v irtue, for one might fu lly  know the interests of another creature and 
set about exterminating i t .  The remaining part o f virtue is  beneficence: 
"Your virtue w ill  be beneficent only in so far as your nature is  
'good ', that is , fundamentally harmonious with other natures i t  
a ffects ..leneflcence is  not obtainable by rational discrimination 
among the impulses o f each soul; i t  presupposes a natural co-operatio 
among a l l  the souls concerned. This harmony oust p re -ex is t . ."(60 »)
I t  w ill become clear in Ch.IX, below, that Santayana came to f e e l  the need 
to supplement the L ife  o f Teas or. with the ethic o f the sp iritu a l l i f e .  
Period ically, human baings need r e l i e f  from the pressure o f rational 
pursuits in a form of disinterested contemplation.
VI; The ; urro3e of the Aesthetics o f " tea son In Art"
I t  w ill  be clear from what has bean said above thmt Santayana's con­
ception of the business o f philosophy is of a trad itiona l, nen-analytic 
kind: the philosopher deals with facts of a general kind, not merely 
concepts. His evident i f  in exp lic it view of aesthetics is perfectly  
consonant with this general standpoint. In "Reason in A rt", he puts 
forward a de fin ition  of art, or »fin e art* as he prefers to say, a general 
psychological account o f how each of the arts arose from basic instincts 
and reactive habits of men, and concludes with an estimate of the extent 
to which fine art in general helps or hinders the realisation o f the L ife 
o f ieason. ( c f .  Introduction, above.)
Thia lost than* la  present throughout the book, and serves as a 
reminder that the governing alia o f "The L ife  o f  Reason" Is a moral one. I t  
is  principally a wor«c o f etnics. "Reason in A rt" is  Santayana's most 
comprehensive work on aesthetics; yet the most important function of the 
aesthetical doctrines put forward in i t  is to serve as premisses from 
which to maike judgments on the possible contributions of the arts to the good 
l i f e . (61»)
VII; Art: Industrial Art, and noe Art
iowhere does Santayana set out a formal de fin ition  o f fine art; yet in 
the course of the f i r s t  three chapters of "Reason in Art", he makes general 
observations which evidently state his views on its  defining properties.
The argument o f these chapters is arranged on the following plan: a 
discussion of 'a r t ' in a vary general sense, in  whioh the term is  used to 
mean any purposive a c tiv ity  in which man modifies his environment to suit 
his own ends; a discussion o f the species industrial art (a lso called 
's e rv ile ' and 'mechanical'), and firs l l y  a discussion o f the emergence of 
fine art.
L ife  is  an equilibrium maintained now by accepting modification and now 
by imposing i t .  Man must sometimes accept a change in his environment; at 
other tiraea he may succeed In changing i t  in accordance with his own lnteresti 
Santayana ca lls  any operation which thus rationalises and humanises the 
environment, "a r t " , in a very broad sense o f th « term. No doubt the Greek 
concept 'techne' influenced him in this usage. ( 62*)
Art (in  the brmad sense) has an instlnetive source and a material 
embodiment. This second requirement entails that a work o f fine art (one 
species o f art in the general sense) always has a materiel embodiment, a 
consequence which at once differentiates Smrtayena's aesthetic from that 
of Groce and Gollingwood, for whom the wor* o f  art is a state o f mind of 
the a r t is t . (63)
While art (in  the broad sense) h s Its  source in the pressure of
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Instinctive drives seeking sa tisfaction , i t  is  not Merely Instinctive .
I t  is  a necessary condition fo r any a c t iv ity  being an art that i t  be 
deliberate:
" I f  the birds in building nests f e l t  the u t il ity  of what they do, 
they would be practising an a rt, and for the instinct to be called 
rational i t  would ever, su ffice that th eir traditional purpose and 
method should become o mscious occasionally." ( 64.)
Santayana is  not precise as to  the description under which i t  is  necessary 
that the a c t iv ity  become conscious in order to qua lify  as an art, i . e .  
whether th is description must include the clause, "and th is a c t iv ity  is 
an a rt", or whether some more specific  description stating a purpose is 
a l l  that is  required.
Most art (in  the broad sensei is exoerimental. We do not know exactly 
what we want to produce before we produce i t ;  yet we recognise i t  i f  and 
when we do produce i t .  Santayana's eplphenomenalism leads h i« to stress 
the well-attested experience o f the involuntariness o f creative thought:
""he ideas co*e o f themselves, being new and unthought-of figments, 
sim ilar, no doubt, to  old perceptions and compacted of fam iliar 
ma ter ia ls , but reproduced in novel fashion and dropping in their 
sudden form from the blue..There is  a painful pregnancy in genius, 
a long incubation and waiting fo r  the s p ir it , a thousand rejections 
and fu t ile  birth-pangs, before the wonderful child appears, a g ift  
o f the gods, u tterly  undeserved and inexplicably perfect. Even 
this unaccountable suocess comes only in rare and fortunate 
instances. What is  ord inarily produced is  so base a hybrid, so 
lame and ridiculous a ehangling, that we reconcile ourselves with 
d if f ic u lty  to our own offspring and blush to be represented by our 
fated works." ( 65*)
Experiment in art (in  the broad sense) is  by no means, then, always 
successful. A successful experiment results in a product which has u tility ,
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which is  accordingly an eventual product o f art and not its  ground. I f  
tha usaful art actually discovered is  to  ba repeated, two conditions must 
out«in: ( i ;  tua a rtis t must have s k il l  ana perseverance, and ( i i )  tha 
material on which he works must maintain i t s  p la s t ic ity . ,Ts#ful works 
can be repeated; repetition  reinforces i t s e l f  and becomes a habit; and a 
clear memory o f the benefit once attains* by fortunate action, representing 
as i t  doe3 the trace l e f t  by the action in the system, and its  harmony with 
man's impulses (fo r  the action is  f e l t  to  be benefic ia l) constitute a 
strong presumption that the act w ill be repeated automatically on occasion. 
When th is  occurs, we say that the action has been learned.( 66)
C learly , art ( in the broad sense) is  o f v i t a l  importance to the 
rea lisation  o f the L ife  o f Reason:
"What makes progress possible is that rational action may leave 
traces in nature, such that nature in consequence furnishes a 
better basis for the L ife  of Reason; in other words progress is 
art bettering the conditions of existence. Until art arises, a ll 
achievement is internal to the brain, dies with the individual, 
and in him spends i t s e l f  without recovery, like music heard in a 
dream."(67)
further the process of art is  teachable; each generation may p ro fit  from 
the experience and art-products o f the generation before.(68)
s'rom art in th is very broad sense Santayana turns to consider one 
species o f i t ,  which he ca lls  variously industrial, mechanical and servile 
a rt. These terms, evidently synonymous in his usage, are not defined. The 
contexts of their use make i t  perfectly clear, however, that an industrial 
art is  cn art which is  cultivated as a means, not as an end, and whose 
value ia  consequently instrumental, not in tr in s ic .
I t  Is Impossible at present (he begins) to give an accurate estimation 
o f the value of art (in  the broad sense) to the L ife  o f Reason: history 
supplies us with insu ffic ien t data. In the msantlme, however, i t  is
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possible to say something about the ultimate interests by which industrial 
arts and thair products have to be evaluated. Or.a might think that
industrial art served two alas: ( 1 ) to produce an abundance o f products, 
and ( i i )  to diminish tha labour needed to  produce them. This second aim 
at least, however, is not ultimate. To diminish t o i l  is  good only i f  it  
liberates energies which can be used in other fie ld s :
"Thus one ideal -  to diminish labour -  fa l ls  back into the other -  
to d iffuse occasions for enjoyment. The aim is  not to curta il 
occupation but to  -ender occupation lib e ra l by supplying i t  with 
more appropriate ob jects." ( 69)
The ultimate goal o f industrial art is  to fa c i l i ta te  a lib e ra l l i f e ,  a 
term by which Santayana evidently means the l i f e  composed as nearly as 
possible of a c tiv it ie s  whicn are endsinthemselves.
¡Jome philosophers would argue that happiness arises out o f work and 
that compulsory acti\ 'ities, du tifu lly  performed, underlie freedom; and 
from this i t  follows that a l i f e  o f instrumental a c t iv it ie s  may be happy. 
Yet, Santayana rep lies, to  arrest attention on a means is i l l ib e ra l ,  not 
so much by what such an interest contains, as by what it  ignores:
"Happiness in a treadmill is  far from inconceivable ; but for that 
happiness to be rational the wheel should be nothing less than the 
whole sky from which influences can descend upon us. There would 
oe meanness o f soul in being content with a smaller sphere, so that 
not everything that was relevant to our welfare should be envisaged 
in our thoughts and purposes. To be absorbed in 'the incidental 
is the animal's portion; to  be confined to the Instrumental is  the 
s la ve 's ."(70)
The objection claims that instrumental a c t iv it ie s  may result in happiness. 
Without denying th is, Santayana Invokes in reply a principle supplementary 
to pure eudaemonism. Happiness is  the good, but there is  a distinction to 
be dr.wn between irrational and rational happiness. The la tte r  is 
occasioned by a l i f e  in which lib e ra l as well ae Instrumental pursuits are
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engaged in . A rational l i f e ,  in which a l l  interests are sa tis fied  us best 
as is  practica lly  possible, is  assumed to be superior to  a l i f e  in which 
re la tiv e ly  few interests are narmonisea. fne d if f ic u lty  in oantayunu's 
reply is  to ju s tify  the supplementary princip le. This is  a species o f 
the d if f ic u lty  pointed out by Stephen Pepper and noted in Chapter I ,  
aoov«, namely, that to make harmony o f interests the good is  a rb itra r ily  
to make one interest (that in harmony) more important than the others. No 
ju s tifica tion  is offered for th is  assumption.
Santayana continues that an instrumental art is  by de fin ition  not an 
end in i t s e l f ,  and that therefore, Insofar as a man is occupied by such 
arts, he is  obviously a slave and his art at best an e v i l  necessity: "Thus 
a l l  instrumental and remedial art3, however indispensable, are pure 
ourdens; and progress consists in abridging them as much as is  possible 
without contracting the basis fo r  moral l i f e . "(71) This needful abridge­
ment of servile  art can take place in either or botn o f two ways. The 
art may become instinctive, unconscious o f the u t i l i t y  that backs i t  and 
conscious of the so lic ita tion  that leads i t  on. Thus hunting and thm 
nursing of children have become automatic to human beings, '’he second way 
in which the industrial arts may be abridged is by a lapse o f the demand 
which required them.(72)
One condition of the rationa lity  o f industrial art, then, is that i t  
ministers to lib e ra l a c tiv ity . A second, Santayana continues, is  that the 
environment and the interests o f the creature be in imperfect harmony. I f  
perfect harmony obtslned, then action would be fu t ile :
"A ll objects envisaged either In vulgar action or in the a iriest 
cognition must f ir s t  be ideal and d istinct from the given facts, otherwise 
action would have lost Its  function as the same moment that thought lost 
it s  significance. A ll l i f e  would have collapsed into a purposeless 
datum."(73)
Art (in  the broad sense) in order to ex ist presupposes a problem to solve 
(an ideal to rea lize ) and a material on vhiah to operate in order to solve
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the problem. A further condition o f the possib ility  o f the ra tion a lity  
o f industrial art is  that this material be other than en tirely refractory: 
"Absolute chaos would defeat l i f e  as surely as would absolute id e a lity ."
(74) Santayana does not notice the difference between the two conditions 
‘'or industrial art which he discusses. The condition that industrial 
art minister to lib e ra l a c t iv ity  is  indeed a condition of the ra tiona lity  
o f industrial a rt; the conditions concerning the state of the environment, 
however, are not 30 much conditions fo r rationa lity  as preconditions of the 
poss ib ility  o f industrial art in the f i r s t  place. Moreover, i t  i s  hard to 
see why Santayana should consider that a perfect l i f e  should be 'a purpose­
less datum': one would s t i l l  act, even in an ideal environment. The 
difference between such actions and those in an imperfect environment is 
simply that the former always produce exactly the desired result.
Santayana proceeds to  his doctrines on fine art by noting that a l l  
art has two stages, the f ir s t  servile  or industrial, the second lib e ra l.
In industrial a rt, "untoward matter is  better prepared, or impeding media 
are over come. "(75) In lib e ra l a rt, "perfectly  f i t  matter is appropriated 
to ideal uses and endowed with a direct spiritual function."(76 ») The 
sp iritual function
"consists in the activ ity  of turning an apt msterial into an 
expressive and de ligh tfu l form, thus f i l l in g  tne world with objects 
which by symbolising ideal energies tend to revive them under a 
favouring influence and therefore to strengthen and refine thee."(77) 
Santayana goes on, changing terminology, to note that a ll fine a rt contains 
an element o f industry ®*>d a ll  industry an element of fine art, fo r  every 
proximate end, in being attained, sa tis fies  the mind; and before any 
product can attain its  ideal function, problems as to its  transparency and
J
fitness have to  be removed. '
The proximity o f occurrence of the terms 'l ib e ra l ' end 'f in e ' in the 
text is Important. Santayana does not state whether these terms ere 
Intended as synonyms, or whether fine art is a specie« o f lib e ra l a rt. The
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unannounced change o f usage, and the absence of any discussion of a 
second species o f l ib e ra l art suggest the former. Whichever alternative 
is  the case, a l l  that is  built into the de fin ition  of lib e ra l art must 
apply also to fine a rt . I t  is important to  be c lear at the outset as to 
the relations of these terms, since Santayana's usage has caused 
considerable confusion.(78*) To recapitulate, a rt in general is any 
deliberate manipulation of the environment to further a human interest; 
industrial art is  that species o f art which is  carried on as a means to 
a further end, and lib e ra l art is  art which is  an end in i t s e l f .  3oth 
industrial and fine art can be rational or ir ra tion a l, depending on whether 
or not they maximize the harmonious satisfaction o f in terests.
The remarks on lib e ra l or fin e art need to be considered at more 
length. A wo^k o f fin e  art has a sp iritual function, an expressive and 
deligh tfu l form, symbolises ideal energies, and stimulates and strengthens 
these energies in i t s  observers, Santayana provides no defin itions or 
explanations o f these terms. We are not told e x p lic it ly  o f what fine art 
•.a expressive, though presumably i t  is expressive at least o f Ideal 
energies. e are not told what i t  is  for a work to symbolise ideal 
energies, nor what sort o f delight the work is supposed to give (presumaoly 
aesthetic de ligh t), nor what ideal energies are. However, some of these 
gaps can be f i l le d  by reference to other remarks by Santayana. I t  has been 
shown in Chapter V, above, that an ideal is  the idea of an imagined state 
o f perfection, in which some interest or group o f  Interests is perfectly 
sa tis fied . A ll moral b e lie fs , in Santayana's view, state or imply ideals. 
Perhaps, then, Santayana ooneeives i t  to be the function o f fine art to  
symbolise imagined states o f perfection, or to express ideals: in view of 
his doctrines on poetry, this is at least a safe conjecture.
I f  Cantayana considers i t  to be a necessary condition for art -  and
the fact that 1m puts forward other conditions makes i t  plausiole to read
his remarks as a set of Jointly su fficient neoessary conditions -  that the
(¿31)
work in question *xor*s3 or In son* sans* symbolise what can without strain 
b* called an ideal, than surely h* Is  wrong, '.on* works o f a rt, perhaps 
a l l  grsat ones, do have this property; but equally, nany do not, e.g. 
poetry of pure sound, or paintings designed to give pure optical delight and 
no more. What Santayana has done Is to  pick an aesthetic virtue which, as 
his views on poetry have aade clear, he holds In high estivation, and builds 
i t  into his de fin ition  o f art.
A further renark interpretable as a statement of a necessary condition 
fo r  art is Santayana’ s doctrine that works, "in which an aesthetic value 
is  or is  supposed to be proalnent take the naae of fin e  a r t . . "(79) This 
aust be approached via his d e fin ition  o f aesthetic value in terns of the 
inagination.
Imagination is ,
■•a region o f deployed sen s ib ility  or synthetic representation",(83) 
which Is In soae sense between abstract discourse and pure sensation. I t  
is ,
"a region where nor* is  seen at era 's  length than in any on* nonent 
could be fe l t  at close quarters, and yet where the renote parts of 
experience, which discourse reaches only through symbols, are 
recovered and reconposed in something lik e  their native colours 
and experienced re la tion s ."(81)
The last clause her* recalls the doctrines on the poet and the data of 
experience discussed in Chapter 7, above: the poet has the a b ility  to 
decompose the unities imposed on the data o f experience by reason. Here, 
the doctrine is extended to cover a ll a r t is t ic  creation, not nerely that o f 
poetry.
Aesthetic value is defined in terns of imagination: "The values 
inherent in imagination, in instant in tu ition , in sens* endowed with fo r » , 
are called aesthetic values. . ." (8 2 ). Thar* is  no expansion o f this 
defin ition  in the tex t, though i t  is by no naans d if f ic u lt  to  supply at 
least a part o f the needed explanation by reference to Santayana's other
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doctrines. He seems hart to mean that aesthetic value is  value in the 
immediate, or at least, in perception conceptualised to a lesser degree 
tb-a obtains In  ordinary, huaarua a c t iv it ie s . This is  consistent with the 
remark in "The Sense o f 3eauty", that aesthetic judgments are "necessarily 
in trinsic and based on th- character o f immediate experience."(83) To 
what degree and in what ways precisely aesthetic perception is  conceptualised 
d iffe ren tly  from ordinary perception is  not clear. I t  is  tempting to 
interpret him as saying that aesthetic perception is perception in which 
the object is  experienced under descriptions which contain no reference to 
the sa tisfaction  o f practical interests. Such a view is speculative, 
though i t  is  consistent with his remarks, and is  consonant with the 
distinction between immediate and mediate experience. I t  is  at least open 
to him to argue that the mediate conceptualisation of data is  directed by 
and towards the satisfaction of practical interests.
This is  the sense, then, in which the term, "aesthetic value" is  used 
in the second necessary condition fo r art, i . e .  having or being sup osed to 
have a prominent aesthetic value. At the risk o f repetitiveness, i t  is 
relevant to note that one d ifficu lty  with this condition is the untenabllity 
o f the doctrine o f aesthetic value, which follows as a consequence o f the 
collapse of the Immediate -  mediate d istinction . Again, the second disjunct | 
o f this condition must be rejected: works merely intended to have aesthetic 
value but fa ll in g  to attain i t  are not classed as art, but at best as 
fa iled  art or would-be art. The f ir s t  disjunct can be retained, provided 
i t  is l ib e ra lly  interpreted, i .e .  provided that Santayana's imperfect 
defin ition  o f aesthetic value Is not Insisted on: i t  is to be argued below 
that a work is  oalled a work of art partly in virtue of Its  possession of 
certain aesthetic virtues; and whatever has aesthetic virtues has aesthetic 
value.
Santayana goes on to assert that to define a work of art as that which 
has prominent aesthetic value Is In a way misleading, fo r, "the work so 
defined is almost always an abstraotion from the actual object, which has
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many non-aesthetic functions and values."(84) Aesthetic and non-aeathatic 
values ara in Santayana's vlaw vary closaly connected. Art (in  the broad 
sense), he argues, is  that element o f the L ife  o f Reason which consists in 
modifying the environment in order to secure the raaximal satisfaction  of a l l  
human interests. Nature is wont to sa tisfy  these interests together, end 
works simultaneously in every ideal d irection. No one direction is  good 
i f  i t  leads to estrangement from a ll  other Interests: "The aesthetic good 
w ill  oe accordingly hatched in  the same nest with the others, and incapable 
of f ly in g  far in a d ifferen t a ir . "(85) Thus to separate out the aesthetic 
element for special attention,
" is  an a r t if ic e  which is  more misleading than helpful} fo r neither in 
the history o f art nor in a rational estimate o f its  value can the 
aesthetic function of things be divorced from the practical and moral."(86) 
Aesthetic values are so nebulous and 30 very intimately connected with 
other types o f value that to take them out o f context is to make oneself 
lia b le  to appraise the object in question irra tion a lly :
"An aesthetic fragranoe, Indeed, a l l  things may nave, i f  in 
so lic itin g  man'3 senses or reason they can awaken his imagination 
as w ell; but this middle zone is so mixed and nebulous, and its  
lim its are so vague, that i t  cannot w ell be treated in theory other­
wise than as i t  exists in faot -  as a phase o f man's sympathy with 
the world he moves in ."(87)
This conclusion is  surely unjustified, at least in such an extreme 
form. I t  is  Just to assert that, in order to understand works of art, i t  
is necessary almost invariably to employ a large number o f be lie fs about 
l i f e ,  as w ell, often, as belie fs about art and its  history. What is 
unjust is  to assert that to consider the aesthetic properties o f works of 
art fcjone is  always to risk misunderstanding the work in Borne important way. 
I t  is  an evident faot that in advanced societies , works o f art are 
produced to serve as objects for contemplation. The aesthetic virtues of
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these objects are their moat important properties. Under these circum­
stances, i t  would ba to misunderstand such objects to regard than as other 
than objects whose value is  almost or en tire ly  aesthetic. I t  is to over­
state the case to assert that aesthetic values are always "mixed and 
nebulous."
A further point arises from the de fin ition  of aesthetic value as value 
in the immediate. I t  seems that there is  some tension between th is 
doctrine and the f ir s t  condition for art, namely that a work o f art must 
express an idea l. I f  aesthetic perception is  perception which is  
conceptualised to a lesser degree than is  the case in ordinary practical 
perception, then to experience a work of art aesthetically  involves putting 
a good deal of conceptual apparatus in abeyance. This is  possibly in 
tension with the doctrine that a work of art must express an ideal, for 
to do 30 presumably requires us to think o f the work o f art under fa ir ly  
complex descriptions! this must be so in th* case o f those poems most 
highly regarded by Santayana, which express a complete philosophy. To 
save his consistency, Santayana would have to accept the paradox that the 
most important feature o f a work of art, i t s  ideal meaning, is  not 
appreciated aesthetically, and by de fin ition  cannot be so appreciated. Yet 
i t  must be stressed that th is objection rests on a conjectural Interpretation 
o f Santayana, turning on exactly what degree of conceptualisation he has in 
mind when he speaks o f value in  immediate experience.
More general points about fine art emerge as Santayana discusses its  
emergence in the l i f e  of men. Art, including fine art, is  so to speak 
between two extremes o f action, pure spontaneity and pure u t i l i t y .  The 
former type o f action is unrefleetive and en tirely undeliberated; while 
u tilita r ian  action is  devoid o f a l l  id ea lity , and expresses only the 
necessities to which man is  subject. Spontaneous action leads to art 
when i t  acquires a rational function; u t i l i t y  leads to art when its  
vehicle acquires in trinsic value and becomes expressive. A good way of 
studying the fine arts is  to  see how they grow, now out o f u t i l i t y ,  now
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out o f automatism. Their goal can be nothing but the complete super­
position of these two characterst
"The meanest arts are those which l i e  near the lim it either o f  
u t i l i t y  or o f automatic self-expression . They become nobler and 
more rational as th e ir  u t i l i t y  Is rendered spontaneous or th e ir  
spontaneity beneficent."(88)
These doctrines are d i f f ic u lt  to estimate as they stand, since they are 
ambiguous. Santayana appears to make i t  a necessary condition fo r a rt 
that the object be in some degree self-expressive and have a beneficent 
e ffe c t on those who encounter i t .  Self-expression is  a slippery term; i t  
has a t r iv ia l  sense in which i t  is  necessarily the case that whatever the 
a rtis t does is self-expressive, merely because the a rtis t himself does 
express i t .  But this t e l l s  us nothing d is tin ctive  about art or the 
process o f creation. Again, to evaluate th is claim properly, i t  would 
be necessary to  know what sort o f beneficent e ffects  Santayana has in  
mind.
He continues that the spontaneous art3 are older than the useful, since 
man must l iv e  and act before he can devise instruments fo r liv in g  and 
acting better. There is accordingly a vast amount o f irresponsible play 
er.d loose experiment in art, before these groping acquire a settled  habit 
and function, and rationa lity  begins..(39) Santayana describes the change 
from automatism to  art in the case of gesture. Vhen rationa lity  is  born, 
"Grimace and gesture and ceremony w i l l  be modified by a sense of 
their e ffe c t ; they w il l  become a rtfu l and w ill  transform th e ir  
automatic expressiveness into ide'al expression. They w ill  become 
sign ificant of what i t  is intended to communicate and important 
to know; they w ill  have ceased to be irresponsible excuses and vents 
for passing fee lin g , by which fee lin g  is dissipated, as in tears, 
without being embodied and ln tellectua lised , as in a work o f  a r t ."(90) 
Before commenting on this, one can notice some remarks by George loss 
in his c r it ic a l essay on Santayana's aeethetios. Boas asserts that 
Santayana c la ss ifies  the arts on the basis o f their materials rather than
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on th* basis o f thair purpose.(91) ■'urther, this view is  said by 3oas to 
hav* th« consequence that tha only c r it ic a l standard relevant to tha 
* ppr«elation ana «valuation of art is  tnat o f tacnnicai competence«
" . . . th e  dafining o f arts on tha basis o f thair aateria ls, while 
ta il in g  us something o f great technical in teres t, Incurs tha 
danger of setting up standards o f workmanship which art in the 
long run only a part of th* s to ry ."(92)
In Boas's view, a fu ll  appreciation of a work o f art presupposes that we 
can grasp th* a r t is t 's  purpose or intention, and therefore Santayana's 
view is  rejected by him as inadequate. Boas's universal claim about the 
need to know th* a r t is t 's  intention is  to say the lea s t debatable; more 
iaportant at present is the in justice in his exposition of Santayana, who 
is  at pains to stress precisely the purposiveness which 9oas claims that 
he neglects, as is made clear by th* passage quoted in  the preceding 
paragraph.
Returning to that passage, Santayana can there ba taken as asserting 
that for an object to be a work of art, i t  aust s a t is fy  the further 
conditions o f ( i )  being intended as a coaaunication; and ( i i )  that i t  
•mbody in tallectualised fee lin g . Tha second of these requires two 
comments. f ir s t ly ,  the sentence in  which th* remark occurs is ambiguous. 
Santayana aay not here be stipulating that a l l  works of art are expressive 
o f fee lin g , but merely that when a work is expressive, the fee ling  is  
embodied and ln tellectu a lised . The ambiguity remains. The second point 
is what meaning is  to  be attached to the undefined terms 'eabodled' and 
'in te llec tu a lis ed '. Embodiment need not present a problem. There is  
no reason to believe that by the t ia *  he wrote "Reason in A rt", Santayana 
had rejected any of the doctrines put forward eight years ea r lie r  in "The 
Sense o f Seauty". This being the case, an embodied feeling w ill  be an 
emotion stimulated by an aesthetic object, probjected back into the object, 
and regarded as one o f it s  properties. As to  the meaning of 'in te lle c t -
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ualised' on« can only guess, though i t  Is by no Mans d if f ic u lt  to 
attach so*• meaning to tha ta r* . I t  Is a fam iliar anough axparlanca In 
contaaplating *  work o f art to ba abla to racognisa and as i t  wara savour 
tha quality  o f an axprassad faa lin g  without axparitncing th» faaling as It 
would ba axpari*ncad in a non-a«sth«tio context} on« way o f pointing to  this 
quality o f «notion fa it  in a stata o f psychical distanoa is  to dascrib* i t  
as in te llectu a lised . Possibly i t  is  this aspect of tha axparianca o f art 
which Santayana has in mind.
Thara ara d if f ic u lt ie s  with both proposad conditions. I t  is  hard to 
accapt that a l l  objects in th“ class of works o f art ara intandad to  
communicate a message which would sa tis fy  tha description of being 'important 
to know'. A work aight be intended to stiaulate delicate or vio lent 
sensory experience and no more, as is the case with some paintings. To do 
this is  not quita to convey a message. Again, i t  is not true that a l l  
works o f art express ir te llec tu a lised  faa ling. This is  not even true 
o f nuslc, where tha theory aight ba thought to be most plausible, fo r 
many pieces o f ausie which are works of art do not express faa ling, 
intellactualisad or otherwise, e .g . much of the 'ta fa lausik ' o f tha 
classica l period.
I f  the foregoing conjectures and arguments are correct, than 
iantayana's defin ition  of art provides only one acceptable, but t r iv ia l ,  
Insight, i .e .  that a work of art aust have a prominent aesthetio valúa.
I t  is  appropriate at th is point to  consider b r ie fly  an analytical a lte r­
native view of tha nature o f a rt.
mu Maim* »nd,
One of the im plicit assumptions made by Santayana in ".{easor in Art", 
and one which ha shares with almost i f  not every other writer in tha 
history o f aesthetics, is  that i t  is in principle possible to defina art} 
or, put in another idiom, that i t  is in principle possible to specify 
necessary and/or sufficient conditions which govern the use o f th* terms 
'a r t ' and 'work o f art*. This assumption has i t s e l f  been questioned by
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analytical w riters, notably tforrls Waltz In "The lole o f  Thaory In 
Aesthetics"; J.A. Pesseore In "The reariness of Aesthetics", and 
'•?.K. ; »nnlc-c In ” Does Traditional Aestnetios rest on a MistsKe/“ (y.j)
On* lina o f argument in support o f  tha negative thesis that 'a r t ' 
cannot be defined la  to riot a that non* o f tha defin itions proposad so far 
has revealed a property common to a l l  works of art. Thus Walts b r la fly  
surveys and c r lt lo lsa s  formalism, Voluntarism, Kmotionmlism, In tallactual- 
18», Intuitionlsm and Organieism, and« having produced tha standard 
objections to these views« raaarks that« "aver. I f  art has one sat of 
necessary or su ffic ien t properties, none o f th* theories w* have noted or, 
for that natter« no aesthetic thaory yet proposed« has enumerated that sat 
to tha satisfaction  of a l l  concerned."(94) Thera Is undoubtedly a good 
deal o f truth in Waltz's contentions. Tha classic theories o f art can 
now b* seen to be deeply unsatisfactory. 7or example, there are obviously 
objects called works o f art which are not In any non-veeuous sense o f the 
te r*  1 a lt»tion s o f anything, e.g. abstract painting, and th* vast majority 
o f buildings. xpresslonist views have o f course d iffered  widely, and the 
unity conferred on the* by th* class ifica tion  Is more apparent than rea l. 
However, «any expression views state or entail that a l l  art expresses 
feelings; yet, as has beer, said in the previous section, this is not true 
even of music where th* theory might be thought to have most p lau sib ility .
Again, to maintain that significant, fora, in th* sense of the ter® used by 
Clive dell ( c f .  Chapter I I I ,  above) is  necessary fo r art is  no less 
d if f ic u lt ,  Bince, although dell does not define significant fora in tar*s 
o f th* aesthetic emotion, yet the occurrence o f th is fee ling  is the only 
sure indication that significant fo r «  is  prasent in a work; aoraovar, it  
is  suraly fa lse  to aaintain that thera is ona emotion common to a l l  
aesthatlc axperlanoa.
le t  while th is such might be conoeded to Weltz, i t  should be noted 
that a l l  that 13 established by his argument la that no feature common
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to  »11 works o f art has yet been found; no 'a posteriori' argument o f this
kind can prove that no such quality can be found.
In order to establish this strongsr claim, an 'a p r io r i' argument la 
needed, and Waltz attempts to provide one by making use of Vaismann's 
notion o f the open-texture o f certain concents. A concept Is open I f  Its 
conditions o f application are amendable and corrig ib le , l . e .  I f  a 
situation can be imagined or secured which would ca ll for some decision 
on our paict to extend the use o f the concept to cover th is, or to close the 
concept and invent a new one to deal with the new case. I f  necessary and 
su ffic ien t conditions can be stated, the concept is  a closed one. Descript­
ive and normative concepts are open, unless a rb itra rily  closed by 
s tipu la tion .(95) "A rt" is an open concept; new art forms have emerged 
and continue to «serge, demanding decisions on whether the concept is  to 
be extended or not to  suit these cases.(96) To know what art is ,  we do 
not need to know any postulated essence o f a rt; we need only to be able to 
use the te r *  'a r t ' co rre c tly .(97)
One can attempt to  show the fa u l t y  of a part of th is doctrine -  l .e .  
tnat no necessary condition binds the terms 'a r t ' or 'work o f a rt ' -  by 
considering the follow ing aspect o f the log ic  o f these terms: when an 
object (used In a sense broad enough to cover pieces of music, ballets, 
e tc .) is  Included in the class o f works o f art, this judgment is  supported 
by advancing reasons which specify the possession, by the work o f art, of 
aesthetic virtues. A few examples w ill make this clear. Suppose, for 
exaaple, that someone makes the claim that a certain book is a work of 
a rt. In support o f this judgment, he may produce any combination of reasons 
such as the following: that I t  is  orig inal; that it3 characters are 
en tire ly  credible and convincing; that tha episodes arise Inevitably from 
ona another; tnat tha style Is always appropriate to the episode; that i t  
has a beginning, a middle, and an end; or that it  is deeply f e l t  and
authentic
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Aitkin, suppose 30 m# one says o f & piece o f music, that i t  is  both 
moving and exciting; that the themes and harmonies ara beautifu l; that 
t»uay uavsiop «a i f  iaevitau ly; t«a t fon t o f tha work, (in  the sense in 
which sonata, fugue, ate*, ara forma) is  a strength, and dots not cramp 
Its  evolution; that tha coaposar'a orehastratlon is  impeccable, and so on. 
Thasa ara among tha typical raasons which would ba tdvancad in support o f 
tha claim that tha piaca of music is  a work o f a rt. Not much Icganuity is 
raquirad to work out parallal l is ts  fo r works o f painting, sculpture, 
architecture, and ba lle t.
While i t  can ba readily conceded to anti-essentia lists such as Waltz 
that none of thasa aesthetic virtues is I t s e l f  a hacessary condition 
governing tha use o f 'a r t ' of 'work o f a r t1, yet an important point 
follow3 merely from the fact that these reasons specify aesthetic virtues. 
An aesthetic virtue is a property of an object such that tha possession o f 
i t  enhances aesthetic experience in 3ome way. I f  i t  is tha case that the 
uses of the terms 'a r t 1 and 'work of a rt ' ara always supported by 
specifications o f aesthetic virtues, than i t  follows that a l l  art is  an 
object o f aesthetic in terest} for c learly , an object whose properties 
enhance aesthetic experience must be an object of aesthetic in terest. In 
other words, being an object o f aesthetic interest is a necessary condition 
binding the use o f 'a r t ' and 'work of a r t '.  These findings vindicate 
two of the positions adopted by Santayana, i .e .  that 'a r t ' is a condition- 
governed term (end so is open to de fin ition  to some degree), and that a ll 
art has a prominent aesthetic value -  to say thi3 is not to say anything 
relevantly d ifferen t from the claim that being an object o f aesthetic 
interest ia a necessary condition fo r art.
A further point in the logical grammar of 'a r t ' and 'work o f a rt ' 
follows from the fact that their use is supported by specifications of some 
combination of a range o f aesthetic virtues, namely, that these terms are 
honorific. To c a ll any object (in  the present extended sense o f the term)
a work o f art Is to pay i t  a compliment. Which aasthatlc virtues ara aost 
prized vari«3 with cultural background, tiaa , place, and individual. The 
history o f taste is  the history of vicissitudes in preferences aaong 
aesthetic virtues. A work o f art is  great art when i t  possesses aesthetic 
virtues to a superlative degree, and possibly sonatinas whan i t  possesses 
very rare aesthetic virtues, such as expressing an advanced state of 
sp iritual developaent (Beethoven's la te quartets and piano sonatas, 
tembrandt's late s e lf-p o rtra its ). The terns 'good a rt ' and 'great a r t ' 
are therefore doubly honorific: the work o f art possesses far more than 
enough aesthetic virtues, (o r has thee to a superlative degree) to gain 
i t  a place in the class o f works o f art.
Again, i t  follows that, i f  certain qua lities  possessed by an object 
f a l l  so into disrepute that they cease to  be counted as aesthetic virtues, 
or i f  for any other reason i t  becomes impossible to take an aesthetic 
interest in i t ,  then that object w i l l  fo r the time being pass out o f the 
class of works of a rt; and conversely, objects at one time excluded from 
the class nay enter i t ,  i f  the conditions opposite to those Just specified 
come to  obtain.
A d ifferen t log ica l problem arising from the use o f the tens 'work of 
a r t ',  and one to which Santayana pays no attention, is that o f the log ica l 
status of the work of art. That there is  such a problem quickly becomes 
clear in connexion with those works which have copies or performances, for 
in these cases, the work i t s e l f  cannot be iden tified  with any spatio- 
temporal particular or process (or however one chooses to describe a 
performance). I f  this were tha case, then i t  would follow that i f  any 
particular copy o f the work were los t, then the work it s e l f  would be los t; 
or again, one might say o f any particular performance that thi3 is the work 
the a rtis t set out to create. The same objections apply to privileged 
copies or performances, e.g . the manuscript copy; or the f ir s t  performance, 
or a performance overseen by the a rtis t.
(2¿2)
These d if f ic u lt ie s  are eluded by the use o f Pe irce 's  d istinction  
between e log ica l type and it s  tokens.(93*) The work of art is  a lo g ica l 
type, while copies or performances o f i t  are tokens. Peirce introduces 
the distinction while discussing the word 'th e ';
"In another sense o f the word 'w ord '...there is  but one word 'th e ' 
in the English language; and i t  is impossible that th is word should 
l ie  v is ib ly  on a page or be heard in any vo ice, fo r the reason that 
i t  is not a Single thing or a Single event. I t  does not ex ist; i t  
only determines things that do ex ist. 'Such a d e fin ite ly  significant 
Fora, I  propose to  term a Type. A Single event which happens once 
• nd whose iden tity  is  lim ited to that one happening or a single 
object or thing which is  in some single place at any one instant of 
time, 3uch event or thing being significant only as occurring just 
when and where i t  does, such as this or that word on a single lin e 
o f a single page o f a single copy o f a book» I w ill  venture to ca ll 
a Token."(99)
The relations between a type and its  tokens can be indicated by con­
sidering to what extent the same properties can be predicated o f each. Some 
properties can be in te l l ig ib ly  predicated only o f tokens, e .g . those 
specifying i t s  spatio-temporal location; while others can be properties 
only o f a type, e.g. having been invented by someone. Where the t.ype is  
a work of a rt, aesthetic virtues and vices can be predicated o f i t i  the work 
can be said to  have organic form, to be expressive, to be authentic, and so 
on. Token-performances can have these properties predicated o f them; or they 
can be critic ised  for obscuring or fa ilin g  to do Justice to the properties 
o f the type; or conversely they can be praised fo r  revealing a new property 
hitherto unnoticed but now regarded as a property o f the type. In general, 
i t  is  clear that the relations between a type and its  tokens are close, 
since many properties can be shared (in te l l ig ib ly  predicated o f both) and 
transmitted between them. (A property is  transmitted from token to type,
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for example, i f  th* typ* is  p because th* token is  p)
I t  Might b* thought th »t th* typ* -  token distinction is  applicable 
only where th* work o f art has copies or performances, and fa i ls  to apply 
wh*r* th*r* i3 a plausibl* physical -  obj*ot candidate fo r  th* t i t l e ,  ' th* 
work o f a r t , ' as is  th* ease with most statuas;buildings and paintings.
But tha situation is  not so simple as th is, luby M*ag*r has pointed out 
that a physical object work of a rt, a tok*n-thlng in h*r vocabulary, has 
a type-function. Michaelangelo's 'David ', fo r axaapl* has this functions 
th*r* is  a replica o f i t  at forest Lawn ?un*ral Park, California, and this 
rep lica is  a replica of i t  only insofar as i t  reproduces th* block which 
Micha*lang*lo worked on and which is  in Florence.(100) Mich**lang*lo's 
•David' is  thus, "th* defining aodel o f a class o f things, more or less 
imperfect copies of i t ,  which take their identity  as works o f art (though 
not as blocks o f marble) froa i t . " (101)
Mi3s Meager raises this point in th* context of a discussion o f a 
further general issue which has exercised analytical philosophers, i .e .  
th* doctrine that a work of art is  in 30M* important sens* unique, and 
further, that thi3 h*3 th* consequence that to  apply general standards to 
a work o f art is  merely inappropriate. In soa# way, a work o f art is  said 
to propose its  own standards and is  appropriately judged by the* alone. 
(102*) The d if f ic u lt ie s  with these views are ch ie fly  (1) to give an 
acceptable 3*ns* to 'unique', and ( i i )  to square the« with th* common 
procedure o f comparing certain works o f art with on* another, a practice 
which is  not accompanied by such a sens* o f log ica l absurdity as ought 
to be present, granted th* truth o f th* uniqueness doctrines.
I t  might be said that a particular work o f art is th* only on* o f its 
kind; yet in exactly th* same sense, everything can be said to be unique. 
Moreover, a ll  works of art have i t  in common that they are works o f art. 
Another view is that differences matter more than sim ilarities in talking 
o f works of a rt; yet in order fo r things to b* d ifferen t they must be 
sim ilar in some respects. Moreover, i t  is hard to see what is  valuable
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•bout shear d ifference. Margaret Macdonald (103) holds that in 
principle, no two works o f art car. t ie  fo r  f ir s t  place in  a competition, 
le t  this is  Just fa ls e : f i l a  and area» fe s t iv a ls  would be impossible and 
absurd i f  th is were the case. N’or again is  i t  acceptable to say that 
works o f art are unique in respect o f content, fo r, in the f i r s t  place, 
th Í3 property is  not d is tin ctive  o f works o f a rt, being shared by 
psychological case h istories, and secondly, i t  is not clear in what sense 
works of architecture and abstract art can be said to  have content.
Perhaps the most acceptable sense which car. be given to  'unique' with 
regard to works o f art is that they are to  soae degree o rig ina l, not wholly 
predictable fro *  prior knowledge or specification . This much one might 
concede to the uniqueness theorists, but i t  is questionable whether such 
a concession precludes the poss ib ility  o f comparison between works o f a rt. 
Miss Meager fo llows Wittgenstein in pointing out how in fact a va riety  of 
paradigm case argument can be invoked in aesthetical reasoning.(104.*) I t  
is  assuaed that, in arguing ab^ut a work o f a rt, the work has a general 
point, in terns of which i t s  features can be assessed as contributing or the 
reverse. I t  is  neither necessary not usual for this point to  be conpletely 
or ex p lic it ly  statable. Evaluative comparisons o f features o f works and 
o f works as wholes can be made by reference to what is  taken as a successful 
use of a c r it ic is ed  feature (or work with »  similar point), indicated in 
its  own successful work. Since such comparisons are common and in tu itive ly  
unproblematic, there Í 3 surely good reason to regard with suspicion any 
doctrine which claims their log ica l absurdity.
I t  might seam that th is point is  not ralavant to Santayana; yet in 
fact the poss ib ility  o f judging the erts by general standards is  a crucial 
prasupposltton of the whole o f "Reason in A rt".
iAi-maaglaa&as
"Th# L ife  o f Raason", including "Reason in Art" is now a neglected 
'philosophical work. I t  Is hoped that the foregoing sections go soee way to
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■ bout shear difference. Margaret Macdonald (103) holds that in 
principle, no two works o f art oan t ie  for f ir s t  place in a competition, 
le t  tnls 13 Just fa lsa : film  and drama fes tiva ls  would be impossible and 
absurd i f  th is were the case. Nor again is i t  acceptable to say that 
works of a rt are unique in respect o f content, fo r, in the f ir s t  place, 
th is property is  not d is tin ctive o f works of a rt, being shared by 
psychological case h istories, and secondly, i t  is  not clear in what sense 
works of architecture and abstract art can be said to have content.
Perhaps the aost acceptable sense which oan be given to 'unique' with 
regard to works o f art is that they are to some degree orig ina l, not wholly 
predictable from prior knowledge or specification. This much one might 
concede to the uniqueness theorists, but it  is  questionable whether such 
a concession precludes the possib ility  of comp.risen between works o f a rt. 
Miss Meager follows Wittgenstein in pointing out how in fact a variety o f 
paradigm case argument can be invoked in aesthetics! reasoning.(104*) I t  
is  assumed that, in arguing ab^ut a work o f a rt, the work has a general 
point, in terms of which its  features een be assessed as contributing or the 
reverse. I t  is neither necessary not usual for this point to be completely 
or ex p lic it ly  statable. Evaluative comparisons o f featuras o f works and 
o f works as wholes can be made by reference to what is taken as a successful 
use of a cr it ic ised  feature (or work with a similar point), indicated in 
it s  own successful work. Since such comparisons are common and in tu itive ly  
unproblematic, there is surely good reason to regard with suspicion any 
doctrine which claims their log ica l absurdity.
I t  might seam that this point is not relevant to Santayana; yet in 
fact tha possib ility  o f judging the arts by general standards is  a crucial 
presupposition of tha whole o f "Reason in A rt".
U i  vW juglftn
"Tha L ife  o f Reason", including "Reason in Art" is  now a naglactad 
philosophical work. I t  is hoped that tha foregoing seetions go soma way to
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showing that such a naglact 13 unjust, especia lly with regard to  "Reason 
in A rt". Santayana is  usually dismissed as a writar o f poatie prosa fro « 
which ¿>kiloeophio*l tech n ica lities  and sequeatia-i. arguaaut are aosant. i t  
must ba ad mitt ad o f coursa that thara is soae Justioa in th is c la ia : tha 
lack of techn ica lity  is  a dafact. Yat i t  is surely not a fa ta l one, 
certa in ly  not grave enough to  ju s t ify  the neglect into which Santayana'« 
work has fa llen . A close decree o f  attention reveals doctrines consonant 
with more recent analytical studies, or at least supportable by analytical 
techniques. Moreover, i t  is  to be noted once again that every crude species 
o f essen tia lis « -  the 'one word answer' theories o f art -  is  quite absent 
fro « Santayana's tex t: th is in i t s e l f  is  an unusual virtue.
I
Qh»pt«r VII :  Tha nne Arts 
X: Introduction
(246)
The f i r s t  three chapters o f "Hasson in A rt" sat out Santayana's 
thaorias on tha evolution o f art froa unlntalllgant behaviour. Chapters 
V -  V III ara "Iran over to ganaralisad accounts o f soaa o f tha flna arts: 
music, lite ra tu re , architecture, scuiptura and painting, traatmant o f tha 
la s t two baing pracadad by a theory o f tha nature o f raprasantation. Writars 
on Santayana's aasthatics hava in tha past aithar ignorad thasa chaptars 
completely or accordad tnam only a bria f and uncritLoal traatmant. Tha 
othar ramarks and ralatad papars considarad balow ara also ignorad. I t  
must ba ad mitt ad that, in ganaral, tha valua o f what .Santayana has to say 
about tha fina arts is  lmpairad by tha axtraaa ganarality of his traatmant; 
but this is  no ju stifica tion  for omitting to give his yiaws sarious 
examination. I t  is arguad in th« prasant chaptar that in soma araas at 
laast -  on music, architactura, and tha natura o f representation -  his 
ramarks deserve to ba batter known.
I I :  Music
In his autobiography, Santayana makes i t  clear that his axparianca o f 
music was by no means extensive. Describing soma time spent in old age in 
Venice, ha w rites:
"Tha public seams to think that to hear music is to saa tha 
musicians fidd le  and blow. I  preferred not to saa them. Hare, 
and on the Plncio in tome, I  had my only taste o f instrumental 
music: shocking confession, no doubt, fo r a person supposed to 
relish  tha flna arts. But music boras me i f  I am s ittin g  panned in 
among a crowd in a hot place, with bright a r t i f ic ia l  ligh ts, and a 
general pretence at in te lligen t in terest, whether such interest 
exists or n o t . " ( l » )
Nevertheless, in his views on musical aesthetias, Santayana avoids thasa 
varieties o f assantialism which have often characterised works on this 
subject•
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The majority o f w riters on musical aesthetics have put forward soma 
version of tha sam* thaory: that music is  in soma sansa tha languag# of tha 
amotions -  Hansliek gives a short l i s t  o f twenty-two writars who hold soma 
variant o f th is point o f view .(2) This moat aranaral formulation covars in 
practica a larga numbar o f variations. Tha composar could ba said to ba 
unburdaning himsalf in music, or expressing himsalf, or communicating his 
faalings to us. I t  could ba said that music appaals only to tha amotions, 
not to tha in ta llact, or that i t  is  its  most important function to do th is } 
or i t  could ba said simply that music arousas tha amotions. Mora sophist- 
icatad varsions o f tha thaory attempt to daal with tha problam of how 
pracisaly sound can ambody or arousa faalings. Notably among raoant writars 
Oeryck Cook a in "Tha Languaga o f Music" (1959 and raprints) holds that tha 
notas and intarvals o f tha major, minor and chromatic diatonic sarnies hava 
an in trinsic emotional sign ifícanos.(3 ) Susanna Langar attampts to 
account for tha sama phanomanon with har thaory that music sharas ths sama 
morphology or log ica l form as faallng, and allows us to  artioulata an araa 
of human axpsrianca in articulabla in any othsr way.(4 )
.'hila thaorias which thus in thair various ways strass tha axprasslva 
qualitias of music havs domlnatsd and s t i l l  dominata musical assthatios, 
othar writars hava drawn attantion to tha formal propartias of music, 
notably o f courss Hanslick -  though this is most emphatically not to say 
that Hanslick was a thorough-going formalist: such a c lass ifica tion  of his 
position would ba as unjust as tha sama lntarpratatlon of w 8 lfflln , for 
axampla. Hanslick allows that music can raprasant tho dynamic propartias 
o f amotions: thair strangth, waaknass, intansity, spaad, and slownass.(5)
Yat while this is so, ha is  at pains to strass that to  usa music as a 
stimulant to amotional ravarla is to  miss a great daal that is  present 
in tha music, notably i t s  formal propartias, thair relations and develop­
ment. To ignore these is  not to respond as fu lly  and riohly »8 i t  is 
possible to do.
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These generalities serve as a framework within which to place 
Santayana's approach to music» I t  has been argued In several previous 
chapters that one of ttte more unu su al auu praiseworthy features of 
Santayana *s aesthetics Is Its  freedom from a ll sim plistic va r ie ties  o f 
essentiallsm. The positive aspect o f  this negative virtue Is  his awareness 
o f the ro le  of each type o f property o f the work o f art In aesthetic 
experience: materials, fora, expression, and subject-matter. I t  Is 
therefore not surprising to find, as has been indicated, that aganeral 
and impressive feature of his musical aesthetics should be an avoidance 
o f both formalism and expressionism. Instead, he attempts to  do justice 
to both the formal and expressive properties o f music. A further virtue 
o f his treatment o f music is  the beauty and delicacy o f h is descriptions of 
the e ffe c ts  music can have and the benefits i t  can confer. The general 
defect o f his views, as so often with him, is  a lack of d e ta il and rigour. 
Positions are taken up which might be tenable or not, depending on the 
detailed explanations which should have been used to  support them.
Santayana considers that a l l  the fine arts originate in a c t iv it ie s  
which are either spontaneous or u tilita r ia n , the goal o f fin e art being the 
complete superposition of both ( c f .  Ch. VI, part V II, supra.). In 
accordance with his b e lie f that a good way o f studying the fine arts is  to 
examine their emergence from one or other o f these types o f behaviour, he 
begins his treatment o f music with some generalised psychological history.
A Spanish commentator, Senor -taimundo Lida, c r it ic is e s  thisdtep in 
Santayana's argument on the grounds that it  is  not c lear, "whether i t  is 
a question o f h istorical genesis, or a process of individual psychology, 
or both at o n c e ." (" ..s i se trata da genesis h istories, o de un proceso da 
psicologia individual, o de anbas coses a la v e z ," (6 ) ) .  "he d if f icu lty  
with jenor Lida's comment is  to see whet "h istorica l genesis" might be 
which is  other than an account o f  what took place, in the last analysis, 
in the minds of individuals. I t  is  abundantly clear that Santayana's 
account is  intended to be a true reconstruction of processes whioh did
(2-49)
occur to  certain individuals in tha distant past. Tha unclarity which Lida 
finds is  o f his own tasking.
huaic (-antayana. begins) «merges froa spontaneous a c tiv ity . Having 
just dascribad tha procass wharaby tha danca progresses froa undellberated, 
instinctiva expression to art, ha goes on:
"The saaa axplosiva forcas that agitata tha liabs loosan tha voica; 
hand, foot, and throat aark thair wild rhythm togathar.. .human music 
i3 parformad long bafora i t  is listanad to , and is  at f i r s t  no 
mora an art than sigh ing."(7*)
Music passas froa spontaneous salf-axprassior- to fina art as follows: what 
occurs once on a given occasion w ill  recur whan a similar situation obtains. 
Tha impulse, reinforced by its  own remembered expression, passas into 
convention, "hese automatisms, in thair repeated performances, are not 
without certain retroactive a ffects : they leave the system exhausted or 
relieved, and they have meantime played more or lass agreeably on tha 
senses:
"The music wa make automatically we cannot help hearing incidentally; 
the sensation may even modify tha expression, since sensation too 
has its  physical sida. Tha expression is rained in and kept from 
becoming vagrant, in proportion as its  form and occasion are 
remembered."(8 )
I t  is a necessary condition fo r fina a rt, in Santayana's view, that the 
work ba intended ms a communication.(of.Ch. VI, loc. c it . supra.) Accord­
ingly, tha mora tha musical performer comas to control his performance by 
reflection  and critic ism , tha mora ha becomes an a rtis t (one notes in 
passing Santayana's tendency to use verbs Ilka 'to  con tro l', which give tha 
misleading impression that ha believes in tha causal e fficacy  of mental 
acts, which in fa c t  he is committed to deny.):
"••he ( i . e .  the musical performar) trains himself to be consecutive, 
impressive, agreeable; he begins to oompare his improvisation with 
its  subject and function, and thus he develops what are called style 
and ta s te ." (9 » )
(250)
?rom these unobjectionable I f  not specia lly informative generalisations, 
Sartayme proceeds to his f ir s t  group o f aesthetical doctrines, gathered 
undar tha heading, "Music Is  a world apart". His usa of th is subtltla 
s igh t produca tha slslaadlng lsprasslon that ha Is about to  put forward an 
autonomist or w r is t  sesthatic, l .a .  tha doctrlna that any link  batwaan 
music and aaotlon Is puraly Incidental, and that music rathar consists of 
sounds whosa whola meaning is intar&al to themselves, deriving none o f ins 
value from any connexion with tha experiences o f l i f e .  In fa c t , dantayana 
■araly begins by emphasizing those qualities o f su3ic in respact o f which 
i t  can plausibly be said to be a world apart, going on la te r  to  state its  
re la tions with tha world outside music.
Sounds (Santayana continues) readily acquire ideal values. Sound has 
the power in I t s e l f  to engross attention, and at the sane time may be easily  
d iv e rs ified , so as to become a symbol fo r other things. I t  has a structure 
o f  it s  own, so that to hear is almost to  understand. Sound approaches that 
type o f Id ea lity  which is  a property o f log ica l and d ia lec tica l thinking:
" i t  presents to  sense something like the efficacious structure o f the object" 
(10) 'D ia lec tic ' is  dantayana's tern for the study of the meaalng of terms 
and their rela tions.(11) Logic and d ia lectic  have it  in  aommon that both 
deal with 'a p r io r i ' statements, true independently o f whatever is  the case, 
3y assimilating music to these d iscip lines, Santayana wishes to stress 
the co mmonplace that musical sounds are such that they must be arranged in 
accordance with certain rules in order to be pleasing and e ffe c t iv e . As one 
says, they have a log ic  o f their own: in the majority o f cases, their 
internal relations are independent o f any non-musical event or process.
(An exception would be the production o f overtones by a given note.) To say 
th is  is surely to say what is true; but i t  is  of course only a f ir s t  step.
Music is  comparable not only to logic and d ia lactlc , but also to 
mathematics. Like mathematics, in dantayana's view, i t  gains its  adequacy 
a t the cost o f being abstraoti
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" . . . while i t  discloses point by point on* strain in existence, i t  
laavas many othar strains« which ara in  fact Interwoven with i t «  
wholly out o f account. Music is  accordingly« lik e  mathematics, vary 
naarly a world by i t s e l f ;  i t  contains a vhola gamut o f axparlanca« 
froai sansuous elements to ultimate irrtallactual harmonies. Yet th is 
sacond axistanca, this U fa  in musio, is  no »ara ghost o f tha other; 
i t  has its  own axcitamants« its  quivering a ltam ativas, i t s  surpris­
ing turns; tha abstract anargy o f i t  takas on so such body, that in 
prograssion or declension it  saans quita as impassioned as any 
animal triumph or any moral drama."(12 *)
Tha axact maaning o f thasa ramarks bacomasclaar only la ta r on. 3y saying 
that music is  abstract, Santayana maans no mora than that music doas not 
raprasant or embody spatio-tamporally uniqua situations in tha world; i t  is  
a world in i t s a l f  baoausa o f tha yariaty o f maanings i t  can contain. No 
aora da fin ita  claims than thesa ara baing put forward, and thasa ara suraly 
Indisputable. Music alona cannot specify spatio-temporal co-ordinates; and 
that music can express a great yariaty o f faalings is  a mare commonplace.
Ha continues that at least a part of tha power musio has over us is 
a result o f an analogy between it s  rhythm and aovamant and that o f l i f e  
i t s a l f :
"...what gives music i t s  superior emotional power is its  rhythmic 
advance. Time is a medium which appeals mora than space to 
amotion. lince l i f e  i t s e l f  is  a flu x , and thought an operation, 
there is  naturally something immediate and breathless about whatever 
flows and expands..The world of sound..insinuates i t s a l f  into our 
vary substance, and i t  is  not so much the music that moves us as 
wa that move i t .  I ts  rhythms seize upon our bodily l i f e ,  ti> 
accelerate or deepen i t ;  and wa must either become inattentive 
altogether or remain enslaved."(13)
Several comments ara appropriate. The informal psychological o la ia  that 
time appeals more than apaoa to amotion is  suraly vary dubious (and
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unnecessary to  the argument« ha naad merely say that time has an important 
anotional e f fe c t . )  Thara ara obvious axaaplas o f tha emotive povar o f vast 
spaces, for example, tha ni^ht sky discussed by Santayana niaself in "Tne 
iansa o f Beauty".(M ) Moreover, vh lla i t  is  possibla that thara is  a link 
o f soma kind batwaan tha rhythms o f music and thosa of l i f e ,  maraly to 
indicata th is in  a ganaral way as Santayana do«3 is  to laava a graat daal yat 
to  ba explained. Why should what is  rhythmic appaal to us? How pracisaly 
to  tha rhythms 'insiausta' thamsalvas into us? Thara ara both physiological 
and psychological strands o f axplanation naadad hara: Santayana should 
acknowladga th is much at least.
However, i t  is cartainly trua that music can have a powarful physical 
a ffact, and bacausa of th is (Santayana continuas) i t  has baan glvan 
functions far from aasthatic. I t  can ba used, fo r  example, to kaap man's 
a ffo rts  in unision, as with sa ilors. iieturning to  tha thama o f tha 
unreflective natura of aarly musical performances, Santayana adds tha naw 
point that what avantually causes tha performers to notice what they ara 
doing, to caasa to be purely expressive and to become artis ts , is  tha 
inherent quality of each of tha sounds they make:
"..an  inherent value exists in a l l  emitted sounds, although 
barbaric practice and theory are slow to recognise i t .  Each tone 
has i t s  quality, like jewels of d ifferen t water; every cadence has 
its  v ita l expression, no lass inherent in i t  than that which comas 
in a posture or a thought."(15)
.Santayana does not expand on this remark, and the f ir s t  comment i t  demands 
is  to note to how l i t t l e  ha has committed himself. Ha does not say, nert 
obviously, that what is expressed in each sound is  always emotion, though 
equally ha does not deny i t ,  and in view of his la ter remarks would 
presumably want to say in soma oases at laast that the 'inherent value1 o f 
sound is an emotional value. The key terms he uses, 'inherent value' 
and 'v i ta l  expression' can bo interpreted to include expressions which ara
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o f southing other then pur« fa il in g , i f  need be, though lantayana makes 
no suggaation as to what music expresses basidas amotions*
What ha is  coaoittad to saying, howavar, is  that tha valua a sound has 
is  at laast in  part natural, not wholly tha rasult of tha alaboration o f 
convantions. Tha accaptability o f th is doctrina in musical aesthetics 
dapands on how axtansivaly i t  is  usad, how larga a rola is  given to  i t  in tha 
explanation o f musical rasponsa. Certain features o f tha response to sound 
are such as are bast called natural: for example, an elementary feature o f 
a sound on which pleasure in tha hearer in part dapands is  volume. Tha 
sound must occur above tha threshold o f hearing and below tha threshold o f 
pain. Again, i t  is surely tha most plausible account o f tha orig in  of 
early instruments that they ware discovered by accident (blowing through 
a horn, perhaps) and cultivated beemuse tha sounds were naturally pleasing 
in soma degree. The d if f ic u lt ie s  o f tha Intrinsic significance view 
begin whan tha attempt is  made, as by Cooke, to use i t  to  account for fa r 
more complex features o f tha musical rasponsa. I t  has bean shown in Ch. IV, 
above, that certain d if f ic u lt ie s  v it ia te  Cooke's theoryt in general, i t  
becomes implausible to maintain in many cases that there is  any significance 
possessed oy individual notes end phrases which cannot be completely 
obliterated by other features o f the musical context. The number and 
subtlety o f the variables in the encounter with music is  daunting: the 
state of mind of the listener; his musical knowledge, sen s it iv ity  and 
emotional maturity; the conditions of listen ing, which can so importantly 
a ffect the quality o f the sound; the calibre o f the performer and the 
instrument used. Again, there is  the question of cultural m ilieu: the 
dominant s ty le  with its  conventions, conventions which may figure importantly 
in the mental set with which the listener approaches a piece o f music. A ll 
these factors are operative in the encounter with muslo, and a l l  are 
relevant to an explanation o f why a given experience is as i t  is .  There is 
a role for the 'in tr in s ic  significance hypothesis in such an explanation;
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but i t  is  by no naans a proninant ro le . I t  should ba made clear that 
Santayana doas not try  to aaka axtansiva usa o f th is  hypothasis; tha
d if f ic u lty  with his position is  rathar that i t  is  a l i t  t i t  unclear just 
how auch usa ha doas want to naka of i t .
Ha continues that tha vhola tachnlqua o f nusic is darivad fron ona 
principla: " I t  displays a sansuous harmony by a sort o f d ia lec tic , suspend- 
ing and rasolving i t ;  so that tha parts baoona d istin ct and thair ra lation  
v it a l . "  (16) A nota, which has its  individual valua, racaivas a heightened 
quality whan i t  figuras in a phrase, a phrasa in  a longar passage, and no 
on. Tha heightened a ffact,
"comas of coursa fron tha tansions astabliahad and surviving in tha 
sansoriun...Tha mind has baan rakad and sat vibrating in an unusual 
fashion, so that tha 'f in a le ' coat: lika  a fu lfilaan t a ftar much 
premonition and dasira, wharaas tha saaa avant, unpraparad fo r, night 
hardly hava baan obsarvad."(17)
This is  suraly quita uncontentious: Santayana says no mors than that tha 
e ffact of musical sounds is dua in tha largast part to thair combination and 
formal arrangaaant. Tha d ifficu lty  with this assartion, as with tha 
praeading claim concarnlng tha intrinsic valua o f  sounds, is  a lack o f 
da ta il: a mora elaborate discussion o f tha modification of in trinsic 
signiflcanea by musical oontaxt would ba prafarabla to tha bara assartion 
that such modification occurs. Kot untyplcally, Santayana buys truth at 
tha axpansa of raal informativanass.
Equally uncontantious is tha claim that tha amount which i t  is  possibla 
to hold in tha mind varlas graatly from parson to  parsons
"What is  tadious and formlas3 to tha inattantlva may aaaa a 
parfact whola to ona who, as thay say, takas i t  a l l  in ..A  musical 
education is  necessary to musical judgment. What most people 
re lish  is  hardly music; i t  is  rathar a drowsy ravaria relieved by 
nervous th r i l ls . "(18)
Santayana sh ifts his ground at th is point, turning to discuss tha formal
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qualities of Busies
"Out o f simple chords and melodies» which at f ir s t  catch only the 
ear, he ( i . e .  the musician) weaves elaoorat* compositions tnat oy 
their form appeal a lso to the mind. This side of music resembles 
a richer vers ifica tion ; i t  may be compared also to mathematics or to  
arabesques. A moving arabesque that has a v ita l dimension, an 
audible mathematics, adding sense to form, and a vers ification  that, 
sinca i t  has no subject-matter, cannot do violence to  i t  by its  
complex a rtific es  -  these are types o f pure liv in g , altogether joy­
fu l and delightfu l things. They combine l i f e  with order, precision 
with spontaneity; the flux in them has become rhythmical and its  
freedom has passed into rational choice, since i t  has come in sight 
o f the eternal form i t  would embody."(19*)
Santayana does not deal e x p lic it ly  with the question of how i t  is  
appropriate to  respond to music; his position, however, can be extrapolated 
from this passage. Hansllck (20) maintains that i t  is inappropriate merely 
to use music as a stimulant; the appropriate response is active ly  to fo llow  
the nuances o f the performance and the unfolding o f the form. By 
Implication, Santayana would presumably not wish to disagree sign ifican tly  
with this view. Having drawn attention to the formal qualities o f music, 
he presumably recommends attention to them as a necessary condition fo r a 
response which is  to count as complete. Moreover, the recommendation is  
surely quite acceptable: perhaps the gravest consequence o f a serious 
acceptance o f formalist and expressionist views in aesthetics is  an 
impoverishing o f the aesthetic response by over-ooncentration on one set o f 
features of a work of a rt. Since musio has formal properties oapable o f 
providing pleasure, it  is  obviously irra tiona l to ignore them.
The form o f music gives more than pleasure; in  Santayana's view, th is 
aspect o f aesthetic experience is morally beneficia l in a subtle way -  i t  
acoustoms us to  ideal perfection:
"Such excursions into ultra-mundane regions, where order is  free ,
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re fin e  the mind and make i t  fam iliar with perfection. 3y analogy 
the idea l form comes to be conceived and desiderated in other 
regions, »here i t  1« not produced so readily, and the music heard, 
as the Pythagoreans hoped, makes the soul also musical."(21)
Remarks such as this are dealt with more fu lly  in the follow ing chapter, 
on art and morality. For the present, i t  is  enough to note that th is claim 
c la r if ie s  and is  consistent with one o f Santayana's necessary conditions for 
fine art, i . e .  that fin e  art stimulates and strengthens our ideal energies.
While the formal qualities o f music are thus de ligh tfu l and beneficia l, 
i t  must be admitted that i f  these formal properties were the only 
properties possessed by music, then i t  would not in terest human beings fo r 
long. This most ethereal o f arts is  brought down to earth by the emotions 
i t  arousesi
"For sound, in sweeping through the body and making fe l t  there its  
k inetic and potential stress, provokes no less in terest than does 
any other physical event or premonition."(22)
The claim that music would not be o f interest fo r long were i t  without 
emotional impact is  a consequence o f Santayana's interest theory o f value.
I f  any phenomenon is  to be valued, i t  must sa tisfy  i.uman wants and needs. 
Since emotional wants and needs are prominent and urgent, any art which is 
to hold that attention fo r  long must engage the emotions in some way.
Music (Santayana continues) can produce emotion as d irectly  as fighting 
or love} what a ffects the soul is  the eonditon o f the body at the moment 
(a consequence o f ephiphenomenalism), and this is  altered no less tru ly 
by a musical impression than by a protective or reproductive act. I t  
cannot be objected that music causes a psychical commotion which is  
purely imaginary; fo r  dreams and delirium (equally Imaginary) can cause 
tremendous emotional upheavals.(23)
There is  perhaps no emotion incident to human l i f e  that music cannot 
render in  i t s  abstract medium by "suggesting the pang o f i t " . (24) Vihat 
music cannot do is  to make the feelings precise, slnoe:
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"Occasions define feelings; we can convey a delicate emotion only 
by de lica te ly  describing the situation which brings i t  on. Music, 
v it ii i t s  irrelevant medium, can never do th is for common l i f e ,  and 
the passions, as music renders them, are always general."(25*)
Yet music has i t s  own substitute for coneeotual distinctness:
" I t  makes fee lin g  more spec ific , nay, more delicate and precise 
than association with things could make i t ,  by uniting i t  with 
musical form."(26*)
Moreover, music can create new feelings:
"We may say that besides suggesting abstractly a l l  ordinary passions, 
music creates a new realm o f form fa r  more subtly impassioned than 
is  vulgar experience..Musical refinement finds no lim it but its  own 
instinct, so that a thousand shades of what in our blundering words, 
we must ca ll sadness or mirth, find in music their d istinct 
expression....These fine emotions are rea lly  new; they are native 
to the passing cadence, absolute postures into which i t  throws the 
soul."(27 »)
These remarks demand several comments. I t  might appear that there is 
some tension between the claims on the one hand that the passions conveyed 
by music are always general, and on the other that they are precise to a 
degree quite Impossible in words. Yet i t  is  easy enough to construe these 
remarks as consistent. "General" can be taken as meaning "not linked by 
the meaning o f the description to some spatio-temporally unique event or 
situation ." In th is sense, i t  is  true that musloally expressed emotions 
are general, fo r, without verbal help, the elements of music cannot 
specify such events or situations. Again, i t  is not d if f ic u lt  to think of 
situations Santayana might have had in mind such as would lead him to claim 
a unique degree o f precision for musical expression. I t  is  a familiar 
enough experience for a music lover to fee l an attitude or emotion such 
that no other way o f indicating i t s  precise tone exists other than to 
re fer any questioner to a given pleas o f music.
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'•.'hat is  dubious is  to  say that th is precis lo t is  to be accounted fo r  
wholly in terms of musical form. I t  is  easy to  see that e l l  elemectE o f 
music oontrioute to tu is pfaeaomeBoat &.-« has only tc a.'.glne & we——mowi. 
theme played on an unusual instrument (and so changed in timbre, and pernapt 
also in p itch ), in a d iffe r in g  rhythm, at a d ifferen t tempo, at a d iffe ren t 
volume, or at a d iffe ren t degree o f prominence in an enaemble. Inute 
changes in any of these respects can change the expressive oorrtent of a 
piece or a performance. Cooke acknowledges this point b r ie fly  (29) and 
i t  is  crisp ly  stated by Hansllek»
"The rhythm, the volume o f sound, or the timbre -  each altera the 
specific  character of a theme en tire ly ; lx fin e , every single 
musical factor neceaaarlly contributes to a certain passage assuming 
just th is particular aspect, and a ffectin g  the listener in this 
particular way."(29)
Cantayana continues that, while the feelings embodied in music are 
thus often of a kind not exactly exemplified in l i f e ,  yet these musical 
feelings Eire sim ilar enough to those o f l i f e  to help us cope with the la tte  
in a certain way. The priv ilege o f music is  "to give form to what is 
naturally Inarticu late, and express those depths of human nature which 
can apeak no language current in the world."(30) Muoh emotion remains 
objectless and unaccounted fo r; i t  may Impede right actions or generate 
illu sions. When music succeeds in tapping this fund of suppressed fee lin g , 
i t  accordingly gives r e l ie f  to  an important naedi " i t  co-operatea with us 
and helps to d e liver us from dumb subjection to influences whioh we 
should not know how to meet otherwise."(31) tfualo is  therefore a valuable 
resource when we are opprossed by fee lin gs , which are usually persistent 
and formless. Music is  suoh that,
"Without attempting to remove a mood that is  perhaps inevitable, 
i t  gives i t  a congruous f i l l in g .  Thus the mood is ju stified  by 
an illu stra tion  or expression which seems to o ffe r some objective 
and ideal ground for i t s  existence; and the mood is at the same
What is  dubious is to  say that th is precision is  to  be accounted fo r  
wholly in terms o f musical form. I t  1b easy to  see that a l l  elements o f 
music oonbrioute to  this *w<sboae£oni ote has only to imagine a well-known 
theme played on an unusual instrument (and so changed in  timbre, and perhaps 
also in  p itch ), in a d iffe r in g  rhythm, at a d ifferen t tempo, at a d iffe ren t 
volume, or at a d iffe ren t degree o f prominence in an ensemble« Minute 
changes in any of these respects can change the expressive content of a 
piece or a performance. Cooke acknowledges th is point b r ie fly  (28) and 
i t  is  crisp ly stated by Hanslioki
"The rhythm, the volume o f sound, or the timbre -  each a lters the 
specific  character of a theme en tire ly ; in f in e , every single 
musical factor necessarily contributes to a certain  passage assuming 
just th is particular aspect, and a ffectin g  the listener in this 
particular way."(29)
Cantayana continues that, while the feelings embodied in music are 
thus often of a kind not exactly exemplified in l i f e ,  yet these musical 
fee lin gs  are sim ilar enough to those o f l i f e  to  help us cope with the la tte  
in a certain way. The priv ilege of music is  "to  give form to what is  
naturally inarticu late, and express those depths of human nature which 
can speak no language current in the world."(30) Muoh emotion remains 
ob jectless and unaccounted fo r; i t  may impede right actions or generate 
illu s ion s . When music succeeds in tapping th is fund o f suppressed fee lin g , 
i t  accordingly gives r e l ie f  to  an Important needi " i t  co-operates with us 
and helps to de liver us from dumb subjection to  influences which we 
should not know how to meet otherwise."(31) Music is  therefore a valuable 
resource when we are opprosaed by feelings, whioh are usually persistent 
and formless. Music is  suoh that,
"Without attempting to remove a mood that is  perhaps inevitable, 
it  gives i t  a congruous f i l l in g .  Thus the mood is  ju stified  by 
an illu stra tion  or expression whioh seems to o ffe r  some objective 
and ideal ground for its  existence; and the mood is at the same
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time relieved by absorption in  this impersonal ob jec t."(32)
The most abstract o f arts serves the dumbest o f feelings:
"Those elementary substances the musician can sp iritu a lise  by 
his special methods, talcing away their reproach and redeeming them
from blind in tensity ."(33)
There is  a certain obvious though lim ited sim ilarity  between these 
views and the elaborately developed doctrines o f Husanne hanger: both 
writers hold that music in some way articu lates or gives form to feelings 
not articu lable in any other way, and it  is  worth pausing to note a 
d if f ic u lty  to which th is type o f theory about music is  lia b le , that o f 
se lf-refu ta tion . Mrs. Langer, for example, insists repeatedly that works 
o f art symbolise (in  her technical sense o f the term) elements o f experience 
which are not formulable in verbal concepts.(34) I t  follows from this that 
the emotional content o f a piece o f music cannot be formulated in words, 
and from this in turn i t  follows that her theory o f music is  undisoussable.
(35) No verbal evidence either fo r or against the thesis can be advanced, 
since 'ex  hypothesi' such evidence is  inevitably a distortion o f the truth. 
A ll the interpretative criticism  o f music ever written is  an attempt to do 
what cannot be done. Thus when Mrs. Langer writes that d iffe ren t feelings 
have similar logica l forms (36), that every factor in our conscious sense 
o f passage is  replaced by a musical elements (37), that inexact repetitions 
occur in organic forms and in music (38), each of th«ae remarks is  an 
attempt to  say what cannot be said. Whether Santayana would have avoided 
th is d if f ic u lty  is  not clear: he nowhere o ffers  any expansion o f the bare 
conclusions announced above.
Santayana moves on to a rather different point. He regards i t  as a 
consequence o f his interest theory o f  value that, considered in themselves, 
a l l  things could be said to be good; it  is only by con flic t with other 
things that they come to be regarded as bad. Thus, i f  each element in the 
human economy were freed from oppressive competition with the other elements 
i t  would develop exuberantly into i t s  ideal form.(39) There is  surely an
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inaccuracy In the claimed consequence: i f  a ll  things are called good or 
bad so le ly  in rela tion  to  human in terests , then considered 'in  themselves', 
i . e . ,  independently o f tn is rela tion , then ratner tnan oeing good, they 
have no value whatever, and so are neither good nor bad.
"liese generalities are the preamble to  some informal psychology.
Because o f the number and variety o f human interests, feelings cannot long 
continue in a state o f purity. ?or example, man has a native capacity for 
joy, incapable, however, o f being long sustained:
"...c ross  currents o f lassitude or anxiety, d istracting incidents, 
irrelevant associations, trouble its  course and make i t  languish, 
turning i t  before long into dullness and melancholy."(10)
Language cannot express a pure feeling, since such an expression demands that 
nothing be named which carried the least suggestion of sadness with i t ,  and 
th is, Santayana assumes, cannot be done. Music, by contrast, can express 
feelings pure and unalloyed:
"The joy condemned by practical exigencies to s c in t illa te  for a 
moment uncommunicated, and then, as i t  were, to be buried a liv e , 
may now find an abstract art to  embody i t  and bring i t  before the 
public, formed into a rich and constant object called a musical 
composition."(41)
The d if f ic u lty  with th is view is to see what grounds .Santayana has fo r 
discriminating between music and literatu re in respect of capacity for 
unalloyed expression. The argument with regard to literatu re turns on the 
premisses that ( i )  a l l  named objects are capable o f sad associations, and 
( i i )  when named, the sad associations w ill  be revived in the mind and 
constitute an a llo y  in the predominant expression. Yet obviously i t  is  
equally true that ar.y pieoe o f music can have sad associations whioh can be 
revived during a performance, and constitute an a lloy  in the lis ten er 's  
contemplation o f the Joy expressed in the music. In this respect, there is 
no relevant difference between music and literatu re.
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Santayana turns fin a lly  to another psychological benefit which music 
can confer. 3y imposing a form on painful fe e lin g , i t  renders the fee lin g  
more bearable«
"A ll utterance is  a feat, a l l  apprehension a discovery; and th is 
in tellectua l v ic to ry , sounding in the midst o f emotional struggles, 
hushes some part o f their brute Import un ity."(¿2 )
Meditation and expression are valuable a c t iv it ie s  in themselves; and this 
complex reaction has a double value when its  subject matter is painful«
"At f i r s t ,  in i t s  very act, i t  w i l l  suffuse and m ollify  the un­
welcome experience by another, digesting i t ,  which is  welcome; and 
la ter, by the broader adjustment which I t  w ill  bring into the mind, 
i t  w i l l  help us to  elude or confront the e v ils  thus laid clearly  
before us."(A3*)
Once again, Santayana articulates a truth without d e ta il. Music can 
indeed confer the benefits he describes; but his metaphorical psychology 
does not provide any real insight into how th is occurs.
I t  should be noted further that he was by no means always inclined to 
allow music to have the e ffects  he here accredits to i t .  Nine years la ter, 
in "Winds o f Doctrine", he dismisses music as always a means o f escaping 
one's problems, rather than a means o f coming to face and understand them. 
When fo r any reason (he writes) human l i f e  is  forbidden to express i t s e l f  
fu lly  and openly in words, man are driven to abstraot arts,
"where human circumstances are lost sight o f, and human problems 
dissolve in a purer medium. "'he pressure of care is  thus relieved , 
without its  quietus being fou din Intelligence. To understand oneself 
is the classic form of consolation; to elude oneself is the romantic. 
In the presence of music or landscape human experience eludes
I ts e lf .  " (U * )
I t  is  d if f ic u lt  to see how Santayana could argue for this wholesale dismiss 
o f music. I t  would follow from wh,-t he says that great ages o f musical 
expression would not occur in history simultaneously with flowerings o f
(262)
lite ra tu re , an art which -  because i t  is  not abstract, in Santayana's 
sense -  enables man to  understand rather than elude himselfj yet the 
Romantio period i t s e l f  refutes th is corollary.
The only point remaining in the text o f "Season in  Art" concerning 
music is  a re-affirmation of certain points in Santayana's value theory. 
The order of values Inverts that o f causes; it  is only by supporting a 
l ib e ra l, i . e .  s e lf- ju s tify in g , delight that causal chains come to have any 
value whatever. Without the existence o f deligh tfu l states of conscious­
ness to be pursued, and painful ones to  be avoided, there would be no 
values. Delight in music is l ib e ra l; i t  makes useful those ends and 
processes which subserve i t . (45) This is surely quite uncontentious.
Music is  a fine art and so an object o f  the aesthetic attitude. This 
attitude is disinterested, and aesthetic contemplation an end in i t s e l f .  
I I I !  Language. Poetry, and Prose
Music is for Cantayana one type of rationalisation o f sound; language 
is another. In his view, language emerges from self-expressive vocal 
noise, developing gradually into a medium which in some sense represents 
the world. I t  is  o f the f ir s t  importance as a means to the domination o f 
the flux o f experience by reason. Poetry is  that use o f language in which 
sound is  only incompletely adjusted to it s  representative function; in 
prose, language is  as transparent as i t  can be: the refracting properties 
o f the medium are minimised, and the structure of the world mirrored more 
c lea r ly . lational poetry, an as yet unrealised idea l, would embody the 
best properties o f both poetry and prose.
I t  w ill  be d ea r  from this synopsis that the doctrines on poetry in 
"Reason in Art" do not duplicate those o f "Interpretations of Poetry and 
Religion” , discussed in Chapter V, above. Rather than discussing its  
elements and function, Cantayana here attempts to place poetry in an 
evolutionary perspective, and to sketch lt3  possible ideal extension. I t  
is  d if f ic u lt  to avoid the conclusion that the two chapiters in which these
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views are expressed are the most disappointing in the corpus of Santayana's 
aesthetics. They are gravely marred by omission o f argument and by internal
inconsistency: the apparatus o f presup ositions discusseu in Sh.VI, above, 
is  both appealed to and flouted.
Much o f language (Santayana begins) 3 t i l l  remains -  what i t  must a l l  
have been o r ig in a lly  -  useless and without u lte rio r significance. The 
musical side o f language is  i t s  primary and elementary side. Yet sounds 
are well fit te d  to  be symbols, "an's vocal chords are capable o f making a 
great range o f sounds and his ear o f registering them. Thus man, "can 
begin to use his lingual gamut to designate the whole range o f his 
perceptions and passions".(46*) To use sounds as symbols fo r things is  a 
great gain to  the mind. Once given names, "things could...be carried over 
mentally into the lingu istic  system; they could be manipulated there Ideally , 
and vicariously preserved in representation."(47 ) Things themselves are of 
course quite unchanged by being named; but nevertheless, "their...reduction 
to  words rendered them comparable and memorable, f ir s t  enabling them to 
figure in discourse at a ll." (A S )
These uncontentlous opening generalities are succeeded by a fa r less 
acceptable doctrine which runs right through the discussion of language, 
prose, and poetry. Language has a structure independent o f things. I t  was 
music before becoming a symbolic medium:
"What makes terms correspond and re fer to one another is  a relation 
eternally  disparate from the relation o f propinquity or derivation 
between existences...The vocal and musical medium is ,  and must 
always remain, a lien to  the sp a tia l."(49)
Once a sound is made the symbol fo r an object or event,
"The ob ject's  quality passed to the word at the same time that 
the word's relations enveloped the ob ject; and thus a new weight 
and significance was added to sound, previously nothing but a dull 
music, A con flict at once established I t s e l f  between the d r ift
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proper to the verbal medium and that proper to the designated things; 
a conflict which the whole histoiy of language and thought has 
embodied and which continues to this day."(50*)
This doctrine involves Santayana in serious difficulties. In the first  
place, to claim that the structure of the world is different from the 
structure of language, and that therefore description of the former by 
means of the latter necessarily involves distortion, is to presuppose that 
the structure of the world can be known by some means other than linguistic. 
It must be possible to step outside language, to take off our linguistic 
spectacles, so to speak, and to compare the structures of language and 
reality. Yet, in Santayana's stated view, it is precisely by the use of 
language that reason comes to dominate the flux of immediate experience. 
There is no suggestion in "The life  of .lea a on" that Santayana countenances 
the possibility of a norv-linguistic mode of knowledge which at the same 
time has the common-sense world as its object. Moreover, Santayana is  
guilty here either of speaking loosely, or of making unverifiable claims 
to knowledge. He speaks in the foregoing quotations of "the designated 
things", not of our experience of them. It follows from his representation- 
slism that the causes of our experiences, things as they are, are in 
principle unknowable by acquaintance, and, therefore, in claiming to know 
that language distorts their structure, he is either making a claim to 
knowledge which is on his own premisses Impossible, or is guilty of slipshod 
writing. Construed consistently, i.e. as concerning our experience of 
objects, the doctrine becomes open to the first objection given above.
Again, as w ill become clearer below, Santayana claims to be able to state 
in language some of the ways in which language distorts the facts, and 
therefore makes a further assertion which on his own premisses is 
unverifiable.
He proceeds to an equally unacceptable argument to show that an animal 
with a language w ill conceive of the world in terms of stable objects which 
persist through change. Suppose an animal without language goes in winter
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to a river which he had previously visited in the sunnier, and finds it  
frozen. Santayana assarts without argument that the animal would conclude 
that the river had vanished. I f  on the other band the animal has language, 
and in particular the world 'r iv e r ',
"he would have repeated its name on seeing it  even when it  was 
frozen, for he had not failed to recognize it  in the guise..An 
identical word, covering a ll  the identical qualities in the 
phenomena and serving to abstract them, would force the inconsistent 
qualities in those phenomena to pass for accidents; and the useful 
proposition would be framed that the same river may be sometimes 
free and sometimes frozen."(51)
This is at best the framework of an argument rather than the argument 
it s e lf .  Why should not the linguistic animal conclude that the river had 
vanished? Why should he conclude the contrary because words have the 
property of immutability? Santayana gives no reason to accept the premiss 
on which the argument turns: that the immutability of words w ill be 
transferred as a property to their referents, a premiss which has only 
to be stated for its falsity to become clear.
further on the theme of the disparity of structure between language end 
the world, Santayana gives his first example of the alleged differences, 
hxperience is a constant flux, while,
"Notions, taken alone, would allow no lapse, but would merely 
lead attention about from point to point over an eternal system 
of relations.••(Words) have dialectical relations based on ideal 
Import, or tendency to definition, which makes the essence of their 
signification; yet they can be freely bandied about and applied for 
a moment to the ambiguous things that pass through existence." ( 5 2 ) 
These remarks are open to at least two objections. In the first plaoe, as 
has been said, they are Internally inconsistent, being a linguistic statement 
of what 'ex hypothesl' cannot be said; secondly the thesis that language 
taken alone ioes not involve the idea of change, la  nonsensical, for what
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ideas are involved in the definition of the term 'change' itself?
Literature is  defined by Santayana by means o f th is doctrine o f the 
disparity of structure between language and the world. The categories 
o f discourse (he continues) are in part merely representative ( i . e .  o f the 
world), partly merely grammatical, partly attributable to both spheres. 
Euphony and phonetic law3 govern language without reference to  meaning; 
here speech is  s t i l l  a sort o f music. At the other extreme is  telegraphic 
speech, where nothing is rhetorical and speech is  denuded o f every feature 
not Indispensable to its  symbolic role (53*). In between is  the fie ld  of 
poetry or Imaginative expression:
"...where the verbal medium is  a medium indeed, having a certain 
transparency, a certain reference to independent facts , but at 
the same time elaborates the fact in expressing i t ,  and endows i t  
with a f f in it ie s  alien to  its  proper nature.. .language habitually 
wrests its  subject-matter in some measure from its  rea l context 
and transfers i t  to a represented and secondary world, the world 
of logic and re fle c t ion ."(54*)
This is partly acceptable, partly not. It is acceptable insofar as 
it restates the doctrine discussed in Ch. V, above, that in the aesthetic 
encounter with literature, the properties of the medium are an object of 
aesthetic interest; it is unacceptable as a further statement of the 
doctrine of the discepancy cf structure between language and the world.
Further on this last theme, he continues that, when the structure of 
language passes beyond the phonetic level, it "begins at once to lean 
upon existences and to imitate the structure of things. We distinguish 
the parts of speech, for instance, in subservience to distinctions we make 
in ideas."(55) An adjective, in Santayana's view, represents a "feeling 
of quality", a verb indicates a relation, and a noun indicates a "substance 
or concretion of qualities", and these are "diversities growing up in 
experience, by no means attributable to the mere play of sound. The parts
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o f speech are therefore representative." ( 56) Before commenting on th is» 
i t  is appropriate to note that Santayana nowhere in his early  writing 
ou language develops a theory o f meaning at any length, Such remarks 
as there are -  like those Just quoted -  seem to indicate that he inclined 
to  some variety o f denotation theory o f meaning. In, "Reason in '?ei*>nce", 
he writes that language is  made up o f two elements* the meaning or sense of 
the words on the one hand, and the sensuous vehicle o f that meaning on 
the other. This sensuous term (the sound, sign or gesture), "becomes the 
sign for an essence or idea, a log ica l hypostasis of perceptions which is  
ca lled  an external th ing ."(57) Santayana seems to  be committed to  holding 
that the meaning o f a term is its  referent, a view now so w ell refuted by 
Frege and Wittgenstein as to make comment hare superfluous.
As to the claim that grammatical and metaphysical categories co-incide, 
th is  too is now w ell refuted. To take up only the most obvious objeotion, 
not a l l  nouns denote substances, Santayana himself is  committed by his 
e th ica l subjectivism to holding that 'goodness', for example, does not 
denote a particular or a quality. (58»)
Santayana continues that, while grammatical categories are thus 
representative to a degree, language also v it ia tes  what i t  represents. His 
second example o f th is kind o f d istortion  is gender in language, which,
"extends much farther than 3ex, and even i f  by some subtle analogy 
a ll the masculine and feminine nouns in a language could be attached 
to something suggesting sex in the objects they designate, yet i t  
can herdly be maintained that the elaborate concordance incident 
upon that distinction is  representative o f any fe l t  quality in the 
things. "(59")
iather, gender is , "non-representative and purely fo rm a l...it  merely 
emphasizes the grammatical links in the phrases and makes greater variety 
possible in the arrangement o f words."(60) Once again, i t  is  hard to  see 
in what sense language distorts the structure o f rea lity  i f  i t  is  possible 
to indicate the distortion by lingu istic  means.
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A third variety o f d istortion , on a plane o f fa r  greater generality,
Is described by '.antayana as the foreshortening o f experience by language. 
Just as consciousness In general foresnortens the confusion of lauMuiate 
sensation by condensing i t  into synthetic ideas, so language.
"acquires scope in the same way, by i t s  kindly in f id e l i t ie s . . .
( i t )  v it ia te s  the experience i t  expresses, but thereby makes the 
burden of one moment relevant to that o f another."(61)
Language transforms events into ideas (62*). 3y way of comment, i t  is 
enough to note that th is doctrine is no more than a consequence o f the 
theory of the birth o f reason discussed in  Ch.VI, above, and is  i t s e l f  
v it ia ted  by the unacceptability of Santayana's epistemology.
The doctrine o f foreshortening is  a preamble to some general remarks 
about literatures
"To turn events into ideas is the function o f lite ra tu re ... 
(L iterature) tr ie s  to subdue music, which fo r its  purposes would 
be fu t ile  and abstract, into conformity with general experience, 
making music thereby s ign ifican t."(63)
This is  a simple consequence o f what has already been said in conjunction 
with a suppressed premiss to the e ffect that the language used in literatu re 
is  at least pa rtia lly  representative o f the world.
Literary a rt, Santayana continues, needs a subject-matter other than 
lite ra ry  impulse i t  s e lf j  the writer must have experience and mastery of 
human a ffa irs  *
"His art is  half-genius and h a lf- f id e lity .. . ( l ite ra tu re ) cannot 
long forget, without fo r fe it in g  a l l  d ign ity , that i t  serves a 
burdened and perplexed creature, a human animal struggling to 
pursuade the universal Sphinx to propose a more in te l l ig ib le  riddle. 
Irresponsible and t r iv ia l  in its  abstract impulse, man's simian 
chatter becomes noble as i t  becomes symbolicj its  representative 
function lends i t  a serious beauty, it s  u t il ity  endows i t  with
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moral worth." ( 64)
Santayana thus commits himself to holding that a serious subject-matter 1s 
a necessary condition for Impressiveness In a work o f litera tu re , iie 
supports this view by means o f the eth ical presuppositions o f the L ife  ox' 
Reason: happiness Is to be attained partly through self-knowledge, partly 
through knowledge o f the environment. I f  language la to contribute to the 
maximisation of happiness, i t  must learn to symbolise the facts:
"Discourse that absolved i t s e l f  from that observant duty would not 
be cognitive; end in fa ilin g  to be cogn itive i t  would f a l l  to 
redeem the practical forces i t  ignored from their brute externality, 
and to make them tributary to the L ife o f teason. Thus its  own 
dignity and continued existence depend on i t s  learning to 
express momentous fa c ts , facts important fo r  action and happiness; 
and there is  nothing which so quickly d iscred its i t s e l f  as empty 
rhetoric and d ia lec tic , or poetry that wanders in dim and private 
world8."(65)
That i t  is  a necessary condition for impressiveness in a litera ry  work 
that i t  deal with some serious issue rom l i f e  is  surely undeniable -  i t  is  
easily  tested by the exercise of trying to think o f any accepted lite ra ry  
work of any stature which fa i ls  to sa tis fy  th is te s t . Equally, however, 
i t  must be stressed that th is condition is merely necessary, not 
su ffic ien t. Were i t  su ffic ien t, it  would fo llow  that the trashiest of 
love stories would rank as serious literatu re. This consequence indicates 
how dominant a role is played by the treatment o f  the subject-matter in 
determining the stature o f a literary  work o f a r t . In an analytic idiom; 
the work must also possess a conjunction of m aterial, formal and expressive 
aesthetic virtues in order to qualify as s ign ifican t art.
The foregoing doctrines concerning language are presupposed in 
Santayana's discussion o f poetry and prose. He begins by considering the 
proposition that primitive poets (among whom he olasses the w riter(s) of
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the Book o f Genesis, for example) are sublime. Conoedlng th e ir  sublimity, 
he finds two reasons fo r i t .  In the f ir s t  place, prim itive men used
language, "with, singular directness to describe the ch ief episodes of l i f e ,  
which was e l l  that l i f e  as yet contained. They had frank passions and saw 
things from single points o f v iew ."(66) Secondly, as has been said, 
language is  an act before i t  is  an expression. I t  gives vent to emotion 
before i t  represents the world. Nothing is so th r illin g  as an expression 
which approaches th is prim itive elementality. The Hebrew prophets are an 
example:
"An intense, inhospitable mind, f i l le d  with a single idea, in which 
a l l  animal, socia l, and moral interests are fused together, speaks a 
language of incomparable force. Thus the Hebrew prophets, in their 
savage concentration, poured into one torrent a l l  that their souls 
possessed or could dream o f . "(67)
Yet such sublimity, in Santayana's view, should not be regarded with unmixed 
admiration. This sublimity is  the result o f defect or at least dispropcation: 
"..such a w i l l  is sadly inexperienced; it  has hardly tasted or even 
conceived any possible or high sa tis factions."(68) The prim itive poet 
merely expresses animal feelings and the thoughts they provoke.
Several d if f ic u lt ie s  arise in  connexion with these opening remarks.
In the f ir s t  place, Santnyr.na is  relying on a qualitative distinction 
between types o f satisfaction , presumably in  accordance w ith his moral 
preference fo r  rational satisfaction , i .e .  satisfaction which follows from 
the maximal harmonisation of Interests. The arbitrariness o f  this 
d istinction has already been discussed in Ch.VI. Moreover, he seems here 
to  be evaluating poetry according to the ra tiona lity  of i t s  subject-matter 
(a point to re-emerge la te r  in his discussion of rational poetry), and 
this Is surely unacceptable. As has been argued, a certain seriousness of 
subject-matter is merely a necessary condition for impressiveness in 
literatu re : and again, Santayana surely cannot maintain that the poets he 
has in mind discuss a subject-matter which is  other than serious.
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Prim itive poetry, he continues, is  a species o f incantation or charm.
He explains th is remark by repeating doctrines dealt with above (in  Ch.V). 
•jcue&tu conventional s&nity there 1« olvnys present the "seething chaos" of 
Drimitive, unconceptualised experience« I t  is  possible for a man to 
"abandon himself" to  this chaos. Words might be carried down into the 
chaos, and, i f  written down, would surely have some quality which makes 
tnem memorable:
"and moreover the words w ill  probably show, in their connotation 
and order, some sympathy with the dream that east them up. ?or 
the man himself, in whom such a dream may be nartly recurrent, 
they may consequently have a considerable power o f suggestion, 
and they may even have i t  for others, whenever the rhythm and 
incantation ava il to plunge them a lso  Into a similar trance."(69*) 
Such in Santayana's view are the circumstances of the orig in  o f poetry.
He adds, consistently with his epiphenoraenalism, that the process o f creatioi 
is  not under the poet's con tro l.(71)
The contrast which Santayana wishes to  draw between poetry and prose is 
derived from th is  doctrine o f the association o f the poet with the data of 
experience, arxJ the thesis that language has uses which vary in the degree 
o f accuracy with which the world is represented. Poetry is a use of 
language which is  in a certain sense Irra tion a l. Before i t  is  mastered 
by reason and thereby made representative o f  the world,
"..experience remains a constantly renovated dream, as poetry in 
the end conspires to keep i t .  7or poetry, while tru ly poetical, 
never loses sight o f in it ia l fee lin gs  and underlying appeals...
By creating new signs, or by recasting those which have become 
conventional, i t  keeps communication massive and instinctive, 
immersed in music, and inexhaustible by clear thought."(71*)
By contrast, a d is tin ctive  property o f prose is that i t  is composed o f 
conventional signs which colour their referents as l i t t l e  as possible with 
irrelevant, subjective associations!
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"When use has worn down a poetic phrase to I ts  external Import, 
and rendered It  an ind ifferent symbol fo r a particular thing, 
tout pnrase uas oecome presale; i t  has oecome, oy tne same process, 
transparent and purely instrumental."(72)
Again, "In prose the veh icle for communication is  a conventional sign, 
standing In the last analysis for some demonstrable object or controllable 
fe e lin g ."(73)
In the S8me vein, he w rites: "Lying Is a p riv ilege o f poets because they 
have not yet reached the le v e l  on which truth and error are discernible. 
Veracity and significance are not ideals for the prim itive m ind..."(7^)
Prose, on the other hand, is  responsible, i . e . , I t  seeks to re fle c t the 
state o f things accurately in order to allow men to  dominate the world:
"Prose Is In l t 3 e l f  meagre and bodiless, merely indicating the 
riches of the world. Its transparency helps us to look through i t  
to the issue, and the signals i t  gives f i l l  the mind with an 
honest assuranoe and a prophetic art fa r nobler than any ecstasy."(75) 
Santayana recognises that on this view, he is  committed to  the consequence 
that, " lite ra ry  prose owns a double a lle g ia n ce ...It  must convey in telligence, 
but intelligence clothed in  a language that lends the message an in trinsic 
value, and makes it  de ligh tfu l to apprehend apart from its  importance in 
ultimate theory or p ractice ."(76)
” he d ifficu lty  with th la  distinction, which is  the central thesis of 
the chapters o f "Peason in  Art" devoted to literatu re , is that what is  
acceptable in i t  is  unoriginal, while certain o f i t s  presuppositions and 
consequences are unacceptable. What is  acceptable is that, where language 
is  used poetically, and in  literary  proae, the medium is i t s e l f  an object 
o f interest; while in examples of non-literary prose, the language is  a 
means only, and not an ob ject o f interest in i t s e l f .  Less aooeptable is  
the apparatus of doctrine which Santayana uses to support th is distinction« 
his central claim in the psychology of c rea tiv ity , that the poet re-acqualnts
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himself with the data o f experience; the epistemological presuppositions 
that there Is Immediate experience o f this kind and that I t  Is lo g ic a lly  
possible to be acquainted with I t ;  tne thesis that language in some sense 
recreaerts the world and yet does so only Incompletely. In connexion with 
the la s t ,  I t  Is  also notable that Santayana completely omits a l l  the 
metaphysios which ought to be present» there Is  no rigorous de fin ition  o f 
"represent", nor a theory o f what the world must be lik e  I f  representation 
Is to  be possible, such as is  present, for example, in a work lik e  the 
"Traetatus". Moreover, Santayana would seem to be committed to holding 
that statement s In poetry are always fa lse or at least inaccurate to a 
degree, a conseouence which has only to be stated fo r Its  inaccuracy to 
appear. (C f. Ch.V, above, on the links between poetry and tru th .)
He continues that poetry is  an interest proper to youth, which fades 
with age and experience. With experience, and a knowledge o f whioh ideals 
are rea lisab le , the wild idealisms o f youth come to seem cheap and 
hysterica l»
"To dwell, as Irra tiona l poets do, on some emotion without 
representative or u lte rio r  value, then seems a waste o f time. 
Fiction becomes less interesting than a ffa ir s , and poetry turns 
into a sort o f Incompetent whimper, a childish foreshortening o f 
the outspread world."(77*)
I t  is  d if f ic u lt  to see why Santayana should indulge in such vast and 
untenable generalisation. His remarks entail that everyone interested in 
poetry is  immature in some sense, a condemnation which would include 
himself as the author o f several volumes o f poetry and poetlo criticism .
"antayana insists on the inaccuracy o f 'p oe tic ' notions, their fa ls ity  
to the structure o f the world. Any use o f language whioh is  in this 
epistemologioal sense inaccurate he describee as poetical, making 
inaccuracy a defining property o f poetry. Thus he writes»
"A novel, a satire , a book o f speculative philosophy, may have a
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most prosaic exterior; every phrase may convey its  idea economically; 
but the substance may nevertheless be poetical, since these ideas 
■Mgr e® irrelevant to a l l  u lterior events, ano express notnin& but 
the imaginative energy that called them forth . On the other hand, 
a poetic vehicle in which there is much ornamental play o f language 
and rhythm may clothe a dry ideal skeleton. So those tremendous 
pos itiv is ts , the Hebrew prophets,had the most prosaic notions about 
the goods and ev ils  o f l i f e . "(78)
These remarks involve a d if f ic u lty  additional to those noted above. Poetic 
ideas are said to be "irrelevant to a l l  u lterio r events"; the d if f ic u lty  
is  to see what could possibly sa tis fy  th is criterion  and so count as poetic. 
I t  is  unlikely that any given idea w ill be Irrelevant to a l l  events in the 
world; and o f course, "relevance" is one o f the vaguest and slipperiest of 
relational terms.
Having dwelt on the inaccuracy of the representation o f the world 
alleged to be a defining property of poetic ideas, Santayana next Insists 
that, despite this lnaocuracy, poetic ideas are not to be condemned. The 
cognitive function o f ideas is  an u lterior one to which they are not 
obliged to conforms
" I f  we abstract, then, from the representative function which may 
perhaps accrue to speech, and regard it  merely as an operation 
absorbing energy and occasioning delight, we see that poetic 
language is  language at its  best. Its  essential success consists 
in charming sounds or in metaphors that shime by their own 
b r illia n ce ."(79)
There can be a positive value in the misrepresentations contained in poetry. 
Santayana considers that i t  is  in principle Impossible that poetry should 
have nothing but truth in i t s  Import and nothing but beauty in i t s  form, 
for the former depends on faotors external to poetry! the truth is  
uncongenial because the world is the way i t  is . Thus,
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moat prosaic ex terior; every phraae may convey its  idea economically; 
but the substance may nevertheless be poetica l, since these ideas 
we irrelevant to e l l  u lterior events, ann express nothing but 
the imaginative energy that called them fo rth . On the other hand, 
a poetic vehicle in which there is much ornamental play o f language 
and rhythm may clothe a dry ideal skeleton. So those tremendous 
p os itiv is ts , the Hebrew prophets,had the most prosaic notions about 
the goods and ev ils  o f l i f e . "(78)
These remarks involve a d if f ic u lty  additional to  those noted above. Poetic 
ideas are said to be "irrelevant to a l l  u lte rio r  events"; the d if f icu lty  
is  to see what could possibly satisfy  th is criter ion  and so count as poetic. 
I t  is unlikely that any given idea w ill  be irrelevant to a l l  events in the 
world; and o f course, "relevance" is  one o f the vaguest and slipperiest o f 
relational terms.
Having dwelt on the inaccuracy o f the representation of the world 
alleged to be a defining property o f poetic ideas, Santayana next insists 
that, despite th is inaccuracy, poetic ideas are not to be condemned. The 
cognitive function of ideas is  an u lterio r one to  which they are not 
obliged to conforms
" I f  we abstract, then, from the representative function which may 
perhaps accrue to speech, and regard i t  merely as an operation 
absorbing energy and occasioning deligh t, we see that poetic 
language is language at its  best. Its  essential success consists 
in charming sounds or in metaphors that shims by their own 
b r illia n ce ."(79)
There can be a positive value in the misrepresentations contained in poetry. 
Santayana considers that i t  is  in principle Impossible that poetry should 
have nothing but truth in Its  import and nothing but beauty in its  form, 
for the former deperris on factors external to poetry« the truth is 
uncongenial because the world is the way i t  is .  Thus,
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" I t  might seem as I f  the b r illia n t substitutions, the magic 
suggestions essential to poetry, would necessarily vanish In the 
fu ll ligh t o f day. The lig h t  o f day Is  I t s e l f  beau tifu l} but would 
not the loss be te rr ib le  i f  no other ligh t were allowed to shine?"(80) 
The d if f ic u lt ie s  in these remarks are obvious. Santayana dismisses the 
cognitive function of ideas quite ligh tly  at this point, and this dismissal 
is  d if f ic u lt  to reconcile with h is ea rlier remarks on the value o f prose, 
(valuable precisely because i t  is  representative) and with the ethical 
presuppositions o f the L ife  o f Season: i f  happiness depends in part on 
knowledge o f the environment, then whatever misleads on th is  subject is  
surely to be disvalued. Moreover, the reason given for valuing poetry is  
vague. He seems to suggest that misleading ideas are valuable merely 
because they are d iffe ren t; but on his own principles, i t  is  d if f ic u lt  to  
see what is  valuable about mere d ifference.
Santayana concludes his consideration o f lite ra ry  aesthetics with a 
statement o f his ideal o f ra tiona l poetry. In the f ir s t  place, rational 
poetry would exclude much now thought poetic. The demands o f the human 
imagination, as it  is  at present constituted, include irra tion a l elements) 
"The given world seems in su ffic ien t) impossible things have to be 
imagined, both to extend i t s  lim its and to f i l l  in the v iv i fy  its  
texture. "(81)
As examples o f ‘ irra tion a l' elements, Santayana gives Homer's mythology, 
Dante's a llegories and 'mock science', Shakespeare's 'romanticism' and the 
symbolic characters and a r t i f i c ia l  machinery o f Ooethe.
Elements o f this kind would be excluded from rational poetry because 
they are inaccurate. The rational poet, by contrast, bases his poetry on 
"ultimate sc ien tific  notions o f nature and l i f e " . (82) He would present 
the truth about the to ta lity  o f things: s c ien tific  truth and great scope are 
important properties o f the projected ideal:
"(llatlonal poetry) would present in graphic images the tota l
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e ffica cy  o f real things...3uch a poetry would represent more 
thoroughly than any formula the concrete burden o f experience) i t  
would become the most trustworthy o f  companions,"(83)
Further features o f the ideal of rational poetry and i t s  creator are 
mastery and idealisationt
" . . mastery, to see things as they are and dare to  describe them 
ingenuously; idealisation, to select from this rea lity  what is 
pertinent to ultimate interests and can speak eloquently to the 
sou l."(81)
To see things es they are, i . e .  ra tiona lly , is  in Santayana's view to see 
them s c ie n t if ic a lly  and in their relations to everything else:
"a rea l thing, when a l l  its  pertinent natural associates are 
discerned, touches wonder, pathos, and beauty on every side; the 
rational poet is  one who, without feigning anything unreal, 
perceives these momentous t ie s , and presents his subject loaded 
with i t s  whole fa te, missing no source o f worth which is  ir. i t ,  
no idea l Influence which i t  may have."(85*)
Though the rational poet has not yet existed, some features of the 
lomerle poems are considered by Santayana to embody the ideal. Homer was 
the heir to generations o f discipline in l i f e  and in a rt, and th is appears, 
" in  his perfect prosody, in his limpid style, in  his 3ense for 
proportion, his abstentions, and the frank pathos o f his portraits 
and principles, in which there is  nothing gross, subjective, or 
arb itrary. "(86)
On a more detailed lev e l, when Homer mentions an object, he often usee an 
epithet, and the epithet,
" is  very lik e ly  a patronymic, the name of some region or some 
mythical ancestor. In other words, it  is a signal for widening 
our view and for conceiving the ob ject, not only v iv id ly  and with 
pause, but in an adequate h istorica l setting."(87*)
This projected ideal demands several comments. With regard to the
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efficacy o f real things...Such a poetry would represent more 
thoroughly than any formula the concrete burden o f experience; i t  
would become the most trustworthy o f companions."(83)
Further features o f the id ea l of rational poetry and its  creator are 
mastery and idealisation:
"..mastery, to see things as they are and dare to describe them 
ingenuously; idea lisation , to se lect from th is rea lity  what is 
pertinent to ultimate interests and can speak eloquently to the 
soul."(84)
To see things as they are, i . e .  ra tion a lly , is  in Santayana's view to see 
them sc ien tific a lly  and in their relations to everything e lse :
" a real thing, when a l l  its  pertinent natural associates are 
discerned, touches wonder, pathos, and beauty on every side; the 
rational poet is  one who, without feigning anything unreal, 
perceives these momentous t ie s ,  end presents his subject loaded 
with its  whole fe te ,  misBing no source o f worth which is  i r  i t ,  
no ideal Influence which i t  may have."(85*)
"hough the rational poet has not yet existed, some features of the 
Homeric poems are considered by antayana to embody the id ea l. Homer was 
the heir to generations o f  discipline in l i f e  and in art, and th is appears, 
"in  his perfect prosody, in his limpid sty le, in his 3ense for 
proportion, his abstentions, and the frank pathos o f his portraits 
and principles, in  which there is  nothing gross, subjective, or 
arb itrary."(86)
On a more detailed le v e l, when Homer mentions an object, he often usee an 
epithet, and the epithet,
" is  very lik e ly  a patronymic, the name o f some region or some 
mythical ancestor. In other words, it  is  a signal fo r widening 
our view and fo r conceiving the object, not only v iv id ly  and with 
pause, but in an adequate h is to rica l se ttin g ."(87*)
This projected idea l demands several comments. With regard to the
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development o f Santayana's thought, i t  is  c lea r ly  an elaboration o f the 
doctrine from "Interpretations of Poetry and le llg ion " (discussed in Ch.V, 
above), that philosophic comprehensiveness o f vision is  a necessary 
condition fo r greatness in poetry. The philosophical d if f ic u lty  with the 
ideal is  that i t  makes greatness In poetry dependent on certain features 
of subject-matter, rather than on properties which are appropriately called 
aesthetic» material, formal, and expressive. A ll the remarks describing 
the ideal re fer to subject-matters sc ien tific  truthfulness, h is torica l 
perspective, descriptions which locate an object In the nexus o f a l l  its  
important relations (and It  is  by no means en tire ly  clear which relations 
are Important, in Santayana's view). G learly, a writer might have an 
in te lle c t  o f the calibre demanded by this ideal and yet f a l l  to be an 
a r t is t ,  le t  alone a great one. To qualify as an a rtis t, the w riter would 
so have to treat his subject-matter as to endow it  with aesthetic virtues 
in at least one o f the classes noted above.
T"i Architecture
In his autobiography, Santayana writes that,
"Architecture, especia lly Gothic, was a passion of my youth, when 
I searched and analysed everything of the kind that I  spied anywhere, 
and a pinnacle or the tracery o f a window arrested my eye as i f  i t  
had promised to be Helen in a l l  her glory."(B8)
He adds elsewhere that he constantly studied such architectural works as he 
could obtain (89), and moreover would have taken up a career in architecture 
had he been unable to find a post teaching philosophy. (90) The number of 
passages o f architectural criticism , both in his autobiography and other 
works, makes i t  clear that his interest in the art was l i fe lo n g .(91») In 
view o f this svowed deep interest, i t  is surprising that he says re la tiv e ly  
l i t t l e  about architecture in "lesson in A rt". He confines himself to  broad 
and undetailed remarks about the origins o f architecture, the relations o f 
structure and ornament, and the re la tive  merits of Greek and Gothic 
s ty le s .(92")
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Typically o f hia remarks on the various fin e arts, Santaya: a opens 
his discussion of architecture with generalised speculation as to i t s  
orig ins, the arts consioerea in the proceeding sections develop from 
automatic self-expression. Other a c t iv it ie s  o f animals, such as burrowing 
or co llecting , "are not les3 spontaneous than the o'hers, and no less 
expressive; but they seem more external because the traces they leave on 
the environment are more c lea r ly  marked."(93) Thus some instinctive and 
self-expressive a c tiv it ie s  produce changes in the environment, and,
" I f  the impulse that has thus le f t  it s  indelib le mark on things 
is  constant in our own bosom, the world w ill  have been permanently 
improved and humanised by our action. Nature cannot but be 
favourable to those ideas which have found an efficacious champion."(9-0
Such plastic impulses have an immediate sanction in that sense of dominion 
over the environment which they bring with them. A second and more 
important sanction is  that by changing the environment by automatic 
action, it  becomes possible that man should promote his own welfare. 
Consistently with his de fin ition  of 'art* in the broad sense, (cf.Ch .V I, 
supra) Santayana observes that, as soon as the agent perceives the benefit 
o f any action to himself, and the act is  done with knowledge o f this 
benefit, the act becomes an a rt. ■'or example, man depends on things fo r  
the aesthetic quality o f his perceptions:
" I f  he happens, by a twist of the hand, to turn a flowering branch 
into a wreath, thereby making i t  more interesting, he w ill have 
discovered a decorative art and in itia ted  himself auspiciously into 
the practice of i t . "(95)
Self-critic ism , a second incipient a rt is t ic  Impulse, may to some extent 
modify the next performance»
" I f  l i f e  is  drawn largely  into this deepening ohannel, physical 
proficiency and its  id ea l sanctions w i l l  develop more or less 
harmoniously into what is called a school of a r t ."(96)
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I t  is  d i f f ic u lt  to object to these opening genera lities , but a part of 
the reason fo r  this is that Santayana has said so very l i t t l e .  Certainly 
one can concede that some instinctive  actions lead to changes In the 
environment which are in one way or another b en e fic ia l, and presumably 
the beginnings of architecture l i e  in some such changes. Yet to  say this 
is  to convey next to no information about the early forms o f building, "’he 
same is  true o f the remark that deliberate action may ultimately develop 
into a school of art. Santayana passes in silence over a l l  the stages o f 
the evolution of the creative process, discussed, fo r  example, by 
Sombrich.
Santayana continues that prim itive art is  extremely conservative, and 
comments that this is a sign o f stupidity, -’or the savage mind, only the 
standnrd form w ill  do. Art can make no progress in such a situation: 
"P la s tic  impulse, as yet sporadic, is  overwhelmed by a brute 
idolatrous awe at mere existence end actua lity . What is , what 
has always been, what chance has associated with one person, alone 
seems acceptable or conceivable. "(97)
In Santayana's usage, 'a r t ' and 'id o la try ' are contrary attitudes. The 
ido later b lindly worships his id o l, whereas art by de fin ition  is  designed 
with reference to human interests and ideals: "The noblest art w ill  be the 
one, whether plastic or lite ra ry  or d ia lec tica l, which creates figments 
most tru ly  representative o f what is  momentous in human l i f e . " (98)
The charge here levelled  against prim itive art is  to say the least 
sweeping, and the Implied low evaluation o f i t  would not o f course be 
widely aacepted today. Philosophically, i t  is  appropriate to note that 
this argument is incompletely stated. On 3antayana's own premisses, good 
art is  art which in some sense represents or expresses (he uses both terms) 
important features o f l i f e  and the ideals Implied by human wants and needs. 
Primitive art is therefore only to be condemned, f i r s t ly ,  i f  i t  fa lls  to 
do th is at i t s  f ir s t  conception, or secondly, i f  the wants and needs of
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Its  creators change without a corresponding change occurring in  their 
art products. Santayana must be assuming, without argument, that one or 
ooth of tnese conditions ootain.
Conservatism, he continues, rules not only in primitive a rt, but also 
in "those manufactures which are tributary to architecture and the smaller 
plastic a rts ."(99) U tility  makes small headway against custom. Inertia 
is  "a general law o f the brain*(100) and can be distinguished into two 
kinds, technical end social.
Santayana suggests that certain technical habits and lim itations are
inevitable, simply because the capacities of any one human being are
v
lim ited:
"Conception and imagination are themselves automatic and run in 
grooves, so that only certain forms In certain combinations w ill 
ever suggest themselves to a given designer. Every w riter 's  style 
too, however varied within i t s  lim its, is  single and monotonous 
compared with the ideal p o ss ib ilit ie s  o f expression. Genius at 
every moment is confined to the image i t  is creating. "(101)
Once again, i t  is  d if f ic u lt  to quarrel with such a generality; but equally, 
i t  is  so obvious a point as to approach the tru is tic .
The same might be said o f Santayana's remarks on social in ertia  or 
inertia  in appreciation, the result o f  the same factors operating in the 
community at large. ?or example, landscape was for a long time not allowed 
to exist without figures, though the old masters showed c lea rly  enough that 
they could love landscape for its  own sake:
"when one link with humanity has been rendered ex p lic it  ind 
fam iliar, oeople assume that by no other means can humanity be 
touched at a l l ;  even i f  at the same time their own heart la expanding 
to the highest raptures in a quite different region."(102)
Santayana considered this conservatism in appreciation to be deeply 
pernicious>
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"Irrational hopes, irrational shames, Irra tiona l decencies make 
man's ch ief desolation..Art has an in fin ite  ranges nothing sh ifts  
so easily  as taste ana yet nooning so persistently avoids the 
directions in  which i t  might find most sa tis faction ."(103)
Turning from these in it ia l  generalities to consider architecture in 
more de ta il, Santayana advances some informal psychological generalisations 
about the order in which features o f a building come to be appreciated. 
Construction comes to  be rational only gradually, and therefore i t  is  to  
be expected that superficia l merits w i ll  be the f ir s t  to be admired: 
"Ultimate beauty in a building would consist, o f course, in 
responding simultaneously to a l l  the human facu lties affected: to  
the eye, by the size, form, and colour o f the e d ific e ! to the 
Imagination, by its  fitness and ideal expression."(104»)
Of a l l  the grounds there are for admiration, the most easily  grasped are 
s ize, elaboration and splendour o f materials, and d if f ic u lt ie s  or cost 
involved. Precious material, fo r example, w i l l  be admired as evidence 
of wealth and wilfulness. A degree les3 irra tion a l, In Santayana's view, 
is  admiration aroused by the great bulk or d if f ic u lty  o f a work. 7or 
example,
"Homan bridges and aqueducts...gain a profound emotional power 
when we see in their monotonous arches a symbol of the mightiest 
enterprise in history, and in their decay evidence o f it s  fa ilu re . 
Curiosity is  sa tis fied , h istoric imagination is  stimulated, tragic 
re flection  is  os lied fo rth ."(105)
The central claim here -  that admiration o f architecture means fo r 
many people admiration of features such as s ize  and cost, rather than, 
fo r example, form -  can surely be admitted. What needs to be made clearer, 
however, is  that the species of response described by Santayana are either 
not aesthetic at a l l ,  or are aesthetlo responses of an impoverished kind.
In the example o f admiration of material given by Santayana, what is
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admired Is not any property o f the mate ia l  or set o f suoh properties 
auch as might be specified  in reasons supporting an aesthetic judgment 
(e .g . ,  texture or colour) i the object o f admiration ia  rather a certain 
combination o f personal qua lities  imputed to  the owner o f the building. 
The example o f the aqueduct may or may not be an examnle of an aesthetic 
response, depending on the interpretation adopted. Undoubtedly associated 
be lie fs  of the kind Santayana specifies can be and are stimulated by 
impressive ruins. Whether such reverie is  to  be class ified  as aesthetic 
w ill  depend on how th is reverie is  related to properties o f the object 
which can be uncontentiously classed as aesthetic themselves, e .g . o f 
material, form and expression. In the example given, Santayana refers to 
monotony, which can perhaps be classed as a property o f the form of the 
aqueduct. Whether or not the presence o f th is property as an object of 
judgment is  su ffic ien t to  ju s t ify  classing the entire reaction as 
aesthetic is  surely simply le f t  unclear by the usage o f "aesthetic*. I t  
is safe enough to assert, however, that since only one property which is 
a typ ical object o f aesthetic judgment is  specified , the response in 
question is  an impoverished one.
Santayana continues with a plea for authenticity in sty le. He 
c r it ic is e s  attempts to create architecture by copying a style which was 
undoubtedly successful in  its  own epochs
"A perruque cannot bring back courtly manners, and a style o f 
architecture, when revived, is  never quite genuine; adaptations 
have to be introduced and every adaptation, the bolder i t  is , 
runs the greater risk of being extravagant."(106)
Too often, a se lf-s ty led  connoisseur w ill  attempt to liv e  in a house a l l  
o f one period, and congratulates himself fo r  his fine sensib ility  in so 
doing. Suoh attempts to  revive post styles are ridiculous:
" . . fo r  the objeots (the connoisseur) has collected or reproduced 
were once used and prized in a ll honesty, when l i f e  and Inevitable 
tradition had brought them forth, while now they are studied and
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exhibited, re lic s  of a dead past and evidences of a dead 
present."(107*)
This is  not to say tnat an idea or a form from the past must inevitably end 
as a mere curiosity, in the way just described; rather,
"Incorporated into a design that ca lls fo r them, traditional forms 
cease to be incongruous, as words that s t i l l  have a f e l t  meaning 
may be old without being obsolete. A ll depends on men subserving 
an actual ideal and having so firm and genuine an appreciation of 
the past as to  distinguish at once what is  s t i l l  serviceable in i t  
from what is  already ghostly and dead."(108)
The accuracy of these views is  surely incontestable. What happens 
when slavish respect for the psst takes over from genuine response to the 
problems of the present as the factor controlling architectural design is 
a major theme o f the protests o f Lloyd Vright and Le Corbusier, discussed 
b r ie fly  in Ch.II, above. A ll three writers, however, were anticipated by 
V iollet-le-Duc, a few o f whose persuasive remarks can be quoted in support 
o f the position Santayana takes up. Commenting on the practice o f copying 
the forms of ancient buildings, Viollet-le-Duc writes:
"Are we compelled to this course by respect for art? I f  so, for 
what art? For a fa lse and denaturalised one, reduced to  the 
condition o f a language which no-one understands, and deprived 
even of the benefit o f the very rules out o f whioh the precedents 
whioh we worsnip were f ir s t  developed.•.when Creek Doric columns 
are engaged between the arches o f a Roman aroade in the second 
story of a railway terminus, covered with mortar or plaster and 
smoothed down, with lin te ls  of Jointed masonry, there is certainly 
neither reason, u t i l i t y ,  common-sense, nor object in suoh an 
inconsistency. Instead o f being a mark of respeot fo r art, is  
i t  not rather an indication o f disrespect or eontempt? Who would 
engrave a verse of Homer upon the walls o f a warehouse?"(109)
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Santayana continues with generalities about what he ca lls  'barbaric' 
architecture, a type o f  building which is  opposed to  what he ca lls  the 
'ra tion a l' s ty le . Characteristically, he defines neither term. I t  
oecomes clear gradually in the course o f his remaining arguments that 
ra tiona lity  in architecture consists in the subordination to the whole o f 
deta ils  which are in themselves exquisite. 3y implication, barbaric 
architecture is  any sty le o f building in which this principle is  ignored.
Barbaric architecture employs two main methods to achieve beauty: 
ornamentation and mass. The la tte r  is  generally more successful. The 
engineer cannot afford to be extravagant, as the decorator can, for the 
concern of the former is  to design a self-sustaining structure; hence,
"(th e engineer) becomes accordingly more rapidly c iv ilised  and his work 
acquires, in spite o f i t s e l f ,  more ra tion a lity  and more permanent charm." 
(110) Once tested and found to be re lia b le , a given structure w il l  ingrat­
ia te  ltB e lf with the observer: "Vhatever beauty its  lines may have w ill 
become a permanent possession and whatever beauties they exclude w ill  be 
rejected by a fa ith fu l a rt is t , no matter how 3orely they may tempt h im ." (I l l  
Santayana postulates a psychological process to account for th is process 
o f ingratiation : "a f f in it ie s  (the form) may have in his ( i . e .  the 
engineer's) memory or apperceptive habits w i l l  come to ligh t, they w ill  
help him to  assimilate the new vision and w ill  define its  aesthetic 
character."(112) This is  not to say that those features excluded from 
a building as a result o f th is process are not in themselves beautiful, 
merely that, " i f  appended to  a structure they have no function in , these 
excellences w ill hardly impose themselves on the next builder."(113)
This passage is  illuminated by comparison with remarks from "The 
Sense of Beauty". By 'apperception' (c f .  O h .Ill, above), Santayana seems to 
mean the singling, thanks to association and recollection, o f the image 
or representation given immediately in perception with other representations 
derived from past experiences o f the observer. Rven granted this 
additional psychological d e ta il, however, I t  Is clear that Santayana's
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alleged psychological process is  In su ffic ien tly  described! 'a f f in i t y ' is  
an imprecise term, and i t  is  le f t  quite unclear precisely how form and 
apperceptive habits can have a ff in it ie s .  Comparison with "The _ense 
o f Beauty", and with other rema ks in the present chapter also make i t  
plain that, in the passages just quoted, Santayana is not to be interpreted 
as embracing any form of the doctrine o f  functionalism, "e  does not hold 
that always and only functional constructions are beautifu l; rather, useful 
structures form the basis o f ideals o f beauty, simply because successful 
functional structures tend to endure, and becoming used to  them, we 
naturally take them as the starting point fo r the construction of ideals 
o f beauty.
Santayana's rejection  o f functionalism becomes clearer in his remarks 
on the relation o f structure and ornament. He rejects the view that 
wherever a structure is  necessary, i t  is  also beautiful. 3oth plain and 
ornamented styles oar. be beautiful. Some structures are such that the 
a rtis t may need merely to  "emphasize the structure in the classic manner 
and turn its  lines into ornament, adding only what may help to complete 
and unite its  suggestions."(114) On the other hand, certain  structures 
need to  be disguised, and moreover, "The v e i l  that conceals natural 
imperfections may have a perfection of its  own."(115) This rejection  of 
functionalism is here given as an instance o f a general principles
"Beauty is  something spiritual and, being such, i t  rests not on 
the material constitution of each existence taken apart, but on 
their conspiring Ideally  together, so that each furthers the 
other's endeavour. Structure by I t s e l f  is  no more beautiful than 
existence by i t s e l f  is  a good. They are only po ten tia lities  or 
conditions o f excellence."(116)
In the absence o f evidence to the contrary, i t  is to be assumed that the 
ob jectiricetion  theory o f "The Sense of 3eauty" is  presupposed here.
Some further remarks on the structure—ornament relation are best set 
out before consent. Some structures, Santayana continues, ore designed for
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display. When his main structure is  uninteresting, the architect may hare 
recourse to  a subsidiary construction, such as a facade. In such oases, 
two separate moounents occupied the architects
"Structure may appear in each independently and may be frankly 
enough expressed. The most beautiful facades, even i f  independent 
o f th e ir  building, are buildings themselves, and since th e ir  
construction is  decorative there is  the greater likelihood that 
th e ir  decoration should be structural."(117)
In such an extreme case as th is, however, "the facade...would be an abstract 
ornament; and so, though the ornament be structural within its  own lines, 
we have reverted to  the style o f  building where construction is one thing 
and decoration another."(118) There is  l i t t l e  reason in trying to  reason 
about such applied ornament. The only general principle which in  
Pantayana's view can be appropriately put forward by a philosopher is 
that, "Everything is  true decoration vhiah tru ly adorns, and everything 
adorns which enriches the impression and pleasantly entertains the eye."(119) 
Certain phrases here are careless -  the remark that structure in I t s e l f  
is only a necessary condition for beauty is only dubiously consistent with 
the prior assertion that classicism consists typ ica lly  in turning the lines 
o f the structure i t s e l f  to ornament. Yet the central idea -  that no general 
rules can be given specifying the degree and type o f ornamentation 
acceptable in a building -  is  sound, and doubly so when considered in 
conjunction with the principle o f s ty l is t ic  authenticity put forward 
above. The only demand which can appropriately be made o f ornament is that 
whatever decoration there is  — and there need not be any -  is  both pleasant 
to look at and coherent with the 3tyle o f the building as a whole.
Writers on architecture have in general by no means been inclined to  
accept th is  tolerant noint o f view. *or Alberti and Palladio, fo r  example, 
Ornament means the classic vocabulary o f  orders, and while the la tte r  
complains o f abuses o f ornament, i t  never occurs to him to envisage the use 
of any other type than the one he advocates. Thus he objects to the use o f
cartouches:
" ...a s  I t  is  requisite to  uphold a great weight with something solid« 
and f i t  to  support i t :  so such non-sensieal things as Cartposhes, 
are altogether superfluous» because i t  is  impossible that the 
Jojrrts, or any other Timber whatsoever, could rea lly  perform what 
these represent; and since they are fe ign 'd  to  be so ft and weak, I  
know not by what rule they can be put under anything heavy and 
hard. "(120»)
At the opposite pole, Curand i l lo g ic a lly  re jects  the use o f the orders 
altogether. Having argued against the Vitruvlan view that the proportions 
o f the orders were derived orig ina lly  from those o f  the human body, he 
fee ls  at lib e rty  to  in fer that therefore the orders give no pleasure 
whatever, and are to  be abandoned. The architect must design only function­
a l structures:
"The architect...m ust concern himself with arrangement alone; even 
the one vho values architectural decoration w ill  give real 
pleasure only to the extent that i t  has been produced by the 
most sensible and economical arrangement, since decoration i t s e l f  
cannot be considered beautifu l."(121)
I f  what Durand claims were true, i t  would fo llow  that only structurally 
necessary elements o f a building are found to be beautifu l, a thesis 
which becomes implausible in the light o f certain counter-examples: in the 
fan vaulting o f King's College, Cambridge, not a l l  the ribs o f each fan carry 
the weight o f the roof, andit is  most Implausible to  maintain that these 
ornamental ribs look uglier than those which are structurally necessary.
(122) I f  whnt Palladio says were true, i t  would follow that every non- 
classic building must be ugly. The sanity o f th e  position adopted by 
Santayana on th is question o f ornament is  emphasized by comparison with 
these views.
iotwlthatarding his avowed tolerance for a l l  styles, Santayana's own 
preference is  characteristica lly  for classic restra in t. He goes on to
equate a taste fo r profuse ornament with a state o f barbarism:
"Nothing is  so much respected by unintelligent people as
elaboration and complexity. They are simply dazed and overawed at 
seeing at once so much more than they oan master. To overwhelm the 
senses is , fo r them, the only way o f f i l l in g  the mind."(123)
I t  takes cu ltivation to appreciate what is  simple, f in it e ,  and f i t s  its  
o f f ic e  perfectly: "In telligence and elegance naturally ex ist together, 
since they both spring from a subtle sense fo r absent and eventual 
processes. They are sustained by experience, by nicety in foretaste and 
se lec tion ."(124) There is  a certain  degree o f truth in what Santayana has 
to  say here: i t  i3 tru is tic  to  note that a certain degree o f  sophistication 
can manifest i t s e l f  in a taste fo r  what is  apparently simple. Vhat is  
very hard to swallow is  the gratuitous rider that only those with th is 
degree o f taste are in te lligen t and elegant. An a ir  o f snobbery hangs 
about such remarks.
Santayana goes on to emphasize that, while a taste for profuse 
ornamentation may be barbarous, he does not wish to  deny that the ornate 
may be very beautiful, and moreover asserts that what is  to be completely 
beautiful needs to be somehow rich . He uses his epistemology to argue for 
t ills  conclusion. Experience is  in it ia l ly  mere fee ling; i t s  representative 
function is  a la te addition:
"Decoration, by stimulating the senses, not only brings a primary 
satisfaction with i t ,  independent o f any that may supervene, but 
I t  furnishes an element o f  e ffect which no higher beauty can ever 
render unwelcome or inappropriate, since any higher beauty, in 
moving the mind, must g ive  i t  a certain sensuous and emotional 
colouring."(125)
Decoration is fundamental in design, "for everything structural or sign­
ifican t produces in the f ir s t  instance some sensuous impression and figures 
as a spot or pattern in the f ie ld  o f v is ion ." ( 126)
Two major d if ficu lt ie s  arise in connexion with this argument, f ir s t ly ,
i t  is  d if f ic u lt  to see what ju stifica tion  Santayana has fo r singling out 
decorative features of a building! structure 'stimulates the senses' quite
us much us ornament and 'figu res  as a spot or pattern' in the suae way.
Thus structure must bring the same 'primary satisfaction ' with i t .
Secondly, a d istinction  between higher and lower beauty is assumed. No 
defin itions or elaboration are forthcoming, but from the context and in 
conjunction w ith Santayana's presuppositions, i t  is possible that he would 
have elaborated the distinction in the following ways reason is the most 
valuable o f human facu lties, and reason must be employed to appreciate 
certain features o f aesthetic objects. Such rational satisfactions one 
might ca ll higher than those which are merely sensuous. I f  this 
interpretation is  correct, then th is version o f the higher-lower beauty 
distinction fa l l s  together with the unacceptable immediate/mediate 
distinction.
Santayana concludes his treatment o f architecture in "Reason in Art" 
with general comments on Greek and Gothic styles. In Greek architecture he 
finds the perfect alliance o f structure and ornament. The Greek temple,
" i f  we imagine i t  tr. a l l  Its  glory, with a l l  i t s  colour and 
furniture, was a type o f human art at it s  best, where decoration, 
without in the least restricting  i t s e l f ,  took naturally an 
exqu isite ly  subordinate and pervasive form: each de ta il had its  own 
splendour and refinement, yet kept its  place in  the whole. "(127)
3y contrast, Gothic architecture in general, in Santayana's view, was not 
"well grounded enough in U t i l i t y  to be a sound and permanent basis fo r 
beauty»"(128) ’'’he architects strained/feverishly a fte r  e ffects which were
never satisfactory even when achieved:
"The structure, in becoming ornament, ceased to be anything else, 
and could be discarded by anyone whose fancy preferred a d ifferen t 
image...The true magic o f that..architecture lay not in it s  
in te l l ig ib le  structure but in  the bewildering incidental e ffects 
which that structure permitted...The structure was but the inevitable 
underpinning for the desired d isp lay."(129)
(239)
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I t  is  almost unnecessary to  add that th is sweeping relegation of Oothie 
'in  to to ' to the rank o f the merely in teresting is neither widely shared, 
nor especia lly  consonant with Santayana's principle o f s ty l is t ic  
authenticity. V iollet-le-Duo and others since have been disinclined either 
to dismiss loth ic so eas ily , or to patronise the technique o f the 
architects to the degree here indulged in by Santayana.
A further general point of architectural theory is  put forward in an 
essay o f 1916, "The Human Seale". No defin ition  of the term 'human scale ' 
is  o ffered , but the context makes i t  clear that a building on the human 
scale is  no larger than is  necessary comfortably to serve the needs o f the 
human mind and body. I t  is  assumed that buildings on this scale w i ll  be 
moderate in s ize . The human scale is  ignored, fo r example, when the door 
o f a building is  so large that a smaller door has to be cut into i t .  The 
e ffe c t , in Santayana's view, is  elways unsuccessful:
"Here is the human scale reasserting i t s e l f  in the midst o f a 
titan ic  structure, but i t  reasserts i t s e l f  with an i l l  grace and 
in the interests o f fr a i lty ;  the patch i t  makes seems unintended 
and Ignominious. "(130)
The tone o f his remarks makes i t  quite clear that lantayana wishes to 
condemn colossal architecture in general. The human scale irrepressibly 
reappeared in enormous buildings, "but for the moment without its  native 
d ign ity, because i t  had been stretched to compass a l i fe le s s  dignity quite 
other than its  own."(131)
The opposite view is  put forward by other writers on architecture.
Thus Friedrich (J lllyi "..arch itecture is  the only art form, the works of 
whioh can become colossal without detriment. Only reduction in size makes 
them in their to ta l e ffe c t  a plaything."(132) Or again, Quatremire de
Quincy, writing on Chalgrin:
"Tet us not be afraid to repeat that physical grandeur is one of 
the principal causes o f the value and the effect o f architecture.
The reason is  that the greatest part o f the impressions produced
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by this art belong to the sense o f admiration«..how much more 
(man) enjoys himself in the presence o f the grandeurs o f architecture, 
in a relationship union f l i t t e r s  his inride; fo r at that moment he 
believes himself as great as he fe e ls  small. This is  beeause he 
is Droud to find himself smell beside the work o f hi3 own hands."(1?3) 
The fault o f which Santayana, S il ly  end de Cuiney are a like gu ilty  is that 
o f over-generality. Santayana assumes that a l l  enormous buildings are 
ungrateful to the eye, and that i t  is  always unpleasant to fe e l dwarfed;
S illy  and de Huincy assert the opposite. I t  is  surely quite obvious that, 
in such a general form, both positions are alike untenable. I t  3eems as 
unwise to leg is la te  generally about the s ize  o f a building as i t  is  about 
its  ornamentation.
V: ^presentation. Sculpture and Painting
?rom the plastic constructions o f architecture, Santayana turns to 
consider plastic representation in sculpture and painting. He precedes his 
remarks on these fine arts by general considerations which can be 
construed as a set o f jo in tly  su fficient necessary conditions fo r mimetic 
representat ion.
(1) The Nature o f ienrcsentatlon
Construction and representation (Santayana begins) have in common the 
property that both oan be decorative»
" I t  is in their decorative function that construction and represent­
ation meet; they are able to conspire in one ideal e f fe c t  by virtue 
o f the common appeal which they unwittingly make to  the senses. I f  
construction were not decorative i t  oould never a l ly  i t s e l f  
imaginatively to decoration; and decoration in turn would never be 
w illin g ly  representative i f  the forms which illu stra tion  requires 
were not decorative in themselvee."(134)
Anything is  decorative, in Santayana's view, which entertains the eye and 
enriches the impression (o f. the previous section) and the imprecision of
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th is defin ition  guarantees the truth o f th is opening remarks no-one would 
wish to deny that both structures and representations can entertain the 
eye auu enrich one impression} out equai.xjr, ttiie is  to say very x i t t ie .
Illu stra tion  -  a term whicn lantayana uses as a synonym for 'represent­
a tion ' -  d iffe rs  from structure, however, in having a certain 'in te llec tu a l 
function ':
" ...th e  essence o f illu stra tion  lie s  neither in use nor in beauty. 
The illu s tra to r 's  Impulse is to  reproduce and describe given 
objects. He wishes in the f ir s t  place to force observers -  over­
looking a l l  lo g ica l scruples -  to c a ll his work by the name o f  its  
subject-matter; and then he wishes to Inform them further, through 
his representation, and to teach them to apprehend the rea l object 
as, in its  natural existence, i t  might never have been apprehended. 
His f ir s t  task is  to translate the object fa ith fu lly  into his 
special medium; his seoond task, somewhat more ambitious, is  so to 
penetrate into the object during that process o f translation that 
this translation may become at the same time analytic and 
Imaginative, in that i t  signalises the object's structure and 
emphasises its  idea l suggestions."(135)
A consequence of this position to which Santayana draws attention is  that, 
in illu stra tion , "The aesthetic element in art has begun to recede before 
the In tellectua l; and sensuous e ffec ts , while of course retained and s t i l l  
studied, seem to be impressed into the service of ideas."(136»)
What is  true in these remarks is  that the illu stra tor seeks to n^ake 
the spectator apprehend the object in a new way. I t  is  necessarily true 
that a mimetic representation (to anticipate a distinction to be c la r ified  
below) does not share a l l  the properties o f that which is represented, fo r 
any object which did sa tis fy  this description would be a replica and not a 
representation. The representational a rt is t  copies some o f the properties 
o f the object (e tc . )  to be represented, with any one o f several general ends 
in view: he may wish to emphasise the form, or a certain aspect o f i t ;  he
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may wish to bring out a certain property o f the object which could other­
wise be overlooked; he may wish to convey an ides, and so on. Santayana 
is  close to  tnis position witn nis claim tnat the general purpose o f 
representation is  to emphasize the structure and ideal values o f that which 
is  represented.
Less acceptable are the accompanying doctrines that the value o f 
representation is neither aesthetic nor instrumental ( i t s  essenoe l ie s  
neither in use nor in beauty), and that illu stra tion  is  in a sense 
unaesthetic. A representation brings to  our notice the structure and ideal 
values o f thst which is  represented, .¡ant ay ana does not explain at th is 
point why awareness o f these factors should be valuable, though, by 
extrapolating from the presuppositions o f the L ife  o f  lesson, i t  is  not 
d i f f ic u lt  to  supply an interpretation. Ideals are the goals o f action 
and the objects o f desire. I t  is  advantageous to have as clear a knowledge 
o f them as possible, in that this w ill contribute to  self-knowledge and help 
us to estimate their a tta in ab ility  in practice. The d if f ic u lty  with such an 
interpretation -  fo r which thewhole apparatus of the L ife  o f season is  
evidence -  is  that such a value must surely be instrumental. Knowledge o f 
ideals contributes ultimately to the maximization o f happiness. I t  is 
more d if f ic u lt  to guess why Santayana should consider knowledge o f structure 
to be valuable. Perhaps i t  contributes to knowledge o f the environment; 
but such a value would again be instrumental. On the other hand, i f  the 
contemplation o f structure is  valuable in tr in s ica lly , then Santayana can 
hardly avoid admitting that this aspect o f representation provides aesthetio 
pleasure. ( I t  w ill be remembered that he associates value in immediate 
experience, the term he uses to define aesthetic value in "lieaaon in A rt", 
with in trinsic value; o f. "The Sense o f 3eauty", where he says that 
aesthetic Juigments are 'necessarily in trinsic and based on the character 
o f immediate experience.' (137) Admittedly such interpretations are 
conjectural; but Santayana omits any consideration o f a third speelea of
value which Is neither aesthetic nor instrumental.
The de fin ition  of aesthetic value as value in  immediate experience 
(c f .  Ch.VI, above) is  the cause o f the d if f ic u lty  in the doctrine that, in 
illu s tra tion , the aesthetic element in  art has begun to recede before the 
in te llectu a l. I t  is  because of his b e lie f that aesthetic experience and 
immediate experience are very c lo se ly  related i f  not identical that 
Santayana considers detailed ratiocination to be incompatible with contempl­
ation. The untenability o f th is doctrine o f aesthetic experience has been 
argued above; i t  is  enough here to point out that e psychical distance 
view has no such corollary.
Santayana continues by sh ifting hi3 ground, fo r the moment, from 
representation or illu stra tion  in a r t , to consider the psychology o f 
im itation, a term which he uses to encompass both a r t is t ic  and non-artistlc 
copying o f gesture or object. Im itation in this sense is  a widespread 
phenomenon, explicable in terms o f the psychology of perception. Every 
sensation o f an external object he considers to be an imitation o f that 
object. Every mental image, he asserts, is to some degree a motor image,
"so that no idea ...can occupy the mind unless the body has received some 
impulse to  enact the same"(138) Since in a motor image, ’ the mind 
represents prophetically what the body is about to  execute," i t  follows fo r 
Sant ay na that,
"The plastic instinct to reproduce what is  seen is  therefore simply 
an uninterrupted and adequate seeing...im itative art is  simply the 
perfection and fulfilment o f  sensation. The act o f apperception in 
which a sensation is re flected  upon and understood is  already an 
internal reproduction. The object i3 gone over in the mind, not 
without quite perceptible movements in the limbs, which away, as i t  
were, in sympathy with the ob ject's habit."(139)
This account o f the psychology of Imitation must be rejected. Santayana 
apparently assumes that a l l  aotlon is  preceded by a mental image o f i t ,  and 
ignores the fact that the occurrence of mental Imagery varies greatly from
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person to person. Moreover, the general principle that no Idea can oocupy 
the mind unless the body has received some impulse to enact i t ,  is  absurd» 
whut would count, lo r  example, as enacting in « i«ea  o f a trlnn^le or a 
mathematical equation or a log ica l relation such as entailment1
Imitation in th is  general sense (and ir. « r t ,  as w ill become clear below) 
does not consist merely in s im ilarity , "nor does its  ideal function l i e  in 
bringing a fla t  and unmeaning sim ilarity  about. I t  has a representative 
and in tellectua l value because in reproducing the forms o f things i t  
reproduces them in a fresh substance to new purpose." ( 140) ’’'or example,
when one man de libera tely  imitates others, he does not merely copy to  no 
purpose; rather, "He enacts what he understands, and his understanding 
consists precisely in  knowing that he is  re-enacting something which has its  
co lla tera l existence elsewhere in nature."(141) In Santayana's view, 
deliberate im itation is in a certain way beneficia l»
" . . . i f  I im itate (mankind) under proper Inhibitions and in the 
service o f my own ends, I  rea lly  understand them, and, by represent­
ing what I  do not bodily become, I preserve and enlarge my own being 
and make i t  relevant id ea lly  to  what i t  depends upon,..to make the 
accretions which time brings to your being representative o f what 
you are not, and do not wish to be, is  to grow in dignity. I t  is 
to be wise and prepared. I t  is  to survey a universe without ceasing 
to be a mind."(142)
The d if f icu lty  with a l l  this seems to be not so much that i t  is  fa lse , but 
rather that i t  is  simply a flo r id  and rhetorical way o f stating banal truths» 
he 3eems to be saying very l i t t l e  more tuan that to im itate features of 
the behaviour o f others which are advantageous to my own purposes is  to 
show understanding, to a degree, o f both the others and o f myself; and that 
such imitation is  beneficial to myself. This is  merely t r i t e .
r^om th is account of imitation in a brmad sense, Santayana turns fin a lly  
(in  these preliminary remarks) to  that species of imitation which is  of
Interest lr. aesthetics, l . e .  plastic lm itetlon. deferring back to the 
psychology o f Imitation given above, he advanoes a theoretical account o f 
the origin o f p lastic im itation. When the stimulus to imitation is not 
pervasive (as a habit, fo r instance, might be said to  be pervasive), and 
touches mainly a single sense, "when what i t  arouses is  a movement o f the 
hand or eye retracing the object, then the response becomes very d e fin ite ly  
cogn itive. I t  constitutes an observation o f fa ct, and acquaintance with a 
th ing 's structure amounting to  technical knowledge..."(143) This process, 
"leaves an efficacious idea", and,
"In an id le  moment, when the information thus acquired need not be 
put to instant use, the new-born faculty may work i t s e l f  out 
spontaneously. The sound heard is  repeated, the thing observed is  
sketched, the event conceived is acted out in pantomime. Then 
imitation rounds i t s e l f  out; an uninhibited sensation has become 
an instinct to keep that sensation a liv e , and plastic representation 
has begun."(144)
In addition to the d if f ic u lt ie s  in the presupposed psychology o f imitation, 
i t  can be objected that this fin a l step in the explanation is  too undetailed 
to  be helpful as a psychology of crea tiv ity . Santayana does l i t t l e  more 
that assert that p lastic imitation does happen. Again, i t  is  not easy to 
see why the fact that a stimulus a ffects  mainly one sense should alone 
stimulate the response o f detailed attention to structure which Santayana 
asserts to occur universally.
■’ar more promising, however, is  his synoptic account o f plastio 
im itation, which oan be construed as a set o f Jointly su fficien t necessary 
conditions. Imitation does not result in the l it e r a l repetition of the 
represented object« rather, the copy, "reproduce« the form (o f  the represett­
ed objeot) in a new medium and gives i t  a d ifferent function. In these 
la tte r  ciroumstanoes l ie s  the imitative essence o f the second image« fo r otie 
lea f does not imitate another nor is  each twin the other's oopy."(M 5») This 
statement contains three necessary conditions. In any plastic imitation ( i )
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the copy reproduces the form of that which is  copied; ( i l )  the copy is  in 
a medium d ifferen t from that which is  copied, and ( i l l )  the copy has a 
d iffe ren t function from that which is  copied. I t  i 3 convenient to consider 
these conditions in reverse order.
"he reasons for the aeeentability o f the third condition -  a plastic 
representation has a d iffe ren t function from that which is  represented -  
have been indicated above. !. representation in art is  by de fin ition  not a 
rep lica o f i t s  subject-matter. I t  shares only some o f its  properties, and 
not only does not but cannot usually f u l f i l  the same function. A picture 
o f apples is  not to be eaten. What the general purposes o f representation 
in art are has already been said: to emphasize some property o f form, or 
material, or expression, or 'meaning* in some sense. Wor example, a 
portrait painter w ill select a given pose and point o f view in order to 
maximize the beauty o f his s itte r , or to exhibit his or her character and 
experience, or to bring to  our attention the play of ligh t and shade on 
the planes o f the face, and so forth , in various combinations. A landscape 
painter w ill  select his point o f view and ligh tin g  to secure a good 
composition, a satisfying set o f colour relationships, to  emphasize a mood 
of nature (h os tile , in d iffe ren t, friend ly  to man) and so forth . A sculptor 
w ill choose scale, material, and pose to emphasize lin e and to endow the 
statue with the mood he seeks to convey ( i f  *ny) and so on. Patently, 
these functions of representation are quite d ifferent from those o f the 
subject-matter represented.
With regard to the medium, while i t  is  almost always the case that a 
representation is in a medium d ifferen t from that o f it s  subject-matter, 
there are exceptions: fo r  example, a painting may include a representation 
of another painting. Such cases are soarce, however, and i t  is  not 
d if f ic u lt  to  see why: a change in the medium w i l l  make i t  easier to take 
up the distanced attitude, as Bullough pointed ou t.(o f. Ch .Il, above).
The thesis that a p lastic  representation reproduces the form o f its  
subject-matter requires a s ligh tly  longer consideration. I f  true, i t
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entails that resemblance in at least formal respects is  a necessary 
condition fo r representation, the denial o f which is  entailed by Soodman's 
general tnesis that resemblance is  neither a necessary nor a su ffic ien t 
condition fo r  representation. In Soodman's view, for anything A to 
represent another thing 9, A must be a symbol fo r 3, stand for B, refer to 
B. Denotation is  the core o f representation and is  independent o f 
resemblance. Resemblance is  not a necessary condition fo r  reference; 
almost anything can stand fo r anything e ls e . (146)
I t  can be granted to Goodman that resemblance is  not a su fficien t 
condition fo r  representation. Everything resembles i t s e l f  more than 
anything else does. Again, resemblance is  a synmetrieal re la tion , while 
representation is not. Moreover, one picture resembles another picture 
more than i t  resembles its  subject-matter. The denial that resemblance is  
a necessary condition fo r representation, however, is quite another matter, 
■■'ather D.O. Barrett cites Monroe Beardsley's counter-example: i f  someone 
were to  paint a picture which resembled a cow in a f ie ld ,  and called i t ,  
"Derby Vinner, 1936", one would conclude that he was being iron ica l, or 
that he was an incompetent painter, or that he did not know what a horse 
looked lik e , or did not know that the Derby was a horse race and not a 
ca ttle  show, or that the t i t l e  had been misplaced.(L47) To say so much -  
that resemblance is  a necessary condition fo r  representation -  is  o f course 
to say very l i t t l e .  There remains the d if f ic u lt  problem of attempting to 
find condifications fo r the varying standards employed at d ifferen t times 
for what counts as the necessary degree o f resemblance. The lim its of 
resemblance are among those factors in the response to art which are 
cu ltura lly  determined.
Granted support fo r this corollary o f Santayana's third condition, 
is  i t  the ease that reproduction o f form in particular is  a necessary 
condition fo r representation? The condition can be accepted provided that 
i t  is  not interpreted in too stringent a way. There can be few
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representations In art In which the fora o f what la represented, or an 
aspect or view o f I t ,  Is Iden tica lly  reproduced, on whatever scale, 
(.iantayana is  presumably no oe interpretea as axxowin; cnange o f bcaxe). 
However, that formal likeness within the cu lturally determined lim its  o f 
the time Is a necessary condition fo r representation In art Is  true.
Form in plastic representation means shape, and since shape Is o f the f i r s t  
importance in the iden tifica tion  o f objects, formal s im ila rity  is  c lea r ly  
necessary fo r  representation. I t  is  tru is tic  to point out the close 
relation  between the form o f an object, and its  identity .
I t  is  worth adding that Santayana's three necessary conditions fo r  
representation can be used to  preserve the distinction which 3ernheimer 
makes between categorical, le g a l, and mimetic representation. As i t  
stands, this distinction is  defective. A l l  mimetic representations are 
"likenesses which represent by virtue o f s im ilarity , natural or convention­
a l. "(143) The d if f ic u lty  is  that the f ir s t  two types o f representation, 
given Bernhelmer's de fin itions, collapse into the th ird. A categorical 
representation ( i . e .  a specimen o f a class) resembles the rest o f i t s  
class and represents In virtue of this natural resemblance, while in lega l 
representation (e .g . the rela tion  o f a lawyer to his c lien t) the 
representative resembles his principal in sharing his in terests , by 
agreement or convention. By defining mimetic representation In terms o f 
Santayana's three conditions, this d istinction , manifestly worth 
preserving, can be saved. The stipulation that a mimetic representation 
has a function d ifferent from that of i t s  subject-matter d iffe ren tia tes  
mimetic from categorical representation, fo r a sample, to be a good sample, 
must share the function o f the members o f the class of which i t  is  a 
sample. Equally, the stipulation that a mimetic representation be almost 
always in a d ifferent medium from Its  subjsot-matter precludes any 
confusion with lega l representation, where the notion of change of medium 
does not apply.
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F ina lly, granted that two o f Santayana’ s three conditions are 
necessary fo r  representation in art, is  th e ir  conjunction su ffic ien t?  
i t  seems in  fact i t  is  not, since an ob ject might sa tis fy  them both but 
not count as a representation, simply because i t  is  not seen as a 
representation. The notion o f seeing as must therefore figure in a further 
necessary condition, though some cere is  needed in i t s  framing. Wollheim 
speaks o f the possib ility  o f 'e lucidating ' the notion o f representation 
in terms o f seeing as.(149) This is  inexact, but can naturally be 
interpreted as meaning that, i f  x is  to be a representation o f y, then x 
must be seen as y. As i t  stands, however, this is  too simple. I t  is  
natural to assume, as Charlton does in h is critic ism  o f t'ollheim, that to  
see x as y entails taking x for y, and he very ju s t ly  points out that th is 
very rare ly  oocurs when an observer contemplates a representation. I t  
occurs only in the cases of 'trompe l 'o e i l '  works or freak lig h t in g .(153) 
Uollheim's suggestion entails that to see a representation as what i t  
represents is  to undergo an illu s ion } yet hardly anyone is  ever deceived.
I t  might be objected that Cherlton fa i ls  to distinguish between types 
o f illu s ion « f ir s t ly ,  that in which x is  both seen as and taken fo r y; 
secondly, a controlled, voluntary 'G esta lt ' switch, and th ird ly , involunt­
ary visual seeing-as, where x is  seen as y but not taken fo r  y. This 
last, I t  might be said, is what happens in representational a rt. Yet this 
objection is  open to counter-moves sim ilar to those which 7i f f  employed 
against Gamuel Alexander. (151) I t  is  hard to see wh.t Justification  there 
is  fo r using 'illu s io n ' at a l l  in the third sense suggested, since, in its  
central use, i t  is  a necessary condition fo r  the occurrence o f an illu sion  
that someone is  deoelved. The Introduction o f the terra 'i l lu s io n ' is  
l ik e ly  to cause confusion, Inviting a mis—iden tifica tion  o f the work o f 
art with a mental en tity o f some sort.
I t  Is advisable, therefore, to d iffe ren tia te  the sense in which x is  
seen as y when x mimetically represents y, from that in which x is  seen
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as y and taken for y. As ha9 been said, when a spectator contemplates a 
mimetic representation, he is  not deceived. The reason fo r this must 
surely oe that ne is  acquainted witu the notion of image-making. I t  is  
a necessary condition fo r  seeing x as a mimetic representation o f y that 
the spectator is  in some sense aware o f th is practice. This awareness need 
not take the form o f ex p lic it  verbal formulation on the lines o f this 
condition, since a child might be aware o f the difference between an 
image and that of which i t  is  an image, while lacking the vocabulary to 
make this awareness e x p lic it .  3ut some sort o f  awareness there must bej 
otherwise, the image w i l l  be incomprehensible, or mistaken for its  subject- 
matter.
( i l )  Sculpture
Santayana's remarks on sculpture in "Reason in Art" are restricted to 
a few generalisations.
Perception (he begins) divides the world into many patterns. I f  the 
single man or hero is  "the unit and standard in discourse",(152) then his 
image w ill  preoccupy the arts. This subject is  best represented in 
sculpture, since sculpture is the most complete o f representations!
"Sculpture retains form and colour, with a l l  that both can suggest, 
and i t  retains ttiem in their in tegrity , leaving the observer free 
to re-survey them from any point of view and drink in their quality 
exhaustively." (153)
Of course, the stage can supply the movement and speech which are omitted 
in sculptural representation, but reproduction by acting has the great 
disadvantage o f ephemerality. Since the e ’ fo rt o f art is  to  keep what is 
interesting in existence, acting must be considered an art in fer io r in 
d ign ity ."(154)
There are several d if f ic u lt ie s  In this opening statement. T irstly , 
the fact that the centrally important moral concept o f a given epoch is 
that o f the hero does not o f i t s e l f  ontail that a complete representation
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ia required in art: a good deal of argument has been omitted here. Again, 
the example o f the concept o f the hero indicates that Santayana is  thinking 
of toe ancient worxa; ana in  tnat case, i t  is  d if f ic u lt  to see now ue can 
square his current claim about the superiority o f sculptural representation 
in general with his high praise o f Homer, whose portraits o f  Achilles and 
Hector he would presumably not wish to denigrate. Moreover, the dismissal 
o f drama is  absurds as i f  a play cannot be re-performed (not to say, now, 
recorded) and thus have a repeated e ffe c t . That i t  might be more d if f ic u lt  
to have repeated access to a play in performance than to a statue in  a 
ga llery  is  t r iv ia l  and irrelevant.
Santayana continues that, being so adequate a rendering o f it s  
subject, sculpture demands a perfect mastery over i t ,  and is  corresponding­
ly  d i f f ic u lt .  In his view, i t  requires taste and train ing above every 
other a rt,
" fo r  not only must the material form be reproduced, but its  motor 
suggestions and moral expression must be rendered; things which in 
the model i t s e l f  are at best transitory, and which may never be 
found there i f  a heroic or ideal theme is  proposed."(155)
The view that sculpture is  in some way especially d if f ic u lt  is  not 
peculiar to  Santayana. C e llin i, for example, held the same view, and for 
roughly compsraole reasons: unlike other art products 'based on design', 
sculpture is  to be viewed in the round:
" I  maintain that among a l l  the arts based on design..sculpture is 
seven times the greatest, because a statue must have eight show 
sides and a l l  should be equally good."(156)
The objection to which th is type of argument is  surely open is  that there 
is  nothing which could count as a unit o f d if f ic u lty  or other ground of 
comparison between the various arts. I t  is  not clear how the re la tive  
d if f ic u lt ie s  of creating a form in etone (say) and creating a unified 
temporally extended form in sound are to be compared. Moreover, Santayana 
gives almost no reasons for th is view which apply so le ly  to  eoulpture:
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the painter equally faces the d if f ic u lty  o f rendering features o f his 
model which are transitory , including (o f  course) expression,
Further on the theme o f d if f ic u lt ie s  unique to sculpture, Santayana 
maintains that the sculptor is  especia lly dependent on his model:
" I f  the statue is  to  be ideal, i . e . ,  i f  i t  is  to express the 
possible motions and v ita l character o f its  subject, the model 
i t s e l f  must be refined. Training must have cut in the f l e 3h those
lin es  which are to make the language and eloquence o f the marble."
(157»)
Once again, i t  is  not easy to  see why Santayana should consider this 
problem peculiar to  the sculptor. I f  a d ignified and noble model is  a 
precondition for d ign ity and nob ility  in a work of art, then the 
representational ¡» in te r  o f the human form faces exactly the same 
d if f ic u lty .  Moreover, Santayana en tire ly  ignores the poss ib ility  that an 
a rt is t  might envision an ideal o f n ob ility  by means of imagination alone. 
To discount th is poss ib ility  is not only implausible in i t s e l f ,  but also 
in tension with the doctrines on the imagination put Forward in 
"Interpretations o f Poetry and Relig ion", where the main a c t iv ity  o f the 
imagination is said to be idealising. (G f. Gh.V, supra) To idealiae in 
th is sense is to work out the hints o f the ideal given in the world as i t  
la.
The alleged dependence of the sculptor on his —d e l, In conjunction 
with Santayana's b e lie f in the superiority o f the Greek way of l i f e  to  a l l  
others, are the grounds fo r a sweeping dismissal o f a l l  mediaeval, 
Rennalssarice, and modern sculpture. Only In Greece, In Santayana's view, 
was sculpture an authentic and fu lly  successful a r t . (158*) Greek 
sculpture answered to a genuine need in the Greek personality, and never 
again in  the iiiatory o f sculpture has th is condition been sa tis fied . Of 
the tsnnalssance, fo r example, Santayana writes:
" I f  several great temperaments, under the auspioes o f fashion, 
could then aall up a magic in the world in which bodies s t i l l
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spoke In a heroic language, that was a passing dream. Society 
could not feed such an a r t i f ic ia l  passsion, nor the schools trans­
mit an arbitrary personal sty le that responded to nothing permanent 
in social conditions."(159*)
I t  is  d if f ic u lt  to comment on so absurdly sweeping a generrlisation, which 
entails that eYery item o f post-Qreek European sculpture is  in some way 
second rate. One can only suppose that Santayana's passion fo r the Oreeks 
temporarily distorted his judgment.
The 1908 paper, "Sculpture" is  a discussion o f the issue what Yalue 
representational sculpture has fo r the community at large: what benefit is  
to be derived from the contemplation of sculpture? Santayana's answer to 
the question is  twofold: sculpture offers moral stimulation and h istorical 
insight 1
"The force o f sculpture is  primarily moral....The sight of what 
human nature might be in it s  purity and freedom thaws us, as i t  
were, and causes the genuine ideal to s t ir  again w ith in .. . .  
(Moreover) this moral renewal has, incidentally, an intellectual 
function, when the freedom and sim plicity expressed in sculpture 
are the record o f what a less encumbered c iv iliza tion  may have 
allowed men to approach in some past age ."(l60 )
The argument to support these conclusions rests mainly on informal 
psychological generalisations about the aesthetic experience o f sculpture.
A statue, Santayana begins, speaks to us la rge ly  by gesture. ( 'la rge ly ' 
only, because Santayana acknowledges the role o f the material, c f.3 h .II, 
above.) He professes not to know how psychologists might explain this 
s ilen t communication; but experience attests that i t  does occur: "we fe e l 
currents o f influence, sympathetic reactions, in the presence o f images." 
(161) The response a statue induces is less powerful than that produced 
by a real person; but i t  gains over the person in persistence, since a 
statue is always in the same mood:
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"In  time, therefore, the companlor.shlp o f a pin otic form can become 
a positive and appreciable influence; I t  can exercise a hypnotic power 
over our organs and bid them operate under i t s  control; we shall
means the very physiological process, and generate the very mood, 
which f i l le d  the a rtis t in the quick moment of creation, when chisel 
in hand, he stepped back from his work and cried, 'That's i t  at la st; 
i t  is  fin ished1»(162)
Santayana is  presumably to be interpreted at this point, when speaking 
o f inward im itation, as taking fo r  granted the psychology o f im itation 
discussed in part ( i )  o f the present section. Not only is  th is 
presupposition dubious, but so also is  the general psychological claim 
that a consistent feature o f the response to sculpture is  an exact 
reconstruction (so to  speak) o f the mood, presumably o f satis faction , 
aroused in the a rtis t by the successful completion of his work. Nor is i t  
clear why i t  would be valuable to recapture such a mood ; what moral or 
h is to rica l insight need i t  o ffer?
gesture (he continues) is  the f ir s t  language, and the most movihg; man 
reverts to i t ,  abandoning the a r t if ic e  o f language, whenever he has his 
whole s e lf  to  express, and is  too fu l l  of feeling to know or care whether 
he is  expressing anything. As a consequence, the plastic arts have this 
advantage over litera tu re ; they express something profounder, more elemental, 
and they express i t  a l l  at once. Speech is necessarily interm ittent; 
p lastic  expression, on the contrary, is  perpetual; i t  costs no e f fo r t ; i t  
makes no noise; i t  does not fatigue the beholder; and i t  continues to exert 
it s  force when i t  works unawares; forms and movements o f bodies, Santayana 
asserts, work on us constantly, even when we are not aware o f i t . (163)
As so often with .Santayana, -he d if f ic u lt ie s  in this argument are a 
result of the gaps in i t .  He assumes that no verbal description o f an 
elemental fe e lin g  can produce an aesthetic experience as intense as can a
im itate and render i t  over...'We shall reproduce in ourselves by this
(306)
p lastic representation of the gesture in which that fee lin g  is  expressed. 
Moreover, in order to  carry through an argument to  prove th is principle 
i t s e l f ,  i t  would be neoessary to find some way o f measuring the in tensities 
o f aesthetic experiences, and showing in accordance with laws o f psychology 
why i t  is  that represented gestures make more imoact than verbal description. 
This entire set o f problems is not so much as hinted at by Santayana.
The foregoing thesis as to the capacity o f  sculpture to express the 
elemental has two important consequences, in Santayana's view. T lra tly , 
the form and attitude of a sculpture "express v ita l habit, and second, 
that they do so by tending to melt and recast in us our own eth ics , our 
own possible actions, our own v ita l h a b it ." (I64) Sculpture is  a veracious 
h istorica l document, iranted sensitiveness on our part, i t  w i l l  introduce 
us to the moral l i f e  and disposition of past ages. The alleged 'recasting* 
o f our Inner l i f e  is  described further by Santayana: " . . i t  is  the sense of 
this renewal within us, o f this impulse and budding capacity to  be 
stronger, straighter, simpler, calmer and bolder than we ord inarily  are, 
that reveals to us what the statue expresses."(165) In this way, sculpture, 
apparently the most solid and material o f the arts, turns out to  be deeply 
end d irec tly  moral. I t  does not f i l l  us with ready made ideas; rather, 
"sculpture a ffe c ts  the sub-soil o f ideas within us; i t  modifies by a sort 
o f Invis ib le irr iga tion , the ideas we are henceforth able to breed, to love, 
or to  adopt."(166)
Several o f these contentions are questionable. In the f i r s t  place, I t  
Is not clear why the appreciation o f expressed 'v i t a l  habit' should always 
involve 'recasting ' o f the spectator's own eth ics. So fa r  as one oan attach 
any clear meaning to th is, Santayana seems to tie committed to  the thesis 
that in the co*temulation o f any expressive piece o f sculpture, the moral 
be lie fs  o f the spectator must undergo some change; but as a psychological 
generalisation th is is surely fa lse. Secondly, he assumes that a l l  
representational 30ulpture expresses noble feelings o f the kind he lis ta .
I-ot only is th is in i t s e l f  dubious, but i t  is  barely consistent wLth his
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dismissal as Inauthentic o f  a l l  European sculpture sinoe the Greeks: i f  
only obedience to the Greek ethic ( i . e .  in Santayana's view, the l i f e  o f 
ieason) produces noble human beings, and i f  the sculptor is  especially 
dependent on his model, then i t  must follow  on Santayana's own premisses 
that whatever is  expressed by post-Greek sculpture is Ignoble ir. some way. 
F inally, such remarks as are here made about the aesthetic experience 
furnished by sculpture are vague and metaphorical: one wonders what le v e l 
o f consciousness or sub-consciousness he means to refer to  by the term 
'su b -so il', or what psychological process by 'ir r ig a t io n '.
Santayana alleges i t  to  be a consequence o f the foregoing claim con­
cerning the moral e ffe c ts  of sculpture that deta ils  and accessories are no1 
important in sculpture; rather, they are dangerous and disturbing. Virtuoso 
technique cannot save a sculptor from t r iv ia l i t y ;  whereas, where sculpture 
is  Informed by a noble l i fe - s t y le ,  "a steady habit of l i f e  and an uncrossei 
a r t is t ic  trad ition ,"(167) i t  is not hindered in  its  foroe by wmt of 
technical accomplishments.
One can concede to Santayana that technical brilliance is  not a 
su fficien t condition fo r gre tness in sculpture; but, on the ground that 
minute differences in a work of art can produce major differences in e ffec  
i t  is  d if f ic u lt  to concede further that such brilliance is  not a necessary 
condition. Inconsistently, Santayana admits th is mucn himself. A few 
pages further on, he writes that the significance o f sculpture is  not 
communicated by indirect symbols suoh as words, "but by physical contagion 
the significance o f sculpture is lik e  that o f natural bodies."(168) 
because of this fact, the form of sculpture is  v ita l ly  important; there 
must not be, "a wrong or ambiguous stroke anywhere, not a d e ta il too muoh" 
(169); otherwise, the sculpture w i l l  not define our reaction unequivocally 
looseness in sculpture is  more fa ta l than in the other arts , where the 
medium is rich, or where adventitious associations are easy to  pick out. 
Sculpture, by contrast, has l i t t l e  to o ffe r  unless i t  has a supremely flm
form
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Not only Is th is Inconsistent with the foregoing remarks on technique 
but I t  is  also implausible in  i t s e l f .  I t  is  d i f f ic u lt  to believe that 
■looseness1 is  less important in tne otner arts tnan in sculpture. 
Santayana gives no good reason in support o f his thesis that form is  more 
important in sculpture than in  the other arts. The fact that gesture is  
la rge ly  responsible fo r the expressive properties o f a representational 
sculpture does not en ta il that the forms o f works o f the other arts are 
in  some way less crucial. I t  is  a mere commonplaoe that formal flaws in 
musical and lite ra ry  forms are quite as disturbing as errors in carving or 
modelling.
Santayana moves on to a d ifferen t point. Sculptures in a co llection  
are at a disadvantage: lik e  systems o f philosophy, they are fa r  more 
impressive i f  met with singly . A sculpture must be fathomed slowly:
" I t  is  a seed, rather than a flower; to understand i t  we must le t 
i t  sink into us, unfold I t s e l f  in us; we must give i t  time to start 
a l l  the tendencies to ordered motion i t  epitomizes; and then, in 
its  fam iliar presence, we shall fe e l the whole world opening out 
again before us, but now, in consequence of the single and central 
attitude we shall have learned to assume, that world w ill  wear a 
new order, a marvellous harmony: i t  w i l l  seem, in fact, to consist 
o f sheer contributions to this one image, to this consummate 
symbol."(170)
The d if f ic u lty  here lie s  in the fact that the reasoning Santayana gives 
does not support his conclusion. One oan readily agree that the aesthetic 
experience provided by a sculpture might -  i f  the work is good enough -  
deepen and become richer with the passing of time and the coming o f 
fam ilia r ity . 3ut Santayana gives no reasoning to show that the ooming o f 
fam ilia r ity  is  precluded by exhibition in museum or gallery conditions: as 
i f  the spectator were obliged to pass quiokly from work to work. The 
In it ia l  generalisation is  simply careless.
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The f in a l point made by Santayana In this paper Is  a contrast o f the 
aesthetic responses to literatu re on the one hand, and sculpture on the 
other. A playwright or novelist begins with a general fee lin g , or come 
character, o r  come incident, and makes this the starting i>oint in a process 
o f elaboration. Such a rtis ts  pass from the one to  the many. The reader 
must reverse this labour, bringing the de ta il together in his mind so 
that the integral idea and supreme sentiment become clear. In sculpture 
by contrast, this labour o f synthesis is  performed by the a r t is t :
"In  sculpture the parts work, or ought to work, only in the whole. 
The sculptor meets us, as i t  were, at the journey's end; he gives 
us, through a form and attitude which en list our involuntary 
sympathy, a single impression, as direct and poignant as a smell.
Cut o f  this one impression we must pass to i t s  submerged ju s t if ic ­
ation : to the acts, the words, the endless situations, in which 
such a sentiment might be manifested in real l i f e . . "(171)
The major d if f ic u lty  with th is fin a l point is  that there is  no reason to 
adopt the general claim that every representational sculpture produces 
in i t ia l ly  a 's ingle impression’ , in any s tr ic t or informative sense o f the 
term. To take an obvious example, Dernini In h i3 "Apollo and Daphne" has 
captured both Apollo's surprise and dismay when he realises that he is  
about to  lose Daphne, Daphne's own distress, and the extreme poignancy 
o f the whole situation. Is apprehension of th is multiple expression 
preceded by a 's ing le impression' o f any importance? I f  Santayana means 
merely that a casual glance w ill  reveal, perhaps, only a vague impression 
o f form and colour, then, while th is can be granted, i t  is  also true that 
the point is  t r iv ia l .  The opposition between the apprehension o f spatia lly  
and temporally extended forms collapses into banality.
( i l l )  j-alntjng
The 1908 paper, "Sculpture" is  one o f the many pieces by Santayana 
which s t i l l  await oollection in an authoritative edition o f his works. Also 
awaiting oollection  is his brie f review of the f i r s t  edition o f 3erenson's,
(310)
"The Florentine Painters of the Ita lia n  Renaissance, with an Index to their 
Works", which appeared in 1896.
Santayana declared the relevance o f psychology to aesthetics in "The 
jense o f Seauty", and made extensive use o f psychological theories in that 
work. (O f. Chs. I- IV , above). I t  is  to  be expected, therefore, that he 
should be sympathetic to the psychological sty le  o f aesthetics exeaplified 
in derenson's theory o f ta c t ile  values. Santayana welcomes derenson's 
willingness,
"to  trace aesthetic pleasures back into the primary processes o f 
sense and imagination. Such an attempt is ...a n  encouragement to 
the psychologist who might fear to miss the essence o f the higher 
a r t is t ic  feelings while digging in the psychological f ie ld . "(172)
While praising the psychological approach, however, Santayana finds 
several deta ils of the theory o f ta c t ile  values unconvincing. In the 
f i r s t  place, derenson asserts that the third dimension is perceived by
association o f the visual image with ta c t ile  sensations, or "muscular sens-
/
ations in my palm and fin gers ."(173) The influence o f other feelings o f 
movement, apparently in the arms, is  once mentioned, but -  and this is  
Santayana's point -  the other poss ib ilities  o f the case are ignored. 
Secondly, derenson asserts that aesthetic pleasure consists in stimulating 
to "an unwonted a c t iv ity  psychical processes which are in themselves the 
source o f most ( i f  not a l l )  o f our pleasures, and which here, free from 
disturbing physical sensations, never tend to pass over into pein."(17ii)
A work o f a rt, for those capable o f enjoying i t ,  heightens the intensity 
o f the act o f perception. I t  "overwhelms them with the sense of having 
twice the capacity they had credited themselves with« their whole 
personality is  enhanced" (175) and they fe e l better prepared fo r l i f e .
This second point .dantayana regards as "arb itrary and hasty"(176), but 
gives no reason fo r this verdict other than that derenaon presents no 
adequate evidence fo r  his thesis.
The value o f Gantayana1 s review is  impaired by its  brevity« he simply
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omits to give reasons fo r his erltloism s, or an alternative view. One 
supposes that he attacks the thesis o f the promlnenoe o f ta c tile  sensations 
in  aesthetic expsrioi.ee from tee standpoint of his ob jectifica tion  view: 
he considers that the sense o f touch has only a small role in aesthetic 
experience, contributing very few ob jectified  ideas, (o f .  Oh.II, above)
Why he should attack the thesis that in aesthetic experience ordinary 
psychical processes are in tens ified , is  simply not clear. He does not 
take up the matter elsewhere.
His remarks on painting in  "Reason in Art" are only a l i t t l e  less 
b r ie f.
Santayana begins by asking why some subjects are better rendered in 
a painting than in a sculpture, producing some uncontentloua answers:
"The isolated figure or simple group may seem cold apart from its  
natural setting. In rendering an action you may need to render 
its  scene, i f  i t  is  the circumstance that gives i t  value rather 
than the hero. You may also wish to trace out the aotion through 
a series o f episodes with many figu res."(177)
More contentious is  the thesis with which he follows up this opening 
remark:
" I t  may be said that any work is  essentia lly a picture which is 
conceived from a single quarter and meant to be looked at only in 
one ligh t. Objects in such a case need not be so tru ly apperoeived 
and appropriated ns they would have to be in true sculpture. One 
aspect su ffices: the subject presented is not so much constructed 
as dreamt."(178)
The d if f ic u lty  here attaches to  the alleged consequence: that the painter 
need not know his subject as w ell as the sculptor. Granted the meaning 
o f the term 'apperception' in Santayana's philosophy (of. seotion IV, 
above) there is  no ground fo r him to assert, without further argumentation.
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that the painter need not apperoeive so accurately aa the sculptor. V/hy 
he should say that an object represented in a painting is  "dreamt'*, what­
ever tnat may mean, is  not clear.
He continues with some very general remarks on the history o f 
representational painting. Archaic painting is  discursive and symbolic: 
"each figure is  treated separately and stuck side by side with the others 
upon a golden ground".(179) 3ut vision is  richer than discursive reports 
record i t .  At a la ter stage, decoration is  l e f t  to take care o f I ts e lf ,  
while, "pointing goes on to elaborate the symbols with which i t  begins, 
to make them symbolise more and more of what th e ir  object contains.. .The 
event w ill  be rendered in its  own language; i t  w i l l  not, to be recognised, 
have to appeal to words."(180) Repeating his doctrine that a l l  perception 
is  accompanied by an emotion normally ignored, Santayana arjues that 
progress in representational painting consists in a restoration to the 
image o f those elements o f perception ignored in  archaic painting:
" . . t o  restore l i f e  without losing significance, painting must proceed 
to accumulate symbol upon symbol, t i l l  the original impression 
is  almost restored, but so restored that i t  contains a l l  the artic­
ulation which a thorough analysis had given i t . "(181)
In the course o f th is development, Santayana claims, the painter, noticing 
what he has missed, adds colour to outline, modelling to  colour, and 
fin a lly  renders tin ts and values. .Representation passes from the 
statuesque to that in which theobjeets H e in their own atmosphere:
"They tend accordingly to lose th eir separate emphasis, in order 
to be like flowers in a fie ld  or trees in a forest. They become 
elements interesting oh ie fly  by th e ir  interplay, and shining by 
a ligh t which is  mutally re flec ted ."(182)
In favour o f these h istorical generalisations, i t  might be advanced 
that they can be stretohed to f i t  European representational painting from 
the Middle Agee to Impressionism, though th e ir  acceptability is bought at
the price o t  extreme vagueness. The presupposed and very undetailed 
psychology of creation has been commented on before, Combrlch's theory 
o f schema and correction w i l l  explain the Jevelopment o f representation 
in art fa r  more adequately than Santayana's few generalisations.
When the process described above is  completed, the resultant painting, 
in Santayana's sense o f the term, is  a landscape, (133) whether the scene 
i t  depicts is  indoors or not. In a landscape,
" . . . th e  observer, even in t .e presence of men and a r t i f i c ia l  
objects, has been overcome by the medium in which they swim. He is  
seeing the a ir and what i t  happens to  hold."(184*)
Perception and art, in th is phase, easily  grow mystical. Objects lose 
th eir individuality«
"A ll becomes ligh t and depth and a ir ,  and those particular objects 
threaten to vanish which we had hoped to  make luminous, breathing, 
and profound...There cease to be fixed  outlines, continuous colours, 
or discrete existences in nature."(185)
This dissolution is never complete, however, and this fo r  two reasons.
,,rt exists for the mind, and the mind is  articu late . Thus an a rt is t  must 
introduce units and divisions into his work. Secondly (as pointed out in 
Ch. VI, above) i t  is not the case that the immediate has no d iversity « 
there must be a basis in the iuMdiate for the distinctions of right and 
le f t ,  ligh t and shade. Thus, "a landscape cannot be so much as vaporous 
unless mists are distinguishable in i t ,  and through them some known object 
which they obscure."(186)
I t  is d if f ic u lt  to  see what Santayana was seeking to  gain by redefining 
the term 'landscape' as he does. Writers lik e  Clark and Triedlander agree 
that, in the earliest landscapes, nature is  treated symbolically. Objects 
are thought of in iso lation  and composed into a decorative pattern. Only 
la te r in the developra-nt o f landscape is  the fusion o f these elements 
achieved by the perception o f l ig h t . (187) The epistemology presupposed In 
the talk o f the immediate and its  d ivers ity  has been su ffic ien tly  discussed
(3U )
Santayana concludes his remarks on the fine arts in "lesson in Art" 
with the comment that, becoming impatient with the restraints imposed 
by representation, the painter may revert to pure decorative design. This 
reversion cannot be said to  be in any sense illeg itim a te . Sensuous l i f e  has 
a value within i t s e l f .  Beauty and expression arise when an outer image 
agreeably strikes an organ, arousing a sustained image in which the 
consciousness o f both image and reaction is  embodied. Abstract design 
csn occasion t ills  experience as easily  as can a representation.(183*)
The ob jectifica tion  theory o f beauty here adumbrated has been 
discussed in Ch.I, above. The remark that an abstract design can be 
beautiful is  tru is tic .
VI: Conclusion
Hopefully, i t  is now clear that the commentators who ignore these 
doctrines on the fine arts are by no means ju stified  in th e ir  omission. On 
music, fo r example, Santayana once again shows freedom from essentialism, 
and an awareness o f the contribution o f formal 'nd expressive properties 
to musical experience; his remarks on architecture show tolerance, and an 
appreciation o f s ty lis t ic  authenticity. His analysis o f representation, 
never referred to in the literatu re on the subject, is  as illuminating as 
any o f the more fashionable accounts. Like so much else considered above, 
th is analysis deserves better than its  present neglect.
In Ch. VI.
chapter V I I I :  Art and Morality
(315)
X» Introduction: Santayana and Some Classic Vlawa on the relations letwean 
Art and Morality.
"The L ife  o f iienson" is  primarily a work o f ethios. The views on 
epistemology and metaphysics, and on the various institutions o f human l i f e ,  
are elaborated subject to  a guiding moral aim: to work out the contribution 
o f each institu tion  to the good l i f e .  Accordingly, having put forward 
his views on the nature o f fine art together with special doctrines on the 
fine arts, i t  is  en tire ly  to  be expected that Santayana should devote the 
fin a l chapters o f " teason in Art" to  jU3t such a consideration o f art from 
the standpoint of the morality o f the rational l i f e .
The aims of the present chapter are to  make clear the type o f stance 
Santayana takes on the rela tion  o f art and morality by a b rie f comparison 
with two classic views on the subject} to  give a detailed, c r it ic a l  account 
o f his views, and f in a lly  to estimate the value o f what he has to  say in 
relation to  current analytica l methods in aesthetics.
»
Debates on the relations o f art and morality which can claim to be 
philosophically interesting have centered c la ss ica lly  around two opposed 
positions, which can be labelled u tilita r ia n  and autonomist respectively.
The u tilita r ian  claims that art is  subject to moral evaluation in the 
following way: the moral content o f a work o f art is a feature relevant to 
the determination of i t s  value as a work o f a rt. The view was held by 
U tilitarian  cr it ics  in the nineteenth century, and a similar position is  
put forward by Tolstoy in  "What is  Art?" The autonomist by contrast holds 
that the moral content o f a work o f art is  irrelevant to its  aesthetic 
merit, and quite often adds the lo g ica lly  independent rider that art is  
and ought to be quite unconnected with morality in every way, and (in  some 
cases) with l i f e  also. The supporters o f art fo r  a rt 's  sake, both in 
bngland a«J on the Continent, aooepted views o f th is kind.(VJllde is  used 
as an example in whot fo llow s). A b rie f discussion of these opposed opinions 
serves as a framework within which to locate Santayana' a views.
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Though post-dating the works o f the U tilita r ian  c r it ic s  against whom 
lau tter, Wilde and other aesthetes reacted, To lstoy 's  views in "What is  
Art?" are u tilita r ia n  in sp ir it and share the major defects o f the views 
o f less important w riters. Tolstoy defines art S3 the deliberate 
communication o f feelings between men by means o f external signs.(1) He 
continues that art,
" is  a means o f union among men join ing them together in the same 
fee lin gs , and indispensable for the l i f e  and progress towards well 
being o f Individuals and of humanity. " (2 )
The important point fo r  present purposes is  that Tolstoy here builds a 
va rie ty  o f u t i l i t y  in to the de fin ition  o f arts any "ork which fa i ls  to 
have the beneficent consequences he mentions is  not art, no matter what 
aesthetic virtues i t  might possess.
This oecomes clearer in remarks made la te r  on in the same essay, e.g.
" . . t o  say that a work o f art is  good but Incomprehensible to the 
majority of men, is  the same as saying o f some kind o f food that 
i t  is  very good but most people can't eat it...Perverted  a it may 
please the majority o f men, but good art always pleases every one."(3 )
Or again: "Creat works o f art are great because they are accessible and 
comprehensible to every one."(4.)
The assimilation o f art to food is ind icative o f the confusion of moral 
and aesthetic values central to the theories o f Tolstoy and the U tilitarian  
c r it ic s .  The value o f food la almost en tire ly  instrumental. Though i t  is 
possible to contemplate certain aspects o f food aesthetically (e .g . it s  
decoration, i f  any), and to have aesthetic experiences o f taste (o f. Chapter 
I I ,  above), such aspects and experiences are o f secondary importance. The 
primary value o f food lie s  in i t s  consequences, i . e .  keeping us a live  and 
w ell. 3y contrast, i t  has been argued above (o f .  Chapter VI) that i t  is a n 
necessary condition for an ob ject's  being a work o f art that i t  be an object 
o f the aesthetic attitude, i .e .  a psychically distanced or disinterested 
attitude. The value o f an object o f th is attitude, while an object o f the
▼
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attitude, I f  i t  has any, la  by de fin ition  in trin sic , not instrumental.
( I t  is  to  be noted in passing that this is  compatible with the view that a 
work o f art may hare an instrumental value, e.g. by conveying information, 
c f. Section I I I ,  below). The value o f e work o f art while contemplated as 
a work o f art is  therefore in tr in s ic . Granted th is, there is  no reason 
to accept To lstoy 's thesis that good art i3 by defin ition  in te l l ig ib le  to 
a l l .  Some art-education is  necessary i f  works o f art are to be fu l ly  
appreciated, and in certain cases the knowledge required fo r  fu l l  appreciat­
ion w ill  be extensive, e .g . in the case o f works o f art produced by artists 
with belie fs about art and the world rad iea lly d ifferen t from our own. That 
th is is so is  no fau lt o f the work o f art; i f  any blame is  to  be assigned 
concerning the unavailability o f a great deal o f art to a large number 
o f people, that blame must l i e  with the social system which deprives the 
majority o f it s  members o f the chance o f the art-education required. That 
makes a work o f art great is  the possession by i t  o f aesthetic virtues to 
a high degree, a matter independent o f its  general comprehensibility.
His confusion of moral and aesthetic values results in Tolstoy 's 
proposal o f a criterion  fo r the evaluation o f the subject-matter o f art 
from a moral, not an aesthetic, point of view. Since in hi3 view art 
consists in the deliberate transmission of feelings, i t  is  fee lin gs wh oh 
his criterion  must evaluate. Good feelings are those which help men along 
the road to perfection, which fo r  Tolstoy is  equivalent to a stats of 
universal brotherhood. Hence he concludes that kindness should be trans­
mitted by art, and a l l  unkind feelings excluded. Were this injunction 
obeyed, he considers, the feelings of men would progress toward perfection. 
I t  is  the function of art to  further this progress.(5)
The d if f ic u lty  here is  that Tolstoy is  arguing, in e ffe c t, that a 
certain subject-matter guarantees good art, whereas, as has been argued 
above (Ch. V I), the treatment o f the subjeot-matter 1b o f far greater 
Importance in determining the aesthetic quality o f a work o f a rt. (This is 
not to say, as certain members o f the aesthetic movement did, that subject—
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matter is  o f no importance whatever. Bradley is  surely right to 
distinguish between the thesis ( i )  that subject-matter guarantees or 
settles  nothing with regard to tne quality ot' a worn of a rt, and toe 
thesis ( i i )  that the subject count3 fo r nothing, i .e .  no subject-matter 
is  more promising than any other: the former is  true while the la tte r  is 
fa ls e .) (6)
Wilde and other members o f the aesthetic movement saw the confusion 
central to views such as these: no feature o f the subject-matter o f a work 
o f a rt, including the moral views advocated, guarantees aesthetic merit in 
that work. The d if f ic u lty  with the views of the aesthetes is  that they are 
marred by over-reaction to U tilitarian  criticism ; thus i t  was held that 
there is not and ought not to be any relation between art and l i f e .  More­
over, in W ilde's case at least, th is reaction included the retention o f 
some o f the eth ica l presuppositions o f the U tilitarians.
The crudity o f these presuppositions emerges in some remarks by Wilde 
in his essay, "The C ritic  as A rtis t" (co llected  in "Intentions", 1891). 
Elaborating his ideal o f the c r it ic  (in  his special sense o f the term), 
llde maintains that he (the c r it ic )  cannot possess the qua lities  of 
sincerity and fairnese, for such qualities border on the moral, "and the 
f ir s t  condition o f criticism  is  that the c r i t ic  should be able to recognise 
that the sphere o f Art and the sphere of Ethics are absolutely distinct 
and separate." (7 ) He continues:
"Art is  out of the reach of morals, fo r her eyea are fixed upon 
things beautiful and immortal and ever-changing. To morals belong 
the lower arid less In tellectual spheres."(8)
I t  becomes clearer elsewhere that, in Wilde's view, ethics deals only with 
action, and therefore is unconnected with the occupation o f the aesthetic 
c r it ic ,  contemplation. Hence he writes:
"while, in the opinion of society. Contemplation is  the gravest 
sin o f which any cltLzen can be gu ilty , in the opinion o f the 
highest culture i t  is  the proper oooupatlon of man." (9 )
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Moreover, since art is concerned to stimulate "exquisite s te r ile  emotions 
(19) fo r their own sake, not fo r the sake o f action, Wilde considers that 
art and the aesthetio l i f e  are Immoral, though he considers this more a 
recommendation than a drawback.(11)
I t  is  curious that Wilde should hold so crude an opinion of the subject 
matter o f ethics in view o f the high praise he lavishes on the Jreeks in 
general and A ristotle in particular, in the course o f this same essay. 
"Theoria" is  the highest a c t iv ity  o f man in A ris to tle 's  ethics: why, 
therefore, Wilde should re s tr ic t  the subject-matter o f ethics to action 
alone is  not clear.
While th is is  so, i t  o f course remains true that the central thesis 
put forward by Wilde is accurate: the morality o f a work o f art is  not an 
aesthetic virtue o f that work, and it  is  irrelevant to  advance this 
morality as a reason for rating the work highly as art. This is the point 
behind the aphorisms in the preface to "The Picture o f Dorian Dray": "No 
a rtis t has ehtical sympathies. An ethical sympathy in an a rtis t is an 
unpardonable mannerism o f s ty le ."(12) Or again: "A ll art 13 quite useless" 
(13»)
s’ar less acceptable are the doctrines which in Wilde accompany th is  
central thesis, f ir s t ly  that art ought not to be related to l i f e  (and so 
not to morality, e ith e r). iealism as a method is a complete fa ilu re and 
can result only in ugliness. The reason given is that, since real l i f e  
is  ugly and formless, any a rt is t ic  depiction o f i t  must be so too:
"Don't le t us go to  l i f e  for our fulfilment or our experience. I t  
is  a thing narrowed by circumstances, incoherent in  its  utterance, 
and without that fin e  correspondence of form and sp ir it  which is  
the only thing that can satisfy  the a rt is t ic  and c r it ic a l temper­
ament. " ( 14)
This protest against realism is  the central theme o f the essay, "The Decay 
o f Lying." The d if f ic u lty  with this view is  that i t  presupposes a 
principle which is  merely another version o f that used by Tolstoy. Where­
as the la tte r  holds that a certain subject-matter guarantees good art.
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Wilde holds that a certain subject-matter guarantees bad art. This la tte r  
view is open to  the same objection as the former, and indeed Wilde states 
i t ,  inconsistently, in his remark., "The treatment is  the te s t ."(15)
Closely related to th is is the thesis that the subject-matter o f art, 
which Wilde opposes to its  s ty le , should not concern uss
"The only beautiful things, as somebody once said, are the things 
that do not concern us. As long as a thing is  useful or necessary 
to us, or a ffects  us in any way, either fo r  pain or fo r pleasure, 
or appeals strongly to our sympathies, or is  a v ita l part o f the 
environment in which we liv e , i t  is outside the proper sphere o f 
a rt. To a rt 's  subject-matter we should be more or less ind ifferen t".
(16)
There is no need, at th is stage o f the present thesis, to work out a 
lengthy rebuttal of th is view: Santayana would agrea that any aesthetics 
which advocates neglect o f some aspect of the aesthetic object is  unaccept­
able, sinae it  must lead to an impoverished aesthetic response. Moreover, 
Wilde' 3 view (which Sautter had put forward ea r lie r ) entails that no 
functional object can be beautiful, a position which Is  obviously fa lse -  
witness many items of domestic u t i l i ty ,  the finest examples of which are 
beautiful: Wil e commits himself to finding the work o f Chippendale and 
Wedgwood ugly. (This Is not o f course to embrace the contrary fa lla cy  of 
functionalism, i .e .  that these objects are beautiful because they are 
useful. C f. Ch. V II, section iv , on functionalism)
Santayana, it  w i l l  be seen, generally avoids the confusions o f both 
views. He rejects the thesis that art is  in no way subject to moral 
censure, holding that, lik e  a l l  other numan institutions, its  contribution 
to the L i fe  o f ieason must be assessed, and that th is enquiry is  a moral 
one. Equally, he usually avoids the U tilitarian  confusion of moral and 
aesthetic virtues; but his position on th is point is  v itia ted  by Internal 
inconsistenoy. His more frequently expressed position is that aesthetic 
experience is se lf- ju s tify in g , and moreover provides a glimpse o f what
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the l i f e  o f Reason would be lik e  i f  i t  were realised, yet at one point, he 
seems to f a l l  into the U tilita r ian  confusion, holding that fin e  art is  
improved as art i f  i t  has a variety o f uses.
The only classic discussion o f a rt and morality with which Santayana 
deals e x p lic it ly  is  that o f Plato (in  "The Republic", Iks. TT, TTT and X). 
Art, Santayana begins, demands the time and e f fo r t  of a rt is ts . I t  demands 
that men .evote tneir liv e s  to  i t .  This involves expense, and impedes some 
possible a c t iv it ie s  while imposing others:
"On th is ground, from the ea r lies t times until our own, art has been 
occasionally attacked by moralists, who have fe l t  that i t  fostered 
ido latry or luxury or irresponsible dreams.1(17)
Plato was one such moralist. In Santayana's view, he overestimates the 
e ffe c t o f myths. Homer's stories about the gods (he asserts) can hardly 
have demoralised the youths who recited them. Santayana adds the general­
isation that, "No re lig ion  has ever given a picture o f the de ity  which man 
could have imitated without the grossest Immorality."(18)
Having thus b r ie fly  dismissed the criticism s of the early books o f 
"The Republic" with the bare statement that they are fa lse , Santayana turns 
to the argument o f the tenth Rooh, which he considers to oe more powerful, 
granted his own interpretation o f Plato. The Utopia described in "The 
Republic" is  in Santayana's view a church m ilitant, a fa llen  state coming 
sadly short of perfection. Plato therefore banished sensuous pleasures 
until l i f e  should be redeemed from baseness. The good fo r  him was 
e ffic ien cy  in a m ilitary state. Hence he condemns music and the drama: 
to excite passions id ly  was to enervate the 30ul. Again, representations 
in art lack u t i l i t y  value, and so must be excluded from the .Republic.(19) 
Plato wished to erase from the world everything productive o f discord:
"This waa done in the ultimate interest o f art and beauty, which in 
a cultivated mind are inseparable from the v ita l ly  good. I t  is  
mere barbarism to  fe e l that a thing is  aesthetioa lly good but morally 
e v i l ,  or morally good but hateful to perception..• i f  a thing were
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ugly it  would thereby not be wholly good, and i f  it were altogether 
good it would perforce be beautiful."(21)
These comisenta on Plato are contestable in several ways. In tne first 
place, Santayana's interpretation of the criticism of mimesis in the tenth 
Book presupposes his own highly contestable thesis that Pleto did not regard 
the Forms as existent entities.(21*) Secondly, there is no reason to 
accept Santayana's remarks on the relation of goodness and beauty. I f  what 
he says were true, then it  would be impossible to apply certain combinations 
of predicates meaningfully to the asme person or thing! no human being could 
be both beautiful and evil, or ugly and yet morally good. Such a corollary 
has only to be made explicit far its falsity to become apparent.
I I : Santayana on Art and Morality
Central to any discussion of the moral value of the effects of art Í3 the 
presupposed theory of the nature of aesthetic experience, Santayana's view, 
as has been made clear in several of the preceding chapters (e.g. Chs. I and 
VI) is that aesthetic experience is Immediate experience, i.e. acquaintance 
with the uhconceptualised flux of sense-data. This doctrine is defective in 
that the presupposed distinction between immediate and mediate experience 
is untenable (c f. Oh. V, above); and moreover, it is difficult to reconcile 
this view with other doctrines Santayana holds, e.g. that great works of 
art express Ideals, since an ideal is inconceivable without extensive 
conceptualisation. (Also cf. Ch. VI) This thesis as to the nature of 
aesthetic experience is used in several of the arguments which follow, each 
of which is thereby rendered unsound. Its untenability is noted here to 
avoid repetition of criticism.
A development is observable in the views on art and morality put 
forward by Santayana in his early period. In "The Sense of Beauty", as 
is noted above (Ch. I ) ,  he holds that a l l  intrinsic values are aeathetio. 
Consequently, a l l  intrinsically valuable activities provide aesthetic 
enjoyment. Describing the ideal life , the life  maae up of intrinsically
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valuable a c t iv it ie s , he writes:
"The variety o f nature and the in fin ity  o f art, with the companion­
ship o f our fe llow s, would f i l l  the leisure o f that ideal existence. 
These are the elements o f our positive happiness, the things which, 
amid a thousand vexations and vanities, make the clear p ro fit  o f 
liv in g . "(22)
Thus in "The Sense o f 3eauty", Santayana commits himself to the view that 
art (which in the terminology o f that book means fine a rt) provides 
in tr in s ica lly  valuable experiences, and would form part o f the ideal l i f e .
These views are consonant with some of those expressed in "Reason In 
A rt", e.g. that the experiences provided by art are lib era l ( i . e .  s e lf-  
ju s t ify in g .) On the other hand, the earlier views are d if f ic u lt  to 
reconcile with the la te r condemnations of aesthetic experience as super­
f i c ia l  and o f most works o f art as inauthentic. ”hus the lin e  o f develop­
ment in this early period was in general one o f increasing severity . As 
he developed the ethics o f the L ife  o f Season, Santayana became more 
sceptical of the power o f fin e art to  be an e ffe c tiv e  agent in bringing 
about thag>od l i f e .  None of these reservations occur in "The Sense of 
leauty“ , and there is  no general condemnation o f fine art from the moral 
point o f view in the early work.
Santayana's in it ia l  thesis in "Season in Art" is that art is  subject 
to  criticism  from the moral point o f view. The only way in which art could 
elude being subject to moral criticism  is  by disclaiming any serious role 
in  l i f e .  I f  i t  does claim seriousness, then,
" I f  an a r t is t 's  inspiration has been happy, i t  has been so because 
his work can sweeten or ennoble the mind and because i t s  to ta l 
e ffe c t w ill  be beneficent. Art being a part of l i f e ,  the criticism  
o f art is  a part o f morals."(23)
The function of ethics, in Santayana's view, is  to determine which 
combination o f satisfactions maximizes happiness. His enquiry into the
relationship o f art and morality accordingly takes the form o f answers to 
the follow ing questions about art«
"What d irect acceptaole contrioution does i t  make to the highest 
good? What sacrifices, i f  any, does i t  impose? What indirect 
influence does i t  evert on other a c t iv it ie s ?  <^ ur answer to these 
questions w i l l  be our apology fo r art, our proof that art belongs 
to  the L ife  o f iieason. "(24*)
These opening generalities have a certain vaguenessi no hint is  given 
o f the force o f qualifications such as "d irect" or "acceptable". Otherwise, 
3antayana's standpoint is  unassailable. He is not confusing moral and 
aesthetic values, merely setting out to investigate whether aesthetic 
enjoyment harmonises well with other goods in the L ife  o f Heason. Three 
lines o f argument are put forward in Chs. IX -  XI o f "Heason in Art" in 
defence o f art and aesthetic value.(25*)
Santayana seeks to  establish f i r s t ly  that a r t is t ic  a c tiv ity  is  both 
innocent and lib e ra l. He begins from a general premise in his theory of 
value.
No natural mood or impulse is  bad in i t s e l f }  i t  is only in their 
contact and mutual interference that they come to have disastrous consequen­
ces. Moralists who deprecate passion do so, i f  they are rational, only 
because passion causes havoc in the world. An innocent a c tiv ity , in 
Santayana’ s sense of the term, is  one which, i f  i t  does not concern I t s e l f  
with the world, at least does not Interfere with it t
"Now art, more than any other considerable pursuit, Is  abstract and 
inconsequential. 3orn of suspended attention i t  ends In i t s e l f .  I t  
encourages sensuous abstraction and nothing conoerns i t  less than 
to influence the world.*(26*)
Nor does art do so in any notable degree. Socia l changes no sooner reach 
expression in art than the sentiment changes and the sty le  comes to  look 
empty and ridiculous.
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Moreover, In the Individual, "art registers passions without stimulating 
themj on the contrary, in stopping to depict them i t  steals away their 
l i f e ;  and whatever Interest and delight i t  transfers to th eir expression i t
subtracts from their v ita l energy."(27) This is c learly  the case, Santayana 
contends, in erotic and re lig iou s  art. Though the a r t is t 's  purpose here 
is to arouse a practical impulse, he w ill  f a i l  to do so precisely insofar 
as he is  an a rtis t,
" fo r  he then w ill  seek to  move the given passions only through 
beauty, but beauty is  a r iva l object of passion in i t s e l f .  There 
is  a high breathlessness about beauty that cancels lust and super­
stition . "(28)
'when erotic  and religious subject-matter are treated in a rt, they are 
transfigured: they become "altogether in te llectu a l and sublime".(29)
To say that aesthetic experience is  innocent is  to say that such 
experience has no e ffect on the conduct of the remainder of one's l i f e .
This thesis is both false and inconsistent with other views held by 
Santayana. ( I t  also presupposes the untenable view o f aesthetic experience 
referred to above.) I t  is inconsistent f i r s t ly  with the view put forward 
In the 1908 paper, "Sculpture", that, in the aesthetic experience o f 
sculpture, the spectator undergoes a species o f moral regeneration: his own 
moral views are 'melted down* and 're ca s t '. I t  is  d if f ic u lt  to see how any 
force could be attached to these terms i f  Santayana maintains also that 
the experience has no practical repurcussions in ex tra -artis tic  a c t iv it ie s . 
(Of. Oh. VII on sculpture) The same criticism  applies to the more 
general doctrine o f which the view on sculpture is  a special case, namely 
that art expresses ideals. An ideal is  a goal o f action, and any a rt is t ic  
expression of them must be nugatory i f  aesthetic experience is  ineffectual. 
Moreover, i t  surely is the case that some works of art do express ideals -  
of action, of beauty, of fe e lin g , and so forth -  and that this is  one of 
the ways in whioh aesthetic experience manifestly does have repurcuasions
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in other areas of l i f e .  (Gf. Section H I ,  below.) Again, the remarks 
on the 'h igh breathlessness' o f beauty are seemingly quite 'ad hoc*. ’hey 
are unsupported, and lo g ica lly  independent o f the ob jectifica tion  theory 
o f "The Sense of 3eauty". F inally, the generalisations concerning th8 lack 
of v i t a l i t y  o f emotional reaction I p «esthetic experience s’*e manifestly 
fa lse . Writings on art frequently contain descriptions o f experiences o f 
qua si-m ystical Intensity occasioned by the aesthetic encounter. Since 
Santayana rejects the disinterest/distance account o f aesthetic experience, 
there is  no good reason to construe him here as making the valid but 
d iffe ren t point that emotions fe l t  during an aesthetic experience are 
subject to  the modifications undergone in the distanced state.
He continues th is f ir s t  major line o f argument with the thesis that 
aesthetic experiences are not only innocent but also liberals
"In  aesthetic a c t iv ity  we have...one side o f rational l i f e ;  sensuous 
experience is  dominated there as mechanical or social re a lit ie s  
ought to be dominated in science and p o lit ic s . Such dominion 
comes of having facu lties suited to  their conditions and consequent­
l y  finding an inherent satisfaction  in th eir operation."(30)
In other words, aesthetic experience is  se lf- ju s tify in g  or In trin s ica lly  
valuable; and since the ideal l i f e  consists In such in tr in s ica lly  valuable 
experiences, aesthetic experience affords a glimpse o f what th is ideal 
existence is  lik e . 3eauty is  the best hint o f ultimate good which the 
experience o f men has yet to offers
" . .a r t  in general is  a rehearsal o f rational liv in g , and reoasta 
in  idea a world which we have no present means of recasting in 
r e a lity . Yet this rehearsal reveals the glories o f a possible 
performance better than do the miserable experiments u n til now 
executed on rea lity . "(31)
Again, in  art there is  no r iva lry . The ambitions o f a rtis ts  are compatible 
with one another: "Art supplies constantly to contemplation what nature 
seldom a ffords in concrete experience -  the union o f l i f e  and peace" (32*)
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Aeeeptance of this claim depends largely on acceptance of the major 
assumptions involved: Santayana's theory of aesthetic experience, and the
etuio of tu« Life of .vs-oao. It might sees thot there Is another difficulty, 
one of Internal consistency. In, "interpretations of Poetry and Religion" 
and "Three Philosophical Poets" (c f. Ch.V, above), Santayana oondemns 
.omantic art for Its Irrationality. Thus he regards Goethe's 'Taust* as 
a paradigmatic example of Irrational ethics: the w ill to live Intensely, 
refusing to learn from experience. It might be objected that he cannot 
consistently commend a ll  art as a rehearsal of rational living. The 
problem is not serious, however, Later In his argument, he distinguishes 
between the basis of aesthetic experience, which is fleeting and deceptive, 
and its form, which is complete. To circumvent the present d ifficulty , 
3antayana would need only to draw a parallel distinction between the subject- 
matter of art and its form: the former might be irrational, while the latter 
might by its perfection afford a glimpse of the ideal. Again, had he 
continued to speak of aesthetic experience rather than art as affording 
a glimpse of the ideal, the difficulty would not have arisen.
The second major line of argument defending the place of art in the 
Life of Reason begins from the thesis, discussed in Chapter V, above, that 
the religion, manners, language and art of a society are a ll in large 
measure products of the imagination. Language, for example, does not 
provide a neutral and accurate report of the external world. Rather, it 
provides an abbreviated report, the abbreviations being largely determined 
by practical needs, but also by the genius of its  formulators: "Forms of 
poetry are forms of human life . Languages express national character and 
enshrine particular ways of seeing and valuing events."(33) The importance 
of these Imaginative productions is recognised by mankind, who have 
preferred death to life  under conditions imposed by alien imaginations.
It has been said that, apart from practical needs, language, religion, 
and so forth, are determined by the genius of their formulators. Santayana
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adds the thesis that this second, non-representative facet of human 
perception may t>e its most important sidei
"because it  represents, or even constitutes, the man. After a ll, 
the chief interest we have in things lies in what we can make of 
them or what they can make of us. ""hare is consequently nothing 
fitted to colour human happiness more pervasively than art does, 
nor to express more deeply the mind's internal habit. In educating 
the imagination art crowns a ll moral endeavour, which from the 
beginning is a species of art, and which becomes a fine art more 
completely as it works in a freer medium."(3A*)
Once again, the presuppositions employed by Santayana lead to a major 
difficu lty  in his position. He holds that religions, languages, and so 
forth, are a l l  symbol-systems, largely constructed in response to human 
needs, and that these systems are partial, providing a biassed and 
incomplete picture of the external world. He also holds that only sense- 
data are known by acquaintance, the external world being a hypothetical 
posit whose existence can never be conclusively established. The 
difficulty is that, granted the second thesis, he cannot in principle 
establish the first. He cannot hope to prove the partiality of the 
symbol-systems of the imagination. The consistent position for him would 
be to hold that it is impossible in principle to know whether the symbol- 
systems are exact or not. Moreover, it is d ifficu lt to reconcile this 
argument in justification of art with its predecessor. iantayana is 
committed to holding that artistic  activity is innocent, i.e . has no 
repureusslons in practical l i fe ;  here he maintains that nothing is fitted 
to colour human happiness so much as art. Art, and so iresumably its  
species fine art, is said to educate the imagination» and since in Santayana* 
view the imagination occupies a central position in the formation of 
concepts used in practical life , the present argument commits him to 
holding that fine art has practical repurousslons, via its effect on the 
imagination.
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A third major line of argument atraaaas tha ubiquity of aaathatio
values in experience. It relies heavily on the premise that aesthetic 
experience is  of the immediate, and is therefore vitiated by the untenabili^
o f this view.
* factor which complicates the calculation of the effect of art in the 
l i f e  of Reason (Santayana begins) is  the fact that what must be dealt with 
is  not merely art, separable as one phenomenon in life  among many, but 
aesthetic values in general, which are present everywhere:
"Aesthetic sensibility colours every thought, qualifies every 
allegiance, and modifies every product of human labour...there is  
an element of poetry inherent in thought, in conduct, in affection; 
and we must ask ourselves how far this ingredient is an obstacle 
to their proper development."(35)
dense is "the substance of experience" (36), and has its own value. Reason, 
in organising data, and making the burden of one moment relevant to that 
of another, may transform aesthetic judgments, but it owes its value to 
the material it  organises:
"..what could relevance or support be worth i f  the things to be 
buttressed were themselves worthless? It is not to organise pain, 
ugliness and boredom that reason can be called into the world."(37) 
The materials of reason, "are the perceptions which i f  fu l l  and perfect 
are called beauties." (38)
There is  a difficulty in this position beyond that of the untenable 
epistemology which is presupposed. It is not the case, on lantayana's 
own principles, thet reason would be valueless were its sensible material 
also without positive value. It is logically possible that existence could 
be unrelievedly ugly and painful, and moreover that this state could be 
mitigated but not eradicated by maximization of the harmony of interests 
by the use of reason. In this case, there would be a state of affairs in 
which the sensible materials of reason would s t i l l  have only negative value 
(which is presumably what dantayana means when he says, 'worthless') yet,
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contrary to Santayana's assertion, reason Itse lf  would surely have a 
positive value.
Continuing this third line of argument, Santayana maintains that,
"A right observance of aesthetic demands does not obstruct 
utility or logic} for utility and logic are themselves beautiful, 
while a sensuous beauty that ran counter to reason could never be 
in the end pleasing to an exquisite sense. "(39)
To pursue beauty to such an extent that we derange theory and practice is 
to deprive ourselves of a double beauty: (1 ) "the unlooked-for beauty 
which a genuine and stable system of things could not but betray" (40) J and 
( i i )  "the coveted beauty itse lf, which, being Imported hero into the 
wrong context, w ill be rendered meretricious and offensive to good taste," 
(4 1 ) e.g. rhetoric in diplomacy.
Even ignoring the presuppositions involved, these remarks lack 
cogency. In the first quotation in the preceding paragraph, Santayana 
appears to maintain that whatever is useful is beautiful} and in the 
second that any "stable system of things", whatever that might mean, 
mu3t be beautiful also. Ue gives no argument whatever in favour of thase 
propositions} nor does he link them to the objectification theory of "The 
Cense of Beauty". Again the example of rhetorio in diplomacy Is a bad 
one, since he is ovidently trying to give an example of a Juxtaposition of 
elements both unusual and inept.
Santayana adds two concluding points on the ubiquity of aesthetic 
values. Hot only are aesthetic values present before the organisation of 
data by reason, but afterwards reappear in rational products, e.g. "A 
mechanical system, such as astronomy in one region has already unveiled, 
is an inexhaustible field for aesthetic wonder."(42) Secondly, "an 
aesthetic sanction sweetens a ll successful living," since "Whatever is to 
be representative in Import must first be immediate in experience} what­
ever la transitive in operation must at the same time be actual in being." 
(43)
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The second of these points is a ¡sere consequence of Santayana's 
epistemology, and fa lls  with i t .  The first is  a contingent truth, but one 
which is independent of Santayana's principles. It  Is not clear how he 
wishes to relate this proposition to his earlier claim that the value of 
reason is entirely a consequence of the value of its data. There is some 
tension between these two positions, since it  must follow from the latter 
thesis that the beauty revealed in a rational construction is dependent on 
reason for its revelation. I f  reason can thus reveal beauty not apprehens­
ib le in its data, then reason must have a value of its own. Without the 
organisation imposed by reason, the particular beauty referred to would not 
be revealed.
Using his ethical and epistemological presuppositions, Santayana adds 
to these arguments some general reflections on the place which fine art 
ought to occupy in the l i fe  of the individual. No general stipulation as 
to the amount of time to be spent on fine art can be given* the rational 
position to adopt is that this amount of time should depend on the degree 
to which contact with art promotes the happiness of the individual concern« 
Santayana describes the type of temperament to which he thinks fine art 
most necessary and congenial*
"A mind at once sensuous and mobile w ill find its appropriate 
perfection in studying and reconstructing objects of sense. Its 
rationality w ill appear chiefly on the plane of perception, to 
render the circle of visions which makes up its li fe  as delightful 
as possible. For such a man art w ill be the most satisfying, the 
most significant activity, and to load him with material riches or 
speculative truths or profound social loyalties w ill be to impede 
and depress him."(44*)
The artistic temperament is  Bohemian.
These remarks furnish a „urther example of the difficulties into 
which Santayana is led by his identification of aesthetic with immediate 
experience. It is a consequence of the above that no artist qua artist
can be interested in social or philosophical problems. This is not only- 
false but inconsistent with other views Santayana holds. He maintains, 
for example, that pnilosopnic comprenensiveness is  a necessary condition 
for greatness in poetry (o f. Ch.V, above), and it is difficult to see how 
this is to be achieved unlesn the ooet does occupy himself with what 
antayana calls "speculative truths".
The three arguments considered so far -  to show that artistic activity 
is innocent and liberal; that imaginative constructs are vital to man; 
and that aesthetic values are ubiquitous and primary -  are a ll  In defence 
of fine art and aesthetic experience. The points of view set out in the 
two final chapters of "Reason in Art" are in varying degrees condemnatory 
of both. As a result, it is by no means easy to see clearly just what 
position Santayana is inclined to allow to art in the life  of Reason.
The great obstacle which art finds in attempting to be rational, 
Santayana begins, is its functional isolation. To approach the ideal of 
rationality, art must diffuse its processes and no longer confine them to 
"a set o f dead and unproductive objects celled works of a rt". (¿5) He 
claims, without argument, that works of art are in general lacking in 
vita lity  and do not minister to needs felt on the pulses
"Why art, the most vital and generative of activities, should 
produce a 3et of abstract Images, monuments to lost intuitions, 
is a curious mystery.. .Why should mind, the actuallsatlon of 
naturdh powers, produce something so Inferior to itse lf, reverting 
in its expression to material being, so that its witnesses seem 
so many fossils with which it strews its path?"(^6)
It is  difficult to see why Santayana should Indulge in such vast and 
untenable generalisations i f  what he says were true, it  is a mystery why 
the art of the past ever survived, and why it la an object of concern on 
any scale at present. Moreover, these remarks bring further difficulties  
of Internal consistency. His first argument in defence of aesthetic 
activity, above, contains the proposition that this activity is liberal or
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self-justi fylng; yet here he condemns fine art, the oause of such liberal 
experiences. Again, In the quotation above, he appears to regard matter
as in some way inferior to mind, a view aouaiy absurd in view of his 
materialistic monism on the one hand (mind is the form of matter, in his 
view, not another type of substance), and his stress on the importance 
of the materials of a work of art on the other, (o f. Ch.II, above, on this 
last point.)
Santayana continues that, the more numerous the rational harmonies 
present to the mind, the more sensible movements w ill be going on there to 
give immediate delights the expectation of an ulterior good is a present 
good also. A richer complex of emotions is produced by what is humanly 
necessary than by what is idly conceived. I f  the products of fine art can 
fu lf i l  "practical exigencies," they w ill thereby be provided with "moral 
functions which it  is a pleasure to see them fu l f i l . "(4-7) Hence Santayana 
notes with approval that, "Architecture may be useful, sculpture commem­
orative, poetry reflective, even music, by its expression, religious or 
martial. "(4.3) Some generalised informal psychology is introduced to 
support this claim:
"The truth is that mere sensation or mere emotion is an indignity 
to a mature human being,..Any absolute work of art which serves 
no further purpose than to stimulate an emotion has about it a 
certain luxurious and visionary taint..Art, so long as it needs 
to be a dream, w ill never cease to prove a disappointment. Its 
facile cruelty, its narcotic abstraction, can never sweeten the 
evils we return to at home} it can liberate half the mind only by 
leaving the other half in abeyance."(49)
It is at this stage of the argument that Santayana appears to fa l l  
into the confusion of moral and aesthetic v irues referred to in Section I ,  
above. He maintains here that architecture is better art for its utility, 
sculpture better art for being commemorative, and so on, attempting to
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support these views with the informal psychology quoted. Yet it is quite 
clear that the mere fact that a piece of sculpture is commemorative, or 
triet a piece of music is of martial expression, is entirely unconnected 
with its merit qua work of art. On the principle here put forward by 
Santayana, it  follows that the most derivative of marches is more valuable 
than, say, a late Beethoven piano sonata, granted that the latter expresses 
neither of the types of feeling to which Santayana here gives his blessing. 
Moreover, the informal psychology itse lf involves d ifficu lties. In the 
f irs t  place, the thesis that mere sensation is in some sense an indignity 
to a mature human being is inconsistent with Santayana's later ethic of 
the spiritual l i fe ,  discussed in the following chapter. Secondly, the 
claims here put forward are le ft  unsupported and do not cohere closely. 
Santayana merely asserts that most so-called works of art are simply 
narcotic in effect; and then adds the seemingly .gratuitous rider that these 
works share the quality of 'fac ile  cruelty' -  why this quality in 
particular is not at a ll  clear, possibly Just an association of ideas 
private to Santayana.
?Te continues by indicating what, in his view, is needed so to modify 
art as to remove it from itB present irrational and narcotic state so that 
it  should become "a truly rational retivity'' (50). In order for this to 
come about,
. Jwe should have to knit it more closely with other rational 
functions, so that to beautify things might render them more 
useful and to represent them most imaginatively might be to see 
them in their truth. "(51)
Occasionally, such a state of affairs obtains, as in the work of artists 
such as Ieonardo or dophocles. To bring this ideal about, two things are 
neeeasaryt more knowledge and better taste.
Knowledge would alter what is found satisfying in the arts, for a man 
cannot relish pictures of the world which wantonly misrepresent it.
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"Myth and metaphor remain beautiful so Ion?; as they are the most 
adequate or graphic means available for expressing the facts, but
so soon as they cease to be needful and sincere they become false 
finery."(52)
In the eventuality of art being brought round to expressing reality, it 
would s t i l l  have to satisfy the senses:
"..but this study would now accompany every activity, taste would 
grow vastly more subtle and exacting...All arts would be practised 
together and merged in the art o f life , the only one wholly useful 
or fine among them. "(53)
These remarks demand several oo.mnents, firstly , the notion that ert 
in some sense provides a picture of the world can hardly be extended to 
architecture, whose ideal form should therefore be specified separately 
by Santayana, Secondly, the thesis about mythology may be acceptable or 
not, depending on exactly what is mea't, It is true i f  a ll that is  
intended is that myth cannot be used authentically as a true description 
of nature at any point in history when it has ceased to be a genuine option 
to the mind in that role. It is false to experience i f  what is meant is 
that it  is impossible to take aesthetic pleasure in works of art which 
contain authentic expositions or uses of beliefs which one believes to be 
false -  otherwise a great deal of art from the past would have no interest 
for spectators of the present day. fina lly  one notes again, in the "inal 
quotation of the preceding paragraph, the presupposition concerning 
aesthetic experience} Santayana considers that it is the business of the 
fine arts to please the senses alone.
The preceding arguments condemnatory of fine art occur in Chapter X of 
"ieason In Art". The tone of the fina l chapter is not so condemnatory as 
this, but on the other hand not so much in favour of fine art as Chapter IX.
The aim of the life  of ieason is the maximization of happiness by the 
use of reason to harmonise human wants and needs. The greatest enemy 
harmony can have (Cant ay ana begins) is a premature settlement in which
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some essential force Is wholly disregarded. The excluded element w ill 
bring disorders until it is recognised. Of a ll  premature settlements, 
the most premature is  that usually established by the fine arts:
"A harmony in appearance only, one that touches the springs of 
nothing and has no power to propagate its e lf , is so nartial and 
momentary a goal that we may justly ca ll it an illusion. .A lovely 
ream is an excellent thing in itse lf, but it leaves the world no 
less a chaos and makes it  by contrast seem even darker that it 
did. "(54)
For this reason, the fine arts are seldom an original factor in human 
progress.
Yet while it is  true that aesthetic harmony is so incomplete in its  
basis as to be fleeting and deceptive, it  is also true that it i3 complete 
in its form:
"This so partial synthesis is a synthesis indeed, and Just 
because settlements made in fancy are altogether premature, and 
ignore almost everything in the world, in type they can be the most 
perfect settlements."(55*)
The artist may urge -  and justly so, in Santayana's view -  that appearances 
are alone actual, and that to bring about a perfect appearance is, "to have 
justified for the f irs t  time whatever may underlie appearance and to have 
put reality to some use. "(56) The cumbrous instrumental activities pract­
ised on the world are vain by comparison.
Further on this theme, Santayana considers the pros and cons of what 
he calls "detached indulgences". It is quite conceivable that a moment 
of perfect happiness should prove a source of lasting unhappiness, for it 
may be that the impulse satisfied in the happy moment is incompatible 
with a majority of others. Hence,
"That art, also,should often be an Indulgence, a blind that 
hides reality from ill-balanced minds and ultimately increases
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their confusion, is by no means incompatible with art's ideal 
essence. On the contrary, such a result is  inevitable when ideality 
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excellent the vision the greater havoc it makes i f ,  being 
inadequate, it  established itse lf authoritatively in the soul."(57)
These remarks are largely consequences of the conjunction of Santayana's 
theory of aesthetic experience, the ethic of the l i f e  of Season, and some 
informal psychological generalisations. It is surprising, however, that 
Santayana should consider thnt the artist provides any real justification 
for his activity with the claim that appearances are alone actual. The 
theme of "leason in Common Sense" as a whole is precisely that the progress 
of rationality consists in extension of knowledge of se lf and the world: 
reason in various ways dominates the flux of experience, constructing the 
common-sense view of the world. Santayana is therefore committed to 
regarding any regression to mere appearances as a decline from rationality. 
He ought therefore to maintain that the justification here attributed to 
the typical artist i3 no justification at a ll.
He continues by drawing consequences from his presuppositions which 
outline the form art would take in the context of a more rational life . The 
ideal artist (i.e . the rational artist) is one who learns to love what 
conduces to his own development. He would be happy, not in having now and 
then a happy moment, but, "in having light and resource enough to allow him 
to cope steadily with real things and to leave upon them the vestige of his 
own mind."(58)
presumably this ideal artist would only be interested in what 
Santayana refers to os 'real things', since it is a characteristic of the 
rational man that he finds what is  unreal uninteresting:
"The conditions of existence, after they are known and accepted, 
become conditions for the only pertinent beauty. In each place, 
for each situation, the plastic mind finds an appropriate ideal.
It need not go afield to Import something exotic."(54)
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In other words, a happy result In art, as In l i fe ,  can only be secured by 
intelligence:
"We fa i l  in practical affairs when we ignore the conditions of 
action and we fa il in works of imagination when we concoct what 
I3 fantastic and without roots in the world."(60)
A rational pursuit of happiness would involve every fin» art and would 
render the world pervasively beautiful:
"The closer we keep to elementary human needs and to the natural 
agencies that may satisfy them, the closer we are to beauty..the 
more unfeignedly human happiness was made the test of a l l  institut­
ions and pursuits, the more beautiful they would be, having more 
numerous points of fusion with the mind, and fusing with it more 
profoundly."(61)
The first part of this sketch of the ideal form of art is marred by a 
difficulty of omission. It  is not clear why closeness to human needs 
should render any object beautiful, as opposed to satisfying or pleasant.
On the objectification theory of "The Sense of Beauty", an aesthetic object 
w ill be beautiful only i f  it is such that the pleasure produced by looking 
at It, listening to It, etc., is projected back onto the object and 
regarded es a quality of it . Santayana gives no reason to connect either 
of the qualities specified with objectification. His talk of points of 
fusion with the mind is unclear and unexplained. The present remarks on 
beauty do not oohere adequately with those of the earlier work.
He contino. - that art cannot be rational until 30ci»ty Is so too -  he 
considers that art is in some sense a symptom or result of the state of 
society, not a cause of it :  aa he has said, artistic activity is innocent. 
At present, art Is neither genuine, native, nor inevitable; Its coming to 
De so would demand a radical re-organisation of society:
"We should have to abandon our vested Illusions, our irrational 
religions and patriotisms and schools of art, and to discover 
Instead our genuine needs, the forms of our rxasslble happiness."(62)
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At present, our ideals are a rtific ia l, demanding artific ia l institutions to 
keep them up.
I f  art is an aberration from rational practice, it is no marvel that 
the irrational artist himself should be in a certain sense a vagrant* 
"...such an erratic workman does not deserve the name of artist 
or master; he has burst convention only to break it , not to create 
a new convention more in harmony with nature."(63)
The artist ought rather to  conduct himself so as to contribute to the ideal 
of "giving practice everywhere the greatest possible affinity to the 
situation, the most delicate adjustment to every faculty i f  affects." (6 4 ) 
''hat it should seem natural to identify the artist with the dreamful 
eccentric is a scandal.
Like the great majority of sweeping generalisations put forward by 
Santayana, those above involve him in d ifficu lties. The thesis that a ll  
contemporary ideals are confused entails, granted Santayana's premisses, 
that a ll  contemporary art is inauthentic, a statement which hardly needs 
to be falsified  at length. Moreover, Santayana has maintained above that 
aesthetic experience affords us our best glimpse of the ideal: why then 
deny the name of artist to the producer of the objects which occasion 
these experiences?
lantayana concludes with a point concerning art in his broad sense 
of the term (any activity which modifies the environment in a manner 
advantageous to the agent). I f  happiness is the ultimate sanction of art, 
art in turn is the best instrument of happiness:
"In art more directly than in other activities man's self-expression 
is cumulative and finds an immediate reward; for it  alters the 
material conditions of sentience so that sentience becomes at once 
more delightful and more significant...the emergence of arts out of 
instincts is the token and exact measure of nature's success and of 
mortal happiness." ( 65)
This point is a simple consequence of the conjunction of the definition of
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art In the brood sense with the presuppositions of the Life of Reason, and 
stands or fu lls  with them.
While dealing with art and morality, Santayana puts forward his views 
on taste. The Life of Season is the life  of harmonious interests. As 
many features of life  as possible must be made to contribute to this 
harmony, and taste is no exception. Hence Santayana's definition of 'good 
taste' as,
"that taste which is a good possession, a friend to the whole man.
It must not alienate him from anything except to a lly  him to some­
thing greater and more fertile  in satisfactions.'•(6 6 )
Good taste results from experiences from having discovered which satisfact­
ions tend to maximize the harmony of human interests. The views on taste 
which follow are an elaboration of this notion of rational taste. He does 
not discuss major classic issues connected with taste, such as the logic of 
the judgment of taste, which had occupied Kant.
Dogmatism In matters of taste Is in Santayana's view in evitable, but It 
may be enlightened. It is inevitable, and in itia lly  justified by sincerity 
because taste is a systematic expression of a man's preferences. Dogmatism 
becomes absurd when Its basis in a particular disposition is  ignored, and 
it pretends to have an absolute or metaphysical scope. It  Is enlightened 
wnen a man asserts his preferences, aware as he does so of their "necessary 
ground in his nature"(67), and of the no less legitimate feelings of others
Since taste is an exposition of preferences, a criterion of taste 
(Santayana continues) is no more than taste itself In its deliberate and 
more circumspect form»
"The very instinct that is satisfied by beauty prefers one beauty 
to another; and we hnve only to question and purge our aesthetic 
feelings in order to obtain our criterion of taste. " ( 6 8 ) 
iefleotlon refines our particular sentiments by bringing them into
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sympathy with a l l  rational life . Consequently, there is the greatest 
possible difference in authority between taste and tastet
"...w hile  delight in drums and ea&l<fc feathers is perfectly genuine
and has no cause to blush for it s e lf ,  it cannot be compared in scooe 
or representative value with delight in a symphony or an epic."(6 9 )
3 ao often, Santayana misses out many of the assumptions on which the 
acceptability of his remarks depends, "'or example, from the single thesis 
that taste has been rationally integrated into life  a3 a whole, it does 
not follow that one taste differs in authority from another. A supplement­
ary principle for evaluating taste is assumed in an undeveloped premises 
that the greater the 'scope' or 'representative value' of taste, the 
greater its authority. One can make sense of this by referring to the ideal 
of rational poetry (c f. Ch.VII), 3ince rational poetry is distinguished by 
its  truth and scope. To take genuine pleasure in works characterised by 
these qualities is to be more fu lly  rational, and to stand a better chance 
of happiness, for to be rational is to have knowledge of 3elf and environ­
ment and to act on it .
Yet even when filled  out in this way, Santayana's remarks involve 
difficu lties. In the first place, the objects of taste in his serss are 
not aesthetic properties of an aesthetic object, but its truth and scope: 
this is another form of the difficulty mentioned in Chapter VII in 
connexion with the ideal of rational poetry, i.e . that Santayana makes 
greatness in poetry dependent on properties of its subject-matter. Secondly, 
he seems to assume here that to reflect and formulate one's criterion of 
taste is 'ipso facto' to bring taste into sympathy with a ll  rational life .
Yet on Santayana's own premisses there is no reason to assume that this 
should be sos I might formulate my aesthetic preferences fully and 
explicitly, but Indulge them to an irrational degree, i.e . in such a way as 
to cause disruption among my other interests.
Santayana's remaining remarks on taste consist of a survey of tour ways
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in which tastea can be said to d iffer. The flra t and entirely unoontentious 
way la in reapect of volume, i.e . aesthetic feeling, in different people,
may rna&e up a different fraction of l i fe  nnu Vary greatly in quantity, 
hven among those who are devotees of beauty (Santayana asserts) intense 
aesthetic experience is a rarity:
"To beauty men are habitually insensible, even while they are 
awake and rationally active. Tomea of aesthetic criticism hang on 
a few moments of real delight and intuition."(70)
Tastes d iffer secondly in respect of vivacity of feeling. Santayana 
introduces the point via some psychological generalisations on the origins 
of standards of taste:
"Taste is formed in those moments when aesthetic emotion is 
massive and distinct; preferences then grown conscious, judgments 
then put into words w ill reverberate through calmer hours; they 
w ill constitute prejudices, habits of apperception, secret standards 
for a l l  other beauties."(71)
Such moments usually occur in youth, which in this respect governs 
maturity.
Prom these unsupported generalisations, Santayana turns to equally 
generalised and unsupported historical views: a race which genuinely 
loves beauty has the same place in history as the authoritative moments 
just referred to in the life  of the individual. Hence, in Santayana's 
view, we should accept, on authority, the aesthetic verdicts of the Greeks. 
For example, we should accept that,
"imitation is a fundamental principle in art, and that any rational 
judgment on the beautiful must be a moral and political judgment, 
enveloping chance aesthetic feelings and determining their value."(7<J 
By contrast, what most German philosophers have written on art and beauty 
is of minimal importance: "it treats a rtific ia l problems in a grammatical 
spirit, seldom giving any proof of experience or imagination."(73)
The second passage quoted in the preceding paragraph is of special
in terest as revealing clearly  the extent o f the Greek influence on 
Santayana. The importance of the notion o f imitation in Greek aesthetics
explains why Santayana should consider only representational painting and 
sculpture in "Reason in A rt", andwhy he should take the view, in the present 
chapter, that art is  subject to  moral censure. The wholesale dismissal of 
German thought (Kant included, one supposes) merely repeats Santayana's 
usual position on the subject. Acceptance o f the remarks on the authority 
o f the Greeks depend very la rge ly  on the prior acceptance o f the whole 
apparatus of the L ife  o f Reason, and of the unarmed fo r assumption that 
the Greeks more nearly lived th is  l i f e  than any other race.
” he third respect in which tastes d if fe r  is  that o f purity or consist­
ency. i . e . ,  they may be "inwardly confused or outwardly confusing."(74)
A th ing 's  attractions may be "partly  at war"(75) with Its  ideal function.
In such a case, what we in i t ia l ly  found beautiful becomes hateful on a 
second view, and according to the "key" o f our dissatisfaction we ca ll the 
e f fe c t  meretricious, harsh, or affected: "These discords appear when 
elaborate things are attempted without enough art or refinement; they are 
essen tia lly  in bad tas te ."(76) Rudimentary e ffec ts , by contrast, never 
have an in trinsic defect, and can disappoint only in comparison with the 
expectation o f something else which is  richer. To cease to be able to 
enjoy rudimentary e ffects  is to  show a certain sophistication and disease.
Vulgarity Santayana considers to be a d ifferen t matter, and finds its  
essence in contradiction:
"An old woman in a blond wig, a d irty  hand covered with Jewels, 
ostentation without d ign ity, rhetorlo without cogency, a ll offend 
by an inner contradiction."(77)
Barbaric art displays this sort o f confusion and absurdity: the a rt is t  
p iles  up splendour on splendour, driven by blind Impulse or tradition ,
producing only chaos.
To remove these defects, a l l  that is  needed, in Santayana s view, is  
"quickened in telligence". Monstrosity consists in being composed o f
elements which are incompatible, and a quickened in te lligence w ill notice 
the incompatibility:
" le t  him ( i .e .  the person with quickened in te lligen ce) but enact 
his sensations, le t  him pause to make exp lic it the confused hints 
that threaten to stupefy him; he w ill  find that he can follow  out 
each o f  them only by rejecting and forgetting the others. "(73)
A quickened in telligence w ill  either abandon what is  barbarous as confused, 
or w ill  disengage its  compatible elements and turn them into a number o f 
rational beauties.
The d if f ic u lty  with th is th ird  feature o f  taste -  i f  'd i f f ic u lty ' is 
not too strong a term -  is  that a good deal of rhetoric is  being used to  
clothe a view which, even i f  true, is  quite commonplace, namely that i t  is  
a necessary condition fo r good taste that one be able to judge whether the 
elements o f an aesthetic object are mutually appropriate, and cohere without 
clashing. The examples given o f both impurity and inconsistency o f taste 
can be analysed in terms of the more basic concept o f appropriateness: both 
the over-complex object, and the examples given o f vu lgarity involve elements 
which do not cohere in the manner in which those o f a successful aesthetic 
object have long been noticed to  do. Moreover, l i t t l e  elucidation o f the 
concept of vu lgarity  is provided by introducing the notion o f contradiction. 
Since, in i t s  basic usage, only propositions can be contradictory, its  use 
here must be in some extended, sense; but Santayana does not say what th is 
sense is . Why introduce an undefined third concept when the notion o f 
appropriateness w ill  do just as well?
Fourthly and fin a lly , tastes d if fe r  in  pertinence and width of appeal, 
once purified , taste has a further progress to make. A criterion  o f taste 
must tru ly represent the interests over which i t  would preside. Even a 
rational id ea l may not be permanent:
" I t  needs a material basis, a so il and a situation propitious to 
i t s  growth. This basis, as i t  varies, makes the ideal vary which
(345)
is  simply its  expression; and therefore no ideal can be ultimately 
fixed in  ignorance o f the conditions that may modify i t . " ( 79)
There are many undiscovered ideals; and many Ideals once embodied are now 
los t, because th e ir  material basis has changed. : erfeet ideals once real­
ised may vanish:
"The achievement may have been perfect; nature w ill rot on that 
account stop to  admire i t .  She w ill  move on, and the meaning which 
was read so triumphantly into her momentary attitude w i l l  not f i t  
her new posture."(30)
Nature has no ideal o f her own. In lieu  o f an ideal, she has a 
constitution, o f which ideals must take account. I f  a work of art is to 
be impressive, i t  must have significance fo r  humanity at large or to 
whatever audience i t  is addressed. Hence the following are the questions 
the c r it ic  should ask of the work o f a rt:
"Has i t . . . th e  a ff in it ie s  needed fo r such intercourse? Is  i t  humane, 
is  i t  rational, i 3 i t  representative? To its  inherent incommunicable 
charms i t  must add a kind o f courtesy. I f  i t  wants other approval 
than it s  own, i t  cannot afford to regard no other aspiration."(81*) 
Thi3 scope, th is  wide appeal, is  necessary to good taste:
"A ll authority is  representative; force and inner consistency are 
g ifts  on which I  may w ell congratulate another, but they give him 
no right to speak fo r me. Either aesthetic experience would have 
remained a chaos -  which i t  is  not altogether -  or i t  must have 
tended to  conciliate certain general human demands and ultimately 
a l l  those interests which its  operation in any way a ffe c ts ."(82)
Most of these remarks are straightforward consequences o f the pre­
suppositions o f the l i f e  o f Reason. I t  need only be noted in conclusion 
that once again, in his stress on the scope and representative quality o f 
good taste and good works of art, Santayana is  making aesthetic merit 
dependent on qualities o f  subject—matter. At least, th is is  so i f  he is 
consistent in doctrine throughout "The L ife  o f reason". No hint is  given
that 'representative' and so forth, have a d ifferen t meaning here than
elsewhere in the work.
i i i i  analysis, ~rt aui norallty
What Santayana has to say about art and morality oar* be described as an 
enquiry o f the follow ing kind: the working out o f  a normative moral 
evaluation of the contribution o f a rt, aesthetic value, and aesthetic 
experience to the good l i f e ,  using an apparatus of philosophical pre­
suppositions in conjunction with informal psychological generalisations. A 
great deal o f what is  said would now be considered to border on the unphil- 
oaophical, and this sty le o f enquiry not to be the business o f the analytic 
philosopher. An analyst who ventures an opinion on such subjects speaks 
not qua philosopher, but qua moralist, sociologist and psychologist.
In view of this change o f opinion as to what enquiries are properly 
philosophical, two subjects must be b r ie fly  considered: f ir s t ly ,  to consider 
what is  involved in an analytical consideration o f the relations o f art and 
morality -  to attempt to fu l l  analytical view would require a thesis to 
i t s e l f .  Secondly, to suggest b r ie fly , by means o f avowedly Informal 
psychology and a normative moral position, an alternative to some of the 
substantive views put by Santayana. Once again, the immense complexity of 
the issues involved quite precludes the working out o f a developed altern­
ative in the present context.
The difference between the conoeptual and substantive enquiries on this 
subject emerges clearly  i f  one considers a group of questions, each of 
which is  obviously relevant to the question o f how art and m orality are 
related:
( i )  does art convey a moral content?
(11) I f  so, is  the moral content o f a work of art a relevant factor 
In evaluating i t  as a work of art?
( i l l )  should a work o f art convey a moral content?, i .e .  is  having a 
moral content a necessary condition for good or great art? (In
the preeent usage, 'good' and ‘ great’ are both aesthetic verdict 
terms, the la tte r  giving a higher ranking than the former.)
( i v )  does the experience occasioned by works of art lead to either an 
enhancement or a deterioration in the moral state o f the spectator?
(v ) does art make l i f e  better or worse, and in what ways?
■’’he f i r s t  three questions can be treated an a ly tica lly  while the last two 
are substantive -  they involve psychology, sociology, -nd a normative 
eth ica l position.
In order to answer the analytical questions, a position must be taken 
up on some complex conceptual issues: on the lo g ica l grammar o f the term 
•art' and on the defin ition  of the notions o f the aesthetic and the morel, 
the f i r s t  question is equivalent to : is  i t  a necessary condition for art 
that the object designated have the property o f  in some way conveying a 
moral belie f?  The second question presupposes some defin ition  o f what i t  
is  fo r  a property to  be asethetic; and the th ird  presupposes an answer to 
the second.
s’rom the analytic positions sketched out in  the present thesis, in 
reply to Santayana, i t  follows that the answer to  each of the conceptual 
questions is negative. The only necessary condition for the U3e of the 
terms 'a r t ' ahd 'work o f a rt ' is  that the object so designated be an object 
o f aesthetic interest, and i t  is  not therefore a necessary condition fo r  
art (e t c . )  that the object convey a moral content. This is  made clear by 
counter-examples: i t  would be d if f ic u lt  to extract a moral recommendation, 
positive or negative, from some of iabo’ s sculptures, or from musical 
cameos such as the t r i f le s  composed by K re is ler. (83*)
Nor is  the moral content o f a work o f a rt, i f  i t  has one, an aesthetic 
virtue or v ice, in the normal usage o f the term 'aesth etic '. I f  i t  were, 
i t  would be commonplace and legitimate to claim that the Homeric epics are 
great partly because they describe heroic m orality} or "The Divine Comedy"
great partly because i t  describes Christian morality} or "A iebours" rent 
partly ; cause i t  describes a decadent aestheticism 5 or, on the other hand.
Again, i t  follows from th is  that i t  is  not a necessary condition fo r 
either goodness or greatness in art that the work o f art convey a moral 
content. Although manifestly many works of art do sa tis fy  both descript­
ions, the la t te r  is not a reason for the former. "Good (great) work o f art" 
is  a description bound by an indefin ite set o f predicates specifying 
aesthetic virtues possessed in a high degree, (c f .  Oh.VI, above, on the 
log ica l grammar of the term 'work of a r t ' e tc .)
The substantive questions ( iv )  and (v ) are no less complex than the 
conceptual ones. To answer them, one must not only work out a normative 
eth ical stance, butalso survey descriptions of th various types o f aesthetic 
experience, and co llect evidence as to  their repureussions in ordinary 
conduct. The debates on censorship, and on violent and pornographic 
subject-matters in art are o f  course o f th is kind.
Much o f the faultiness o f  Santayana's account derives from his untenable 
thesis that aesthetic experience is  experience o f the immediate flux o f 
sensations. Hia recurrent condemnation of aesthetic experience as super­
f ic ia l  derives from th is presupposition. The psychical distance view 
assumed in the present thesis has no such consequence, and can accommodate 
the facts o f aesthetic experience as Santayana's view manifestly cannot.
This is not the place to  try  to develop a comprehensive eth ic. One 
must be content here to adopt dogmatically some general be lie fs , some 
identical with those o f Santayana: that happiness is  good in i t s e l f ,  and 
that knowledge of se lf and the world are good as means to that end. Again, 
pleasure other than that taken in the unfeigned suffering o f another is a 
prime fac ie  in tr in s ic  good.
Granted th is, i t  is surely obvious that works o f art and the experiences 
they provide can be both in tr in s ic  and instrumental goods. For example, 
the materials o f works o f art give pleasures that can be c lassified  as 
sensuous: visual and aural colour and texture please (or ought to ) in this 
way. Again, one might produce evidence fo r the calm of mind and consolation
to dismiss " fcjnaux et Cameea" because Gautier abjures moral content.
(349)
which a well-formed work of art can brings the complex of emotional and 
in te llectu a l pleasure caused by the progress o f fee lin g  in a good piece of 
music, fo r  example. Equally, works o f art oan supply vicarious experience,
psychological insight, and suggest ideals o f conduct and o f feeling. (84») 
Thus fo r  example, la te works o f Rembrandt and ieethoven give insight into 
rare and advanced states o f sp ir itu a l development. F inally, in the encounter 
with a r t ,  the individual can gain self-knowledge by comparison and re fle c t­
ion, by stopping to consider what he finds he rea lly  likes and d islikes, 
approves and disapprove s o f, agrees with and disagrees with.
A fu l l  study o f these substantive issues would involve an investigatior 
of the d ifferent ways in which the different arts enhance or v it ia te  l i f e ;  
and o f the ways in which the capacity o f the individual concerned -  his 
in te lligen ce, experience, s en s it iv ity , a r t is t ic  knowledge and so forth -  
modify or condition his aesthetic experiences and their consequences. Any­
thing lik e  d e fin itive  answers to these questions must await progress in 
psychology and sociology as yet in  the future. To try , as Santayana does, 
to s e t t le  the issue with a few unsupported generalisations, with no 
acknowledgement o f the complexities omitted, borders on the useless.
IV; Conclusion
While wrong in some of the d e ta il of his arguments, Santayana's central 
view on art and morality i3 unavoidable, i .e .  that art and aesthetic 
experience are subject to moral scrutiny in respect o f th e ir  contribution 
to the good l i f e .  He almost completely avoids the fa lla c ies  which v it ia te  
u tilita r ia n  and autonomist arguments on this subject, e .g . that the moral 
content o f a work o f art is a fa c to r  relevant to its  aesthetic evaluation; 
or that art and morality are en tire ly  unrelated. Again, some of his 
mistakes are partly due to the time of writing, e .g . his assumption, so 
d i f f ic u lt  to reconcile with his materialism, that mind is  more valuable 
than matter: he was reacting strongly against the absolute Idealism o f 
the generation o f Royce, yet did not succeed in freeing himself from a l l  
its  doctrines. Santayana's eneral position on the relation of art and 
morality is  one which would now be widely accepted. He should be allowed
credit for having put forward this point o f view when he did
"'ll« last volume o f "The L ife  of teason" appeared in 1905. I t  ia evident 
from the exposition given in Ch. VI, above, that Santayana's ch ief Interest 
in this work is  eth ica l, and that the metaphysical and epistemological 
doctrines on which he re lie s  are merely adumbrated, not developed in the 
deta il which the subject demands.(1 ») For the greater part o f his remaining 
l i f e ,  Santayana was occupied with the working out o f his philosophical 
system. The Be-lms of Being. This is  set out in the four volumes of "The 
iealns o f Being" (1927-40) I ts e lf ,  each volume dealing with one o f the four 
tealms o f Being held to be irreducibly d ifferen t: essence, matter, truth, 
and s p ir it . These works were preceded by "Scepticism and Animal ^aith" 
( 1923) ,  and several philosophical papers ( 2*) setting out the epistemology 
which accompanied the metaphysics, philosophy o f mind, and ethics o f The 
Realms o f Being. Whether the system set out in these works i 3 compatible 
with the doctrines o f "The L ife  of Reason", particu larly as regards ethics, 
is  a central question in Santayana scholarship.
"ieason in Art" was the last fu ll-length book by Santayana devoted to 
aesthetics. Turing the composition o f "The Realms o f Being" and associated 
works, he wrote re la tiv e ly  l i t t l e  on the philosophy o f art. What he did 
write, however, is  of importance not only for a study of Santayana's 
aesthetics -  which would be badly incomplete without reference to these 
works - but also because o f its  in trinsic philosophical interest. These 
late works on aesthetics a l l  presuppose an acquaintance with the system 
of the iea ms of Being and are couched in its  vocabulary. The central 
concepts and doctrines of the system are therefore set out b r ie fly  in the 
following sections.(3*)
The need to  grasp these late doctrines is  the reason why the late 
pieces on aesthetics, sometimes thematically related to ea rlie r works, are
(352)
here treated Independently. »
.^ ¿uit&y—n& denies any claim to f in a lity ,  even to 
absolute truth, for his system:
"Such an articu lation of thought has nothing comoulsory about it.; 
and i t  can be neither complete nor exclusive, and other animal 
minds may come to clearness d if fe re n t ly ." (4)
He describes himself as merely wishing to put forward a minimum corpus of 
b e lie f ,  formed la rge ly  by criticism  of other philosophies:
"...m y endeavour in putting i t  into words hes been to retreat to 
the minimum belie fs and radical presuppositions implied in facing a 
world at a l l  or professing to  know anything: belie fs and presuppos­
itions that i t  is  impossible for me to deny, although I may seldom 
or never have conceived them clearly . " ( 5)
'■’he two quotations in the preceding paragraph are clearly  in tension 
with one another. In the second, "antayana seems to  claim quasi-categorlcal 
status (in  the iantian sense) for his fundamental concepts, as i f  essence, 
matter, truth, and sp ir it  were lo g ic a lly  presupposed by the claim that 
there is  a world to be known. Yet the f ir s t  quotation avows a species o f 
relativism : the system of the kealms o f Being is  merely one system among 
many possible and equally valid systems. This in it ia l ambiguity is never 
cleared up.
I I :  The -.eelms o>’ Being: The kresuppositlons o f the la ter Vritings on 
Aesthetics 
(a) essence
The fundamental thesis advanced by Santayana in "The Healms o f Being" is 
that what there is can be divided into four irreducibly d iffe ren t categories 
called by him essence, matter, truth, and sp ir it, bach of these is  one o f 
the kealras of Being. The fir s t  in his exposition Is that o f essence.
An essence is  a character or quality; in traditional terras, to 
distinguish between essence and existence is to indicate the difference
between what a thing is , and that i t  is ,  between its  character and its  
occurrences. Essences have the ontological status of being, which
Santayana distinguishes from existence. To ex is t, in Santayana's view, is  
to stand in external relations. Thus, while a spatio-temporal particular 
ex ists , the essences or characters that i t  exemplifies are non-existent, 
having mere being.
The being o f every essence is  completely exhausted by its  d e fin ition , 
not its  de fin ition  in words, "but the character which distinguishes i t  
from any other essence. very essence is  perfec tly  individual."(6 ) This 
inalienable ind ividuality  o f each essence also renders i t  universal:
" . . . f o r  oeing perfectly  self-contained and real only by virtue o f 
it s  in tr in s ic  character, i t  contains no reference to any setting in 
space and time, and stands in no adventitious relations to anything."
(7 )
Any essence may be repeated or reviewed any number o f times. I t  Is the 
essential universality of these characters which makes any fact -  Santayana '* 
terra fo r a state o f a ffa irs  in the existent world -  Insofar as i t  exhibits 
them, d istinct and knowable.
A l l  essences taken together make up the realm o f essence. Santayana 
holds that essences are In fin ite  In number. ( 8)
Essences are instantiated by matter, which is  in flux. The essences 
traversed in change make mutation possible and describable; without th e ir  
eternal distinctness, no part of the flux could d if fe r  from any other 
part. (9)
A ll essences are eternal. This etern ity  is  merely the se lf- id en tity  
proper to each o f the forms which existence may instantiate, or very l ik e ly  
never illu s tra te  at a l l . (10) They are outside space and time.
While Insisting that essences are both universal and individual,
Dantayana denies that they a»-«  general. An essence is universal not 
because there ®’ -e reoeated instantiations o f i t  — for there need be no
(35-4)
manifestations whatever -  but because i t  is  individuated internally (and 
eternally ) by its  character, not externally by its  position in the flux of 
nature |
“and no essence is  general for the 3ame reason. However i t  may be 
related to particular existences, its  own nature is  complete an 
in trin s ic ; whereas a term can be said to be general only i f  i t  
happens to be predicable o f a number o f  scattered things, none of 
which, perhaps, i t  defines in tr in s ica lly ." ( 1 1 )
Essences may be either simple or «omplex. Since Santayana wishes to 
maintain both that essences are ind ivisib le individuals, and (as is  shown 
below) that a l l  essences are equally primary, he has t o  describe a species 
o f complexity compatible with these other properties. The complexity o f 
a complex essence is  not material,
" i t  is  not the factual co-existence o f elements themselves s e lf-  
centred and se lf-ex is ten t. I t  is  the essential complexity of a 
form, in which the relations o f the parts are internal relations in 
the whole; so that both the tota l unity and the contrasting parts 
are oure essences. " ( 12)
There is  no lim it to the degree o f complexity o f complex essences: the whole 
realm o f essence is one essence, and therefore there is  one essence of 
absolutely in fin ite  complexity. Santayana holds that other essences are 
in fin ite ly  complex in particular rescects, as number is .
In one sense, the being of any essence implies that o f every other, for 
i f  any one essence is  as ured of its  being because i t  is  a distinguishable 
something, obviously ever/ other distinguishable something is assured of 
it s  being on the same ground, so that an in fin ite  multitude of essences is  
implied in the being o f any essence.( 14 ) Yet Santayana insists that 
essences asve no consequences. Every essence is completely self-contained 
and has no external relations whatever.(15) As Santayana sees i t ,  this 
position entails a denial that log ica l relations obtain between esaences.
(355)
He explains the basis o f d ia lectic  -  h is term fo r  the study of a priori 
relations -  empirically. In the system of the tealma of 3«ing, the only 
factor which has any dynamic properties is  matters essences are to ta lly  
inert. The basis o f d ia lec tic  is  therefore said to be materials a p r io r i 
log ic  expresses physiological prefornsations. When an organ is  formed, it  
imposes certain responses on the body and -  a consequence of epi 'henomenalism 
-  certain ideas on themlnd. The implication o f ideas is  a sign of th is v ita l 
bias. (16*) Vhat is  normally referred to  as log ica l necessity is  on th is 
view merely a subjeotive function o f the structure o f the human body and 
mind. A lternative law3 o f log ic  are possible.
’issences may be instantiated or exemplified or manifested in existence: 
Santayana uses these terms in d iffe ren tly . Any type of manifestation 
involves a sort o f alienation from essence. In existence, in sense, in 
thought, essence has become impure; i t s  essential character now figures in 
a substance, a medium, or a context which is  alien to  i t .  (17) Nevertheless, 
whenever an essence is  manifested, i t  is manifested perfectly. This follows 
from the in fin ity  of the realm of essence, in which a l l  possible forms of 
being have been from a l l  e tern ity .(13 ) One mode of manifestation o f essence 
is  embodiment in a material particu lar; another is  being Imagined by sp ir it , 
( i . e .  consciousness) Indeed, some »ssences are such that they can only be 
exemplified in sp ir it, o. g. any type of pain. (19)
Santayana re-iterates the doctrines that complex essences are not 
compounded, and that a l l  essences are equally primary. In the realm o f 
essence, the true has no p riority  over the fa lse , nor the natural over the 
unnatural. Truth, complexity, deform ity, and so forth , are categories 
re la tiv e  to human capacities and in teres ts . In the realm of essence, the 
greatest complexity and the greatest sim plicity have being eternally . Again 
essences which have been exemplified in existence have no p riority  over 
those which are not exemplified. ( 20)
This insistence on the equal primacy of a l l  members o f the realm of 
essence is  in tension with the further doctrines o f the special properties
(356)
which Santayana a ttribu tes to one essence in particular, the essence of 
pure Being. He in s is ts  that th is essence is  not to be identified  either 
with matter, with lod, or with nothing. (21») Pure Being supplies, as it  
were, the log ica l or aesthetic matter which a l l  essences hove in common. 
There is  evidence that the essence o f pure Being is intuitable alone to 
the human in te lle c t only at the most advanced stages o f sp iritual develop­
ment. I t  may, however, be discerned analytica lly  in any essence whatever.
(22) The sense in which pure Being is pure is  d ifferent from that in 
which any other essence may be said to be pure, i .e .  when considered only 
in its  proper character, absolutely unconnected with exemplification and 
human interests. V.'hat is  meant by ca lling pure Being "pure" is rather 
that pure Being is  related to any other essence very much as any essence 
is  related to its  ex is tin g  manifestations.(23)
^ure Being in a certain sense may be said to be the to ta lity  o f a ll  
essences, when the la tte r  are regarded not in their d istinction -  in which 
they form the realm o f essence -  but in th eir continuity and in their 
common latency w ithin the essence o f pure Being i t s e l f ,
"beaause we may say (though the language is  figurative and 
inaccurate) that pure Being contains a l l  essences within i t s e l f  
v irtu a lly  or eminently, since, though it  cannot be any o f them, 
i t  requires each of them to  be what i t  13."(24 )
The contemplation o f  pure 3eing is  the last phase of sp iritual progress, 
and has always been the goal o f any seriously cultivated sp iritual l i f e .  ( 2^ 
(The stress which Santayana places on the notion o f pure Being and 
its  contemplation is  o f h istorical interest in indicating the distance he 
had travelled from his position in "The L ife  o f teason", In which work he 
would have dismissed any such mysticism as irra tion a l.c f. Chs. V and VI, 
above.)
The concept o f  essence is  o f the f ir s t  importance in Santayana's later 
writings on aesthetics. In his ate period, he retains his thesis that
aesthetic experience is  to be equated with immediate experience. Essences 
are not only individual and universal, but are also the data of immediate 
experience, whether the experience be o f sensation or thought.(26) 
.esthetic experience is  therefore iden tified  by Santayana with awareness - 
or to  use his term, Intuition -  o f essences considered in themselves, not 
as signs for objects or events in the external world. The position is  
complicated by the further thesis that sp ir it  ( i . e .  consciousness) is  
naturally addressed to  the contemplation o f essence, and returns to this 
s ta te  o f detachment when not harassed by animal wants and needs. What he 
c a lls  the spiritual l i f e  is the l i f e  o f detached contemplation of essence. 
Since for him aesthetic experience and intuition o f essence are descript­
ions of the same state, the sp iritual l i f e  and the aesthetic l i f e  are 
fo r  him one and the same. His la te r  ethic o f the sp iritual l i f e  must 
therefore be considered in a survey o f his writings on aesthetics.
The concept of essence has been extensively discussed, and the 
d i f f ic u lt ie s  in it  are now well established. I t  is su ffic ien t fo r present 
purposes to indicate a few central points. Sentnyrna maintains that 
essences bave no external relations, and I t  follows th t  they are there­
fo re  unrelated to existence. This en ta ils, however, that i t  is  lo g ica lly  
possible for there to be a quality which does not imply a subject o f 
q u a lit ie s : indeed, every essence sa tis fie s  this description. Yet i t  makes 
as l i t t l e  sense to speak of a quality which is  not and need never bs a 
qu a lity  of anything as I t  does to speak of a thing which lias no qualities. 
The concepts o f quality and subject o f qualities mutually imply one 
another.
Again, the axiom thEt a l l  essences are equally and perfec tly  deter­
minate entails that no essence is in tr in s ica lly  general. The general is 
the partia lly  Indeterminate, and therefore the in trin s ica lly  general is 
the in trin sica lly  pa rtia lly  indeterminate. Santayana agrees that the 
order of decreasing definiteness is the order o f increasing generality,
(357)
(358)
but adds the thesis that pure Being Is quite as determinate as any other 
essence. This has the consequence that to  say o f something that i t  ' i s ' ,  
is  to say something as d e fin ite  as to say exactly what qualities i t  has.
This is  p la in ly fa lse  in  the ordinary 3ense of 'd e f in it e '(27).
Again, some o f the doctrines o f the theory o f essence are in tension 
with one another. Tantayana maintains that there is  evidence for the 
detachability o f essence from existence in the experience o f repetition . I f  
the identical character can appear in more than one thing or event, at 
least i t  does not depend on that thing or event. Yet Santayana also holds 
that i t  is  highly doubtful that any essence is  exactly repeated in human 
experience. From th is i t  follows that, so fa r  as perception is concerned, 
we have no d irect evidence that essences, a3 determinate, are detachable 
from their substances, not to  mention a l l  existence. (28*)
(b) Matter and Truth
"The -tealm of ¡■latter" (1930), the second volume of "The {«alms of 
3eing", sets out Santayana's philosophy o f nature.(29*) Santayana holds 
that b e lie f in an external world is  lo g ica lly  unjustifiable but 
psychologically inevitab le. The task o f natural philosophy is  therefore 
not to attempt to  provide a foundation fo r b e lie f in nature, but rather to 
try  to arrive, "at a conception o f nature by which the fa ith  involved in 
action may be enlightened and guided."(30)
The mo3t fundamental concept in the philosophy of nature is  that of 
substances i t  is  presupposed in action that nature is  substantial. I f  
th is b e lie f is  not an illu s ion , then substance necessarily has certain 
properties. (31) 3y analysing what he claims are the presuppositions of 
the notion o f action, Santayana arrives at the conclusion that there are 
f iv e  indispensable properties o f substance! a world in which action is to 
occur must be external (to  the thought that posits i t ) ,  spatia l, temporal, 
and having both unity and variety. A substance with these qualities has 
a fam iliar name: matter. The fie ld  o f action is  therefore the realm of 
matter.(32) Santayana provides no argument to show that there either is
not or cannot be a non-material substance or substances.
Matter is  the only active principle among the realms o f being. A ll
change and existence is  grounded ultimately in  matter. I t  is the flux o f 
matter which explains why those essences are embodied which are embodied, 
and which accordingly determines the content o f the realm o f truth. Again, 
sp ir it  or consciousness is  an epiphenomenon o f matter.
A central concept in  Santayana's hilosophy of nature is  that of a 
trope, defined as the essence or form of an event. A trope is the 
essence o f an event seen under the form of etern ity and belongs to  the realm 
cf tru th .(33) This concept is  important in part because i t  is used in the 
de fin ition  o f an equally important notion in Santayana's philosophy o f mind, 
that o f the psyche. Santayana denies that sp ir it  has any causal e fficacy, 
being an epiphenomenon o f matter. He therefore has to posit a material 
agent to  determine the course o f the l i f e  o f both body and sp ir it, and this 
agent he terms the psyche. He is  emphatic in his distinction between 
sp ir it  and psyches
"3y sp ir it I  understand the actual ligh t o f consciousness fa llin g  
up^ r: anything -  the ultimate in v is ib le  emotional fru ition  of l i f e  
in feeling and thought. On the other hand, by the psyche I under­
stand a system o f tropes, inherited or acquired, displayed by liv in g  
bodies in their growth and behaviour. Thia psyche is  the specific  
form o f physical l i f e ,  present and potential, asserting i t s e l f  In 
any plant or animal. '*(34*)
The operations of the psyche are mysterious to us, and we liave only indirect 
knowledge o f them, i.e . we can only be aware o f the e ffects of psychic 
operations, not o f those operations themselves. Consciousness and its  
contents are the most important o f the indirect indices we have to the 
operations o f the psyche, lecause consciousness and its  contents are 
epiphenomena of psychic operations, every event is  significant of what is
occurring in the psyche.(35)
A few o f the leading d if f ic u lt ie s  in th is philosophy o f nature may 
be mentioned here. They are the problems over epiphenomenalism discussed
in Ch. VI, above; and there is  the absence o f any argument to show why the 
concept o f a nor,-extended substance is incoherent, conceptually uneconom­
ic a l,  or in 3ome other way unacceptable. Equally serious are the frequent 
claims to  knowledge unobtainable on his own principles, as has ,oen said, 
Santayana holds that the thesis that there is  an external world in 
principle cannot be established: its  necessity i3 psychological. Moreover, 
i t  follows from his thesis that only essences can be known d ire c tly  in 
intu ition that matter i t s e l f  can never be the object of any in tu ition . We 
can therefore never know whether our experience is  an accurate record of 
the flux o f matter or not. Thus when, in the course o f his discussion of 
the question of the properties o f substance Santayana sets him e l f  the 
problem o f discovering which essences tru ly  pertain to the essence of 
substance, he is pursuing an inquiry which is  on his own principles 
impossible.(36) Again, he maintains that some o f the essences exhibited to 
human in tu ition  f i t  the dynamic movement o f nature t igh tly  and consecutive­
ly , and can be guides to action, whereas others are less trustworthy.(37)
On his own principles, th is assertion is unverifiable.
The shortest o f the four volumes o f "The lealms o f lelng" is the third, 
"The tie aim o f Truth", disappointingly, i t  is  d if f ic u lt  to find in this 
work any doctrine new to Santayana or to philosophy in general, and many 
o f the views which are put forward are unargued for and not stated with a 
proper degree o f completeness.(38*)
Santayana holds a variety  o f the correspondence theory o f tru th . A 
truth—functional proposition is true i f  what i t  asserts to be the case is 
the case:
" ..th e  abstract relation  o f correctness, by virtue o f which any 
opinion is  true, is easily  stated. An opinion is  true i f  what i t  
is  talking about is  constituted as the opinion asserts i t  to  be 
constituted.• i t  is  a question o f Identity between a fact asserted 
and a fact ex is tin g ."(39)
(360)
(361)
The theory is not developed beyond bald assertions of this kind. There is 
no analysis of what a fact might be, nor any investigation of the exact 
nature of the correspondence between fact and assertion.
The sum of a ll  true propositions is called by Santayana "the truth".
I t  is ,
"what omniscience would assert, the whole ideal system of qualities 
and relations which the world has exemplified or w ill  exemplify.
The truth i 3 a l l  things seen under the form of etern ity ."(49 )
Again, he maintains that there is a comprehensive description of every 
fact which is  "the truth" about that fact. This description is obtained 
by taking the fact in question as central and considering everything else 
in relation  to  i t .  The comprehensive description, fo r every fact, i 3 
in fin ite . (41)
fin a lly , the reelm o f truth is -  segment o f the realm o f essence; it  
is  "tl* it segment o f the Malm of essence which happens to be illustrated 
in existence."(42)
(c l Spirit
The fourth realm o f being is that o f s p ir it . The book dealing with 
th is d iv ision  o f Santayana's system, "The iealm o f Spirit" (1940) sets 
out In d e ta il a deterministic epiphenomenalism o f  the kind presupposed in 
the ea r lie r  " l i f e  o f Season", considered and cr it ic ised  in Ch. VI, above. 
To cut down repetition to a minimum, the fo llow ing exposition is res tr ic t­
ed to essential propositions and certain items o f technical vocabulary.
Santayana offers many definitions of sp irit, of which the following 
is typicals
"What I ca ll sp ir it is  only that inner ligh t o f actuality or 
attention which floods a l l  l i f e  as men actually l iv e  i t  on earth.
I t  Is  roughly the same thing as fee lin g  or thought; it  might ba 
called consciousness..."(43 )
It is a confusion o f thought, Santayana maintains, to regard spirit as
an agent or power In the universe. The only power in the universe is  
matter; and in human action, the moving force, as has been said, is
exercised by the material part o f  the person, i .e .  the psyche. The myth 
o f the causal e ffic a cy  of sp ir it  in  action is  promoted by fa lse belie fs 
on the relation o f mind to body. The mind is  not an en tity separable from 
the body. Showing Dlalnly a debt to Sninoza -  whose philosophy o f mind 
he is  elsewhere at pains to abjure (c f. Ch. VI, above) -  Santayana contends 
that there are not two facts , s p ir it  and body, incongrously juxtaposed.
Sp irit and body are realizations o f the same fact in incomparable realms 
o f being. Sp irit and body are lo g ic a lly  incomparable; the former is  a 
moral integration and dignity accruing to body when body develops a certain 
degree o f organisation and responsiveness to distant things.
An important consequence o f th is  position is that Santayana must deny 
the possib ility  o f disembodied existencefbr sp ir it: being a form of the body 
not a separate en tity , sp ir it  can only ex ist incarnate. Moreover, animal 
interests direct the course o f thought, generating particular images and 
categories. (<45) This i t s e l f  has a consequence the importance o f which w ill 
become clearer in the next section. The consequence is  that contemplation 
can never be in a s tr ic t sense en tire ly  disinterested and yet remain 
contemplation by an individual. I t  follows from Santayana's premisses 
that, by de fin ition , any sp ir it which attained absolute disinterest in the 
sense o f ceasing to  be directed by any impulses from the psyche would cease 
to be incarnate, and would become Identical with the realm o f essence.
Sp irit has a vicarious sympathy with its  native psyche and the world 
o f that psyche, which i t  cannot bear to fe e l dragged hither and thither in 
confusion. S p ir it  craves to see its  psyche and world everywhere w ell- 
ordered and beautifu l, so that that they may be better seen and understood. 
This, in Santayana's view, is  the specific function o f s p ir it , whloh i t  
liv e s  by fu l f i l l in g  and dies i f  i t  oannot somehow f u l f i l . ( 46)
On the question of the distribution o f sp irit in nature, Santayana
maintains that sp ir it is  the consciousness proper to an animal psyche, 
and, as has been said, is  incarnate by nature and not by accident. I f  
th is were not the case, sp ir it  would not possess its  impassioned 
character. Perception, impulse, conscience, and hope, in Santayana’ s view, 
a l l  Indicate the roots o f sp ir it  in matter. I t  cannot imagine or love 
what is  not somehow native t,o Its  own climate. ( 47) These assertions 
presuppose Santayana's interest theory o f va lu e .(c f. Gh.I, above) In the 
vocabulary o f  the »alms o f being, pure s p ir it  would have no values. The 
human sp ir it  has the values dictated by the interests o f i t s  psyche.
Sp irit is  defined as the inner ligh t o f attention. Attention is  by 
de fin ition  tran s itive , i . e .  i t  has an object, and a particular instance o f 
awareness, I t  may be repeated, is  an In tu ition . The object given in 
intu ition 13 an essence. When an essence is  interpreted as a sign of 
an object or event in the world outside the s p ir it ,  the in tu ition  is said 
to  be impure (in  a non-derogatory usage), and -nowledge o f the external 
object said to  be symbolic. When, by contrast, the essence is  considered 
merely In I t s e l f ,  as an immediate datum -  and this fo r Santayana is to 
consider the essence aesthetica lly  -  the in tu ition  is  said to  be pure, and 
our knowledge o f the essence l i t e r a l .  (4^*)
The notion o f pure or aesthetic intu ition is  o f the f i r s t  importance 
in Santayana' 8 la te r ethic o f the sp iritual l i f e .  He asks the question: 
what is s p ir it  naturally f i t  to do? What is  the free  and native l i f e  o f 
sp ir it , which i t  enjoys more and more when conditions are favourable? His 
answer is  that the perfect function o f sp ir it  is  pure in tu ition . Intuition 
tends to become pure in virtue of the very impulse which generates its
" I t  is  the movement of apprehension by which anything is  given to 
consciousness; and there is  a natural Joy in i t ,  whenever i t  can 
l iv e  unimpeded by fatigue or pain, and not harrassed by oare, fear- 
doubt, desire or any other obsession about the not given."(49)
Put it y of intuition la logically independent of the complexity of its objeot: 
the given essence may be perfectly simple or as complex as a given spirit oar
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maintains that sp irit is  the consciousness proper to an animal psyche, 
and, as has been said, is  incarnate by nature and not by accident. I f  
th is were not the case, sp ir it  would not possess its  impassioned 
character. Perception, impulse, conscience, and hope, in Santayana's view, 
a l l  indicate the roots o f sp ir it in matter. I t  cannot imagine or love 
what is  not somehow native to  its  own climate. (47) These assertions 
presuppose Santayana's interest theory o f va lu e.(c f. Gh.I, above) In the 
vocabulary o f the ealms o f being, pure sp ir it  would have no values. The 
human sp ir it  has the values dictated by the interests o f it s  psyche.
Sp irit is  defined as the inner light o f attention. Attention is  by 
de fin ition  transitive, i . e .  i t  has an object, and a particular instance o f 
awareness, it  may be repeated, is  an intuition. The object given in 
intu ition is  an essence, ’ .'hen an essence is  interpreted as a sign o f 
an object or event in the world outside the sp ir it, the in tu ition  is  said 
to  be impure (in  a non-derogatory usage), and -nowledge o f the external 
object said to  be symbolic. When, by contrast, the essence is  considered 
merely in i t s e l f ,  as an immediate datum -  and this for Santayana is  to 
consider the essence aesthetically  -  the intuition is  said to  be pure, and 
our Knowledge o f the essence l i t e r a l . (43*)
The notion of pure or aesthetic intuition is  of the f i r s t  importance 
in  Santayana's la ter ethic o f the spiritual l i f e .  He asks the questions 
what is  sp ir it  naturally f i t  to do? What is the free and native l i f e  o f 
sp ir it , which i t  enjoys more and more when conditions are favourable? His 
answer is  that the perfect function o f sp ir it is  pure in tu ition . Intuition 
tends to become pure in virtue of the very impulse which generates it *
" I t  is the movement o f apprehension by which anything is  given to 
consciousness; and there is  a natural joy in i t ,  whenever i t  can 
liv e  unimpeded by fatigue or pain, and not harrassed by care, fear 
doubt, desire or any other obsession about the not given."(49)
Putity of intuition is  lo g ica lly  Independent of the complexity o f its  objeot: 
the given essenoe may be perfectly simple or as complex as a given sp irit oar
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accommodate. Provided it is considered in itse lf, and not as a sign, the
Intuition is  pure.
Santayana is  careful to say that pure in tu ition  is  possible only when 
conditions are favourable. I t  is his view that conditions are only very 
rare ly  su ffic ien tly  favourable for sp ir it  to  enjoy any notable degree of 
ourity in in tu ition . Almost a l l  the time, the sp ir it  is  directed by the 
psyche to attend to the environment; v ir tu a lly  a l l  intuition i 3 designed to 
give symbolic knowledge and is  therefore impure. (51) As he says:
"The pure joy and knowledge that should come to  (s p ir it )  can oome 
only in snatches, or in ultimate concentration and so litude."(52) 
i l l :  Inter Writings on j,esthetics 
(a ) The Spir itu a l L ife : a Variety of Aestheticism
In "The Realm of S p irit" and several other la te  works, Santayana 
develops the ethic o f the sp iritual or aesthetic way o f l i f e .  I t  is 
appropriate to consider i t  as a part o f his aesthetics for reasons outlined 
in section I I  (a ) above, and now made clearer in section I I  (d ): the 
perfection of sp iritual l i f e  is  pure in tu ition . Pure intuition Is 
contemplation o f the immediate. Since fo r  Santayana, the realm of the 
immediate and the realm of the aesthetic are one and the same, i t  follows 
that fo r him the sp iritual man is iden tica l with the aesthete.(53*)
I t  has been noted above that pure in tu ition  is  only rarely possible.
The reason is  that sp ir it is  usually hnrrassed in some way by its  psyche, 
the world, and even on occasion, by i t s e l f .  This state o f harrassment 
‘Santayana refers to as the state of d istraction . He describes distraction 
as,
"the alien force that drags the sp ir it  away from the spontaneous 
exercise o f it s  lib e r ty , and holds it  down to the rack o f care, 
doubt, pain, hatred, and vice."(54)
In the sta te  o f distraction, the sp ir it oannot enjoy pure Intuition.
There are three major agents of distraction, for which Santayana retain* 
Christian terminology: the flesh, the World, and the "evil, detraction by
(365)
the 'lesh consists In balng deflected, confused, and deceived by the 
demands o f psychic impulses which are in discord.(55) The emotions of 
love snd hatred are powerful agents o f distraction o f th is  kind. I t  i 3 
seen at it s  purest, however, in  the experience of pain, the essence o f 
e v i l  to the sp ir it, fo r  painful existence is  pure west«. (56) ""he World 
is  a l l  that is external to the individual psyche with i t s  epiphenomenal 
sp ir it . The World, both man-made, and non-man-made, is  an tithetica l and 
distracting to sp ir it  in a fundamental respect: i t  is unstable, being 
constantly in flux. I t  is o f the essence of sp ir it, Santayana holds, 
that i t  wishes to transcend the flux and keep a l l  moments present, as i t  
tr ie s  to  do in memory and prophecy. Sp irit finds the World treacherous: 
i t  is not as i t  looks; I t  leaves memories which i t  s tu lt i f ie s ,  and excites 
hopes which i t  betrays.(57) The Devil Is any enemy o f s p ir i t  internal to 
sp ir it. Bedevilment is  the state which results when the d ifferen t passions 
o f the psyche make th e ir  impulses fe lt  in the sp ir it . Contrary thoughts 
and impulses cross the s p ir it ,  but the la tte r  cannot synthesize them or 
fuse them into a single v is ion . The essence o f bedevilment is  to  make 
Impossible harmony either within a man, or between man and nature. ( 58)
The f ir s t  step towards liv in g  the sp iritual l i f e  (the l i f e  o f pure 
in tu ition ) is to escape distraction. To have done so is  to attain the 
state Santayana ca lls  liberation . liberation  does not consist in the 
passage of sp ir it into another world or form o f l i f e :  such a view is 
precluded for Santayana by his denial that sp irit can ex is t disembodied. 
Liberation consists rather in detachment from our own impulses. This 
attitude co-incides with the occurrence o f spontaneous, disinterested, 
pure Intuition. (59*) Outwardly, nothing is  changed by th is  sp iritual 
metanoia; but inwardly, the whole natural world, and our own persons in I t ,  
w ill  be removed to a distance.
The ways to attain liberation from the Tlesh, the World, and the Devil 
are diverse. It Is not the Tlesh alone In its simple animal functions that
A
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Imprisons sp ir it , but the world and the mind, complicating those impulses 
or compel lin g  them to hide. The sp ir it  could be liberated from the Flesh
i f  the /lean could ue iioerateu from a x l toat., as risen, d is to rts  i t ,  
starves and degrades i t .  liberation from the World does not consist in 
removal from i t ,  which is  in any ease impossible. S p irit, in  the measure 
in which, by attentive study and sympathy, i t  may have understoc the 
World, is  liberated from i t ,  i .e .  from distraction by i t .  Santayana is  very 
imprecise as to  the method o f achieving liberation from the Wevil. He 
states that i t  may be achieved by a retrea t to  a state he describes as 
"perfect health and simple knowledge"(60) , which can be achieved only a fter 
long d is c ip lin e .(61)
To attain  the state o f liberation is  merely a precondition for the 
sp iritu a l l i f e :  Santayana regards libera tion  as a negative 3tate; i t  would 
bring no positive benefit were i t  not a preliminary to the fin a l stage or 
goal o f the spiritual l i f e ,  union. I t  is  to be emphasized at once that 
sp ir itu a l union does not consist in the fusion of the substance o f sp irit 
with anything! there can be no union where there are not at least two 
things to be united. Union in both prayer or love requires the persistent 
separuteness o f the two beings united. Union consists in a perfect 
unanimity:
"The union sought by a liberated sp ir it i 3 no fusion o f  it s  sub­
stance with any other substance, but a moral unanimity or fellowship 
with the l i f e  o f a l l  substances in so far ns they support or enlarge 
its  own l i f e . " ( 62)
Sp irits  can be united only by thinking alike. (63)
The object with which the liberated sp irit is  united is  called by 
Santayana the Sood. (64) The Sood fo r the spLrit la impartial understanding, 
and love o f a l l  things. This follows from Santayana's own premisses! the 
goal o f sp ir it  i t s e l f  -  not of it s  psyche -  i 3 to understand a l l  things, 
and i t  may approach as near to this state as is possible fo r  a fin ite  sp irit
tn the state o f liberated  detachment. (65) Thus Santayana can w rite that to 
the sp ir it that has renounced a l l  things, a l l  things are restored. ( 66)
I t  w ill  be asked now such a state may be realised by a f in ite  s p ir it  i 
how can we be united, even in s p ir it , with an absent good or be at peace 
with a power that may be always destroying us? Santayana maintains that 
we may do so by means o f  prayer, a term which, as w ill become clear, he 
uses in a special sense. Prayer is  not a petition  made with the aim o f 
changing the w ill  o f the d iv in ity ; i t  is  not a means, but an end. A ll 
preferences are as i t  were suspended and neutralized by the sense of 
dependence and by the virtua l acceptance o f  the perhaps contrary fact:
"We are reco llectin g , digesting, purifying our conscience..Even when 
we are expressing a wish, we are doing so in the face o f the truth, 
or o f fate impersonally, considering how excellent i t  would be i f  
fortune came to  our assistance."(67)
The goal o f s p ir i t ,  as has been said, is  not only to  understand the 
world, but to love i t .  The love o f the liberated sp ir it for the World 
Santayana ca lls  charity, a term which, once again, he uses in a special 
sense. Charity is  sympathy with a l l  there i s ;  i t  is a doubly chastened 
sympathy, chastened by understanding and renunciation ( i . e .  o f the particul­
ar goals o f the psyche). The World is  seen to  be in a sense innocent: its  
sin is that o f being a spontaneous world, self-contradicting and ignorant 
o f it s  destiny. ( 68) Onion for the sp ir it  consists in presence (emphatically 
not physical possession), and th is presence w ill  hardly i f  ever be 
uninterrupted. Sp iritu a l love ia accordingly not anxious, and is  en tire ly  
free from desire. I t  lives  in the virtua l presence o f a l l  the fu lfilm ents 
and a ll the p o ss ib ilit ie s  that nature pursues. (69)
Finally, i t  is to  be emphasized why th is state o f sp iritual detachment 
is  to be classified  as an aesthetic sta te , in Santayana's usage. He 
stresses that sp ir it  is raised to  this f in a l  sta te , not by knowledge, but 
by in tu it ion. (70) Knowledge, as Santayana uses the term, is  by defin ition
tra n s itiv e , i .e .  i t  involves correct interpretation of essences as signs 
o f ob jects, events, e tc ., in the external world. I f  sp ir it is  concerned 
to gain knowledge, i t  is therefore to osne degree distracted, since to 
be concerned with finding out about the external world is  not to  be 
detached from i t ,  and so by de fin ition  not to be liberated. In the states 
o f lib era tion  and union, therefore, Intuition is  nure, i .e .  aesthetic 
contemplation o f essences in  themselves as essences, not as signs.
Santayana accordingly speaks o f  the sp iritual l i f e  as fo llows: sp irit 
is  addressed to essence, and can rest only in what is  necessary; in the 
form that a form lias, and in the inevitable relation  of that form to 
others. More deeply, therefore, than with truth, sp ir it is  concerned with 
conceiving, loving, or listing what might have been true. (71)
Granted Santayana's premisses, this is  equivalent to saying that, when 
l iv in g  the sp iritual -  aesthetic l i f e ,  sp ir it is  a detached spectator of 
whatever essences are presented to i t  by the flu x o f matter. Being en tirely  
detached, i t  has no interest in interpreting these essences as signs of 
the external world, or o f manipulating the order in which they occur: its  
sympathy is  universal. Since fo r Santayana, immediate experience is  
aesthetic experience, this sp iritual l i f e  is a variety o f aestheticism.
The sp iritual l i f e  is  one o f the most discussed aspects o f  Santayana's 
philosophy: an extensive consideration o f i t  here is  accordingly unnecessary 
The following comments are de liberately  restricted to  a few central 
p o in ts .(72*)
I t  should perhaps be emphasized in it ia l ly  that aestheticism as here 
ascribed to Santayana obviously d iffe rs  in several important respects from 
other ethical theories which go by the same name. Santayana's aestheticism 
is  not a cult o f beauty in particular: beauty is  one essence among infinitely 
many essences, and has no privileged status. Again, the ideas of cu ltivat­
in g  intense sensual experience -  Pater's hard, gem-like flame -  and of the 
cu lt o f a r t i f ic ia l i t y  in everyday experience (Wilde) are quite absent from
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Santayana's aesthetic way of life . In comparison with nineteenth century 
varieties of aestheticism, Santayana’ s recommendations emerge as fa ir ly
ascetic.
A repeated criticism of the aesthetic-spiritual way of life  is that it 
involves Santayana in internal inconsistency with the ethic of the Life of 
teason (of. Ch.vi, above). It must be conceded that those who take this 
view can find evidence for their thesis without great d ifficulty , since 
the Life of Reason and the spiritual l i f e  d iffe r markedly in certain 
respects.(73) It may be pointed out that the Life of Reason involves effort 
to modify nature to suit the needs of men;, whereas the spiritual l i fe  
involves no effort whatever to control nature, being rather an escape from 
the mundane realm. Again, the goal of the Life of Reason is the harmonis­
ation of desires by reason, while a condition for the spiritual l i fe  is 
maximal freedom from desires. Again, the spiritual life  is  concerned with 
essence and eternity, while the Life of Reason is concerned with existence 
and time. Again, the Life of Reason is a temporal career in pursuit of 
ideal goods, while the spiritual life  i3 a withdrawal from time and 
indifference to goods as much as to evils, indifference to a ll  existence 
of whatever moral quality.
"antayano was sufficiently disturbed by such criticisms to devote a 
part of his "Apologia pro mente sua" (his reply to criticisms in the Schilpp 
volume) to a response to them. One reply he makes is that rational end 
spiritual lives should not be separated, since, "the two may be lived 
together and in the same moment..."(74.) In the first place, the spiritual 
l i fe  presupposes either the Life of eason or some other form of non- 
spiritual reality*
"You cannot be detached without being previously attached; you 
csnr.ot renounce or sacrifice anything significantly unless you 
love it. Your detachment w ill not be spiritual unless it is  
universal; it w ill then bring you liberation at once from the world 
and from yourself. This w ill neither destroy your natural gifts
(370)
and duties nor add to them; but i t  w ill  enable you to  exercise them 
without illu s ion  and in  far-seeing harmony with th eir rea l function 
and end."(75)
The d if f ic u lty  with th is proposed solution is  that, at best, i t  provides 
only fo r  the compatibility o f the L ife  o f Reason with the f ir s t  stage o f 
the sp iritu a l l i f e ,  i.«*. liberation  or detachment. The state o f  union, or 
contemplation o f the immediate flux o f essences, is  manifestly incompatible 
with carrying out the demands of the l i f e  o f Reason.
The text o f the '’Apologia'', however, suggests a way o f mitigating the 
charge o f inconsistency. At one point o f his discussion, Santayana suggests 
that a retreat from the World such as is  recommended in the sp iritual l i f e  
is  a safety-valve fo r the sp ir it  which i t  is  necessary to keep open, fo r, 
"The sp ir it  in man cannot liv e  fo r  man alone, and man is  never 
happier than when the sp ir it carries him beyond himself. "(76)
The charge o f inconsistency might be mitigated, by being turned instead 
into merely a charge o f addition. Santayana may be construed as having 
added to his philosophy the thesis that man cannot be happy unless the 
sp ir it  in him is  at times able to retreat to the non-human. Periodical 
indulgence in the sp iritual-aesthetic way of l i f e  would then be a necessary 
condition fo r  remaining sane and unbent by the pressure o f the world, where 
l i f e  would at a l l  other times be lived in accordance with the principles 
o f the L ife  of eason. This interpretation is  corroborated by Santayana's 
insistence that the pure intuitions of the sp iritu a l l i f e  are possible 
only at privileged moments in l i f e ,  a point re-iterated in the "Apologia": 
"S p ir itu a lity ..is  only an attribute in the a ir ,  and I doubt that 
i t  can be discerned with any clearness except in those moments o f 
l i f e  that have a transporting quality ."(77 )
On th is view Santayana is  to be construed as having changed his mind to the 
extent of coming to  regard the l i f e  o f Reason as on incomplete ethic; yet 
this is  fa r  le s 3 grave a charge than that o f inconsistency. He is guilty, 
however, o f not relating his early and la te  views as exactly as he might:
i t  should not be necessary to construct defences fo r him.
The above defence provides a reply to two criticisms put forward by 
Professor Lacns.(78) The f ir s t  i 3 that i t  is  not clear to  what extent 
Santayana regarded the sp iritual l i f e  as livab le ; the second that, as an 
idea l, th is way o f l i f e  is  both unattractive and v ir tu a lly  impossible to 
attain :
" . . . th e  sp iritual l i f e ,  desaicated angelic existence that i t  is ,  
seems u tterly remote from and unattractive to human nature as we 
generally know i t .  ..No-one would care to, and fo r  that matter no-one 
could, liv e  sp ir itu a lly  fcr fo rty  or f i f t y  years o f  one's adult 
l i f e . "(79)
Santayana would reply that the sp iritual l i f e  is to be regarded as a way 
to liv e  only in rare and privileged moments, and would therefore agree 
with much o f what T.achs has to say.
The d if f ic u lt ie s  which most seriously v it ia te  the philosophy o f the 
sp iritual l i f e  l ie  in its  presuppositions: in the concept of essence, in 
the distinction between immediate and mediate experience, and in the 
iden tifica tion  of the aesthetic with the former. Much o f  what Santayana 
says about detachment and contemplation is , as he would admit, well-known 
from the liv e s  and writings o f spiritual people, and is  not problematic.
The real d if f ic u lty  over Santayana's philosophy of the sp iritual l i f e  is 
that the technical framework in which he places these acceptable truths 
Is  philosophically defective, fo r reasons already given in  this and the 
preceding chapters.
i P l  i'jXgust ¿senses" (12321
Santayana was an omnivorous reader, and when he came across 
corroboration of his views in another author, liked to  give notice o f this 
fact to the world. In " !e  "emps retrouve", he came across a passage which 
indicated to  him that Proust had grasped the concept o f  essence, and 
valued the spiritual-aesthetic way o f l i f e .  Tie short paper, "Proust on
Essences” , subsequently reprinted as an appendix to la te r  editions of 
"The Realm o f Essence” , announces th is discovery. He assumes throughout 
tnat tne views o f the Narrator of "A la recnerehe du temps perdu" are the 
views o f Proust himself.
Santayana begins by referring to a remark of Desmond MacCarthy that no 
novelist has ever done such complete ju stice  to the fact that a i l  things 
pass and change as has Proust. Yet, Santayrna comments, Proust, apparently 
so absorbed in the flux o f things, f in a lly  arrived a t ,
"a very remarkable perceptions that the flux of phenomena is  a fte r  
a l l  accidental to them, and that the positive rea lity  in each is  not 
the fact that i t  appears or disappear* out rather the in trinsic 
quality which i t  manifests, an eternal essence which may appear 
and disappear a thousand times. "(30 )
Moreover, " a l l  that was in trin s ica lly  rea l in past time is  accordingly 
recoverable" (81), for in trinsic rea lity  is  a property only o f essences 
manifested, not o f the material occasions on which essences recur.
Having given a substantial quotation from ” Ie  Temps retrouve” to support 
this view that Proust had grasped the concept of essence, Santayana comments 
that, granted Proust's "exquisite” and "voluminous" sensib iilty , i t  is  no 
surprise that he could be "rescued from d istraction" only by finding certain 
repetitions in his experience: he required two phenomena to reveal a single 
essence.(82) dy contrast,
"A mind less vo la tile  and less reten tive, but more concentrated and 
loya l, might easily  have discerned the eternal essence in any single 
momentary fa c t ."(83)
Santayana continues that Proust seems remarkably detached from worldly 
in terests. He is not attracted to some essences in particular and repelled 
from other* by his own human wants and needs. He is  content simply to 
perceive without direction by his in terests. This fact (in  Santayana's
view) makes his testimony to the r e a lity  o f essences a l l  the more 
remarkable!
"We could not have asked for a more competent or a more unexpected 
witness to the fe a t  that l i f e  as i t  flows is so much time wasted, 
and that nothing can ever be recovered or tru ly noasessed save 
under the form o f eternity which is  also, as he t e l l s  us, the form 
of art. " ( 84.)
3y way of comment, it  should be noted that, in view o f his remarks on the 
sp iritual l i f e ,  i t  is curious that Santayana should think i t  remarkable 
that a detached sp irit should recognise the eternal essences given in 
experience. As has been made clear in the preceding section, detachment 
is  made a condition for the pure in tu ition  o f essence! what type o f sp irit 
more lik e ly , then, to discern essence than a liberated sp ir it  of the kind 
Santayana takes Proust to  be?
Santayana continues that Proust's style bears witness to his great 
power o f intuition. Any adequate rendering o f intuition in words must 
necessarily be diffuse and many-sided, and must in v ite  many a postscript and 
reconsideration i
"The evanescent and immediate cannot be defined or traced or 
analysed! it  must be re-evoked by suggestion."(85)
His point here -  made also in "The tealm o f Essence" -  is  that an essence 
cannot be recalled to intuition simply by f ia t !  i t  must be evoked by a 
escription o f the situation in which i t  orig ina lly  occurred. ( 86)
A psychological c r i t i c  (Santayana goe3 on) might object that i t  is 
extremely unlikely that the same essence w ill  ever be given twice in 
in tu ition 5 and that even i f  one believes that a given essence has recurred, 
th is b e lie f is no evidence of recurrence. Santayana does not rebut the 
'psychological c r i t ic » !  Indeed, since he himself makes the same point in 
"The rtealm of Essence", he cannot consistently do so .(87*) His comment is 
rather that the criticism  is unimportant!
"The important p o in t... is  not how intuition is  reached, but that
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when reached I t  reveals an essence belonging o f i t s e l f  neither 
here nor there, but undated and eternal. 3uch essences are set 
over against existence everywhere and at a l l  times..a liv in g  sp ir it  
finds a great joy  in conceiving them, not because they are a l l  
beautiful or true, but because in  conceiving them i t  is  liberated 
from the pressure o f u lterior things, energises perfectly , and 
simply conceives."(88)
This concluding remark is  simoly an affirmation of one o f the doctrines 
o f the philosophy o f the sp iritual l i f e .  I t  is  not a critic ism  o f th is 
short paper to note thnt i t  does not introduce any new doctrines into 
Santayana's aesthetics, or indeed develop any to which he already 
subscribes. He fu l f i l s  his very lim ited purpose, which is  to note an 
agreement with his doctrine.
#
Santayana's remaining pieces on aesthetics are less c losely  linked to 
the realms o f being than those discussed on the preceding sections, though 
the apparatus o f the system is  always in  evidence. In the absence o f 
thematic links, the following discussions follow  their order o f publication. 
(c ) :■ Penitent .nrt" (1922)
In the short paper, "Penitent A rt", Santayana uses the conceptual 
framework o f the "Realms o f 3eing" in some generalised description and 
analysis o f then contemporary movements in the visual arts, indicating 
b r ie f ly  that he considers his remarks applicable to the other arts a lso .(89)
I t  is presupposed throughout the paper that cycles can be discerned 
in the history o f art, each cycle being made up of a series o f phases, 
dantayana be "’ ns by comparing t ese phases in the evolution of art with 
the stages in the l i f e  o f a woman. As a child, a g ir l may be beautiful 
without knowing i t ,  and wholly absorbed In what she is  doing. In her p’’ime, 
when she has discovered her beauty, she dresses herself in finery and 
invents a l l  sorts o f fashion to keep admiration a live . Finally, when past
(375)
her best and in decline, she puts on rouge, fa lse  hair and too much scent. 
Sometimes, however, during th is phase o f decline, she hears a ca ll to 
repentance, and thinks o f  bein^ converted. Henceforth, in thoughtful 
and re flec tive  hours, she upbraids herself fo r the hollowness o f her old 
a irs  and graces. Art exhibits corresponding phases in its  history. 
Santayana considered the art contemporary with his time of w riting to  have 
reached the stage of decline and repentance: hence the t i t l e :  penitent 
a r t . (90)
Penitence in the visual arts consists in a retrenchment o f pretensions: 
the a rtis t no longer seeks to give an exact representation o f external 
objects, or indeed any representation at a l l .  "he penitent a rt is t  
relinquishes interest in the forma o f external objects and instead directs 
his attention to mere appearances: sensations, or the very incomplete 
signs we take to be a su ffic ien t indication of the presence o f external 
objects. In the vocabulary of "The Realms of Jeing", the penitent a rtis t 
has retreated from a consideration o f the external world to  concentrate on 
the way things appear to  sp ir it :
"The more we transform things in seeing them, the .more we seem to 
sp iritualise them and turn them into forms o f our own sen s ib ility , 
regarding the liv in g  image in us as the dramatic essence o f the 
object. I t  Is  the business of science to  correct th is illu s ion ; but 
the penitent a r t is t  -  who has taken refuge in the sp ir it  and is  not 
striving to stretch his apprehension into l i t e r a l  truth, sinoe the 
e ffo r t to depict things discursively has proved a vain and arid 
ambition -  the penitent a rtis t is  content with the rhythms, echoes 
or rays which things awaken within him."(91)
Santayana is carefu l to point out that not a l l  the works o f a rt o f the 
period can be said to  fa l l  into this class, sinoe, "somebody must s t i l l  
manufacture o f f ic ia l  statues and family portraits, somebody must design 
apartment houses, clubs, churches, skyscrapers, and stations."(92 ) Yet in
sp ite o f a l l  the paraphernalia o f professional a rt is t ic  expertise, works 
o f a rt are produced which are unmistakably penitent. The two forms o f 
art woicu ue uibouases, and which he regards as im.ai stakasly penitent, are 
pure colour (Cubism) and caricature.
These forms o f art are to be regarded as penitent,
"because i t  Is only disappointment In other directions that drives 
a rtis ts  back to these primary e ffe c ts . 3y austere and deliberate 
abstinence from everything that naturally tempts them, they achieve 
in th is way a certain peace. "(93)
They would much rather regain this peace by genuinely recovering their 
naivetes
"Sensuous splendour end caricature would then have seemed to them not 
the acme of abstract a rt, but the obvious truth of things."(91)
The d if f ic u lty  with this endeavour Is that the notion of recovering 
Innocence is  seif-contradictory. This fa c t, in Santayana's view, v it ia te s  
the revivals o f art in the nineteenth century: the revived styles, at the 
time o f their conception, could not have been thought of as h istorical 
s ty les :
"Romanticism thought i t  was exqu isitely  sensitive to the sp ir it o f 
remote things, but in  rea lity  i t  was sensitive only to material 
perspectives, to costume and stage setting: i t  grew sentimental over 
legends and ruins, and being moonstruck, thought it  was imbibing the 
pest. 3ut the past had not been consciously romantic..."(95)
At the time o f writing, however, 3antayana observed that the age of 
rev iva ls had passed, and a rtis ts  were instead seeking to recover the 
genuineness and freshness o f  vision, the unselfconsciousne3s of children. 
Cubism is  an example of th is striving. I t  demands expertise and is  fa r 
from meaningless, since,
" le fo re  you can compose a chaos or paint the unnamable, you must 
tra in  yourself to a severe abstention from a l l  practical habits o f 
perception; you must heroically suppress tha understanding."(96)
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This Is  one kind o f aesthetic repentance. 'ant ay ana suggests that the 
grounds fo r th is type o f repentance might be as follows (using the vocabul­
ary o f the sp iritu a l l i f e ) «  art cannot r iva l Nature In Its  urgency; and In
any case, the mutability and confusion o f existence Is valueless to the 
s p ir it .  ^eoresentation o f m eterisl objects is a species o f  preoccupation 
with the world and so o f d istraction . I t  was never the objects depicted 
which were o f importance in a r t :
" I t  is  always the play o f  sens ib ility , and nothing e lse , that lends 
interest to external themes; and i t  was an e v il obsession with 
alien things that dragged sensib ility  into a slavery to  things 
which s t if le d  and degraded i t :  salvation lie s  in emancipating the 
medium. "(97)
What the medium is  emancipated from, is representation.
The second form of penitent art discussed by Santayana is  caricature.
In th is  form of penitence, i t  is  not maintained that the medium can be 
su ffic ien t unto i t s e l f ,  and no attempt is made to ovoid the impulse to 
observe and express external things. What is abjured is  rather any attempt 
at exhaustiveness. I t  is held by the caricaturist that, 30 to speak, a ll 
that is worth saying can be said in words of one sy llab le . Once again, 
Santayana suggests generalised grounds which might be put forward in 
ju s tifica tion  o f this position:
"...noth ing is more important than an abstract posture, an immovable 
single gesture, le t  a rt abandon reproduction and become indication. 
I f  i t  threatens thereby to become caricature, know that profound 
art can never be anything e ls e .. salvation lies  in S*rl.9f£ure."(93)
In conclusion, Santayana makes a handful of evaluative remarks.
Penitent art is  not a rev iva l o f primitive art, as some c r it ic s  have 
maintained. Savages were never rudimentary on purpose. They were not 
experimenting with the sim plification  or distortion of form, much less 
abjuring representation in  order to deepen sensib ility  fo r  the medium.
(378)
Penitent art is not crude or incompetent. Tta defects are rather to  be 
ascetic, morbid, and sometimes vulgar:
"because one o f the forms of caricature and se lf-reve la tion  is  to
be brutal, to flaunt what is  out o f place, what spoils the picture. 
Tragedy used to be noble; there is  a new refinement in seeing how 
often  i t  is  ignoble; there is a second tragedy in th a t."(99) 
iy way o f commentary, i t  should be noted f ir s t  that Santayana deserves 
credit fo r pointing out t la t  a style cannot be revived wholly as i t  was, 
fo r  the lo g ica l reason that, when fir s t  conceived, the sty le  was not 
thought o f under the description of a revived sty le. Every trick  o f form 
may be im itated; but its  former novelty lo g ic a lly  cannot. Two closely 
related points, however, need to oe added. In the f ir s t  place, rev iva list 
art is not by defin ition  inferiors there i3 no reason 'a p r io r i ' why it  
should not answer a genuine need fe l t  s t the time of rev iva l. Secondly, 
Santayana does not mention the point that rev iva lis t art has qualities of 
it s  own period which tend to be ignored when i t s  rev iva lis t aspects are 
ernpha si zed .
While they include this insight, Santayana's views on penitent art 
involve certain important d if f ic u lt ie s . The f i r s t  o f these concerns the 
ap p licab ility  o f the doctrine to the other arts. I t  is  clear that 
Santayana wishes to extend the application o f the idea o f penitence beyond 
the visual arts. The penitent a rtis t is  content with the inner echoes 
aroused by external objects,
"and in proportion as these reverberations are actually renewed, the 
poem rermins a cry, the story a dream, the building a glimpse, the 
portra it a caricature."(100)
In the 11 ;ht o f Santayana's defin ition  o f penitence, i t  is  not d if f ic u lt  to 
see how he intends the doctrine to be applied to literatu re. Concentration 
on the world within rather than the world outside leads to lyricism in 
poetry and to stories becoming fantastic. nhe real d if f ic u lty  lie s  in 
applying the dootrine to architecture» to say that the building remains a
glimpse is no help. Since the architect has no representation to abjure 
or simplify, i t  is  not clear how he is to manifest penitence. Santayana 
makes no mention whatever o f applying the doctrine to music.
Again, i t  is  doubtful whether caricature is  a tenable candidate fo r  
the position o f a form o f art especia lly typ ica l o f the *orty year» or 
ao (say) before Santayana wrote -  c learly , i f  the doctrine o f the cyc lica l 
view o f the evolution o f art is  to  be tenable, the alleged leading features 
o f a given phase should not apoear in others. I t  is clear from the text 
that Santayana regards the Romantic era as a period o f decline in a rt, with 
Cubism and caricature as recent forms of penitence in this period o f 
decline. The d if f ic u lty  is  that caricature as we know i t  emerged consider­
ably before the Romantic period, and indeed flourished before that time. 
Annibale Caracci is credited with the invention of caricature, andby 1700 
the form was established and sophisticated, witness the works of Pierleone 
Chezzi. Again, the U3e o f caricature as a p o lit ic a l weapon emerged by the 
middle of the eighteenth century, in the works o f leorge, Third Marquess of 
Townshend.(101*) There is  no indication in the text that Santayana wishe» 
to extend the phase o f decline as far back as the time o f Ghezzi, to  
say nothing of Caracci. The choice o f caricature as a d is tin ctive  feature 
of the period of decline seems ill-advised .
Thirdly, i t  is contestable whether Cubism f i t s  the description o f a 
penitent form of art as w ell a3 Santayana maintains that i t  does. In 
order for what Santayana says to be correct, the Cubist must sa tis fy  the 
description o f retrenching his pretentions, ceasing to  aim at exact and 
exhaustive representation o f the world, instead taking an interest in 
external objects only as appearance. I f  C leises' and Metzinger's ''Du 
Cubisme” is taken as an authoritative statement of the Cubist credo, i t  
appears that while there is  some truth in Cantayana'a claims, the Cubists 
themselves would disagree with him importantly on certain issues. They 
would appear to agree with him Insofar as he asserts that they have a 
special interest in the world within, i .e .  the world of sp ir it:
(380)
"There is  nothing real outside us; there is  nothing real but 
the coincidence o f a sensation and an individual mental direction.
I t  is  not our intention to cast in doubt the existence o f objects 
which a ffect our senses; but there is  reasonable certitude only 
in regard to the image which these ca ll fo rth  in our minds. "(102) 
While th is is so, the OuHist Is s t i l l  concerned with the external 
world, and indeed with the "expression" on canvas of aspects o f objects 
which, in the opinion o f Gtleizes and Metzinger, i t  had not been thought 
possible to express before:
"O il painting today permits the expression of notions (heretofore) 
deemed inexpressible, those of depth, density and duration, and i t  
in c ites us to represent according to  a complex rhythm and in a 
restricted space a veritable fusion o f ob jects ."(103)
Again, fo r  the Subist, the object is not any one o f the views taken o f i t ;  
i t  is  the fusion of a l l  its  appearances. I t  is  th is  fusion which the 
Cubist t r ie s  to  render on canvas:
"We are sure that the least sagacious w i l l  soon acknowledge that 
the pretention o f making the weight o f body apparent and the time 
spent in numbering i t s  diverse aspects is  as legitimate as that o f 
im itating the daylight by the shock o f a blue and an orange. Then 
the fact that the object is  moved about in  order to  have i t s  many 
successive appearances caught, when these appearances blend Into 
a single image and reconstitute the object in duration, w i l l  no 
longer rouse the indignation o f reasonable people."(104)
There are grounds therefore fo r holding that the Cubist attempts a more 
exhaustive rendering o f the object than an a r t is t  working in  geometrical 
perspective. This beLng so, Cubism does not wholly conform to Santayana's 
analysis o f penitence in art.
(d ) "The Mutability o f Aestr.etlc Categories" (1925) and delated Passages In 
"The tealm of Essence"
The paper, "The Mutability o f Aesthetlo Categories" is  o f special
_
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interest among Santayana's la te r  writings on aeathetics for two reasons, 
f i r s t ly ,  i t  contains his analysis o f  th-? types of disagreement which can 
occur in aesthetics, a topic he does not deal with elsewhere. Secondly, 
in an important footnote, he presents an amended view o f beauty. This 
note, in conjunction with two passages in "The tealm of Essence" sketch a 
theory o f beauty which t im e r s  in certain resnecte from that nut forward 
in "The Sense o f leauty" (o f .  Sh .I, above). This is  one of the few issues 
in aesthetics on which Santayana s ign ifican tly  changed his mind.
In the following c r it ic a l exposition, a pessa ;e on expression is 
omitted. I t  is  dealt with in Ch.IV, above.
The paper was suggested by Henry Rutgers Marshall's book, "The beautiful", 
and, as its  t i t l e  suggests, is concerned with aesthetic categories or 
concepts. Santayana contends, against Marshall, that mutability of meaning 
i3 a more radical and notorious feature o f these categories than o f those 
used in  other speculations. The principle o f mutability is  however 
extensible to  other areas o f inquiry, e.g. physics, psychology, and log ic .
(105)
In Marshall's view, the Real may be exhaustively divided into the 
Seautiful, the ’Talid  or factual, and the Moral Sood. Of these, the concept 
o f the Jeautiful alone is  unambiguous (Marshall contends): o f course, the 
word is  applied to a great va rie ty  o f objects, and in contradictory ways; 
yet th is by no means implies ambiguity in the concept.
3efore proceeding to argue against th is assertion, Santayana brings 
forward views which Marshall might have advanced in support o f the thesis 
o f the non-ambiguity of 'b ea u tifu l'. Santayana does not argue against 
these views, and the context indicates that he regards them as possible 
truths which Marshall might use to  support his case. I t  is therefore 
safe to attribute these views to  Santayana himself.
No two aesthetic judgments (Santayana contends) can be contradictory 
unless the same category is  applied in both. With this in mind, he proceeds 
to analyse two types o f disagreement which can oocur over the aesthetic
(382)
properties o f an object)
( i )  merely verbal disagreement:
" I f  tub beauty which one party found in  a thing was not at 
a l l  the same beauty which the other party missed in i t ,  the 
quarrel would be merely verbal, the paucity and vagueness of 
words not being able to mark clearly  the variety o f things and 
of men's perceptions."(106)
( i i )  where the disputants agree about the aesthetic qua lities o f an 
object, but disagree as to whether these are to be approved of or disapprove« 
o f:
" . . i f  the quarrel is  more than verbal, i t  is p o lit ic a l and 
mor-1. turning on the sort o f man and the sort o f culture 
which are desirable; i t  is  not about the aesthetic character 
o f given objects. Two men may see exactly the same character­
is t ic s  in the Venus de Mediois, yet one may turn his back on 
i t ,  while the other's mouth waters. I t  Is a moral question 
what kind o f beauty we shall love. "(107)
This is  surely an acceptable analysis of types of disagreement about 
aesthetic properties o f objects, sofar as i t  goe3. Santayana's views may 
be restated in analytic idioms as fo llows:
( i )  disputes occur in which the disputants agree over what condition 
or conditions govern the use o f the terra "beautifu l", but disagree as to 
whether the given object satisfies these conditions. (An aesthetic disagree­
ment. )
( l i )  disputes occur in which the disputants agree over what conditior 
or conditions govern the use o f the word "beautifu l", and agree as to  
whether the given object sa tis fies  these conditions. They disagree over 
whether i t  is morally desirable to  like or d is lik e  an object of this kind.
(:. moral disagreement.)
Santayana omits, however, to consider a third possible type o f disagreement!
?
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( l i i )  disputes occur In which the disputants agre* over th* 
aesthetic properties o f the given object, but disagree as to  whether these 
constitute necessary or au ffio len t conditions fo r the predication o f th*
term "beautifu l". (An aesthetic disagreement.)
While Santayana's views can therefore be accepted as they stand, though 
they are incomplete, i t  is  d i f f ic u lt  to see how they buttress Marshall's 
contention that the term "beautifu l" is  univocal. They w ill  do so only on 
the addition o f a premiss which is  not stated: that the meaning o f the 
term "beautiful" is  d istinct from the sets o f su fficient conditions fo r  its  
ascription . I t  is  im plic it in  the form ultion  o f the types o f  dispute he 
analyses that Santayana recognises that there are various sets o f such 
c r ite r ia . However, i t  is  to be doubted whether he was aware o f the need 
to  establish it . In the absence of any argument on the point, Santayana can 
hardly be said to have succeeded in supporting Marshall's case.
Having attempted to  support Marshall, Santayana turns to critic ism  o f 
h is views, and to the main aim o f the paper, i .e .  to establish the thesis 
that "beautiful" and other aesthetic terms have a variety o f d iffe ren t 
meanings. He f ir s t  considers some o f the senses which have been given to 
the term, "beau tifu l". Marshall himself (Santayana reports) notes that fo r 
the Greeks, the Seauitful was not an aesthetic oate ;ory at a l l ,  but a moral 
one:
" i t  meant, in the most typ ica l instances, the 'honestum1, the noble, 
excellent, admirable, or rightly  constituted."(108)
The modern usage o f "beautifu l" as an aesthetic term therefore involves a 
sh ift  in meaning and, even in modern philosophy, the term is  not unambiguous: 
" . . .a s  Groce observes, i t  is a hybrid concept which covers the 
a ttractive, the 's im pático ', as well as the expressive.."(109) 
"Expression" Is  another aentral aesthetic category which has a d ivers ity  
o f meanings. Platonic id ea lis ts  claim that a being o f the lowest order may 
express the highest: a worm may express the inexpressible. This is the opp­
osite o f 'ornantic  expressiveness: for the iomantlo, the world is  the creat—
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ion o f his own consciousness or W ill, and i t s  whole merit is  t ta t  i t  
expresses him. Santayana's criticism  o f th is la tte r  point o f view, i t
w i l l  be clear by now, is  wholly typical o f him:
"This which he ( i . e .  the .omantie) c a lls  his sp ir it or W ill is 
somethin« v ita l but distracted; l i t t l e  as he suspects i t ,  i t  is  
matter in him speaking without self-knowledge. "(110)
Marshall maintains that beauty consists in  stable pleasure. Santayana 
quotes him as follows: "Beauty is  re la tiv e ly  stable, or rea l, pleasure.
Any pleasant element may become part of the f ie ld  that is  re la tiv e ly  
stable. We c a l l  an object beautiful which seems always to y ie ld  pleasure 
in impression, or contemplative r e v iv a l . " ( I l l )  Santayana agrees with this 
insofar as what is  asserted is that pleasure is  the substance o f the sense 
o f beauty:
"The one thing that beauty, as actually revealed, can never be, 
is ind ifferen t: i t  cannot be divorced from liv in g  preference and 
ineffable charm. The soul must be drawn out by i t ;  an inner 
commotion and a clear apparition on which the commotion centers 
are equally essentia l.''(112)
He disagrees, however, with Marshall's assertion that, in order to qualify 
as beautiful, a thing must seem beautiful over and over again. In 
Santayana's view, this stress on s tab ility  Indicates that Marshall is  
thinking not so much of the sense o f beauty, but o f the reasons why given 
works o f art are publicly esteemed or said to  be masterpieces. I t  is 
possible that the fitness to  occasion repeated pleasure should figure among 
these reasons,
"but the esteem in which works o f a r t  are held by cultivated 
opinion depends on a ll sorts of considerations: date, rarity , 
typ ica l character, workmanship, signifioanee in the history of 
art or religion or sentiment. "(113)
Santayana maintains that collectors and connoisseurs do not look for
beauty in the arts; what they look fo r are the qualities Just lis ted .
He goes on to separate the love o f  art from the love o f beauty:
"The fine arts have to be studied lik e  any other department of
nature} and that study, with much fatigue end waste o f s p ir it ,  w ill  
y ield  some pleasures and a larger view o f the world; i t  w ill  refine 
a nan's taste and enrich i t  with a l l  sorts of s id eligh ts, qualifica­
tions, and iron ies ; but I  think a lover o f beauty w ill  soon turn 
his back on concert halls and museums, and take to the fie ld s . "(114  ) 
Sven the love o f beauty in  nature can be disappointing, i f  i t  is  not 
genuinely f e l t :  i t  must be spontaneous i f  i t  is  to enrich l i f e .
By way of commenting on these assertions, i t  is to be noted f ir s t  
that the thesis that beauty cannot be ind ifferen t is  a coro llary of
Santayana's interest theory o f value: i t  is  asserted that values arise only
as the result of fe l t  preferences, and therefore by de fin ition  cannot be 
objects o f indifference. Secondly, Santayana is surely wrong to quibble 
at the suggestion that a beautiful object can be repeatedly beautiful, 
although he is  right to  maintain that i t  is  not a necessary condition for
beauty. He seems to have in mind the view that, i f  an object is  repeatedly
found to be beautiful, the reason must be that taste has ceased to be 
spontaneous and has degenerated into what he ca lls  'ob ligatory raptures' 
(115), i .e .  mere subscription to received opinion, without any genuine 
aesthetic pleasure being f e l t .  The d if f ic u lty  with this thesis is  that 
i t  is  over-generalised, as are those dissociating love o f art from love of 
beauty. Sertainly i t  would be foo lish  to  deny that mindless repetition of 
what i t  is thought ought to be said before accepted classica l works o f a l l  
the arts is  by no means an unknown occurrence; but i t  is  not universally 
the case that a l l  examples o f repeated pleasure in a work o f art are of 
this kind. Again, while beauty has perhaps no special place among 
aesthetic virtues, i t  is  fa lse to suggest that i t  is  not among the possible 
reasons why works o f art are esteemed.
Santayana continues by referring to Marshall's view that a r t is ts , 
when at work, do not aim at foregone e ffe c ts  but obey a spontaneous inpulse. 
Santayana's comment is  that i t  may well be that certain aspects o f the
creation o f  a work o f art are inspired, appearing involuntarily in  the 
mind o f t,he a r t is t ,
"but his art begins where his inspiration ends. Art is something 
that can be learned and taught; and in the fine arts, as in  a l l  
human achievements, that which is  most admired, that ir, which merit 
is  measurable, is precisely this element o f success in accomplishing 
an assignable task. "(116)
Marshall's account o f the creative process is  certainly one-sided, and 
stands in  need of s supplementary stress on technique. I t  is  w e ll-  
established that, in the creative process, the deliverances o f lnspiratio. 
are scrutinised and manipulated by the conscious mind o f the a r t is t .  gain, 
the extent of material provided by inspiration v  ries considerably from 
a rtis t to  a rt is t . I t  is w ell known that Beethoven, for example, drew very 
l i t t l e  on inspiration, creating most o f his works by relentless working- 
over o f small phrases. Yet Santayana goes too far in his correction of 
Marshall's views in suggesting that the qua lity  of inspired aesthetic 
material is  not an object o f aesthetic judgment, and that only i t s  conscious 
fashioning is . Indeed, i t  is  surely the qua lity  and fecundity o f  an 
a r t is t 's  inspiration which ultimately determines his statures a l l  the 
technique there is  w ill not disguise poverty o f material. I f  what 
Santayana says were true, no distinction would be drawn between the 
technically proficient in the arts, and those who are proficient and more 
besides.
Santayana goes on to deny that i t  is  the function o f the fin e  arts to 
create beauty; or at least, that this suggestion as to  their function 
w ill  not serve to  d iffe ren tia te  them from useful objects or natural 
objects. To say that works o f art are (by de fin ition ) beautiful,
"by no means implies that such boastful or playful works w ill  give
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more pleasure or possess more actual beauty than useful or natural 
objects: but they w i l l  attract and hold public attention and I f  
there is  any real beauty In them I t  w i ll  be easier to  name and to
point to  than the thousa d intangible beauties which a poet finds 
in rambling through the world. "(117)
Further against the view that the function o f the fin e  arts is to create 
beauty, he maintains that the a rt is t  usually has a technical task set fo r  
him in advance, a task which w il l  measure his s k i l l  and power. Twice in 
the history o f European a rt, in Ireece and at the liennaissance, this task 
has been to represent things as they look. This is  a legitimate ambition: 
"but i t  was not a search fo r  greater beauty. 3eauty cannot be 
searched fo r; and i f  a subtler sense for beauty had then been d r iv ­
ing man to new types o f composition, they might have refined th e ir  
calligraphy, multiplied the harmonies of design or o f sentiment, 
without becoming more rea lis t ic : both decoratively and poetica lly  
the archaic arts, as we see today, were the more beautifu l."(118) 
¿gain, modern a rtists have the technical ambition o f  emphasizing single 
characteristics or single emotions in violent abstraction. Like the 
representational ambitions o f ea rlier a rtis ts , th is  aim has no special 
connection with beauty.
Insofar as Santayana is  here denying that the possession o f beauty is  
a necessary condition fo r a rt, then what he says is  surely incontestable, 
and accords with the analysis of the usage of the term "a rt", put forward 
in  Ch.VI, above. I t  is  fa r  fetched, however, to maintain that beauty is  as 
unspecial to  artiste  as he seems to imply here: there is  no reason to  
assume that the goals o f either representational or abstract art ars 
incompatible with or were h is torica lly  dissociated from a wish to oreate 
beautiful works.
In ooncluslon, Santayana epitomises his own views by using Marshall's 
terms in d ifferen t senses. Happiness is  the true Sood, and i f  Moral lood 
means noble habit become second nature, the Moral Good is part of the ' seAtf.
being a means to  that end. The 3eautifu l, as actually  f e l t ,  would be a 
part o f the Good, "being a sublimation o f pleasure and an ingredient in a 
complete happiness"(119) Santayana thinks that, in  so twisting the meaning 
o f these terms, he is  not fa lse to  Marshall's intentions,
"so variable are a l l  these categories, themselves creatures of 
passing in tu ition , and so l i t t l e  do they mark any permanent lines 
o f cleavage in the liv in g  world."(120)
As a general comment on this paper, i t  is  to be stressed that i t  is to 
Santayana's cred it to insist as he does on the v a r ia b ility  in meanings of 
terms in aesthetics. This view might now seem obvious; but i f  so, that 
is  la rge ly  due to the lingu istic  insights provided by Wittgenstein and the 
analytic school o f aesthetics. Santayana worked alone and insisted on this 
point years before i t  became the truism of analysis i t  now is .•
I t  is in a long footnote to th is  paper that Santayana makes some 
general remarks on beauty which indicate a change o f view from that 
expressed in ""he Sense o f Beauty" (c f .  Ch.I, above). In the course o f 
his discussion o f Marshall, Santayana has occasion to  use the terra, 
"ob je c t ify ", and introduces the note to d iffe ren tia te  th is new usage from 
that o f "The Sense o f Beauty". The term, "ob jec tified " in the phrase, 
"ob jectified  pleasure" (the de fin ition  o f beauty in "The Sense o f Beauty") 
was 'a fo r t io r i ' not intended to  indicate any hypostasis o f beauty, i .e .  
he did not wish, in the early work, to put forward an ob jectiv is t theory 
o f beauty, but on the contrary a subjectivist one.
The adoption o f the metaphysics and epistemology of the lea 1ms of 
Being led Santayana to modify these early views in certain ways. The 
most important emendation to the ea r lie r  doctrine i3 that pleasure does not 
need to  be ob jectified  because i t  is  not in tr in s ica lly  subjective. This 
is a consequence of the distinction  between Intuition of essence and the 
essence intuited; the intu ition is  subjective, the essence intuited neutral:
(389)
"Nothing is  subjective in experience except experience i t s e l f ,  the 
passing act o f intuition or fe e lin g ; the terms distinguished during 
that experience, such as spec ific  qualities of colour or pleasure, 
are neither objective nor subjective, but neutral,..Pleasure there­
fore does not need to be ob jectified  in order to be fused into an 
image f e l t  to be beautiful: i f  f e l t  at a l l ,  pleasure is  already an 
object o f  in tu ition ; and the beautiful image is never ob jective in 
any other sense."(121)
The experience of pleasure, on th is  analysis, is  o f a universal essence, 
which is  neither objective nor subjective, but neutral.
Nevertheless, Santayana maintains, with regard to  the view expressed in 
"The Sense o f 3eauty", " I  am fa r from disowning my old view in i t s  import," 
(122) He was making an e ffo r t  to  describe what he fe l t  within himself 
whenever he experienced beauty. Again, the phrase, "ob jectified  pleasure", 
was not intended as a de fin ition  o f beauty, "a visionary essence utterly 
indefinable" (123)} rather,
" i t  was an indication o f the conditions and manner in which the 
momentary apparition o f beauty arose and vanished. I f  I  tried  now 
to give such an indication I  might perhaps say that beauty was a 
v ita l harmony fe l t  and fused into an image under the form o f eternity 
I  add the last f iv e  words...in  order to emphasize the fact that 
beauty, as I  fe e l i t ,  transports us altogether into the realm of 
essence, and that no pleasure, interest, or admiration becomes a 
sense o f beauty unless i t  does so."(124)
This la ter opinion can be paraphrased as follows: the experience o f beauty 
is  an aesthetic experience, i . e .  i t  involves a contemplation o f essences 
fo r  th eir own sake, not as sigi s o f the external world. Essences are 
eternal: hence the references to  eternity and to the realm o f essence. Like 
a l l  mental events, this contemplation must be eniphenomenal. I t  involves 
freedom from distraction and therefore presupposes a harmony within the 
organism, and between organism and environment: hence the reference to
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v ita l harmony as a condition fo r contemplation. This position diverges 
from that o f "The .ense o f 9eauty" in the fo llow ing way: in the early work, 
the experience o f beauty is o f an object in the external world, since 
beauty is  pleasure regarded as a quality of an object. In the la te r  view, 
aesthetic exnerienee is  by defin ition  not o f the external world, but o f 
essences considered as immédiat,e data.
More modifications in the theory of beauty are evident in two passages 
in "The tealm of hssence". He begins the f i r s t  of these passages by 
reitera ting that, when an essence appears to us to be beautiful, i t  is  
because i t  is harmonious with our nature. (125) He goes on to develop the 
notion of the individual essence, beauty: c lea r ly , in his system there 
must be such an essence, since beauty is  a discrlminable character:
"The beautiful is  i t s e l f  an essence, an indefinable quality fe l t  in 
many things which, however disparate they may be otherwise, receive 
this name by virtue of a special emotion, half wonder, half love, 
which is  f e l t  in their presence." ( 126)
This passage mokes clear a further divergence with Santayana's ea r lie r  
views: formerly, the experience afforded by beauty was said to  be simply 
pleasure; in the la te r  writings, i t  is  a complex o f awe and love. I t  is  
highly question ale on introspective grounds whether the presupposition 
common to both views is ju stified , i . e .  that there is  one fee lin g  common 
to the experiences occasioned by a l l  beautiful objects.
Santayana continues by making exp lic it an aesthetic corollary o f the 
doctrine o f essence: since beauty is an essence, beauty i t s e l f  can be 
contemplated. He is  careful, however, to distinguish th is view from 
certain classic opinions with which i t  might be confused:
"The essence o f the beautiful, when made an object o f contemplation 
by i t s e l f ,  is  rather misleading: lik e  the good and like pure Being, 
i t  requires much d ia lectica l and sp iritu a l training to discern i t  
in its  purity and in it s  fulness."(127)
Misled by i t ,  philosophers have sometimes converted i t  into a causal agent
I d te leo log ica l explanations; others have buried i t  under massive 
descriptions of the circumstances o f i t s  occurrence«
Chat contempx; tion o f one essence o f beauty i t s e l f  is  possible in  the 
la te r  philosophy is  evidence o f how great a development, in the direction 
o f Platonism, had taken place in Santayana's b e lie fs . In t ie  ea rlier 
theory, i t  is  impossible for there to be an experience which lias fo r its  
object beauty 'tout court', simply because beauty must be regarded as quality 
o f  an ob ject. There is  no hint In the early works that the object can 
disappear from contemplation and pure beauty be l e f t .  Whether the la te r 
view is  an improvement on the ea rlie r is  surely highly questionable: even 
i f  i t  is  in te l l ig ib le  to speak of an experience o f beauty where the beauty 
is  not a quality o f anything whatever, i t  is certain that states approx­
imating to this are o f extreme ra rity , and therefore Santayana can hardly 
be said to  have contributed to the understanding o f less esoteric 
encounters with beauty.
He concludes this passage with the assertion that the beautiful,
" is  a great liberator o f  other essences. The most material thing, 
in so fa r  as i t  is  f e l t  to be beautiful, is  instantly immaterial- 
ised, raised above personal relations, concentrated and deepened, in 
i t s  pure being, in a word, sublimated into an essence. .."(128 )
What Santayana appears to mean i3 simply that an object regarded as beautiful 
is  contemplated; In which case, a l l  i t s  qualities are contemplated; the 
essences normally taken to  be indices o f properties o f the object are 
regarded as pure essences. Tt 1b in th is sense that the object may be said 
to  be " irunaterla 11sed". This view is  objectionable as a corollary of the 
thesis that aesthetic experience and immediate experience can be 
id en tified . (C f. Ch.V, above)
The second passage on beauty in "The Healm o f I'.ssence" occurs as part 
o f  an argument designed to  show that, however complex the physiological 
( i . e .  in dantayana's ®nae, psychic) causes o f intuition may be, the essence
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Intuited may be perfectly simple.
Suppose a Shinaman in the louvre is invited to admire the Venus of Milo.
The admiration expected of him is  a spiritual emotion; and no amount of 
intellectual preparation will induce this state in him. Used to works of 
his own tradition, he w ill be unmoved by the Ireek statue:
"He w ill remain oold, because he w ill miss here the things which in 
his case can work the miracle and entrance the minds things minute, 
ornate, parti-coloured, fragrant, incidental"(129)
This passage demonstrates clearly Santayana's grasp of what has since come 
to be called cultural conditioning, which hardly needs oomment here.
He continues by specifying what he takes to be the factors contributory 
to forming the sense of beauty in any individuals
"The sense of beauty is not a feeling separable from some intuition of 
form; on the other hand, it is a feeling, not a verbal or intellect­
ual judgment. It arises by the convergence in the psyche of many 
assaults and many reactions, from far and near."(130)
H specifies morality, literature, erotic sensibility, "familiarity", 
"lucidity", and "harmony with other esteemed things", as his lis t  of these 
"assaults and reactions".( 131 )
From the philosophical, as opposed to the psychological point of view, 
the chief interest of this passage lies in the emphasis on form, which is 
new in Santayana's theory of beauty. In the light of the doctrine of 
essence, however, this new stress is not surprising. Why this is so 
becomes clearer in the light of a further passage, in which the emphasis 
on form is  reiterated. Santayana is arguing that the notion of essence has 
several important properties in common with a beautiful form:
"In a form felt to be beautiful an obvious complexity composes sn 
obvious unity: a marked intensity and Individuality are seen to 
belong to a reality utterly immaterial and Incapable of existing 
otherwise thar. speciously.. . ’his divine beauty is evident, fugitive, 
Impalpable, and homeless in the world of material fact; yet it is
unmistakably individual and sufficient unto Itse lf, and although 
perhaps soon eclipsed is never really extinguished« for i t  visits
time, but belongs to eternity."(132)
Santayana is slightly inexact here: he should restrict his analogy 
between essence and beautiful form to complex essences: on his own 
premisses, simple essenoes deflnitionally cannot possess any complexity 
whatever, and therefore cannot exhibit the unity in multiplicity of which 
he speaks. As has been said, however, the main interest of this passage 
lies in the formalism in the theory of beauty which it reveals. In, "The 
Sense of Beauty", Santayana argued that material and expressive properties 
of the aesthetic object contribute to its beauty. However, since in his 
later philosophy he is committed to holding that the aesthetic experience 
is experience of essences alone, not objects, it is hard to see how he can 
accommodate his earlier remarks on material and expression. An essence is 
immaterial, and it is not an object in the sense of the earlier theory with 
which feelings, thoughts, etc., can be associated, and so cannot satisfy 
the earlier conditions for expression. Hence, Santayana is le ft  only with 
form of which to predicate beauty. For reasons already given in Ch.I, the 
theory of beauty of "The Sense of Beauty", where room is  allowed for 
contributions by material and expression, is  preferable to the restricted 
formalism of the later theory.
The doctrines of the Realms of Being explain his remarks to the effect 
that beauty is fugitive arxJ eternal, but a visitor in time. Beauty is an 
essence, and so eternal; but it is periodically instantiated in matter, 
and so "visits time."
The aim of this second passage in "The Realm of Essence", it  may be 
repeated, is to show that complex psychic events may result in a simple 
intuition. Santayana maintains that the effect of a ll  the experiences which 
contribute to cultural conditioning is not reflected in the actual intuition 
of beauty. A ll this conditioning,
"occurs underground: it is physical and merely preliminary to the
beauty realised in intuition. This realised beauty is not compounded 
of those miscellaneous extinct impressions.. .it  is  a fresh flower, 
with its own form, its own scent, and its  own naughtiness."(133)
He adds that for this reason, beauty cannot be preserved, as it were 
mummified, in any external object, " it  can belong to things only by being 
attributed to them by some living soul. " ( 1 3 0
The difficulty with the whole argument over complex causes producing a 
simple intuition is that many stages are omitted. Santayana is striving, 
in effect, to make his e pi phenomena l i  an consistent with some obvious facts 
of experience. What he asserts is that there is not a one to one correl­
ation of psychic to spiritual events: a group of psychic events can 
produce one spiritual event. Entirely absent is any detailed account of how 
this comes about, e. g . , it is not clear what he counts as one psychic 
event -  is the arousal of memories by a present stimulus one event or, 
as he appears to assume, a complex of events? Quite typically of him, a ll 
detail is absent.
Drawing together the main ideas from these passages from "The Mutability 
of Aesthetic Categories" and "The Realm of Essence", it  emerges that 
Santayana changed ills mind considerably about the theory of beauty in Ilia 
later period. Beauty is no longer pleasure considered as a quality of an 
object, but an eternal essence which can be contemplated alone; pleasure 
is no longer objectified, because it is not subjective, but a neutral, 
eternal essence; aesthetic experience is not of external objects but of 
immediate data; and finally, beauty of material and expression can no 
longer be accommodated within the theory, leaving Santayana committed to 
a variety of formalist account. Because of the difficulties over the 
concept of essence, and for reasons given in Chapter I and the present 
section, the earlier view, though Itself imperfect, is preferable to the 
latter,
(e ) "an aesthetic .ovlet" (1927
(39-0
The paper, "An Aesthetic Soviet" states Santayana's fundamental
criticisms of the Aesthetic Movement. Characteristically, he does not 
refer to specific persons or texts; the vievs he attacks, however, are not
relevantly different from those of 'Jilde, set out in Ch. VIII, above. 
Santayana's own position is the consequence of the conjunction of several 
of his own doctrines! the interest theory of value; epiphenomenalism; the 
theory of intuition, and the identification of aesthetic with immediate 
experience. These premisses have a ll been discussed in this chapter or 
the preceding ones. To avoid repetition, therefore, only doctrines new to 
Santayana's aesthetics are commented on.
For reasons which w ill become clear, Santayana regards the members of 
the ,esthetic Movement as forming a Soviet: hence the dominant image and 
t it le  of the paper. A Soviet is a caucus of comrades, jo :ned by a bond 
which is both spontaneous and spiritual. It is the perfect ideal of a 
free society. While each member of the Soviet is an independent spirit, 
"grounded in itse lf and responsible to itse lf only", yet each also trans­
cends this isolation to feel,
"the exhilaration of living and thinking in unison with a legion 
of kindred spirits, each no lesr* free and absolute than it s e lf " . (135) 
I f  a Soviet attempts to enforce its authority in any way, it  forfeits  
spontaneity and thereby ceases to be a Soviet in the proper sense.
Aesthetic feeling and invention would by their very nature seem to be 
the least liable of human states or pursuits to be subject to authoritarian­
ism. The aesthete is he who takes pleasure in the intuition of essence, 
i.e . of immediate data. Santayana stresses that the realm of essence is 
an infinite field for pleasure, including every po sible form which 
experience can take. In this sense of the term, the aesthete is he who is 
likely to elude authority, for,
"What could be more spontaneous and incontrollable than living  
intuition, and at the same time more innocent?"( 136 )
The aesthete is to be distinguished from the artist: "Artists are
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craftsmen working under the patronage of Industry, religion, custom, 
sentiment, or pride. They are not aesthetes..."(137) Yet they need much 
aesthetic sensibility I f  they are to excel In their crafts. A particular
aesthetic bias w ill be visible in their works:
"Silently, and almost without knowing it , they will subject every­
thing to special optical or manual rhythms, and w ill impose a 
thousand technical tricks, distortions, or inventions upon their 
subject-matter." (133)
It is this personal element which the aesthete, who In effect considers that 
everything ought to be made for his contemplative satisfaction, exalts Into 
the sole virtue of works of art. The aesthetic soul In the artist* them­
selves takes this view. 3ecause of it  they may come to find conformity to 
patronage and natural models a monstrous imposition. They may be tempted 
to rebel, to proclaim the independence of the "free imaginative element" 
in their work3. They may well establish an aesthetic Soviet, i.e . become 
aesthetes, in the sense defined.
In favour of this proposal, Santayana points out that a Soviet of 
aesthetes does not run the risks of political or industrial Soviets, where 
interests conflict, and dangers must be faced from outside. The brother­
hood of aesthetes is not one of blood or of interests, but purely of 
affin ity, and can accordingly break up harmlessly at any moment.(139)
I f  this is the case, however, why bother to form a Soviet at all? 
.Santayana's reply is that emancipated and free spirits are naturally 
gregarious. Even in the matter of spiritual vision, men prefer to think 
themselves part of a group:
"The truth and beauty which we profess to love would leave us 
profoundly disconsolate, I f  we could not dance before them holding 
hands and assuring ourselves, by saying so in chorus, that this 
beauty la really beautiful and this truth really true." ( 140 )
This fact Is evidence of the psychic ground of spirit, which, however
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much it might think itse lf so, is  never absolute or free: "down to its 
inmost depths it expresses the li fe  of some material organism, formed 
and buffeted by slroumstances»" (141) Reiterating a doctrine f ir s t  put 
forward in "The :ense of Beauty", Santayana insists on the subjectivity of 
values and their ground in our animal interests. Without these, there would 
be no sense of beaut71
"Beauty...is not intrinsic to any form: it  comes to bathe that form, 
and to shine forth from it , only fay virtue of a secret attraction, 
agitation, wonder, and joy which that stimulus happens to cause -  
not always but on occasion -  in our animal hearts. " ( 14-2 )
('’’he stress on form as the vehicle of beauty peculiar to Santayana's later 
works appears here onoe again, cf. the previous section.)
These remarks are not so speculative as they sound, since they are 
relevant to the fate of a ll Soviets. There cannot be a Soviet unless the 
spontaneous impulses of its members are unanimous and specific. They come 
to be so by the combined influence of animal nature .’ nd external circum­
stances. The continued existence of any Soviet depends on the constancy of 
these two factors:
"A common competence or a comon hatred or hope is f irs t  bred by the
very institutions on which it reacts, and cannot long survive them."
(143)
The only stability which an aesthetic Soviet can possess is the result 
of these factors remaining constant. Ware the spirit absolutely free, 
and the artist a pure aesthete, he would be unable to begin creating 
works of art, since, being without the bias supplied only by interest,
"pure taste is not creative, it  contains no principle of in itia l choice, 
no radical motifs."(144) Thnt this state of affairs does not obtain is 
due to the artist's having a definite human nature which he cannot escape 
or put into abeyance:
"...a s  nature supplies his (l.e . the a rtis t 's ) Initial notiona, so 
she also steadies his hand, and lends depth to his final a ll«  '—
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lances. ...why that effect rather than another? ?or some humble, 
non-aeathetie reason: familiarity, fac ility , contrast, affinity, 
cnance. The spar* of spirit requires tne contact of arterial forces 
not only to kindle it  but to give It direction, and fc-shions become 
styles only when they are anchored In necessity. "(145)
The truth of this thesis Is illustrated by the fate of the art of stained 
glass. Though an intensely and exclusively aesthetic pursuit, this art 
was not developed until non-aesthetic reasons were found for so doing in 
c iv il life . When this state of affairs ceased to obtain, when religion 
became puritan, the art declined.( 1 4 6 )
The aesthete (in Santayana's sense) is "essentially an amateur, a poetic 
spirit listening rather than composing."(147) In the modern world, how­
ever, it has come about that the aesthete pose3 as an artist. He assumes 
himself competent to do anything he may choose, and do It better than those 
who are slaves of routine:
'This is improbable: and In fact the most Interesting work done by
the aesthetic Soviet Is that of old regimental artists who have
passed to the revolutionary camp, and who can laugh at their own
experiments and revert from them, on occasion, to traditional ways."
( H 8 )
This reversion is no recantation: "Pure creation, absolute music, has 
always been the aesthetic essence of the a r t s . (149) Hut this creation 
cannot be creation out of nothing. This is  the flaw in the aesthetic Soviet: 
its members announce that art is to be made independent of life ; yet i f  they 
succeeded in performing this emancipation, the resultant art would cease to 
be of interest as soon as it  were created. The theory, however, cannot 
even be executed:
"The prophets of the aesthetic Soviet announoe that art must be 
emancipated from nature, and appreciation of art from literature.
This is possible (though by no means exclusively right) i f  by 
literature we understand romantic history or fiction, and by nature
visual appearances; but there la a mother-nature deeply hidden from 
the eye, and there is  a moral world of vhieh literature is the verb­
a l expression; and from these no human art can be emancipated."(150) 
A human being has animal interests, which are the ground of values which 
psychologically cannot be ignored. I f  a work of art is to endure, it must 
in some way satisfy these interests:
" I f  (a work of art) is  to be permanently esteemed it  must continue 
to enrich the sympathetic observer with some emotion which exalts 
him, or with some perception that he is glad to renew. Otherwise 
the work abdicates that aesthetic quality which was its original 
essence, and says nothing to intuition."(151)
Santayana concludes that artists might join an aesthetic Soviet, i.e . 
become aesthetes, periodically with benefit. The exercise would be a 
holiday, and they would return to their normal pursuits with a refreshed 
conviction of the necessity that their works be relevant to human needs: 
"They have discovered afresh how mighty is any technical medium, 
and how varied are the methods of pure composition: none compulsory 
and none illegitimate, i f  only they minister to the life  which 
intuition draws from nature, but enjoys for its own sake."(152)
In summary, from the standpoint of his own obilosophical position, 
Santayana puts forward two fundamental criticisms of the dogmas of the 
Aesthetic Movement: first ly , that i f  the emancipation of art from life  
could be carried out, any work3 of art produced on this principle would be 
as good a3 valueless; and secondly, th-.t in any case this pro grannie cannot 
be carried out. Spirit is  merely an epiphenomenon whose desires and needs 
are inescapable, and which prevent Indulgence in pure aesthetic intuition 
for any but the shortest periods.
These conclusions can be reinforced by reference to the cr,se of Wilde 
himself. His works obstinately endure, and, despite his aesthetic dis­
claimers in "Intentions" and elsewhere, exhibit a constant concern with 
matters of conduct, witness, "Dorian dray", "Lady Windermere's Fen", and
"An Ideal Husband", to mention only a few leading examples. There is no 
need to emphasize that, in " ne Profundls", Wilde's concern with the ethic 
of love is profound unu desperate, uis works endure precisely because 
his artistic practice deviated so markedly from his aesthetic theory. He 
deal3 with matters of wide concern, involving deep human interests, so 
satisfying Santayana's necessary conditions for successful art.
( f ) Passages in "Dominations and Powers" (1951)
"Dominations and Powers", Santayana's longest single book, is primarily 
a work on politics. It is  considered here because certain passages in it 
contain his lest remarks on aesthetics, and develop some themes he does not 
consider elsewhere.
To live the life  of ieason, it is  necessary to have self-knowledge, ¡¡nd 
knowledge of the environment. To live rationally is to harmonise one's 
interests in accordance with this knowledge. Santayana never lost interest 
in these views which form the ethical presupoositions of "The Life of 
ieason". ’rom the period of the ?irst World War to within two years of his 
death, he composed essays and notes on these same themes, coming eventually 
to the conclusion that he had omitted, in """he Life of Heason", to consider 
some important features of the world with which the individual has to cope, 
particularly political factors. The Second World War seemed to him evidence 
of the truth of his revised views, and caused him to undertake the task of 
ordering his vast quantities of notes. This revision produced his last 
major work, "Dominations and Powers: «flections on Liberty, Society and 
overnment."(153)
"The Life of Heason" had been largely inspired oy the ethics of Plato 
and Aristotle, Santayana having assumed that their views were in a ll  
important respects 3t i l l  relevant. later on in his l i fe ,  however, Santayana 
became convinced of the relativity of moral reconmendations to the circum­
stances und' r  which they are formulated:
"I have become aware that anyone's sense of what is good and
beautiful must have a somewhat narrow foundation, namely, his 
circumstances and his particular brand of human nature; and ha 
should not expact the good or the beautiful after his own heart to 
be g re t ly  prevalent or long maintained in the world." (154)
Plato and Aristotle spoke for che type of ancient city then in decline,
"but they hardly consider non-tern it or la 1 powers, such as universal 
religions, nor the relation of the State to the non-political 
Impulses of human nature."(155)
To correct the deficiencies of his earlier analysis, Santayana introd­
uces several new concepts, most importantly those of Dominations and Powers /
themselves. A ll Dominations involve the exercise of a -ower, but not a l l  
powers are Dominations. The difference between them is drawn from the 
point of view of a given person or society. This person or society has, 
"in itia l interests of their own, but surrounded by uncontrollable 
circumstances» circumstances th-it w ill at once be divided, by that 
person or society, into two classes: one, things favourable or 
neutr 1 , the other, things fata l, frustrating or inconvenient: and 
a l l  the latter, when they cannot be escaped, w ill become 
Dominations."(156)
Santayana does not define the term "Power". His usage indicates that it  
is  to be understood to cover a ll  forces in the individual's environment, 
human and non-human, with which ho has to reckon, and forces he exercises 
himself.
The dominations and Powers to which the individual is subject are 
grouped into three broad classes, to which Santayana refers as the Orders 
of Society. The Senerative order of Society consists of those Dominations 
and Powers on which the individual is most radically dependent: parental 
authority and local custom. This iener-tive Order may be deliberately 
modified by a group within the conra inlty, seeking to Impose a new order 
on It. This new order w ill appear criminal to society at large, but
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deeply honourable to those who seek to establish It . Such activities 
constitute the Militant Order of Society,
"understanding tnat it  includes a ll  voluntary associations tnat 
cross the generative order of society: not military bands only, but 
a ll  political parties, religious sects, and parasitical arts."(157) 
Thirdly and finally there is the National Order of Society, consisting of 
those arts which are parasitical in a material sense, but most important 
for human happiness.(158)
Included in the treatment of the Generative Order of Society is a 
section on the arts, which, while briefer than the corresponding chapters 
of "Reason in Art", and not mar edly different from them in doctrine, is 
of interest as being the nearest Santayana comes to a discussion of the 
relation of art and politics, a topic he does not face so clearly else­
where in his works.
Certain doctrines are common to both the early and the late work. In 
"Dominations and Powers", Santayana draws a distinction between art in 
general, economic art, liberal art, end fine art: the same distinction 
appears in "Reason in Art", except for a change in vocabulary. (The terms, 
'industrial', 'se rv ile ', and 'mechanical' are used in the earlier work 
instead of 'economic') Art in general is any modification of the environ­
ment by the psyche, to further its own purposes. (159) liberal arts are 
those the practice of which is an end in itse lf, and which are not 
necessary solely as a means of making life  possible or less unpleasant.(160) 
Economic or useful arts, it is imnlied, are t hose which are practised under 
the constraint imposed by the environment. Tinally, it is evident from 
Santayana's usage in "Dominations and Powers" that the fine arts are to be 
regarded as a sub-class of the liberal arts -  a point not clear in " lesson 
In Art" — but regrettably this is a ll that is clear. No definition of "fine 
art" is given in the text, and It is therefore not certain how Santayana 
wished to discriminate it  from liberal art. (161*)
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Few In "Dominations and Powers” are certain pessimistic assertions 
about human motivations in the arts. All arts are stimulated by an 
interest which becomes the criterion of their excellence. A ll rely on 
son» need in the psyche to be relieved by some specific eventual attain­
ment. Jot surprisingly, therefore, fierce proprietory feelings are to 
be found throughout the economic arts, and may overflow into the liberal 
and even into the fine arts. Santayana considers greed to be the main 
motive for economic labour, and takes this to explain the irrationalities 
to be found in the economic arts, even 30 closely controlled as they are 
by the potentialities of matter. A ll arts are powers in danger of becom­
ing dominations, because, necessarily having organs in the psyche, and many 
of them organs in the public world, they are rivals, and each tends to 
monopolise the energies of life  at the expense of other developments or 
even at the price of life  itse lf. (162) These remarks in effect show 
Santayana more dubious about the possibility of rational living, because of 
the competitiveness of human beings and the practical incompatibility of 
certain goals.
Of the fine arts, Santayana considers only music and architecture in 
"Dominations end Powers". Music, he begins, is bom in idleness. It 
began vocally, in that the first impulse to train vocal powers vas accidental, 
through the delight felt in mimicking natural sounds. The root of the 
emotional impact of music lies In its analogy to bodily rhythms: in 
Santayana's terms, the source of music is "measure in motion".(163) The 
whole of nature is fu ll of repetitions, among which ore those of the human 
psyches "the heart, the passions, and the ages of l i f e " . ( l6 l )  Music 
appeals to these vital analogies, and "through these it diffuses the 
atmosphere of the various passions without representing their occasions.
(165)
Santayana goes on to reiterate in a synoptic form the thesis that music 
is a world apart, a view also to be found in "Season in Art"i
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"the technical precision of its own medium, when artistically  
developed, lends to these climates of passion a non-natural form,
so that the passions themselves seem to be rendered metapnysical 
and unworldly, a ll  their ardour and trepidation being embodied in 
the apnarently bodiless torrents of sound."(166)
Peculiar to "Dominations and Powers" is  a statement of the value of music 
in the vocabulary of ‘Santayana's later system. Music used to be considered 
primarily as an accompaniment to words, but now it has come to seem almost 
profane to dwell on this aspect of it . Pure music has become the most 
transporting of arts:
"It is therefore a signal proof of the unexpected fe rt ility  of 
the generative order in the liberal dimensions for a l l  this science, 
a ll this art, a ll thi3 unfeigned pleasure and exaltation, comes to 
us, os it were, from nowhere, serves us for nothing ulterior, end 
yet seems to us the e lix ir and finest flower of the sp irit."(167)
Comparison with Santayana's earlier views on music reveals that a ll  
that i3 new in these brief remarks are the concepts of the later system.
"he views that music is a world apart, is transporting, and so forth, are 
a ll  to be found in earlier works.
In his views in architecture, by contrast, Santayana lays a new stress 
on the importance of political factors in artistic creation.
Pater's view th t a ll  the arts aspire to the condition of music 1b 
clearly illustrated and in a sense corrected by the example of architecture. 
Architecture is fundamentally an economic art, and more dominated than any 
other by materials, costs and practical uses
"Yet its chief masterpieces have been always temples and palaces, 
triumphal gates and manumental tombs! edifices that a cynic might 
pronounce to be scandalously useless. Royal vanity and pious zeal 
hnve evidently taken possession of these means of expressing their 
militant passions and of lving to their social dominstions the
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powerful help of wearing an imposing and bewildering aspect."(168) 
This is  one obvious way in which political dominations impinge on 
artistic creation. Santayana continues with more remarks in the same 
vein. The eye is. so to speak, an artist that has to paint pictures in 
order to -onvey facts. Tt is this pictorial aspect of the perception of 
objects that first endears the world to the spirit. These appearances 
nowhere catch the eye more quickly than when they present themselves in 
the work of the artisans every detail of construction, Santayana asserts, 
can be made sn aesthetic delight. Again, in communal works, providing 
safety against raids and seiges, more aesthetic possibilities present 
themselves. They offer a splendid opportunity for heraldry, for example. 
Thus the harsh necessities of existence unwittingly let loose a passion 
for plastic and decorative art. (169)
The marriage of artistic impulse with moral and political powers 
certainly gives the liberal arts a prominent place in history and society. 
Does it , however, run counter to the aspiration to pure music which Pater 
discerned in them? Santayana certainly thinks that in this enrichment there 
is a temptations
"What hapnens to a hermit when he is made a great abbot or bishop 
happens to the pure artist when he figures as a wit or a prophet ir. 
the popular mind."(170$
The suggestion 13 clearly that the artist ceases to be flilly authentic, to 
be fully true to his inspiration, and instead toadies to the demands of 
the world. Typically, Santayana nrovides no examples to back up this 
generalisation« its truth is in any event a matter of art history rather 
than aesthetics.
He continues with tte example of the lothio style, whose fate ha regards 
as typical of the «relations of free inspiration to the world. The Sothic 
style failed when it did because the conditions in the world around it 
changed«
"Tiie perfect scorn with wtiioh the seventeenth century treated every­
thing mediaeval was an economic scorn; and the new architecture with 
its  regularity, symmetry, and quiet dignity, embodied good sense and 
good order no le ,3 than toe rational appeal of its  human scale and 
private convenience."(171)
Thus Santayana suggests that changes in society -  its moral and political 
structure, for example -  govern the fate of styles. The inspiration to 
create Oothic came to be out of place in the changed world:
"Inspiration comes from the heart, and in always in itia lly  as 
blameless and courageou ; as life  itse lf . This is its  inalienable 
privilege: but it is born in ignorance, and cannot count either on 
permanent youth for itse lf  or on a place for it  in the world."(172) 
Santayana concludes with some general remarks about the arts and the 
spirit. The art3, even the economic ones when they become liberal (as 
periodically they do), liberate the spirit. This is not the a r t is t '3 
intention: his intention is normally directed on some specific technical 
problem. The artist liberates spirit by providing it with the objects to 
which it  is n turally addressed, i.e . essence:!, ’.'hat spirit is liberated 
from are the "obstacles and inner confusions"(173) that render it , in 
some adventure, bound and not free.
What is new in these remarks, as has been noted, is the stress on the 
importance of politicsl factors in the creation of art. Put at its simplest, 
political factors influence what is commissioned, and to understand a st le 
or work fully, (it  is implied) some grasp of the political background is 
necessary. Quite characteristically, Santayana is inclined to deny the 
autonomy of the work of art. His interest theory of value commits him to 
denying that art, i f  it  is to be satisfying, can be independent of important 
human interests. Hence his criticism of the doctrines of the .‘«esthetes, 
his views on art and morality, and finally his views on art and po litic s . A 
work of art can only be valuable, and can only be understood, i f  it satisfiec 
important human needs. This doctrine is one to which Santayana is committed
throughout his career, from "The Sense of Beauty" onwards. It receives 
its  final emphasis in these passages in "Dominations and Powers". 
iv¡ Conclusion
While Santayana's later works on aesthetics are few and brief, it  
w ill be clear that they heve a certain importance, firstly  because he here 
considers issues not treated in other works, and secondly because they 
include important developments in certain doctrines. In the first class 
come the views on Cubism and caricature, ("Penitent Art"), on Aestheticism 
("An Aesthetic Soviet"), art d politics ("Dominations and Powers"), and 
the types of disagreement in aesthetics ("The Mutability of esthetic 
Categories"). In the second group come the philosophy of the spiritual 
l i fe ,  and the revised theory of beauty. These works exhibit the range of 
Santayana's interests in aesthetics. That they form part of a substantial 
metaphysic is a credit to his stature as a philosopher, and evidence of the 
injustice of the neglect to which he is subject.
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Santayana ia now a philosopher litt le  read. The reasons why are summed 
up very accurately by Professor Passmore:
" ...h is  (i .e . Santayana's) claim to be considered a philosopher of 
any consequence would certainly not, in Great Britain, go undisputed. 
Certainly, i f  philosophy is defined as the »analysis' or 'c larifica ­
tion' of everyday concepts Santayana is only occasionally a 
philosopher. One naturally classified him with Schopenhauer.. .o r  
with Neitzsehe, rather than with either Moore or MeTaggart. •’’or 
a ll  that his works are conceived on a grand scale, he is an episodic 
thinker, remarkable for Ids 'a per jus' rather than for a sustained 
philosophical effort. "(1)
(To bo fa ir, it  should be pointed out that Passmore excludes aesthetics 
from his sphere of reference in the work from which the above quotation 
is taken. Bis remarks, however, are a fine summary of received opinion on 
a ll  aspects of Santayana' 3 thought.)
It  can hardly be denied that there is some foundation for this type of 
opinion, ’‘or example, it has beenneoessary to call attention repeatedly 
to Santayana's tendency to announce conclusions without argument} to ids 
neglect in not providing definitions for many of his key terms; and to his 
tendency to use a good deal of metaphorical rhetoric to clothe ordinary 
insights. This accounts for the t ndency to regard Santayana as a 
phil sopher notable as much i f  not more for stylistic excellence than for 
rigour and 'sustained philosophical e ffort '. Moreover, what is true of 
his philosophy In general is also true of his aesthetics. 'or example, he 
does not Drovide definitions for key terms like 'a r t ',  'industrial a r t ',  ai 
'fine art ' }  nor does he make it exactly clear what he means by immediate 
experience, the central term in his theories of aesthetic experience and 
the psychology of creativity.
The conclusion to whioh the arguments of the present thesis point,
however, la that, so far as Santayana'a contribution to aesthetics is 
concerned, the style of evaluation summarised by Passmore is far too 
severe and sweeping. Certainly there is a lack of argument in Santayana's 
aesthetics; certainly there is imprecision! but equally there are important 
good qualities ignored by current opinion. In the first place, Santayana 
has a far more comprehensive set of doctrines to offer in the philosophy 
of art than the usual reference to 'The Cense of beauty' would suggest. 
Again, he has many opinions which can either be supported analytically, or, 
more importantly, suggest lines of analytical argument. Again, he has 
some very modem ideas, ar.d some insights which are Ignored by almost a ll 
other aestheticians.
Santayana's aesthetics is usually identified with the theories of 
beauty as objectified pleasure and of expression as vague association, both 
from 'The Cense of Beauty's both views are s t i l l  referred to and commented 
on. After these, probably the most influential of his views in the 
philosophy of art has been the theory of rational poetry which, as has been 
indicated, appealed to several leading American poets. The remainder of 
his aesthetics has passed now largely into neglect. There is no mention 
of the theory of poetry and religion from 'Interpretations of Poetry and 
Religion'; of the theory of fine art, or of his writings on each of the 
fine arts. Kor is Santayana mentioned in current work on the relation of 
art and morality, despite his eminently reasonable position on this issue. 
Quite neglected are his views on the Aesthetic movement, on the varied 
meanings of terras in aesthetic discourse, and is own variety of aeethet- 
icism, the spiritual life . Santayana either states or implies an opinion 
on a wide spectrum of problems ir. aesthetics, fhls breadth of vision -  
a quality of .Santayana's oeuvre as a whole — is a feature of his aesthstics 
for which Santayana does not usually receive fu ll credit.
One of the major findings of philosophical analysis, in aesthetics as 
elsewhere, has been the exposure of the difficu lties involved in essential-
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Ism. Perhaps the most modem feature of Santayana's aesthetics Is his 
freedom from essentlallsm In almost a l l  departments of aesthetic theory, 
ills early theory of beauty shows ar appreciation of the contribution made 
to aesthetic experience by formal, «»te ria l, and expressive features of the 
aesthetic object; equally, in his remarks or fire  art, he is not tempted to 
try to Isolate formal or expressive properties as its essence. Again, he 
avoids formalism and expressionism In his theory of music, doing more than 
usual justice to the role of both types of property In the effect of this 
art. Ths nsgative virtue of avoiding the difficulties involved in many 
other types of aesthetic theory has a positive side: it  steins from an 
awareness of the complexity both of worlcs of art and of aesthetic experience, 
an awareness most clearly demonstrated In his discussion of the response to 
tragi»'* ,
Again positively, Santayana's aesthetics suggests profitable lines of 
analysis on at least two major topics: the early theory of beauty suggests 
the analysis of the reasons dvan for judgments of beauty which is put 
forward in Chapter I , above; equally useful suggestions emerge in his thsory 
of representation, an area In which his Ideas are never cited.
Amongs the most modem of his Ideas In his liislster.ee on stylistic 
authenticity: revivals of the externals of a atyle does not bring with It 
a revival of the authenticity It possessed as a response to genuine needs. 
Again, and finally , Santayana is one of the few aesthetlclans to have 
stressed the contribution made to aesthetic experience by the material of 
a work of art, ar. area of aesthetic theory which s t ill awaits an examination 
as fu ll as it deserves.
These observations Invite a new evaluation of Cantayana's stature as 
an aeBthetlcian, and at the same time of his relation to analytical 
aesthetics. He has much more to offer to a contemporary reader than recelMd 
opinion would allow: the rich and raetaphorioal style expresses points of 
view which respond well to analytic treatment. Santayana is already
assured of a permanent place In the history of aesthetics« Hopefully, It 
has been shown that this place is more elevated than many philosophers now
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Interest In Santayana’ s philosophy, In the English speaking world at 
least, Is probably now at Its a ll time low. The publication two years ago 
of a special issue of 'The Southern Journal of Philosophy', dedicated 
exclusively to Santayana, constituted an island In a sea of indifference, 
lor are the chief reasons far to seeict Santayana not only wrote metaphysics 
but wrote it in a highly poetic style, both features which would hardly 
endear his work to philosophers of an analytic persuasion, or at any rate 
those inclined to a fairly  narrow conception of the province of analysis.
In recent years, Santayana has been dismissed as hardly a philosopher at a ll ,  
notable, to be sure, for a beautiful style, but hardly distinguished by 
tough philosophical argument.
Dr. Sprlgge'8 book comes as a much needed corrective to this prevailing 
opinion. Most of what he has to say is taken up with an examination of 
Santayana's philosophical system, set out in 'Scepticism and Animal ^aith' 
and the four volumes of 'i'he 'ealms of leing. • fa irly  lengthy treatment is 
accorded to Santayana's views on scepticism, the all-important doctrine of 
essence, philosophy of mind, substance, matter, and truth. Though concerned 
in the main with ontology and epistemology, Or. Sprigge devotes two 
chapters to Santayana's ethics, and in the first of these gives some 
consideration to the masterpieoe of the first part of Santayana's oaraer, 
the five volumes of 'The Life of ieason'. Or. Sprlgge deliberataly 
excludes any reference to Santayana's political philosophy and philosophy of 
religion, and, again deliberately, spends only a few pages on the branch 
of philosophy in which Santayana is best remembered, aesthetios. Tha 
material selected for commentary is very definitely slanted towards
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Santayana's la ter writings.
Dr. Spriggs doss not set out to be exhaustive. In each chapter, he 
exposlts the major points o f the subject In question, defending or 
rebutting Santayana's views -  usually the former -  from the standpoint o f 
contemporary philosophy. The aim of the book as a whole is to show that 
Santayana s t i l l  has considerable relevance to philosophy, and In one area 
at least -  the attempt to f i t  a theory o f spiritual l i f e  on to  a materialist 
metaphysle -  an almost unique relevance.
Typical o f the style o f conclusion to  which Dr. Sprlgge Is lead is that 
concerning scepticism and animal fa ith . (The la tte r  is Santayana's term 
fo r  the irre s is t ib le  impulse to believe In the external w orld .) While 
he oojrrts to details In the argument, Dr. Sprlgge thinks that Santayana 
has demonstrated that there Is no satisfactory resting point between a 
solipsism o f the present moment (the Inevitable result, In Santayana's 
view, o f doub tlnconsisten tly  a l l  that Is dubltable) and trusting In 
animal fa ith . The attempt to find certainty In anything beyond my present 
experience can only be the resu lt, Santayana argues, o f fa i l in g  to apply 
the sceptical doubt with su ffic ien t rigour. The great v irtue o f Dr. 
Spriggs's book, which sadly cannot be established in a b r ie f review, is the 
s k il l  and sympathy with which he shows repeatedly how Santayana's doctrines 
are at least defensible by modern techniques, and not infrequently o ffe r  
positive insights.
The fau lts whioh the present writer finds in the book are fa ir ly  
slight in comparison with its  good points. Dr. Spriggs hardly does fu ll 
justice to  the doctrine o f l i t e r a l  and symbolic knowledge, o f  great import­
ance in Santayana's la te epistemology. Again, he is occasionally too kind 
to Santayana. While he very ju stly  censures Santayana fo r an unsatisfactory 
tneory o f truth, very l i t t l e  is  said by way o f criticism  o f epiphenomenal- 
lsm. Dr. Sprigge does not discuss tha well-known paradoxes in this 
philosophy of mindj nor is  there any discussion of Santayana's attempts to
extricate himself from an important attaok over inconsistency in the 
philosophy o f mind (an attack which rattled him coidLderably) by A.W. Moore.
Again, nne l i t t l e  ur. oprlgge uas to  say aoout oantayana1 s aestustics 
is  highly contestable. Dr. Sprigge thinks i t  regrettable that the most 
widely read o f Santayana's books is  s t i l l ,  'The Sense o f Beauty', his 
f i r s t  published philosophical work, Dr. Sprigge preferring 3otae late 
remarks on beauty in 'The Realm o f Essenoe'. While i t  is true that the 
thesis that beauty is pleasure ob jec tified  (from 'The Sense o f Beauty') is 
d if f ic u lt  to  defend, Santayana in this early  work does show a keen aware­
ness o f the ro le  of each of the major classes o f  property o f an aesthetic 
object in aesthetic experience, l .e .  formal, material and expressive 
properties. In other words he is quite free from the va r ie t ie s  of essent- 
ialism which mar moot o f the classic theories o f beauty. I t  is  by no 
means clear whether he could defend such a view, granted his theory of 
essence. Both the passages in 'The Realm of Essence' which Dr. Sprigge 
considers, and others in a late paper, 'The Mutability of Aesthetic 
Categories', show a tendency to formalism.
The most surprising remark in the book is Dr. Sprigge's claim that 
'The l i f e  o f  lesson' can hardly be regarded as an essay in rational ethics, 
since i t  is  lacking in positive recommendations. In 'The L ife  o f Reason', 
Santayana's central concern is  to evaluate certain human institutions - 
society, re lig ion , art, and science -  to  see which forms o f each have 
contributed most to the l i f e  of Reason, i .e .  the l i f e  in whiah the good is 
taken to be maximal harmony of desires. His recommendations are implied in 
everything he says about the subjects ha considers. Certainly no set of 
moral saws is  to be found in this work, but th is is fo r  a reason o f which 
Dr. Sprigge is  perfectly aware, i .e .  that there is no one mode of l i f e  which 
is the l i f e  o f Reason: there are as many ways o f liv in g  rationally as there 
are sets o f individual desires to be harmonised. The oentral recommendations 
o f the l i f e  o f reason are to know oneself and to know one's environment, to
(U 5)
A
M .
(U 6)
be aware of one's desires and the extent o f th e ir  possible satisfaction , 
beyond that, in Santayana's view, no positive recommendations o f a general 
¿ind can be aivei.. -antayaui ^ives ns -nob in the way of positive 
recommendation as his be lie fs  concerning the va r iab ility  o f desires allow.
I t  is to be stressed once again in conclusion that these adverse 
criticism s are fa ir ly  minor. Dr. Sprigge does a fine job o f exposition and 
defence. I t  is not too  much to say that his book is  the beat introduction 
to and commentary on Santayana's la ter philosophy available in  English. I t  
is to be hoped that the boo/ has the e ffe c t which Dr. Sprigge would hope 
fo r, to stimulate a general revival o f in terest In a most unjustly neglected 
philosopher.
KOTES
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Abbreviations used in the following notea
Full deta ils  of the editions used are given in the Bibliography.
U ; -.or* a UJ JUiU.faj>ai.a. or oontrioutxona m u i* .
AFSL x Animal Faith and Spiritual L ife , ed. John Lachs
3ft : The 3irth of Reason and Other Essays, ed. Daniel Cory
COUS ! Character and Opinion in the United States
DL x Dialogues in Limbo
DP s Dominations and Powers
ECJP : Egotism in German Philosophy
HW • My Host The World (Volume three o f autobiography)
ICG x The Idea of Christ in the Gospels
IHW s The Id le r  and His Works and Other Essays, ed. Daniel Cory 
IPR : Interpretations o f oetry and Religion 
Tetters : The Letters o f George Santayana, ed. Daniel Cory 
LSP : Lotze 's  System of Philosophy, ed. P.G. untz (Santayana's thesis for 
the degree o f Ph.D. at Harvard.)
MS ! The Middle Span (Volume two of autobiography)
OS x Obiter Scripts (Essays)
POMI x Physical Order and Moral Liberty, eds. John and Shirley lachs.
PP : Persons and Places: The Background o f My L ife  (Volume one of
autobiography.)
PSL : Platonism and The Spiritual L ife
HA x Reason in Art (Volume four o f "The L ife  o f Reason")
!<GS i Reason in Common Sense (Volume one o f "The L ife  o f Reason") 
iffi i The Realm of Essence (Volume one of "The Realms o f 3eing")
HM x The Realm of Matter (Volume two of "The Realms of Being")
RH t Reason in tellgion (Volume three o f "The L ife of Reason") 
ftS x Reason in Society (Volume two of "The l i f e  o f Reason")
RSo i Reason in Science (Volume fiv e  o f "The L ife of Reason")
RSp : The Realm of Sp irit (Volume four of "The Realms of Being")
(¿ 1 9 )
RT » The Realm of Truth (Volume three of "The Realms o f Being")
SA » leorge Santayana's America, ed. James Ballowe (Essays)
SAF : Scepticism and ,.nimal aith 
SB : The Sense o f Beauty
Schilpp : The Philosophy of Seorge Santayana, ed. P.A. Schilpp, Vol.I I  
o f "The lib ra ry  o f Living Philosophers"
SELS s Soliloquies in England and Later Soliloqu ies 
5TTMP ! Some Turns o f Thought in Modern Philosophy 
TPP s Three Philosophical Poets 
WD : Winds of Doctrine
( i l )  SQnunentgrje» on Santayana
Arnett : Willard E. Arnetts " iantayana and The Sense o f Beauty"
Ashmore : Jerome Ashmore: "Santayana, Art, and Aesthetics"
Duron : Jacques Duron» "La Pensée de leorge Santayana: Santayana en
(Amérique"
?e.rre : I uis iarre/» "Vida y Pensamiento de Jorge Santayana"
I Ida : caimundo Tida: "Belleza, Art y Poesia en la Patètica de Santayana" 
Singer : Irving Singer: "Santayana's Aesthetics: A C r itica l Introduction."
( i i i )  ether bbreviatlons
Barrett : D.C. Barrett, 3 .J ., Ed. : "Collected Papers on Aesthetics"
Elton : William Elton » "Aesthetics and language"
Holt, I ,  I I ,  or I I I  « Elizabeth dimore Holt « "A Documentary History of 
A rt", three volumes.
JPPSM : Journal o f Philosophy, Psychology, and Sci r t i f io  Methods. 
Margolis: Joseph Margolis : "Philosophy Looks at the Arts"
SJP : Southern Journal o f Philosophy.
»
WorKs not referred to by abbreviation are referred to  by author and t i t l e :  
details o f publisher, etc. are given in the bibliography.
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Iotas to the Introduction
(1 ) 'Sonnets and Other Verses', 1394; 'A Hermit o f Carmel and Other Poems',
1901
(2 ) 'Lu cifer: A Theological "regedy', 1399
(3 *) Santayana contributed to  the book o f essays: 'The Tew ealism: Go-oper­
ative Studies in Philosophy', which appeared in 1912. The writers agree 
in denying the truth o f Idealism, and acceptance o f a representationallst 
theory o f perception.
(4 ) LSP, p.219.
(5 ) op. c lt.,pp .4-5 .
(6 ) 'A General Confession', Schlipp,p . l l j  Santayana's views on Serman 
philosophy are developed at length in E5P.
(7 ) 'A Teneral Confession', Schlipp,p.10
( 8) le t te r  to Henry Waro Abbott, 16/1/1837, Letters,p. 14
(9 ) Letter to William James, 23/2/1837, Tetters,p.23
(10) 'A General Confession', Schlipp,p.135 o f. MS,pp.12-13.
(11) 'A General Confession', Schlipp,p.13} c f. HW, Ch. Two.
(12) Puron,p.77
(13) 'A General Confession', Schlipp, p.15
( 14 ) ib id .
(15) op. c lt .,p . 17
(16) op. c it.,p .20
(17) MS,p. 165
(18) 'What is Aesthetics?', 0S,p.28
(19) op.oit.,0S,p.25; cf.ST Introduetion,pp.6-8
(20) 'What is Aesthetics?', OS,p.23
(21) S3,p.8
( 22) ibid
(23) op c lt,p .9
rotes to chapter I :  The ' ature of beauty
(1*) e. g. by A.J. Bahm, 'beauty Defined'. Acknowledging the jo in t 
Influences o f 3anve„ar.a and DeWitt H. Parker, 3ahm defines beauty as 
'pleasure ob jec tified , involving either sensation, pattern, or combination 
o f these, and involving some degree o f organic unity', (op c i t . , p .582).
Sahm does not s ign ifican tly  a lte r  the doctrine o f ob jectifica tion , and his 
view succumbs to the d if f ic u lty  involved in that notion set out la te r  in 
the text o f the present chapter.
(2*) 3oas's paper in Schllpp,pp.250-1. He follows Santayana'3 f ir s t  
biographer, G.W. Howgate. See his, 'George Santayana', pp.97-3. for reviews 
o f SB, c f. entries o f section I I I  o f the bibliography under Alfred Hodder 
and J.D. Logan. The piece by B .I. Gilman lis ted  in the same section o f the 
bibliography is  a reply to Iogan.
(3 ») Other discussions o f the ob jectification  theory can be found in 
commentaries on Santayar* as follows! (1) Arnett, eh. Two; ( i i )  Singer,
Ch. ’’’wo; ( i l l )  Our on, pp. 295-310J ( iv )  Ashmore, pp.7-115 (v ) T Ida, pp. 29-47 
(¿ ) 'A General Confession', Sehilpp,p.7
(5) op .c lt.,p .9
( 6) SB,p.143
(7) e.g. 'A General Confession' ,  Schilpp,p.l8
( 8) S3,p.22
(9) op. c i t . , pp.37-40
(10) op. a i t . ,  p.34
(11) op. c lt.,p .179
(12*) Among those who use th is vocabulary are Singer, op. c it .,oh  Three, 
paesira, ard Stephen C. Pepper, ' Santayana'■ theory of Value', Sohilpp, 
pp.219 aqc.
(13*) In his doctoral thesis, feeling his way towards his own la te r position, 
Santayana writes! '....m ora l values are fee lin gs  and emotions, prior to a ll 
theories and unchangeable by them.' 7SP,p.2Q8
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(422)
(M ) SB,p.41
(15) op. c it.,p .81
(16) op. o lt . ,p .l8
(17) op. c it .,p .7 ; same point in ICS,pp. 173-4
(18) c f. note (12*), above.
(19) 'the moat recent analytic studies': c f. 0. J. Varr.oefe, " 'he Object o f 
M ora lity ', where stress is  la id  on the relation between morality and wants 
and needs.
(20) Pepper, op. c it . , Schilpp,p.230
(21) ;{CS,pp.183,eqq
(22) Schilpp,p.233
(23) ' nologia pro mente sua',  Schilpp,p.577 
(2A) 33,p.22
(25) op. c it.,p .41
(26) ibid.
(27) op. c it . ,p.22
(23) op. c it .,p p .23-5
(29) op. c it .,p p .25-7
(30) Edward Bullough: 'Psychical Distance as a factor in Art and an 
Aesthetic Principle' in his 'A esthetics '.
(31) 30,p.31
(32) ibid
(33) op. cit.,pp.32-3
(34) op. cit.,p .33
(35) Kar.ti 'Critique o f Judgment', 'Analytic o f the Beautifu l', Second 
Moment, According to Quantity.
(36) SB,p.35
(37) ibid.
(38) o p .c it .,p .37; c f HA,pp.325-6, where the same view is assumed.
(39) SB,p.39
(AO) Kelson ioodmani 'languages o f Art',p.2A3
(¿23)
( a )  SB,p.41
(¿2») While Santayana does escape the usual va rieties o f essentialism in 
the theory o f beauty, there ore pauaujea, i t  ...ust he a&Ultted , in which he 
veers towards formalism without log ica lly  committing himself to i t .  This 
is  o f in terest in the ligh t o f the form alistic development o f his theory, 
discussed in Chapter IX, below.
In 'Reason in A r t ',  he writes that to  understand something unpleasant is 
•ipso fa c to ' to curb its  unpleasantness a l i t t l e ;  hence, peace is  a triumph 
o f the s p ir i t .  7rom this he draws the consequence:
"Melancholy con in this way be the good of art; and i t  is  no paradox 
that such a material may be beautiful when a f i t  form is  imposed upon 
i t ,  since a f i t  form turns anything into an agreeable object; its  
beauty runs as deep as i t s  fitness, and stops where its  adaptation 
to  human nature begins to  fa i l .  "(RA, p.252)
Certainly, form is Here given pre-eminence among the properties of an 
aesthetic object. A similar stress on form is  found also in this passage 
from 'Interpretations o f Poetry and ie lig ion ':
"The stu ff o f language is  words, and the sensuous material o f words 
is  sound; i f  language is  therefore to be made perfect, its  materials 
must be made baautlful by being themselves subjected to a measure, 
and endowed with a form. "(IPR,p.l76)
(43) The idea is borrowed from R.M. Hare: 'The language o f Morals'.
(44) In recent ethics, the meaning/criteria distinction is developed by 
Hare, op.eit.,and by J.O.^rason in his paper, 'On Cradlng'.
(45*) There are many corroborative references which could be given. Two 
which figu re in important works on aesthetics are C live Hell, 'A r t ',p p .80-1; 
and Roger Pry, 'Vision and Design' ,pp.29sqq and 45eqq.
( 46) J.O. ITrmaon: »What ma :es a situation aesthetic?'
(47) o p .o it . ,  in Mar golls,pp. 22-4
(48) Notably, of course, 'Symposium',210-11
(A2A)
(49) 'Metaphysics’ , 1078bl sqq.
(50) •Poetics ', 1450b34 sqq.
(51) 3t. Augustine: cf. 'De Vera (e lis ion s ', Chs. 30-32, and Letter 18 to 
Caelestinus.
(52) leasing: 'LaoeSon', ch. XX
(53) Diderot: ' iecherches Philosophiques sur L 'o rig in s  et la Nature du 
3ecu' (1752) in 1 Diderot: Oeuvres F.sth/tiques',pp.391,sqq.
(54) In the English trad ition , for example, both Hutcheson and Folerid re 
are form alists. Passages from the former's 'An inquiry into the Original 
o f our Ideas o f Beauty' and from the la t te r 's , 'On the Principles of 
Criticism ' are reprinted in C arritt,E .F ., ed., 'Philosophies of Beauty'. 
(55*) Plotinus, 'Ennead' I , v i , I .  In C arritt, op .cit.,p .4> Santayana 
himself remakes th is point: '..th e re  may be an interesting object without 
any perceived structure, l ik e  musical notes, or the blue sky'(S3,p.83)
(56*) 38,pp.200-1. The same thought is set out in Santayana's paper, 
•Philosophy on the Bleachers', published two years before 'The Sense of 
Beauty', i .e .  in 1394:
"A few moments of enjoyment and intuition, scattered throughout our 
lives, are vhat l i f t  the whole of it from vulgarity. They form a 
background of comparison, a standard of values, and a magnet for the 
estimation of tendencies, without which a ll our thought would be 
perfunctory and du ll. Enthroned in those best moments, art, religion 
love, and the other powers of the imagination, govern our character, 
and silently direct the current of our thoughts." ('Philosophy on 
the Bleachers' in SA,pp. 124-5)
Cf. also 'Interpretations of Poetry and te lig ion ',p .l79 , where a new 
elemert is introduced into the analysis. Beauty (he writes) suggests a 
world more closely in harmony with our desires, I.e. ar. ideal world. 
Santayana writes that the sensuous qualities of words and their utterance 
in measure, "suffice to give that th rill of exaltation, that suggestion of
(425)
(56*, corit.) an ideal world, which we fe e l in the presence o f beauty"(of. 
also IPR,p.169, fo r  the same point). Santayana's views on the construct­
ion o f ideals by the imagination are discussed at 3ome length in Chapter V, 
below.
rotes to Chapter IT; The "a te r la ls  of Beauty
(1*) S3,p.44. This section o f 'The Sense o f Beauty' is  discussed in the 
commentaries as fo llows: ( i )  Arnett, ;p.32-4; ( i i )  Ashmore,pp. 12-14; ( i i l )  
Duron,pp.310-12; ( iv )  Singer,pp.133 sqq.
(2 ) SB,p.45
(3 ) ibid
( 4 ) o D .c lt . ,0.46
(5) op .c it.,p ,45
(6) op .cit.,p .4S
(7) ibid
(8*) o p .c it . , p.49. Santayana is  here drawing on Stendhal's 'De L'Amour', 
the crysta llisa tion  theory o f which is o f course congenial to him, holding 
as he does that beauty is  pleasure ob jectified . Both theories Involve the 
projection of thoughts or fe e l in g  o f the perceiving subject onto an object.
(9 ) 33,p .50
(10) op .o it .,p p .51-3
(11) op .c it .,p p .53-5. Cf. Keats: 'The hve of St. Agnes', stanza XXX in the 
text ed. by H.W. Barrod in ’-eats' 'Poetical Vorks'.
(12) BA, pp. 223-9
(13) Nelson Coodman: 'languages o f  Art',p.243
(14) Huysmans, Joris-Karl: 'A P.ebours', 1834» ch.X, passim.
(15*) Aîaurice Cuyau: 'le s  Problèmes de l'Esthétique Contemporaine',p.63; 
c f. ' dward Bullough, ' Aesthetics ',p. 119. I t  is worth noting that Croce 
rejects the doctrine that only the so-called 'higher senses' are aesthetic. 
His view is  that "a ll  impressions can enter into aesthetic expressions or
(426)
(15*»otd.) formations, but that none are bound to do so." ("Aesthetic as
>
Science of Expression and General lingu istic",p .13 )
(16) kid, p. 56
(17) Ibid
(18) ibid
(19) ibid
(20) ibid
(21) op.oit.,pp.57-8
(22) o p .e it .,p .59
(23) op.oit.,p .61
(24) op .c lt .,p .6 2
(25) ibid
(26) RA,p.26l (and 263-4» for other remarks in the same vein .)
(27) l etter to Arthur Davison Ticks, 18/7/1913, I etters,p.l27
(28) 'The Photograph and the Mental Image', AFSI,p.399. This book 
appeared only in 1967.
(29) op. c it . , p.402
(30) Bullough, op.0it . ,p p .113-4
(31) Prank Lloyd Wright, 'The Natural House',pp. 21-2} 'The Future of 
Architecture' ,pp.47-2* of.p.105
(32) 'The '•’uture o f -*rchiteoture',pp.27-8
(33) 'The Natural House',p.45} cf.p.151; 'The Future of Architecture', 
pp. 27-8.
(34) 'The Future o f Architecture', p.324
(35) op.elt.,p.213
(36) 'The : atural House' ,pp.47-8» c f. p.51
(37) op.cit.,p.151
(38) 'The future of Architecture',p.94
(39) 'The Natural House',p. 175
(40) 'The "hjture o f Architecture',p.86
(427)
( 4 1 ) op .e it. ,p.l66
(42) La Corbusier: ‘ Towards a New Architecture*,p,13
(43) o p .e it .,p .6 l
(44) o p .c it .,p .266
(45) Pier Luigi *'ervi: 'Aesthetics and '"eehnolo.-* ir. ’’u lld ir g ',  nrefac* 
(pages o f th is section o f the book unnumbered.)
(46) 'Henry Moore on Sculpture' ed. -h ilip  James,p.69. This piece dates 
from 1933, part o f the manifesto o f the group Unit One.
(47) Jack C. Hich: 'The Materials and Methods o f Sculpture' ,p.3
(48) Philip James, ed .,op .c it,p .ll3 *  This remark by Moore dates from 1951.
(49) Le Corbusier, op .c it.,p .9
(50) T loyd Wright: 'The future of A rch itecture',p .99
(51) I.loyd Vright: 'The Natural House',p.53
(52) op. c it . ,p.52
(53) op. c it .,p p .36-7
(54) op* c i t . ,p .52
(55) Nervi, op .cit.,pp .4  and 11
( 56 ) o o .e it . , pp.4-5
(57*) op .c it. ,p. 10. I t  is  to be noted that remarks o f th is kind are not 
re s tr lc ‘ -d t i  twentieth century writers. V iollet-le-Duo, fo r example, 
repeatedly eaphasiies the need for the arch itect to understand not only 
r.he physical properties of materials, but a lso their aesthetic potential: 
"To know the nature o f the materials we are to employ is not only 
to know the strength and texture o f stone, the p lia b ility  and 
toughness o f forged iron, the r ig id ity  and brittleness of cast iron, 
e tc ., but i t  la to be able to anticipate the effect3  these materials 
are capable o f producing under certain conditions; i t  is to com­
prehend thoroughly, for example, the essential differences o f 
expression between a monostyle set up on end and a pair bu ilt up o f 
courses of masonry" (?rom the Tenth o f the 'Discourses on Architect-
(423)
(53) o f, I.H . Hogers, 'Sculpture',pp. 200- 15 and Jlch ,op .c lt.,p .4  
(59*) Ph ilip  James, ed. , o p .c lt . , pp. 113-4- Santayana agrees with Moore on 
the important relation between form a d material In sculpture. In his 
1903 paper, 'Sculpture', Santaya a maintains that the ch ief Importance o f 
the material In representational sculpture is precisely that i t  should 
render the form with su ffic ien t subtlety and e la s tic lty .('S cu lp tu re ', 
p.110. This paper is discussed more fu lly  in Chapter V II, below.) The 
d if f ic u lty  with this point c f view is one of omission: curiously, Santayana 
does not point out in th is  paper the importance o f the in trinsic properties 
o f  the medium. A remark in 'Season in A rt' to the e ffec t that. In repres­
entational a rt, a ood medium is a medium which makes possible a good 
rendition, escapes tills  critic ism , but only because of it s  imprecision. I t  
is  not clear whether a 'good rendition' does or does not make maximal use 
o f the in trinsic properties o f the medium. (!U ,pp.316-7)
(60) o f. William Taunt: 'A Companion to Painting',pp.74 sqq.j and Frederic 
Teubes: 'A Tuide to Traditional and Modern Painting Methods',pp.l2 and 15. 
(61») "aubes, op.cit.,pp.27-9. Henri ^o^illon in •■'•he l i f e  of Forms in 
A rt ' nnkes some excellent corroborative remarks on this subject. On colour, 
fo r  example:
'The same red ...takes on d ifferen t properties, not only according to 
its  use in distemper, tempera, fresco, or o i l ,  but also a d ifferent 
property according to the manner o f its  application In each one o f 
these various processes' (op .clt,p .34 )
Again, he points out that materials are no less important In drawing than 
in palriting. Kot only Is  there a great range o f materials -  Ink, wash 
lead-pencil, charcoal, sanguine, crayon — but they are not interchangeable. 
Imagine the impossibility o f a san uine by Watteau copied by Ingres in 
lead^ei.oil. (ib id .) F ina lly , he comments on the relation o f volume to 
material:
'I s  i t  not strange thnt a volume may onange, as i t  assumes shape in
(57*, otd.) ure', tr, Henry van Hrunt, In Holt, vi.III,p.213)
(429)
(61*, c td . ) marble, bronze, or wood, as i t  is painted in distemper or o i l ,  
engraved with a burin or lithographed?" (op .o it.,p .35 )
! o, because volume depenas on the iignt that models i t ,  and tne iigu t is  
a ffected  by the surface that receives i t .  The ligh t may flow easily  or 
come to  rest; i t  can penetrate the surface to a greater or less degree; it  
may receive a dry or olfer quality from i t :
1 In painting i t  is more than plain that the interpretation o f space 
is  a function o f matter, which sometimes lim its space, and sometimes 
destroys its  lim its. Then, too, a given volume varies according to 
whether i t  is painted in fu l l  impasto or in superimposed glazes' 
(op .cit,p .35 )
(62) SB,p.64
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(1) cf. e.g. P.A.?. Hutchings: 'Organic Unity Revindicated'.
(2 ) J.A.M. Whistler: 'The lentle Art o f Making Enemies'; Clive Bell, 'A rt '} 
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(8) B e ll,o p .c it . ,pp.33-7; ’ 'h is tle r ,op .c it.,p .l2 7
(9) B e ll,o p .c it. ,pp.21-2
(10) ’r y ,o p .o it ., p.235; o f. W histler,op.clt.,pp. 127-8
(11*) B e ll,o p .c it . ,p .15; c f.h is  remarks on Michelangelo. The description 
of ernbrandt as 'a typ ical ruin of tils age' (op .o it.,p .l5 6 ) i3 worth 
remembering es a reminder to the lengths to which he was prepared to  go in 
defence of his views.
(12) SB,p.65
(-430)
(13) Ibid
(14) o p .c it . , p.148
(15) op .o it.,p .66
(16) Ibid
(17) op .c it.,p .67  
(13) Ibid
(19) o p .c it . ,p .75
(20) Dorothy Vernoni 'The Psychology o f Perception ',p.45
(21) SB,p.76
(22) ibid
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(25) Discussed by Michael Podros 'Vormal Elements and Modern Theories of Arl
(26) A ris to tle , ' poetics ',oh .7 j ef.Van Meter laws, 'What Is ''orm.p.S?
(27*) 53,p.76. William James encouraged the reading o f Techner at 
Harvard. (As Copleston points out, James drew on ^eehner's pragmatically 
tinged principles, c f. Copleston, 'A History o f Philosophy',v. VII,pp.
375—-
(23) SB, pp. 76-7
(29) c f. Podro, op,
(30) SB,p.77
(31) Ibid
(32) ibid
(33) op. c it .  ,p.78
(34) Ibid
(35) Ibid
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(37) ibid
(3d) op .c it. ,p.79
(39) op .c it. , p.30
(40) op .cit.,p .81
( 4 1 ) Ibid
(42) Ibid
(43) Ibid
(44) op .cit.,p .86
(45) op .cit.,p .37
(46») op.eit.,pp.86-7. Santayana expends his remarks on Whitman as a 
champion of democracy in his essay on the poet in ' Interpretations of 
poetry and ie llg ion ' ,pp. 128sqq.
(47) c f. John Stuart M ill» 'On L iberty ', esp. C h .III, passim
(48) S3,p.48
(49) ibid
(50) ibid
(51) op. c it . , p.102
(52) op. c it .  , p.103
(53) o p .c it . , p.104
(54) o p .c it . , pp.104-5
(55) o p .c it . , p.105
( 56) o p .c it . , p.106
(57) op .c it.,p p .107-10
(58) o p .c it . ,p . I l l
(59) o p .c it . , pp.112-3
(60) ’.eorge Steiner: '^olstoy or Dostoevsky',p . l l
(61) Duron,p.316
(62) Quoted in SoBanquet, 'History of „esthetic ’ ,pp.319-20
(63) S3,p.113
( 64 ) o p .c it . , p.114
(65) ibid
(66) o p .c it ., p.116
(67) o p .c it .,p .6 8
(68) op .c it.,pp .67-8
(¿31)
U 32)
(69) op .c it. ,pp.6S-9
(70) op .o lt.,p .69
(71) op .c it.,p .70
(72) op .e lt. ,p.73
(73) o p .e lt . ,p .3 (Preface to  SH)
(74*) Hermann Totse: 'Mediainische Psyehologie', te lpzlg , Veidmann, 1852 
•’ranch tr . by A. enjor.s 'Principes leneraux de psychologie physiologique' 
Paris: le raer T a lllie re , 1876. No T’n 'lish  translation listed .
(75) e f .  Robert Thomson, 'The Pelican History o f Psychology',pp.33-4
(76) S3,p.70
(77) op .c it. ,pp.70-1
(73) op .c it. ,p.71
(79) op .cit.,p .72
(30*) Hermann Weyl, 'Symmetry', passim. Señor ’arre, in his commentary on 
Santayana, sees here the influence o f A ris to tle : "De acuerdo cor. Aristóteles, 
(Santayana) cree que la simetría es un elemento que necessariamente inte *ra 
la b e lle za ..."  (Ferre',p .86. Trans: "Santayana, in agreement with A ris to tle , 
regards symmetry as a necessary component of beauty".) He refers us to  
A r is to tle 's  'Metaphysics' 1037a-b: "The chief forms o f beauty are order 
and symmetry and defin iteness", ( t r .  loss) I t  is hard to say whether so 
b rie f a passage on so common a theme was the determining influence on 
Santayana's mind at this point.
(81) 33,p.72
(82) op .cit.,p .73
(83*) op .cit. ,p. 73t cf. Henri •’o jjillon , 'The L ife  o f Forms in A rt ',p .9 :
'The logic of the eye, with its need for balance and symmetry..'
(8¿) S3,p.73 
(85) op .cit.,p .74
(86») Dorothy Vernon,op.ci t . ,pp.50 sqq. Desmond Morris reports a preference 
for balanced and symmetrical forms among apes, and so the need for symmetry
(433)
(86*, ctd .) is  not restricted to  human beings. (Morris: 'The Biology o f 
A r t ')
(87) Wolfgang Kohler: 'Gestalt Psychologyp . 104
(38) iudolf Amheim: 'Gestalt Psychology and A rt is t ic  7ora' ,pp. 201-2; c f. 
the same author's 'Art and Visual Perception'» Ch.l, passim.
(89) ''ohler, op .e lt.,p .35  and more generally Cbs.V snd 71; c f also aobert 
Thomson, 'The Pelican History o f Psychology' ,Ch.13.
(90) 7or philosophical criticism , cf. e .g . W. Charlton, 'A esth etics ', p.43; 
and O.W. Hamlyn, 'The Payeholo >y o f Perception', Routledge, 1961, Ch.4.
(91) Dorothy Vernon, op .c it. ,pp.50 sqq.; c f. Podro, op .clt. ,pp.334-5 
(92*) c f. A r is to tle , 'P o e t ic s ', Ch.7.
( 9 3 )  S 3 ,p .7 5
(9 4 )  o p . c l t . , p p . 1 2 7 -8
(95) c f. E.H. Gombrich: 'Meditations on a Hobby-Horse’ and 'Art and 
I llu s io n '.
(96*) S3,p.88. I t  is presumably with some such doctrines as these in mind 
( i . e .  concert ing the psychology o f the perception o f form) that Santayana 
makes the fo llow ing isolated generalisation about form in the second 
volume of his autobiography:' . . .  there is  a subjective root to immediate 
pleasure in form and harmony just as profound as the roots o f the arts ir. 
the public w orld .' (MS,p.l50)
(97*) of. Leibniz, 'Princip les of Nautre and of >race', sections 4-5; 
•Monadology', section 30; Kant, 'Critique o f Pure Reason', A107=3131 sqq.
On Herbert, c f .  The F.arl o f lis to v e l, 'Modern Aesthetics: A Historical 
Introduction* ,p .52. I t  is  presupposed in Herbert's usa-e o f the term, 
•apperception' that apperception is individually biassed, since i t  makes 
use o f individual memories and experiences. (Perhaps this is i t s e l f  a 
trace o f the Ieibn izien  and Kantian usa es, where apperception is  used to 
re fer to s e l f - consciousness.) This individual element in apperception is 
stressed by Santayana in a passage in ' Reason in A rt' (pp.285—6) headed 
'A l l  apperception modifies its  ob ject'. The point made in this section is
(434)
(97*, etd .) that a ll  thought has a point of views reason views the world 
from the standpoint of some specific  Interest or moral aim. This same 
point is  reaffirmed considerably la te r  in 'Scepticism and Animal Faith'
(p. 251). Pure sp ir it ( i . e .  consciousness), Santayana argues, need never 
apoerceive at a l l .  Apperception is an animal exigency, imposed on animals 
by the world. The force o f the technical terms used here is  explained in 
Ch.IX, below. Tor present purposes, i t  is enough to note the reiteration  
of the idea of an individual point of view in Santayana's usage o f 'apper­
ception'. This is  the only point o f explanation of what he means by this 
term which I have beer able to trace in his own writings.
(98) S3,pp.88-9
(99) op.cit.,p.89
(100) ibid
(101) Sin ger, pp. 139-40
(102») Singer,P.138. In Singer's view, Santayana singles out two kinds o f 
form as especially unsuited to  aesthetic enjoyment« ( i )  forms o f indeter­
minate orgai isationj and ( i l )  forms of 'overly-determinate organisation'
(a phrase I  cannot looate in Santayana's te x t ). These are said to be 
contrasted with ( i i i )  forms in which the elements inevitably suggest the 
scheme o f their unity; Singer takes the cloud as oamel ar;d then whale to 
be an example of this th ird type of form. These remarks are misleading 
and confused. Santayana's c lassification  of forms as i t  appears in the 
text o f 'The Sense o f Scauty' it? set cut in the present chapter, and in 
i t  the second class of forms alleged by Singer to belong to Santayana's 
classification does not appear. What Singer has in mind are a few incid­
ental remarks Santayana makes in one paragraph during his survey o f lund- 
scape painting. Santayana opposes to the Impressionistic manner what he 
calls the discursive s ty le  of landscape painting, by which he evidently 
means the technique of exhaustive realism. This school o f fainting 
"collects so many glimpses and gives so fu lly  the sum of our positive
(-435)
(102», otd .) observations o f a particular scene, that its  work is  sure to  
be perfectly  in te ll ig ib le  and plain."(SB,p,105) Having said th is, 
_untayana lo ts  the subject drop. dinger is  wrong to suggest that this is 
one o f the main classes o f forms which ,'antayana discriminates.
(103) Duron,p.31-4
(104) S3,p.89
(105) ibid
(106) op.cit.,p.90
(107) op .c it.,p .92
(108) op .eit.,p .93
(109) op. c i t . ,  pp.92-3
(110») op. c it . ,p.93. c f. Locke, 'An Kssay Concerning Human Understanding', 
3k,IV, Ch.VII. section 9 5 and Berkeley, 'Princip les of Human Knowledge', 
Introduction, a ction X III.
(111) Robert Thomsoi : ' he Psychology o f Thinking’ , chs. 4 and 5.
(112) V. Irey ’ .'alters 'The Living Brain', chs. 6 and 7.
(113) S3,p.116
(114) V o lfflin : ' '"he Principles of Art History',pp.226,sqq.
(115) SB,pp.95-6
(116*) op .clt.,p .94 . rrobablv Bantayana had in mind Kant's judgment of 
perfection and concept o f adherent beauty. According to ?,ant, human 
beauty la ar. example of the lstteri'..human baauty..presupposes a conoept 
o f the purpose which determines what the thing is to be, and consequently 
a concept of i t s  perfection ..' fCritlaue o f Judgment ’ , p. 66)
(117) SB,p.96 
(113) op .clt.,p .93
(119) 'A leneral Confession', 3ohilpp,p.l0
(120) Bosanquet,op. c it. , p.365
(121) S3,p.9Sj of. HA,pp.300-1
(122») SB,pp.98-9. This objection to the mystical view of beauty is  a
(122*, ctd .) special form o f Santayana's general distaste fo r  mysticism, 
a feature o f his thought fa ir ly  prominent in his early works« In 
'In terpretations o f Poetry and relig ion ' ,  he accuses the mystic o f wishing 
to abolish human nature, rather thai. wishing to perfect i t ,  this la tter 
being what Santayana ca lls  the 'id ea l o f reason', ( l l ’R,p. 16; cf.a lso pp.74 
and 158-9« A lso, V.D. ,pp.73-4
(123) S8,p«99
(124) op. c it .  ,pp. 100-1
(125) op .c it. ,p«100
(126) op .e it. , p.118
(127) ibid
(128) Ibid
(129) PP,p.155
(130) 3B,p.119
(131) op.cit.,p.120
(132) op .c it. ,pp. 120-1
(133) op .c it.,p .l22
(134! ibid
(135) op .c it. ,p. 121
(136) op. c it . ,p. 122
(137) op. c i t . ,  p. 124 
(133) ibid
(139' ibid
(140) op .c it. , p.125
(H I )  ibid
(142) op .c it. ,p. 126
(143) op .c it. , p.127
( 144) op. c it .  , p. 128
(145) op .c it. ,p,127
(146) C.H. Waddingtor, 1 'The Character of Biological Form' ,pp.43-56.
(4-37)
rotes to Chapter IV: xpresslon
(1 ) William Wordsworth: Preface to  'ly r ic a l Ballads' (1800). In E.’ . 
C arritt, ed., ' Philosophies o f Beauty',pp. 128-9
(2 ) Tolstoy: 'What ia A rt? ',p .l23
(3 ) op .e it. ,pp.227-8
(4) Croce: 'Guide to Aesthetics',p.23
(5) op.clt.,pp.37->VO
(6) 0S,p.23
(7) ibid
(8 ) .BA.pp.230-1
(9) AFSI,p.423
(10) 'Croce'a Aesthetics' in IHV,p.l09
(11) op. c lt . ,pp. 110-13
(12) op .c it. ,p .ll5
(13) SB,pp.U7-8 
(U )  op .c it.,p .U 9
(15) ibid
(16) iiA. p. 325
(17) AFSL,p.423
(18) S3, p.152
(19) o p .c it . , p.153
(20) op .o it.,p .l50
(21) iA.pp.271-2; o f.pp .275-6
(22») SB,p. 151. Several critics of the doctrine of expression of 'The 
Sense of Beauty' seem to have failed to notice how emphatic Santayana is 
ofi the point that beauty of expression is as inherent in the aesthetic 
object as beauty of form or material. Santayana has been taken to task -or 
giving an untrue desori tion of aesthetic experience of expression, in 
that he is taken to assert that tho expressing thing and the thing express­
ed are in some way separate, whereas in faot they are one thing.
(438)
(22*, c td .) Katherine Gilbert put forward one version of th is critic ism : 
"Santayana's specific  doctrine o f  the con eat I o n  o f presentation  
and expression in art by the fortuitous link of association is  
simply his whole system writ small. As in rea lity  In the gross 
the psyche has to  create sp ir it to  bring into the cosmic process 
meaning and value, so in the aesthetic exDerienoe, the im ediate  
imagine! content is  forced to  suggest fo r i t s e l f  a lo g ic a lly  alien 
import". ('S tudies in Recent A esth etic ', pp.135-6)
There seeiu3 to be no ju stifica tion  in Santayana's text fo r the assertion 
that what is  expressed is  'lo g ic a lly  a lien ' to that which expresses i t .  
Again, why the verb 'fo rced ', as i f  the association of ideas were a rare 
occurrence or one d if f ic u lt  to  stimulate?
'■'incent Tomas argues that Santayana's analysis o f expression as 
involving two terms must be wrong, since the aesthetically expressive 
object is  one thing, not a distinguishable fusion o f two. (Tomas: 'The 
Concept o f Kxpresslon in Art',pp.32-3 and 39 sqq. Page refs to Margolis.) 
Santayana would rep ly  that, while the two terms can be distinguished in 
analysis, yet as actually experienced, expressed properties appear to be 
in the expressing object, i . e .  i t  does appear to be one thing, not a 
distinguishable fusion o f two. (This lin e  of reply is  also suggested by 
Iouise Kisbet oberts in her paper: 'In  Defense o f  Santayana's Theory of 
repression' ,pp.34-90^) Santayana's ob jectification  theory entails that 
expressed properties appear objective. Uhether this is an acceptable 
account o f how they come to appear ob jective , and so o f how the object 
comes to appear to  be ore, l .e .  by projection is , however, another matter.
(23) S3,p.151
(24) IPS,p.184
(25*) In «Modern painters' (1343-60), Ruekln writes:
"i-.xamine the point in question -  namely the difference between the 
ordinary, proper and true appearances o f things to us; and the 
extraordinary, or fa lse appearances, when we are under the influence
(25*# etd .) o f emotion, or contemplative fancy; false appearances, I  say, 
as being en tire ly  unconnected with any real power or character In 
the object, and only Imputed to I t  by us...so long as we see that 
the fe e lin g  Is true, we pardon, or are even pleased, by, the confused 
fa lla cy  o f sight which It  Induces." (o p .o it .IV ,x it ,4 ; in Oarrltt, ed. 
op .c it. ,p .l79)
Cf. also the empirical Empathy or Empathy In Nature of Lipps ("emplrische 
Oder Nature lnfdhlung") by which we transform and humanise the objects that 
surround us In nature, so that we seem to hear the groaning o f trees, howl­
ing o f storms etc . On Upps, c f. "he Earl o f  Listowel, 'Modem Aesthetics, 
An H istorical Introduction' , pp.62-3
(26) Carrltt, o p .c it . , p.253. from Lipps' papers '"Empathy", "Inward 
Imitation" and Sense feelings' in 'Archiv fur die gesamte syehologie' ,1903
(27) C a rr itt ,o p .c it ., p.255
(28) op .c it. , p. 25^ 1
(29) o p .c it . , p.255
(30») o p .c it ., p.257. ’rom Lipps: 'A "urther Consideration of "Bmpathy"' in 
’ Archiv fur die gesamte Psychologic', 1905. Carritt refers us to  a 
passage in lord Krmes's : 'Elements o f Criticism ’ (1762), in which one 
element of Lipps' theory is present, i .e .  the possib ility  o f some sort of 
conformity or congruence between an object and an emotion: "Many emotions 
have some resemblance to  their causes...’ ¡hen force is exerted with any 
e ffo r t , the spectator feel3 a similar e f fo r t ,  as of force exerted within 
his mind. A large object swells the ¡»a r t .  An elevated object makes the 
spectator stand erect."(C arritt,op .c it.,p .94 )
(31) Vernon Lee: 'The beautifu l', pp.62-3
(32) op .cit.,p .65
(33*) L istow el,op .c it.,p .71; Carritt makes a similar point in his 'The 
Theory o f 8eauty' ,pp. 190-1:
" I  cannot attach any precise meaning to  such phrases as 'being 
active in a p illa r ' nor find any truth in the statement that when I
(A39)
(440)
( 33*» ctd .) enjoy a seagu ll's fl ig h t  or the plunge o f a cataract, ' I  fe e l
myself actually executing these movements.' I do not see how either 
ay 'p ractica l' nor ay 'contemplative' s e lf  could do 30, s t i l l  less 
do I  see how such a formula could plausibly be applied to a sunset, 
a fugue, or the smell o f a clover f ie ld . "
(34) Deryck Cooke: 'The Language o f M usic ',p .x li
(35) op .clt.,p .51
(36) o p .c it .,p .57
(37) o p .c it . , p.115
(38) op.cit.,p.133
(39) o p .c it ., pp.95-112
(49) Eduard Hanslick: 'The Beautiful in Music',p.35; of. also Hanslick's 
examples from the 'Ohrlatmas O ratorio ',p .36
(41) Lipps quoted in Tistowel, op.cit.,p.63
(42) Richard Wollheim: 'Art and Its  Objects', section 28
(43) Wittgenstein: 'lectures and Conversations, e tc ',  ed. D.C. Barrett, 
Section 10, c f. Wollheim, o p .c it . ,  section 18
(44) Rudolf Arnhelm: 'Art and Visual Ferception',pp.433-4
(45) John Hospers: 'Meaning and Truth in the A rts ', Ch.3, passim.
( 46) Such views are considered and rejected by Ronald Hepburn in 'Emotions 
and Emotional dualities' in Barrett,p.189
(47) Wittgenstein: 'The Brown Book',pp. 178-9
(48) Wittgenstein: 'Philosophical Investigations', I ,  section 523
(49) Kelson Coodraan: 'languages o f Art',pp. 50-2; c f. Wittgenstein: 
•Philosophical Investigations' ,p.209e.
(50) Coo;¡man,op.cit. ,p.52 
(51}» op .cit. ,pp.71 sqq.
(52) SB, p.154
(53) ibid
(54) opyoit. , p.156
(55) op .cit.,pp . 156-7
(M l)
(56) op. c l t . ,  p.157
(57) op. d t .  ,pp. 157-8
(58) o p .c it . , p.158
(59) op. c i t . , p.159
(60) Ibid
(61) op .e it. ,p,160
(62*) o p .e it .,p p .161-3. This discussion o f cost as an aesthetic element 
is  taksn almost verbatim from an su rlier (1832) paper by Santayana: 'What 
is  a P h ilis t in e? ' in SA,p.l38
( 63) 'What is  a Ph ilis tin e? ', 3A,p.l38
( 64) 33,p.l63; reassertion of the thesis that the mind hates waste in 
'The Senteel Tradition at 3ay',p.l62
(65) SB, p.165
(66) o p .c i t . , p. 166
(67) op .o it.,p .l6 7
(68) ibid
(69) o p .e i t . , p.168
(70) o p .e it .,p p .168-9
( 7 1 » )  'T ragic Philosophy'. Santayana's paper is  a reply to an unspecified 
piece by T.S. P ilo t. Prom the content o f Santayana's paper, i t  seems that 
his target is E lio t 's : 'Shakespeare and the Stoicism of Seneca', now in 
his 'Selected Essays'.
(72) 'T ragic Philosophy', p.285
(73*) op .c it .,p p .285-6, j this thesis a propos o f the fa lse be lie fs  of the 
tragic hero is repealed and extended in an incidental remark in 'Character
and Opinion in the "nited States ':
"The tragedy and comedy o f l i f e  l i e  precisely in the contrast between 
the illusions or passions of the characters and their true condition 
and fa te , hidden from them at f ir s t ,  but evident to the author and 
the public ."(op .cit.,p .47 )
Curiously, Santayana takes a somewhat d iffe ren t view in a b rie f passage in
(442) r
(73*, otd.) his autobiography. In these late remarks there is no 
suggestion th t the tragic hero or heroine is in the grip of an illusion.
The free spirit, Santayana argues, rebels against social conventions, 
expediencies and taboos:
"...and there I see the secret o f tragic strength being often sixed 
with tUi extraordinary fa ta lis t ic  weakness. You are tossed by every 
wave, and je t  something in you observes your plight and fundamer.tally 
despises you. Most o f the heroes and heroines o f iacine suffered 
from th is in tellectua l elevation in moral helplessness, Phedre 
especia lly .. . . i t  was th is complete helplessness that gacine fe lt  to 
be tragic..."(HW ,p.31)
While these remarks are incompatible with his ea rlier views, they are 
arguably bn improvement, since the itacinisn characters he mentions do 
furnish a counter-example to his earlier views. It  need not be the case 
that the tragic h^ro or heroine is  blind to important circumstances.
(7-4) RA, p.252
(75) 'Tragic Philosophy' , p.286
(76*) op.cit.,p .237. The same argument concerning Shakespeare is  put for­
ward, from a d ifferen t point of view, much earlier in the essay: 'The 
Absence o f le lig lon  in Shakespeare' (in  IPR, 1900). Santayana is  there 
concerned to c r it ic is e  Shakespeare for a lleged ly  lacking a to ta l world­
view, such as is  to be found (Santayana contends) in Lucretius. Curiously, 
however, while in this early essay Santayana regards the absence o f a 
religious world-view as a defect in Shakespeare, in 'Tragic Philosophy', 
he finds this absence to be a necessary presupposition for the writing 
o f tragedy. Tor the reasons given in the text of the present chapter, the 
la ter view is an advance on the earlier.
(77*) Jeorge Str-nari 'The ^eath of Tragedy',pp.340-2. He also deals with 
the possible oounteiv exam pie of Claudel, (op. cit., pp. 33 5 S99«) Of. also 
I .A. (ichards: 'The Principles of l iterary Criticism',1934 ed. , pp.246-7.
(443)
(73) HA,p.252; o f. A ristotle* 'P o e tics ', oh.6, and 'P o l i t i c s ',  3k.3,ch.6 
(79*) S3,p.172. Van Meter Ames reports a remark by Santayana (made some 
txiue in the 1930's, the context suggests) to the e ffe c t  that he (Santayana) 
wished to  revise his views on tragedy, though not to any great extent:
" I  d idn 't discuss tragedy as much as I should have in 'The Sense 
o f beauty'. What I  said was weak and I 'd  lik e  to put an appendix 
correcting that. I  said that tragedy pleases, not on account o f the 
pain in i t ,  but on account o f the elements that outweigh the pain. 
Now I  think people lik e  a certain amount of fr igh t and suffering, 
within lim its o f course, although I thin people might be refined 
beyond the enjoyment o f tragedy" (Ames: 'Proust and Santayana',p.65) 
This remark is  not developed by Santayana. What l i t t l e  he does say 
suggests that he came to have more sympathy with the view he refers to  as 
'paradoxical' in the text o f 'The Sense o f ieauty'.
(SO) 33, pp. 171-2
(81) op .c it. ,p.l69
(82) PP,p.229j a memory also mentioned in the remark quoted by Ames in 
note 79* above.
(33) S3,p.172
(34) op .e it. ,pp. 173-4
(35) op .c it.,p .l7 4
(36*) This is  in fact a condensed misquotation o f 'King Lea r ', I I I , i i , l l .  
63-73.
(37») S3,p.176. Santayam make3 complementary remarks on th is  subject of 
the desire to  know the truth in the course o f his dlsoussion of Lucretius 
in 'Three Philosophical Poets'. F.ven i f  the truth is  sad, he contends, a 
rational mind desires to know it .  One such truth is  that nature, while i t  
often fosters l i f e ,  often also condemns i t  to extinction:
" I t  is  a truth with a melancholy sides but being a truth, it  
sa tis fies  and exalts a rational mind, that craves truth  as truth,
(U 4)
(37*) whether i t  be sad or comforting, and wishes to pursue a possible, 
not an ir-possible, happiness". (TP °,p .l7 )
What is new here, as is to be expected a fte r  the completion o f 'The L ife  
o f eason', is  the restriction  o f the desire fo r truth to the rational 
mind. The qualification is 3urely welcome: the unrestricted generalisation 
of 'The Sense o f Teauty', that everyone desires T,he truth, is decidedly 
optim istic.
(33) S3,p.176
(39) op.eit.,p .178
(90) op .c it . ,p,179
(91) ibid
(92) o p .c it . , p.130
(93) op .c it. ,pp. 130 and 182
(94*) op .c it. ,pp. 185-6. Santayana reiterates the theme of the ecstatic 
nature o f the response to tragedy in a passing comment on catharsis which 
be makes in his autobiography. The context is  the description of a 
profound change o f heart which he underwent at the age of th irty , a change 
o f allegiance from the existent and transitory to the eternal and idea l: 
"This transition may be called philosophic metanoia. Tike the 
trag ic  catharsis, i t  turns disaster into a kind o f rapture without 
those fa lse comforts and delusions by which religious metanoia is 
often cheapened." (HW,p.lO)
The further themes o f the elevation and the panoramic view of l i f e  
occasioned by tragedy are repeated in a passage in 'Interpretations o f 
Poetry and e l ig lo n ':
"This is the essence o f tragedy: the sense o f the finished l i f e ,  
o f the w ill  fu lf i l le d  and enlightened: that purging of the mind so 
much debated upon, which relieves us of our pent-up energies, 
transfers our feelings to a greeter object, and thus ju s t ifie s  and 
entertains our dumb passions, detaching them at the same time fo r a 
moment from their accidental occasions In our earthly l i f e . . . th e
(U5)
(94*, e td .) enlightenment by which tragedy is  made sublime is  a glimpse 
into the ultimate destinies o f our w ill.*(IPH ,p .195)
Uue further point neeon to he ~-ue on tnis subject. These descriptions 
of the experience furnished by tragedy almost duplicate Santayana's la ter 
descriptions of the state which he claims is happiness. One such Dassage, 
from 'The L ife  o f 'Reason* is  quoted in Chapter VI, section v, below. A 
further passage from the much later 'Centeel Tradition at la y ' reinforces 
the paralle l. Happiness (he argues) consists in an in tu ition  o f very 
comprehensive scope; and therefore the nature o f happiness is  in te llectu a l. 
This scope,
"distinguishes happiness from carnal pleasures, fo r  although happi­
ness, lik e  everything else, can be experienced only in particular 
moments, I t  is found in conceiving the to ta l and ultimate fru its  o f 
l i f e ,  " (o p .c it . ,p .l65)
When th is view is  even partia lly  stained,
" i t  raises the mind to a contemplation which is  very fa r from cold, 
being in fact ecstatic ; yet this ecstasy remains in te llectu a l in 
that i t  holds together the burden o f many successive and disparate 
things, which in blind experience would exclude one another..." 
(op .c it. , pp.165-6.)
So fa r as I  know, Santayana never remarked on the s im ila rity  between the 
two descriptions: the Important elements o f contemplation, elevation, 
ecstasy, arid comprehensiveness being common to both. A fter, 'The Sense o f 
Reauty' he rarely mentions sublimity, and, when w riting his f i r s t  book, he 
evidently did not have a fu lly  worked out theory o f happiness. The 
occasion for a comparison probably never occurred.
(95) lor sinus t 'On the Sublime', t r . T.3. Dorset» in 'C lassical L iteraiy 
C ritic ism ',p .107.
(96) op.cit.,p.147
(97») Schopenhauer: 'The World as Will and Representation', tr. Haldane and 
Kemp, tout ledge, v.I.,p .261 . Elevation is stressed also in Hegel, whoe
(446)
(97*, ctd .) Santayana also admired In the ea r lie r  part o f hia career. Hegel 
d iv ides art into types according to  the relations o f su b ject-n tter ( i .e .
s p i r i t )  anti form. The f ir s t  type is  Symbolic a rt, that in which no true 
form has been found to embody the S p ir it ; rather, there are only strivings 
toward such a form:
"Owing to th is inadequacy o f the two sides to each other, the 
relation o f the sp iritual rea lity  to its  ob jectification  becomes 
one of contrast, for the former, as something inward, despises any 
such externalization. As being the inward universal import of this 
host o f inadequate forms, i t  elevates i t s e l f  above them a l l  as 
sublime. In this sublimity, natural objects and the human form and 
its  experiences are no doubt accepted and tolerated as they are; 
but they are recognised as inadequate to  a meaning which is exalted 
above a ll things in heaven and earth." (Introduction to  the 
'Aeethetik ', 1335. In Carrltt, ed: ‘ Philosophies o f Beauty',
p.163.)
(98) Burke: 'A Philosophical Inquiry into the Origin o f our Ideas on the 
Sublime and the Beautifu l', 1756,1 ,v i i .  In C arrltt, op .eit.,p ,38
(99) Burke, o p .c it ., IV ,v il , in  C arrltt,op .c lt.,p .93
(100*) In Kant's view, the mathematical sublime is  an experience of 
a lternating plensure and pain:
"The fee lin g  of the sublime is . . .a  fe e lin g  of pain arising from 
the want o f accordance between the aesthetical estimation o f 
magnitude formed by the imagination and the estimation o f the 
same formed by the reason. There is  at the same time a pleasure 
thus excited, arising from the correspondence with rational ideas 
o f this very judgment of the inadequacy o f our greatest faculty 
of sense, in so far as i t  is  a law fo r  us to strive a fte r  these 
ideas". (Critique o f Judgment,p.96)
I f  nature is  to be regarded as dynamically sublime, i t  must excite fear in
(M7)
(100*, ctd.) us to ao .io degree, (op .c it . ,p.99)
(10]* ) Jacques Duron claims that Kant is  the origin of this doctrine that 
the sublime is the name of a state o f mind and not an objects *11 co jnence 
...p ar étab lir entre eux (c 'es t-à -d ire  le  beau at le  sublime) une dist­
inction qui rannelle ce lle  de Kant...* (Puro::,p.325) ant argues that the 
sublime is  that which is absolutely great; yet nothing is absolutely greats 
greatness and smallness are merely comparative predicates introduced by 
human beings. Therefore, " i t  is the state of mind produced by a certain 
representation with which the re flec tive  judgment is occupied, and not the 
object, that is  to be called sublime” . (ian t,op .c it.,p .d9 ) The similar­
it y  to Kant, however, must not be overstressed, since he and Santayana 
d if fe r  precisely over what the state o f mind is . Kant includes fear and 
pain; Santayana excludes them.
(102) 3B,p.134
(103») o p .c it ., p.185. The few remarks Santayana makes on the sublime out­
side 'The Sense o f Beauty' are inconclusive and do not amplify what he 
says in the early  work. In ' !eason in A rt' he notes that poetic invention 
may "buffet old associations” so as to  "enlarge them to cover, with 
unexpected propriety, a much wider or more momentous experience,"(dA,pp. 
276-7) and th is experience is  sublime. In "The Bealm o f Truth", he notes 
merely that sublimity can include the distressing and the ugly, and that,
I f  the sublime is regarded as part o f the beautiful, this unpalatable truth 
w ill  be beautiful to us. ( HT,pp.116-7) These remarks clearly  do not add 
to what is  said in 'The Sense o f Beauty'.
(104) Hobbes: 'leviathan ', P t . I ,  oh.6; Everyman edn.,p.27
(105) S .LS,p.135
(106») op.cit.,p.136. In the system of the iealms of Being, laughter 
figures in the ethical context o f the spiritual l i f e .  Pure laughter, 
Santayana maintains, is not malicious or scornful; i t  is not a triumph of 
one se lf over another s e lf ,  but o f sp irit over a l l  selves. I t  is  a joyous 
form of union with our defects, in which the sp ir it  i3 victorious. ( \Sp.,
( 08 )
(106*, ctd .) pp.247-3). This sp iritual laughter d iffe rs  from laughter as 
described in Santayana's ea r lie r  works. I t  occurs in a state o f spiritual 
liberation , i . e .  a state in consciousness is  free from the need to
occupy i t s e l f  with the organism o f which i t  is the epiphenomenon. ™o 
accept th is analysis, i t  is  n e c e s s a r y  to  see“ T!t the whole apparatus of the 
sp iritual l i f e .  Cf. Ch.IX, below.
(107) HW, p.131
(108) Plautus: 'Captivi' in 'The Pot of "told and Other P lays ', tr . E.F. 
Watling,p. 59
(109) A ris to tle : 'P oe tics ',cn .5.
(110*) C arritt, in 'The Theory o f Seauty', gives the following quotation 
from Iotze in a footnote to his remarls on Bergson, but unfortunately 
omits to give a reference: "The comic is  a joke played by the mechanism of 
nature on the freedom of the s p ir it " .
(111) S3,p.187
( 112 ) ibid
(113) op .c it. ,p.l83
(114*) A sim ilar Indication o f the peculiar, elevated e ffe c t  o f high comedy 
is Musset's comment on *le Misanthrope':
"Quelle dale gaite" ,^ 3i  t r i 3te et s i profonde,
Que lorsqu'on vient d'en r ire  on devrait en pleurer."
(115) SB,p.189
( 116 ) ibid
(117) ibid
(118) o p .c it .,p .190
(119) ibid
( 120) ibid
(121*) op .c it. , p.193. Similar ideas on the distinction between the 
humourous and the comic are put forward in a short passage in Santayana' s 
essay, 'Dickens'.(1921) Dickens, in Santa.,ana's view, points out fo ib les
(U 9 )
(121*, c td .) which are ignored In polite society. In such society, we 
put masks on the weaknesses Dickens exposes,
"so that a conventional world, a world of masks is  superimposed or
the rea lity  and passes in every sphere o f human interest fo r rea lity  
i t s e l f .  Humour is the perception o f this illu sion , the fact allowed 
to pierce here and there through the convention, whilst the convent­
ion continues to be maintained, as i f  we had not observed i t 3 
absurdity. Pure comedy is mor radical, cruder, in a certain sense 
less human, because comedy throws the convention over altogether, 
revels for a moment in the fact, and brutally says to  the notions 
o f man ind, as i f  i t  slapped them in the face, There, take thatj 
That's what you rea lly  arel" ( o p .c it . , p.263)
Common to these views end those put forward in 'The Sense of Seauty' are 
the comparative gentleness o f humour, and the harshness of comedy (indic­
ated in the remark that there is a good deal of malice in the sense o f 
fun) The notion that both the humourous and the comic are concerned to 
expose conventions is  a la te r  addition to Santayana's views, not surprising 
in view of the fact that he is  writing about cic ens.
(122) 33,p.195
(123) op.cit.,p.196
( 124) ibid
(125) ibid
totes to Chapter V; Poetry and religion
(1) IPR.p.7
(2) o p .c it .,p .8
(3) op .e it.,p .9
(4 ») ibid. 5 e f .  V i , p.216»Imagination is  "a region o f deployed sensib ility  
or synthetic representation" between sensation and abstract discourse.
(5) IPR.p.9( 6* )  o p .c it .,p .58. The theme of idealisation by the imagination is  o f
(450)
( 6» , ctd .) Importance not only In the present context o f the theory of 
poetry, but a lso in Santayana's philosophy as a whole, Royce once said 
to  Santayana that the ¿1st o f his (Santayana's) philosophy is the separ­
ation o f essence from existence, i .e .  the discrimination between that which 
exists and that which has merely ideal status, (ioyce 's  remark is  reported 
by Santayana in  his 'Apologia pro ¡nente sua', Sohllpp,p.4-97) In his 
theory of Idealisation Santayana is insistent that Platonic and religious 
concepts have only ideal status, and do not denote existent en tities, 
.ioyce's remark, made shortly a fte r  the publication of IPS, turned out to 
be prophetic, as is amply shown in the philosophy of the Realms o f Being. 
(C f. Ch.IX, below.) In his system, lantayana maintains that only two of 
the realms he distin juishes, those o f matter and sp ir it, are existent.
The realms o f essence arid truth are ideal only.
(The problem of tire relation of the real and the ideal, i t  may be 
repeated, was probably deeply impressed on Santayana's mind by his study 
o f lo tze . Cf. the Introduction to the pr sent thesis)
(7) I  R ,p.U 8 
(3 ) S3,pp. 139-40
( 9 ) op .cit.,p .97
(10) ibid. jc f. COTJS,p.101, for the same point; also IHV,p.l59
(11) IPH,p.92
( 12) o p .c it ., pp.93-4
(13) op. c i t ., pp. 55-6
(IX ) 'Shelley, or The Poetic Value of .{evolutionary Princ ip les ',p .231
(15) ibid
(16) ibid. Cf. M'hat is Aesthetics?', 03, pp.26- 5
(17) s:XS, p.258 
(13) 39,p.200
(19) ibid
( 20) op. o it. ,pp.200-1
( 21) op .cit. ,p . 202
(6», c td .) Importance not only In the present context o f  the theory of 
poetry, but also In Santayana's philosophy as a whole. hoyce once said 
to Santayana that the gist o f  his (Santayana's) philosophy is  the separ­
ation o f essence from existence, i .e .  the discrim ination between that which 
exists and that which has merely ideal status. ( toyce's remark is  reported 
by Santayana in his 'Apologia pro mente 3ua', Schilpp, p.X97) In his 
theory o f idealisation Santayana is insistent that Platonic and re lig iou s 
concepts have only ideal status, and do not denote ex istent en tities . 
Hoyce's remark, made shortly a fte r  the publication o f IPS, turned out to 
be prophetic, as is  amply shown in the philosophy of the (calms o f Being. 
(Cf. Ch.IX, below.) In his system, 'antayana maintains that only two of 
the realms he distinguishes, those o f matter and s p ir it ,  are existent.
The realms o f essence and truth are ideal only.
(The problem of the rela tion  of the real and the id e a l, i t  may be 
repeated, was probably deeply Impressed on Santayana's mind by his study 
of Io tze . Cf. the Introduction to the pr sent thesis)
(7) I  PR, p. 1X8
(3) SB,pp.l39-X0
(9) op .cit.,p .97
(10) ib id . jc f .  COPS,p. 101, fo r  the same point} also I!IV,p.l59
(11) IPR,p.92
(12) op.olt. ,pp.93-X
(13) op .o it .,p p .55-6
(IX) 'Shelley, or The Poetic Value of (evolutionary Princip les ' ,p .231
(15) ib id
(16) ib id . Cf. ' 'hat is Aesthetics? ', 03,pp.26-J
(17) SIX3, p.258 
(13) 3B,p.200
(19) ib id
( 20) op .c it .,p p .200-1
(21) op .c it. ,p.202
(450)
(22) I!IW,p. 169
(23) 30,p.199
(24) PP,p.22
(25) ibid
( 26) TPP,p.44 
(27> m ,  p.105
(28») EGP,p.152. The f ir s t  trace o f this interpretation o f Plato Is to 
be found In  fcntayana's marginalia to  Totze 's  'System der Philosophic', 
where he ( antayana) describes the Ideas as 'goals o f thought'. (LSP,p.lOO) 
I t  was an opinion Santayana did not changescf. 3A?,pp. 198-200; iM,pp. 376-7
(29) SELS,p.266
(30) op.oit.,p .277
(31) op.eit.,p .228
(32) IPft,pp.38-9j of. 33,pp. 142-6, fo r  a less developed form o f this view.
(33) IPH»p.77
(34) op .eit.,p .79
(35*) op .o it . ,p.30j c f also: SB,pp.142-6; SA,p.93. 'The last Puritan', 
'T riton  Edition',v.XII,pp.38-40; 210-211;259. I t  is  said of th is  novel 
that a l l  the characters In it  speak lik e  Santayana. Certainly three o f 
them, Peter Alden, Oliver Alder,, and Mr. Barnley, accept his views on 
re lig ion . The same view is  retained In Santayana's autobiography: PP,p. 
247; HW,pp.3-5, p.108; and It  is presupposed in Santa.- ana'3 fu l l  length 
work on Shristology, 'The Idea o f Christ In the Cospels'.
(36) IPfl,p.71
(37*) o p .c it . ,p .76. Tor more examples, o f. the early essay, 'Moral 
Symbol« in the B ib le ', in IHW,pp. 152-78
(38*) IP.i,p.3. In his autobiography, 'antayana relates that the publicat­
ion of 'Interpretations o f Poetry and ie lig ion ' in 1900 was the result o f 
a transformation In his religious sentiments. Pot that he had ever 
practised or believed in the l it e r a l  truth of the relig ion  into which he 
was born (Catholicism); rather, he hod come to believe that relig ion  should
(451)
(452)
(38*, etd .) be regarded not as history and cosmology, but as symbolic myth. 
(HW,pp.4-6) A comment reported by his friend and biographer Daniel Cory 
is more deprecatory: "he (Santayana) merely remarked that the issues he 
discussed in that work were very much 'in  the a ir ' at the turn o f the 
century" (Cory: 'Santayana: The la te r  Years',p.17) However that may be, 
Santayana did not change his mind on the question of the relation between 
poetry and relig ion  during his l i f e :  o f. the la te  works 3AF,p.165 RE,pp. 
x iv -xv i.
Commentators have repeatedly pointed out that Santayana's doctrine on 
the relation of poetry and re lig ion  almost certain ly owes a great deal 
to the works o f Matthew Arnold and to  M ill 's : 'Three ssays on e lig ion ' 
(Commentators: c f .e .g .  Howgate: 'George Santayana',p. 1341 Ashmore,pp.26 
and 114, note 3) To Ashmore's references to  'Culture and Anarchy' and 
'lite ra tu re  and Dogma', one might add Arnold's essay: 'The Study of 
Poetry ', where he maintains that poetry w ill  take over the functions of 
re lig ion : "We should conceive of (poetry) as capable o f higher uses, and 
called to higher destin ies, than those which in general men have assigned 
to i t  hitherto. More and more mankind w ill  discover that we have to  turn 
to poetry to interpret l i f e  fo r  us, to  console us, to sustain us." (op. 
c it .  in the veryman's Library edition o f Arnold's "Assays in Criticism", 
p.235) The para lle l with i l l  is extremely strik ing: " ielig ion  and poetry 
address themselves.. .to the same part o f the human constitution: they both 
supply the same want, that of ideal conceptions grander and more beautiful 
than we see realized in the prose o f human l i f e "  (M ill ,o p .c it . ,p .103)
Though Santayana had read M ill, he does not mention the 'Three Essays 
on {e lig ion ',  nor indeed does he mention M ill with anything lik e  the 
frequency of his references to Arnold. Of the la tte r , at d iffe ren t times 
he both affirms and denies a debt to  him. Discussing 'Interpretations o f 
Poetry and e lig io n ' with Van Meter Ames, Santayana remarked: " I  got the 
idea from Matthew Arnold who had a great influence on me when I was young" 
(r.mea: 'Proust and Santayana',p.76) On the other hand, Cory reports that
(453)
(38*, otd .) Santayana, "denied that he himself had been Influenced very- 
much by either Arnold or Pater; i t  vas rather to  the French writers that
he wt>.s indebted -  aen li.ce ..enan and fnine" (Cory,op.cit. ,p. 72) However 
that may be, it  must surely be true that at least Arnold and M ill implanted 
in Santayana13 mind the idea that there is  some close and profound a ff in ity  
between poetry and re lig ion .
(39) IPH,p.189 
(4.0) op.cit.,pp. 175-6 
( a )  33,p.133
(42) IPH,p.178; c f. HA,pp.277-8
(43) ¡A, p.231
(44) IPS,p.179
(45) op.ait.,p.189
( 46) op.cit. ,p.l79
(47) ibid
( 48) op.cit. ,p .130
(49*) op .c it .,p p .179-80. Santayana says that euphuism is a device exploited 
especia lly  by the Symbolists, (op .c it . ,p. 179) This i3 presumably the 
ground fo r  Ph ilip  3 la ir  d ee 's  claim that the reason why Santayana should 
consider euphuism at a l l  as an element of poetry was the Influence of 
Symbolist aesthetics on advanced American lite ra ry  opinion in the late 
nineteenth century, and therefore during Santayana's student years and 
ea rly  professional career. (And during the time when Santayana himself 
was well known as a poet.) lice  refers us to tone Taupin: "L*Influence du 
Symbolisme français sur la Poesie Américaine de 1910 a 1920". I f  follows 
from what Taupin reports that Santayana wa3 certain ly conversant with the 
Symbolist movement in America. I t  was two Harvard students, Stone and 
imball, who founded the Symbolist periodical, «The f.hap "»ook* in 1394, 
a journal to which Santayana contributed poems. ’’he aim of the periodical 
was to provide a showcase fo r American Symbolist poets, (o f. Taupin, op. 
c i t .  ,pp.32-4) Whether i t  is safe to in fer a deep influence on Santayana
(¿9*, ctd. ) by Symbolist doctrine is , however, another matter, o f. note 
51*, below.
(50*) IPS,p.130. The thesis that the poet has access to  the data o f 
experience is repeated by Santayana in worlds which span his whole career:
HA,pp.270-1; SAP,p.230; IE,pp.153-4» 3 Cp,pp.lO'V), and the essay 'Woman 
Symbols fo r Matter' in IHW,p.l36.
Inspiration is  regarded by lantayana as a psychic -henoiaenon: by 
•psyche' he means the human body with its  structure o f wants and needs, of 
which sp ir it or consciousness is  ar. e pi phenomenon. His materialism and 
epiphenomenalism commit hi* to explaining inspiration as follows:
"The occasion and the ambient influences merely v iv i fy  the sp ir it , 
by stimulating the organism to fuse scattered impressions, to revive 
and transform forgotten images, to invent, as in dreams, scenes 
that ju s tify  ripening emotions, and to  fe e l a f f in it ie s  or equivalence 
in apparently disparate things." (ICG,p.7;ef. HSp.pp. 5-6; CP,p.96)
While his ephipenomenalism allows Santayana to do fu ll  justice to the 
well-attested Involuntary character o f creative thought, he does not 
discuss the process o f creation in great d e ta il -  the above quotation 
from 'The Idea of Christ in the Gospels' is  the most detailed I have come 
across.
(51») IPS,p. 137. 3 la ir lice  (Schilpp volume, p .268) once again sees here 
the Influence o f the Symbolists. This doctrine, he argues, is sim ilar to 
the "dérèglement raisonné" o f Jimbaud and Corbière, and to the dissociation 
preached by démy de lourmont.
idrabaud wrote: ( le t te r  to Paul ^emeny, 15/5/1871): "Je dis q u 'i l  
faut être voyant par un long, immense et raisonné dérèglement de tous les 
sens. Toutes les formes de l'amour, de souffrance, de fo l ie ;  i l  cherche 
lui-même, i l  épuise en lu i tous les poisons, pour n'en garder que les 
quintessences". Perhaps Santayana was influenced by this doctrine to some 
extent; but his remarks in 'Interpretations o f Poetry and Religion' clearly 
lack the urgency and violence o f  those o f llmbaud. There is no mention in
(454)
U55)
(51*» ctd.) Santayana's text of the belief that» In order to reach the 
data of experience, the poet must derange and disorder himself as much as 
ilmbaud insists. Moreover» Rimbaud sou.ht to discover things hitherto 
un> now, and to do so he chose dellber teljr to cultivate hallucination. 
Baudelaire had written, at the end of 'Voyage't
"fous voulons, tant ce feu nous brule le cerveau,
Plonger au fond du -ouffre, Rnfer ou Ciel, qu'importe?
Au fond de l'Tnconnu pour trouver du nouveau." 
limbaud, of course, chose 'L'Knfer'. These doctrines of discovery are not 
echoed in Santayana, for him the poet restores to experience elements 
present but unnoticed. At best he is a re-discoverer of these neglected 
elements. It seems best not to maM- too strong an assimilation between 
Santayana and the Symbolists.
(52) I  PR, p. 133
(53) ibid
(5A) op.oit.pp.133-4, same point dSp.,p.l29, footnote.
(55) IPR,p.185
(56) ibid
(57) o p .c it ., p.136 
(53) op.cit.,p.139
(59») In view of this long and explioit three-fold division or poetry by 
Santayana, it is a mystery how Arnett can write in criticism: "It is 
surprising that Santayana, with his very keen sensitivity and wide exper­
ience, should not have perceived more sharply and elaborated more precisely 
the fundamental difference between poetry and art of the ilk that is 
concerned largely with the sensuous qualities o f its own medium and the more 
profound sort (both within and without religions) which professes to be 
seriously concerned with the problems of men." (Arnetts 'Santayana and 
the Poetic Function of teligion',p.785)
(60) IPa,p.191
(61) op.cit. , p. 192
(■456)
(62) op.oit.,p.194
(63) Ibid
(64.*) op.oit. ,pp. 19-4-5» similar views as the prixaoy or plot are put 
forward In Sd,pp. 134-5
(65) ir.-i.pp. 195-7
(66) op .o it.,p .197
(67*) op. cit. ,pp. 198—9. It is  evident from the value he sets on ideals 
that Santayana was as Platonistio in his philosophy as his materialism 
would allow (of. on this Ch. IX, below, on the spiritual l i f e ) :  had he 
been born at a time when Platonistic metaphysics were a possibility for a 
philosopher he would most assuredly have accepted that philosophy. In 
view of this, it is hardly surprising that his doctrines on poetry should 
on some points resemble those of Shelley. 'or example, in his 'defence 
of Poetry', Shelley writes, relating poetry and ideals (in  his fu ll 
Platonic sense of the term): "The tragedies of the Athenian poets are as 
mirrors in which the spectator beholds himself, under a thin disguise of 
circumstance, stript of a ll  but that ideal perfection and energy which 
everyone feels to be the internal ty pe of a ll  that he loves, admires, and 
would become." (Shelley, op.cit. in Ernest thys, ed., 'The Prelude to 
Poetry, p.220) Or again, relating poetry and religion in a way similar 
though not identical with that of Santayana: "Poets according to the 
circumstances of the age and nation in which they appear were called, in 
the earlier epochs of the world, legislators or prophets: a poet essent­
ia lly  comprises and unites both characters, '-’or he not only beholds 
Intensely the present at it is , and discovers those laws according to 
which present things ought to be ordered, but be beholds the future in 
the present, and his thoughts are the germs of the flower and the fruit of 
the latest time". ( lhys,ed., op.oit.,p .210 )
It is impossible to say for certain whether these doctrines influenced 
Santayana in the formulation of his own views. Certainly, he had the highest
(67*, c td .) regard fo r  Shelley as a poet, as Is evident in his essay, 
"Shelley, or The Poetic Value o f Revolutionary Principles" (1913). The 
most one can say without speculation is  that Santayana would have found
Shelley 's doctrines deeply congenial.
(68*) IPfl,p.200. Sf. le t te r  to  obert Rriéges, 29/8/1920, for the same 
view, which Santayana thus retained for a t least twenty years. Of Homer, 
V irg il ,  and Oente, Santayana writes: "My contention is ..th s t their dignity 
as poets would f a l l  immeasurably i f  they had had no geography, astronomy, 
theology, or agriculture; in other words, i f  they had not attuned their 
minds to the world as they conceived i t ,  but had conceived no world and - 
to be quite frank -  had had no mind." Letters,p . 183. There are closely  
related remer’ s also in ' ïeeson in A rt ', where Santayana specifies, as 
one of the ways in which art may become class ic, that o f expressing, 
"ultimate truths, cosmic laws, great human idea ls ," (  iA,p.355) .V irg il and 
Dante are classic poets in th is sense (he repeats), end a similar classic 
quality belongs to Ireek sculpture and architecture: "Such eminence is  the 
reward o f having accepted discipline and made the mind clear anagram of 
much experience."(ib id )
(69) IPH,p.200
(70) op .e lt . ,p.201
(71») op. c it . ,pp. 125-6. The tone of th is passage is fa r  from sympathetic 
to barbarism. Santayana's attitude had therefore mellowed considerably 
when he wrote to Cory, twenty-eight years later:
"When people despise that which exists, in language, in vocabulary, 
or morals, and set up the sufficiency of their unchcstened impulses, 
they are barbarians. 3ut..that may be the beginning of a fresh 
civilization. It is only at f irs t  that it seems orude and 
unnecessarily wasteful...I am therefore far from contemptuous when 
I use the word." (letter In Cory: 'Santayana: The Later Years',p.30) 
This pessage is exceptionally tolerant among Santayana's remarks on barbar­
ism.
U57)
(72*) of. TPP, Ch.IV, passim and K3P,Ch. IV, passim, on Soothe and 'Faust'. 
Earlier, Santayana had used the term 'philistine' instead of barbarian.
vf. «.he paper, '¿»hut id a PuilistineÍ ' repr. in m . For the standard 
doctrine on barbarism, of. also the essays 'Hellenism and Barbarism' in 
(73> I DH,p.126
(74*) op.oit. ,p.l28. For the same view of Whitman, cf.WD,pp. 143-1 
(75*) IP:l,p.143. 3enor lida in his commentary on 'antayan's aesthetics 
reports on the liter; ry historical background to these remarks on Browning. 
Santayana was very much in opposition to the received critical and popular 
opinion of the day. So great was Browning's popularity that his works 
were even printed as edifying appendices to tourist guides to forth 
America, not to mention their use in religious contexts such as the sermon. 
Browning was regarded as a sage. (Lida,p.129) As Lida also reports, 
Browning did not lack defenders. One of the reviewers of 'Interpretations 
of Poetry and e li -ion ', Hutchins Hapgood, while allowing Santayana 
brilliance of intellect and consummate style, criticises him for coldness 
and asceticism, finding him "lacking in warmth, in humanity, and in robust 
intellectual impulse." (Hapgood: ©view of IP.i,p. 191.) Helen Tyer 
Woodard argues that the opposition between Santayana and Browning is that 
between a pessimistic and an optimistic view of the universe, and 
questions the justice of Santayana* 3 analysis of Browning's attitude and 
beliefs. (Woodard: "Santayana on Browning: A Pessimist Criticism") Notably, 
neither Santayana nor his critics concern themselves with Browning's 
technical abilities, but rather with his beliefs. Soth parties to the 
dispute assume the inseparability of poet and thinker, and that the views 
a poet expresses in his poetry are relevant to tho evaluation of his 
stature as a poet. (The thesis that truth is an aesthetic virtue is 
discussed in the text of the present chapter.)
(76) cf. TPP, Ch .Ill, passim.
(77*) a b is customary with him, Santayana gives no indication of who it is
(77*, ctd. ) that he is arguing against here. oe is the obvious candidate. 
In the essay, 'The Poetic Principle' (1850) Poe writes: "I hold that a
long poem does not exist. I maintain that the phrase 'a long poem' is 
simply a lif  t contradiction in terms." (Poe, op.cit., in "Works", v. V,p. 
101) This is supported by th» further claim that: "a poem deserves that 
t it le  only inasmuch as it excites, by elevating the soul. The value of the 
poem is in the ratio of this elevating excitement." (ib id .) Since a ll  
such excitements are of physical necessity transient, there cannot be a long 
poem; when the excitement fa ils , ?ca argues, what we are reading ceases 
to be a poem. This view is to be found also in his earlier essay, "The 
Fhilosophy of Composition,", 1846.
(78) ?PP,p.6
(79) op.cit. ,P.10
(SO) op. c it . ,P . l l
(S I) ibid
(82) op.cit. ,pp. 12-13
(83) sa, u.99
(34) op .cit. , p. 100
(35) op.cit. , p.102
(36) op.cit. ,p,100
(87) op .cit. , P.103
(38) S3, p.lpO
(39) ibid
(90) SKLSfP*254
(91) ibid
(92) ibid
(93) ibid
(94*) op.cit.,p.255. These remarks are similar in tone to views expressed 
in another late work, 'The ieslra of m ence'. Santayana argues that any 
attempt at the communication of experience by poetry can never have more
(460)
(94*» ctd .) than the most lim ited success» since essences given in one 
experience are rarely i f  ever repeated. (C f. Ch.IX fo r  an explanation o f 
the term essence, and the background of doctrine to th is assertion .) This 
fa c t, however, does not in the least impair the value of poetry, * fo r  the 
function o f poetry is  not to  convey information, not even to  transmit the 
attitude o f one mind to another, but rather to  arouse in each a clearer 
view of its  own experience, longings, and destiny." (Lb,p. 109) Once again, 
the development o f Santayana's epistemology leads him to  suggest a less 
strenuous ideal for poetry. The notion that the function of poetry is  to 
promote self-knowledge i3, however, not developed by Santayana. The idea 
o f the c la r ifica tion  of experience by poetry is  mentioned in passing in 
•The tealm of Matter' (p.229). Otherwise he remains s ilen t on th is subject. 
(95) Hhys,op.clt. ,p.33
(96*) ihys,op.cit. ,p .l8 . Cf. Horace: 'The Art o f Poetry's "The man who has 
managed to blend p ro fit with delight wins everyone's approbation, fo r  he 
gives his reader pleasure at the same time as he instructs him." Tr.
T.S. Dorsch, 'C a ss ica l L iterary Criticism1 ,p.91
(97) thya,op.oit., p.153 
(93) op .olt. ,p.204 
(99) op.clt.,p.112
(100*) 'Kak»' and 'maker' used in this sense: cf. eg Chaucer: 'The Legend 
o f Lood Women1, 1.69} ' Horaaunt of the lose', 1.41. (Text ed. Skmat, O.Ü.P.)
(101) thys, op .cit.,p .89
(102) o p .c it .,p .91
(103) op .clt.,p .39
(104) tene Wellek and Austin Warren: 'Theory o f Literature',pp. 160-1
(105) Prom "les  Paradoxes L ittéra ires ou les  Discours éc r its  par cet 
académicien sur les Principaux genres de poemes", réunis et annotes par 
3.Jullien: Paris: 1359. Cited in Henri Srémond: "Prière et Poésie",p.33
(106) ;h ys .,op .a lt., p. 111
(107) Preface to 'L y rica l Hallads' { in thys,op.oit.,pp.l75-6
(461)
(108) 'The Brown Book',p.l64
(109) ' Philosophic«) 1 Investigations' ,II,x i,p .l93
(110) op.clt. ,p.l95
(111) op .c lt., p.199
(112) op.oit.,p.202
(113) cf. Singer, Ch.I, passim.
(114) Anton Ehrenzweig: 'The Hidden Order of A rt ', Ch.7* The Three Phases 
of Creativity'.
(115) Arnold Isenberg, 'The Problem of B e lie f'.
(116) t.W. Hepburn: ' oetry and Concrete Imagination',p.4
(117) H .K . F.lliott: 'Poetry and ""ruth',pp.79-80
(118) Elliott,op.clt.,pp. 30-1
(119) Isenberg, op.clt. ,pp. 129-31
(120) E llio tt ,op.clt. ,p. 31
(121) Hepburo,op.olt.,pp.3-9
(122) IPH,pp. 117-8
(123) op.clt. ,pp.13-16
(124) ibid
(125) Bremond,op.dt., p.102. 3o far as I have been able to trace,
Cantay¡ na refers to Bremond only once, in a letter to his friend Cory, 
(letter dated 27.11.1953) Bremond had recentl died, and Santayana had 
come across an article about him in a Spanish periodical. His comments 
are entirely what one would expect from a philosopher who is a material­
ist In metaphysics:"...You know (Bremond) had a theory about pure poetry 
which attracted a good deal of attention., .Why Is,
'la  f i l ie  de Minos et de Pasiphae' 
a wonderful line, and ravishing poetry, whereas 
11 a f i l ie  de Pasiphae et de Minos'
would be dull prose from a school-book? L'Abb^ Ir^ mond said that it was 
the Holy jhost blowing where It llsteth — or something to that effect: but 
I suspect there are tropes that let the currents through in the brain, and
U 62)
(125*, ctd.) tropes that don't and that It is a matter of litt le  orgasms 
in the nervous system." (In Cory: 'Santayanas "he later Yea rs ',  pp. 119-20) . 
Santayana, as one would expeot, w ill have no truck with mysticism.
( 1 26 ) Sremond,op.cit.,p.123
(127) op.cit.,pp. 114-5 (Bremond is citing the my3tic Brabançon.)
(128) op.cit.,p.l43
(129) op.cit.,p.153
(130) op.cit.,p. 172
( 1 3 1 ) op.cit.,p.130
(132) op.cit. , p.207
( 1 3 3 ) op. cit. ,p.208
( 1 34 ) op .cit., p.218
rotes t o  Shunter Vis "he Kature of Art
(1) RSC,p.l3
(2) The note, dated, 'Cambridge, April 13,1907,' is printed in JPPSM, v.15, 
no.13, (1913), pp. 32-3
(3) :iCS,pp.27-8 
(A) op .c it.,p .29
(5) 'A Brief History of My Opinions', repr, as part of 'A General 
Confession', 3chilpp,p.l2
(6») Critics have repeatedly commented on this, e.g. H. Barker, ieview of 
•The Life of »ason' ,pp,126-32; f ora  recent example, of. Thomas iansom 
gilts: "A Propos de la The'orie Morale de le orge Santayana", p. 386:
"..on constate chec Santayana un grand manque de précision tant dans la 
definition que dans l ’emploi de la terminologie de base..Ce qui est encore 
plus grave, c'est la gratuite'’ avec laquelle i l  prend certaines positions 
sans en donner la moindre preuve."
(7) letters,p.76
(8) RC. 3,p. 97; similar remarks in 'A general Confession', Sehllpp,pp.9-10
(9) IS,p.227
(463)
T
(10*) :<3c.,p.73. Possibly Santayana is here confusing Aristotle's 
distinction between primary and secondary matter. Prime matter has no 
qualities whatever: its function is solely to be the potentiality for any 
kind of form. Secondary matter is material, with weight, density, and so 
forth. Possible quantity, time, and place would be determined by prime 
matter. Santayana's report of Aristotle's views on matter is  rather too 
simple, and his debt to him on this point more extensive than he appears to 
allow.
(11) WD,p.60; same point (Sc. ,pp. ,54-7
(12) C0”S,p.151
(13) op.cit. ,p.l27; same point -{SC,p.l68
(14) RGS,p.102
(15) op .c it., p. 103
(16) 'Comparison with Other Views of S p irit ', A?SL,pp.280-1
(17*) op .c it., p.280. The agreement of doctrine Is not of course complete, 
aristotle is  willing to allow at least the possibility of disembodied 
existence to that part of the soul which thinks: "We have no evidence as 
yet about mind or the power to think} it  seems to be a widely different 
kind of soul, differing as what is eternal from what is perishable; it 
alone is capable of existence in isolation from a ll  other psychic powers. 
All the other parts of the soul. ..are, in spite of certain statements to 
the contrary, incapable of separate existence though, of course, distingu­
ishable by definition.*( 'De Anliut»' ¿13b,tr.J.A. Smith)
(18) aSe.,pp. 106-7
(19) op.clt.,p.108} cf. also £C,pp.160-2,166-7; WD,pp.9-ll,p.75
(20) iSe, p.118
(21») op.cit. ,p.72; cf also iCS,pp.l65-6; 'A Senernl Confession', Sohllpp, 
pp. 17-13. E pi phenomenalism is stated poetically in the last six lines of 
Santayana's Cornet 20:
"The soul is not on earth an alien thing 
That hfita her l i fe 's  rich sources otherwhere;
(464)
Ihe is  a parcel o f the sacred a ir.
-he takes her being from the breath of Spring,
"he glance o f  Phoebus Is her fount o f ligh t,
And her long sleep a draught of primal night."
(Triton edn,v.I,p.224)
(22) <CS, p.169
(23) riSc, p.105
(24) op .cit.,pp . 105-6
(25*) C0TIS ,p .53. Santayana is here adopting the James-Lange theory o f 
emotion. James's papers 'What is an emotion?' appeared in 'Mind' in 18-34, 
and became very in flu en tia l, in conjunction with a similar doctrine of the 
Danish psychologist Lange. Jumes had argued against the view that an 
emotion is a mental state which induces the physical states which are its  
manifestations. He maintained thst, "the bodily changes follow d irectly  
the PKHGEPTIOK of the existing fa c t, and that our fee lin g  of the same 
changes as they occur IS the emotion." (James,op.cit.,in Magda B. Arnold, 
ed, 'The Nature of E.motion',p.l9.) James maintained that the viscera are 
the ch ief sources o f  emotion. The d if f ic u lt ie s  in this view were establish­
ed by physiologists like W.B. Cannon. Cannon presented experimental 
evidence on fiv e  important points: ( i )  operations on animals showed that 
to ta l separation of the viscera from the central nervous system does not 
a lte r  emotional behaviour; ( i i )  the same visceral changes occur in very 
d ifferen t emotional states (e .g . fear and rage), and in non-emotional 
states; ( i i i )  the viscera are re la tive ly  insensitive structures; ( lv ) 
v iscera l changes are too slow to be the source o f emotion: emotional 
reactions oocur three or four times faster than visceral muscle can react; 
and (v ) a r t i f ic ia l  Induction o f the visceral changes typ ical o f strong 
emotions (e .g . by adrenalin in jection ) does not produce the emotions. 
Cannon's objections are accepted as having routed the James-Tange theory.
(21», ctd.)
U65)
There arc u iff ie u lt ie s  not only In the theory o f emotion .Santayana 
auopta buo ciiao iii tuat wiU.cn he attucKsi wnion phij-osupher ever maintained 
that emotions ex ist for no reason?
(26*) 'Comparison with Other Views o f S p ir it ’ ,k * 3 l , p.286. There is  more 
an consciousness per se, of which Santayana says very l i t t l e  In 'The l i f e  
o f ieason' in 'Character and Opinion In the TTnited State«',p .84. He here 
claims that (a) consciousness has what he ca lls  a synthetic and transitive 
function, l .e .  i t  colours events with Memories and facts with emotions? and 
(b ) that by inspecting consciousness, one cannot find consciousness i t s e l f  
as a positive datum, because consciousness is  cogitation . One can only 
take note o f the Immediate objects o f consciousness, in such private 
perspective as sense or imagination may present.
(27*) A.W. Moore, teview o f 'The L ife  o f ieason', in AF3t,pp.2A3-?*. The 
objection is  made also by Milton K. Munitz in his book» 'The Moral Philos­
ophy of Santayana': "Santayana's epiphenomenalism is  inconsistent with 
the practical role he assigns to Intelligence in the l i f e  o f reason.. One 
cannot deny a l l  instrumental efficacy to thought, and s t i l l  maintain that 
'man's rational l i f e  consists in those moments in which reflection  not only 
occurs but proves efficacious.(LH , 1 , 2 ) "  (M unitz,op.cit.,p.35)
(28) 'The Kfficacy of Thought* in A*SL,p.248
(29*) o p .c it .,p .249. This controversy had a th ird and fin a l stage in 
Moore's discussion of Santayana's reply. (A.W. Moores 'The 'unction of 
Thought'ssee bibliography .’ or d e ta ils .) Moore maintains that he finds the 
non-epiphenomenallstio passages in ’ ’"he l i f e  o f eason', "so numerous, so 
convincing, and 30 v ita l to so much o f his doctrines, that the reader 
w i l l  find Professor Santayana's instruction to  take them in a Pickwickian 
sense a very d if f ic u lt  one to  execute."vMoore,op.eit.,p.522)
(25*. ctd)
(30) John Lachst 'Santayana's Moral Philosophy', repr. In AP3I , p.334
(31) US,P.370
(32*) One o f the leading themes o f Munitz's book (cited In note 27», aupra) 
is  that this represent at iona list theory o f perception is  inconsistent with 
Santayana's naturalistic metaphysics, "■ollowing Santayana, he refers to 
th is sty le o f philosophy o f perception r:a transcendentalism, and to its  
consequence -  that only data and not objects are nown by acquaintance -  rs 
agnosticism. In Munitz's view, Santayana's philosophy at the time o f 'The 
L ife  of leason' includes a strain  o f common-sense philosophy or naive 
realism, (M unitz,op.cit.,pp.l0-12) Inconsistent with his transcendenta-list 
epistemology. He produces passages from "The l i f e  of ieason" which are 
alleged to  support th is view, e.g . from • Reason in Science': "Appearances 
are the qua lities o f rea lity , else rea lit ie s  would be without place, time, 
character, or in terre la tion .. .Appearances define the constituent elements 
o f . . . r e a l i t y ,  which could not be b 'tte r  known than through their means."
Yet this pessage, like the others which are a lleged ly naively re a lis t ic , 
can be construed without strain as consistent with transcendentalism and 
agnosticism. Santayana can be regarded as saying here: 'We can know only 
immediate data by acquaintance; we can know rea lity  no better than through
them, because there is  no other way o f so doln -. Tn a manner o f speaking,
then, appearances are the constituents o f rea lity , in the sense that they 
are the only rea lity  we can in principle ever know.' Whatever may be one's 
opinions of such views, Munitz's allegation o f inconsistency is  possible 
only on an over-stringent principle of interpretation. Adopting the more 
charitable view that one should interpret a writer consistently i f  possible, 
th is  particular alleged inconsistency disappears.
Munitz further a lleges that, in 'The L ife  of teason', Santayana 
advances the doctrine that knowledge o f the external world is possible by 
some means other than sense-perception: "Instead o f retaining sense- 
experience as the basis for a l l  trustworthy knowledge, such experience is 
rejected in favour o f an insight into the hidden mechanism o f objects, an 
insight revealing the real and efficacious structure o f these mechanisms." 
(M un itz,op .clt.,p .30) Munitz considers that Santayana has here been in-
(32*, c td .) flueneed by locks. This misunderstanding arises from Munitz's 
interpretation o f another passage from • ieason in Science'i "Science..passes 
...beyond the dreamlike unities and cadences which sense discloses: only, 
as science aims at controllin  its  speculation by experiment, the hidden 
rea lity  i t  discloses is exactly like what sense perceives, though on a 
d ifferen t scale.'' Munitz admits that the 'in s igh t' o" which he speaks is 
thus to be arrived at by sense-perception, an admission which contradicts 
hi3 f ir s t  remark. Moreover, this passage can be construed quite easily 
as compatible with Santayana's philosophy o f perception, on the model 
suggested above.
(33) ¡A, p.324
(34) iiCS,pp.42-3; C0US,p.l27j 'Hellenism and Tarbarism' in BHj MS.p.93} 
HW,pp. 134-5
(35) HCS,pp.61-2
(36) SSc,pp.21-2
(37) cp.oit. ,p. 23
( 33» )  g>he doctrine of concretions in discourse and existence is fore­
shadowed in 'The Sense of 3eauty',p.97: " ...th e  whole machinery of our 
in telligence, our general ideas and laws, fixed and eternal objects, 
principles, persons and rods, are so many symbolic algebraic expressions. 
They stand for experience; experience which we arc incapable o f retaining 
and surveying in its  multitudinous immediacy. T'e should flounder hopeless­
ly .. .d id  we not iteep ourselves afloat and direct our course by these 
in tellectual devices." cf. the same work pp.107—10.
(39) <CS,pp. 131-2
(40) op .cit. , p.132 
( a )  Ibid
( 42) op. c i t . , p.131
(43) op .c it.,p . 130
(44») op .cit.,p .99 . I t  is perhaps worth pointing out that these claims to 
knowledge of what primitive experience is lik e  are possible only i f  
Santayana's d istinction between mediate and Immediate experience is
U 6 7 )
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(468)
( 44*, otd .) presupposed. I f  th is presupposition is  denied on the Wittgen- 
steiniar. grounds advanced in Ch.V, above, then Santayana's claim becomes 
unverifiab le, since we have no way of describing primitive experience (in  
his sense o f the term).
(45) HCS,p.113
( 46) op. c it . ,pp. 114-22
( 47) cf.WD,pp. 117-3
(43*) On Santayana and the tech n ica lities  o f modern ethics, c f. John Tachs: 
'Santayana's Moral Philosophy', in APSI.
(49) HCS,p.135
(50*) iGS,p.130. Gf. A ris to tle : 'Nicomachean Ethlos', 3k.X, ee ¡eota lly  
section 7. Contemplation is the good fo r  man; i t  is  se lf-su ffic ien t 
a c t iv ity  in accordance with the best part o f us. The depth o f Santayana's 
debt to A ris to tle  becomes even nlainer when one sees how many o f A r is to tle 's  
remarks in e ffe c t epitomise Santayana's views, e.g. :" .. .n o t only is  reason
s
the best thing in us, but the objects o f reason are the best knowable 
ob jec ts ."(op .c it. ,1177a. Tr. S ir  riavid loss.)
(51") HSe.,p.230; o f :S,p.272: "..man can have no l i f e  save in occupation, 
and in the exercise o f his fa cu lties ; contemplation i t s e l f  can deal only 
with what practice contains or d iscloses." The development o f the theory 
o f essence in the philosophy o f the ;6ulms o f Bein 5 led Santayana to change 
his views on contemplation. In the la te r  philosophy, the objects o f 
contemplation are not objects relevant to  action in the external world, but 
essences, the immediate data o f  experience, contemplated fo r themselves, 
not as signs o f objects in the external world, c f. Ch. IX below on essence, 
sp ir it , and the sp iritual l i f e .
(52) HR,p.145; cf.HS,pp.236-7
(53*) tG3,p.206; th is doctrine is  foreshadowed in 'The Sense of Beauty', 
p.166: " ...th e  function of practical reason is to compare, combine, and 
harmonise a l l  our Interests, with s view to attaining the greatest satis­
factions o f which our nature is capable." Gf. also: HG3,pp.203-4? <So,pp.
(¿69)
(53*» ctd .) 182-3 and Ch.IX, passim; 'Dickens' . c.?68; ESP,p.239; and 'The 
Last Puritan', Triton edition, v.XII,p.253. (The hero o f the novel O liver 
Alden, arrives at the morality of the l i f e  o f eason.)
(54.) iSc, p.173 
(55) <CS,pp. 186-9
(56) op.olt.,p.189
(57) iiSe, p.178
(58) ICS,pp. 205-6
(59) ilSc,pp.l72—3
(60») 'Two National 'Moralists', In A^SI,p.358. Santayana's friend and 
lite ra ry  executor Cory thinks that the ? irst War had a fa r mor i consider­
able e ffe c t on Santayana's philosophy than is  usually realised. I t  led 
him to consider the possib ility  of anyone's l iv in g  the L ife  o f ieason as 
more and more remote. Cory, Introduction to Letters, p.xxx.
(61*) One o f Santayana's Spanish commentators, Señor ^arre, is completely 
wrong about th is . Morality, he asserts, is only a peripheral interest fo r  
Santayana, and considered by him only when th is  is  made necessary by other 
problems: "f'o estamos..de acuerdo con aquellos estudiosos de las les 
doctrinas de Santayana, John Dewey entre e llo s , que pretenden adivinarle 
tendencias preferentement moralistas. Dice Dewey que 'The T i f  e o f reason' 
es la  mas adecuada contibuclon que America ha proporcionado a la filo s o fía  
moral desde los días de merson. Las preferencias de nuestro pensador y 
sus directas preocupaciones, a mi parecer, son de orden especulativo y 
estético ; sólo como un complemento, tan necesario que no podía excusarse 
su estudio, se preocupa por lo  moral." ( ’arré: 'v ida  y Pensamiento de 
Jorge Santayana',p.7¿. Tr: "We do not a ;rae with tnose students of 
Santayana's doctrines, John Dewey among them, who claim to be able to find 
a preference fo r  moral philosophy in his work. Dewey claims that 'The L ife  
o f leason' 1s the best American contribution to moral philosophy since the 
days of Emerson.. I t  seems to me that the preference o f our thinker, and 
his immediate preoccupations, are o f a speculative and aesthetic kind; he
(470) [
(61*, ctd .) occupies himself w ith moral philosophy only as a complement, 
so important that its  study cannot be Ignored.") His argument to  show 
tula la nothing more tnan oo point out tnat .-iantayana is  a subjectivist 
in ethics! Heedless to say, such a view rests on a complete misreading 
o f 'The l i f e  o f lesson', the very t i t l e  o f which specifies a moral recommend­
ation.
(62») -¡A,pp.207-8. Much la te r , in 'The tealrn of Matter', Santayana points 
out a feature o f his de fin ition  o f a rt, i . e .  that, in his usage, the terra 
'a r t ' is  an achievement word: "Art..im plies moral benefit} the impulsive 
modification o f matter by man to  his own confusion and injury I should 
not ca ll art, but vice or f o l l y ' , (:?M,p.347)
7or uncritical expositions o f the early chapters o f ' Season in A rt ', 
o f. Duron,pp.335-40; shioore, ch.TV, and Arnett, oh.IT.
(63) <A, p.208
( 64) ibid
( 65») op .cit. ,pp.210-11; for the same point, c f. note 50» to Chapter V, 
above.
( 66) ;iA,pp. 212-13
(67) o p .c lt .,p .214
( 68) op.cit.,p.215
( 69) o p .c it .,p .220
(70) op.cit.,p.221
(71) op.cit.,p.222
(72) op.cit.,p.223
(73) op.cit.,p.226
(74) o p .c lt . , p. 227
(75) op.cit.,p.223
(76*) ib id . These remarks on the emergence o f fine art seem to be in con­
f l i c t  with some remarks in the Preface o f 'The lealm o f Essence', where 
Santayana claims that fine art is  older than aervile labour, since, "Poetic,
U 7 D
(76*, c td .) creative, orig ina l fancy is  not a secondary form o f sen s ib ility , 
but its  f i r s t  and only form." (;iE ,p.xv.) The d if f ic u lty  is aggravated by 
the confusion o f these in ter remarks, oontnyana can consistently say that 
poetic fancy is  the ea rlies t form of sen s ib ility : th is is a reference to 
his theory that the poet (o r, one may sa fe ly  add, any a rt is t ) is acquainted 
with the data o f experience. Yet he cannot equate th is type of perception 
with fine a rt: as he says (c f .  Ch.V, above), the descent to the data of 
experience is  ju s tified  only i f  new structures are built upon them, 
structures expressive of ideals, and so forth . The descent to the data o f 
experience is  a necessary but not a su ffic ien t condition fo r the creation 
of fine a rt. That poetic fancy is  the fundamental form o f sen s ib ility  
does not therefore entail that fine art is  prior to  serv ile  labour.
(77) p.229
(78») Just how much confusion th is usage has caused is shown by Jerome 
Ashmore's essay, 'Santayana's Mistrust o f Tine A rt '. This paper has the 
distinction of being wron - in almost every assertion about what Santayana 
said, ^or example, Ashmore asserts that, in Santayana's view, fine art is 
without moral commitment -  yet, as has been shown in Chapter V, above, and 
w ill  shortly reappear in the present chapter, a l l  great art (Santayana 
argues) expresses moral ideals. Again Ashmore asserts that fo r  Santayana, 
fine art lacks the u t i l i t y  of rational art -  yet Santayana affirms that 
the goal o f fine art is the complete superposition o f spontaneity and 
u t i l i t y ,  which en ta ils that a work of art has beneficial consequences o f 
some kind. Again, it  is alleged that fo r  Santayana, "fine art being 
predominantly Involved with imagination, makes on abstraction "rom the real 
object in the environment and rational art does not." (Ashmore o p .c it ., 
p. 34 J) This Is Ashmore's version o f the following passage in " teason in 
A rt": "Productions in which an aesthetic value is or is supposed to  be 
prominent take the name of fine a rtj but the work of art so defined is 
almost always an abstraction from Lhe rea l object, which has many non-
(78*, otd .) aesthetic functions and values.” (:iA,p.216) The distance 
between tuo -ext and Ashmore's psrephrase Is obvious; Santayana asserts 
that to consider aesthetic values In Isolation Is lik e ly  to lead to a 
misunderstanding of them. (See text o f the present chapter on th is . ) gain, 
Cantayana asserts that fine art can he rational; moreover, there Is In 
Santayana no dispraise of the Imagination such as Ashmore's paraphrase 
implies.
Ashmore’ s mistakes were thoroughly refuted by Willard E. Arnett in 
a reply: "Santayana and The °ine Arts" (see bibliography for d e ta ils ). 
Ashmore undaunted retained his opinions. Cf. his Letter to the Editor, 
•Journal o f Aesthetics and Art C ritic ism ',16 (dee.1957) and his commentary 
on Santayana's aesthetics,p.58: " . . i t  is clear that in Santayana's view 
fine art sometimes l ie s  outside the domain of art and, judged by the 
standards o f the l i f e  o f leason, commands no great respect."
I t  is important to note fin a lly  that in Santayana's last philosophical 
work, 'dominations and bowers', the art/lndustrial art/ llberal art/fine 
art terminology reappears, and in this late tex t, antayana's usage makes 
i t  clear that fine art is  a species of liberal art. Yet this is l i t t l e  
help, since he provides no definitions for these terms. Cf. Ch.IX, section 
I I I  ( f ) ,  below.
(79) -iA,p.216
(80) ibid 
(21) ibid
(82) ibid
(83) SB,p.22
(8^) U,p.216
(85) op.clt.,p.217 
(36) op.cit.,p.216
(87) op. c i t . , p. 217
(88) o p .c it . , p.232
(89) op .cit. ,pp.232-3
U72)
(.472)
(78*, otd .) aesthetic functions and valuea."(HA,p.2l6) The distance 
between the ,jx t and Ashmore's paraphrase is  obvious; Santayana asserts 
that to  oonsider aesthetic values in isolation  is lik e ly  to lead to a 
misunderstanding o f them. (See tex t o f the present chapter on th is .) gain, 
"Santayana asserts that fin e  art can be ra tiona l; moreover, there is in 
Santayana no dispraise of the imagination such as Ashmore's paraphrase 
implies.
Ashmore's mistakes were thoroughly refuted by Willard E. Arnett in 
a rep ly: "Santayana and ""he pine Arts" (see bibliography fo r d e ta ils ). 
Ashmore undaunted retained his opinions. Cf. his le t te r  to the Editor, 
'Journal o f Aesthetics and Art C ritic ism ',16 (bee.1957) and his commentary 
on Santayana's aesthetics,p.58! " . . i t  is clear that in Santayana's view 
fine art sometimes lie s  outside the domain of a rt and, judged by the 
standards o f the l i f e  o f teason, commands no great respect."
I t  is important to note fin a lly  that in Santayana's last philosophical 
work, 'dominations and Powers', the art/industrial a rt/ libera l art/fine 
art terminology reappears, and in th is la te tex t, ¡antayana's usage makes 
i t  c lear that fine art is  a species of libera l art. Yet th is is l i t t l e  
help, since he provides no defin itions for these terms. Cf. Ch.IX, section 
I I I  ( f ) ,  below.
(79) iA, p. 216
(80) ibid
( n ) ibid
(82) ibid
(83) S8,p.22
(84) (A,p. 216
00 op. c i t . ,  p.217
(86) op .c it. ,p. 216
(87) op. c i t . ,  p.217
(88) op .c it. ,p .232
(89) op .cit. ,pp.232-3
(473)
(90) op.elt.,p .233
(91) Schilpp,p.257
(92) op.cit.,p .259
(93) Morris Weitz: 'The ¡ole of ^heory in Aesthetics' (In M argolis); John 
Passmore: 'The Treeriness o f ¿esthetics' (in  Elton); W.E. fenriek: ,noes 
trad itiona l Aesthetics Best on A Mistake?' (in  Barrett)
(94) Weitz in M argolis,p.52; c f Passmore in Alton,pp.43-5
(95) Weitz in Margolis,p. 54
(96) Weitz in Margolis,p. 55; c f. Kennick in 3arrett,p.7
(97) Weitz in Margolis,p.53; o f. Kennick in Barret,p.6
(98*) The 'locus classicus' fo r th is d istinction  is  C.3. Peirces "Collected 
Works", Vol.IV , paras 537 sqq. There is  some considerable use o f i t  in 
analytic aesthetics, e .g . in Margaret Macdonald: 'Some D istinctive Features 
o f Arguments used in Criticism o f the A r t s '; 1. kudner: 'The Ontological 
Status o f the Aesthetic Object'; C.L. Stevenson: 'On "What is  a Poem?"'; 
Joseoh Margolis: 'The language o f Art and Art Criticism ' and liehsrd 
Wollheim: 'Art and I t s  Objects'. (See bibliography fo r fu ll d e ta ils  of 
these works.) ""he present discussion is  ibdebted to Wollheim.
(99) Peirce, loc . c it .
(100) iuby Meager: 'The Uniqueness o f a Work of A r t ',  in 3arrett, esp,pp. 
26-8
(101) op .c it. ,p.28
(102*) op .c it. She discusses the views put forward in three o f the papers 
in Elton's anthology: ( i )  W.B. C allie : 'The Function of Philosophical 
Aesthetics '; ( i l )  Margaret Macdonald:, o p .c it . , (c f .  note 98», above); and 
( i l l )  Stuart Hampshire, "Logic and Appreciation".
(103) Margaret Macdonald, op .cit. ,pp. 124-5
(104*) Meager, op .e lt. ,in  Barret,pp.42-5. Wittgenstein's lectures were 
reported by S.E. Moore in 'Mind', 1955. A short extract, including Wittgen­
ste in 's  suggestions on the structure o f reasoning in aesthetics, is  repr. 
in Harold Osborne, ed ., "Aesthetics",pp.86-8
u n )
Notes to Chapter V II: "he Jlne Arts
(1 *) HW,p.l^2, o f. also the section o f Ch. IX, below, dealing with 'Domin­
ations and Powers', for a few la te remarks on music. Almost a l l  Santayana'8 
remarks on music are co llected and exposlted without criticism  by William 
Austin: 'Gantayana as a C ritic  o f Music'. (See bibliography fo r  d e ta ils ).
(2) "dua-M Tansllcki '""he "eEutl'u l In Mus1 e ' ,  pp. 1A-19
(3 ) e f. the b r ie f discussion o f Cooke In Gh.IV, supra.
(4 ) c f. especia lly her 'Philosophy In a New Key' (hereafter PKK),ch.8j and 
'dealing and Form',chs.7-19. (hereafter F"1) .
(5 ) Hanslickjop.cit.,p.2A
(6 ) I,lda,p.87
(7 ») HA,p.235. I t  is  superfluous to stress how deeply Santayana was 
Impressed by the theory o f evolution. To study the fine arts by invest­
igating th e ir  emergence from other types of behaviour Is to set them in 
an evolutionist perspective. I t  is more than l ik e ly ,  therefore, that 
Gantayana was acquainted with Herbert Spencer's essay, 'The Origin and 
^unction o f Music' ( 'F ra ser 's  Magazine', October, 1857.) Spencer puts 
forward a version of the speech theory of the orig in  o f musics "...what we 
regard as the d is tin ctive  tra its  o f song are simply the tra its  o f emotional 
speech Intensified and systematized. In resoeot o f Its  general character­
is t ic s , we thin i t  has been made clear that vocaj. music, and by consequence 
a l l  music, is  an Idealisation of the natural language o f passion." (o p .o it ., 
■"^inker's tibrar. repr. ,pp,60-l) Kmotlonal speech, Spencer argues,is 
characterised by greater loudness than ordinary speech, d iffe ren t timbre, 
pitch, and a use o f greater Intervals. In it ia l ly ,  these changes are the 
automatic result o f muscular contraction fo llow ing Instinctively  from an 
emotional state, (op .c lt . , pp.49-50) Tr. music, each of these factors Is 
exploited systematically. As the technique of music becomes more elaborate, 
I t  becomes possible to express feelings not f e l t  In l i f e :  "And thus we may 
understand In some measure how It  happens that music not only so strongly 
exoltes our more fam iliar feelings, but also produces feelings we never
MMN ■luTMftu
(7*, c td .) had before -  arouse« dormant sentiment« o f which we do not know 
the meaning; or as 'Uehter says -  t e l ls  us o f things we have not seen and 
shall not see .''(op .c it.,p .66 ) iie speaks elsewhere o f "Those vague fe e l­
ings o f unexperienced fe l i c i t y  which music arouses -  those indefin ite  
impressions o f an unknown ideal l i f e  which i t  ca lls  u p ...“ (op .c it. ,p.75)
I t  w i l l  be seen from the present section that Santayana accepts views 
remarkably close to  some of these: music is  o r ig in a lly  automatic, then 
deliberate, and car come to express new fee lin gs . The only point on which 
he is ambiguous is  that on which "rnest Newman quarrelled with Spencer, 
i .e .  whether music originated from speech, or whether, as T'ewraan contended, 
prim itive man had a musical sense independent o f speech and probably earlier 
in time. This musical sense, Newman contended, gives r ise  to what the 
French musicologist Jules Combarieu described as 'thinking with sounds' 
as d is tin ct from 'thinking with words'. (Newman: 'A Study of Wagner',
1399; 'Musical Studies',1905) There is  no clear indication in the text 
where Santayana would stand on th is  point.
(3) itt,p.236
(9^ ib id . Santayana retained these unobjectionable opinions until the end 
of his l i f e .  They occur again in a le t te r  to Corliss T imont, (dated 
6/1/1950) Tetters,p.339
(10) 3A, p.237
(11) c f .  iSc,pp.21—2
(12*) (A,p.237. The doctrine that music is  a world apart is  put forward by 
Santayana, iri less d e ta il, in several other works o f dates both before and 
a fter that of 'Reason in A rt '. In 'Interpretations o f Poetry and ie llg io n ', 
(1900) Santayana writes that a vis ion  of the ideal is  momentary, and ha3 
a l l  i t s  value in i t s e l f ;  yet such a vision does remind us that perfection 
is possible: “ i t  reminds us, l ik e  music, that there are worlds fa r  removed 
from the actual which are yet liv in g  and near to the heart.“ (IPS ,p .19) 
Thirteen years la te r, in his essay, 'Shelley, or the Poetic Value o f 
Revolutionary Princip les ', he w rites: "(Musio) is relevant to l i f e
(475)
U75)
(7*, ctd .) had before -  arouses dormant sentiments o f which we do not know 
the meaning; or as 'iiehter seys -  t e l ls  us o f things we have not seen snd 
shall not se e ."(op .c it .,p .6 6 ) He speaks elsewhere o f "Those vague fe e l­
ings o f unexperience 1 f e l i c i t y  which music arouses -  those indefin ite 
impressions o f an unknown ideal l i f e  which i t  ca lls  up. .." (o p .c it .,p .7 5 )
It  w i l l  be seen from the present section that Santayana accepts views 
remarkably close to  some o f these: music is o rig in a lly  automatic, then 
deliberate, and oar come to express new feelings. The only point on which 
he is ambiguous is  that on which rnest f'ewman quarrelled with Spencer, 
i .e .  whether music originated from speech, or whether, as Newman contended, 
prim itive man had a musical sense independent of speech and probably earlier 
in time. This musical sense, Newman contended, gives rise to what the 
French musicologist Jules Combarieu described as 'thinking with sounds' 
as d is tin ct from 'thinking with words'. (Newman: 'A Study of Vaguer',
1399; 'Musical Studies',1905) There is  no clear indication in the text 
where Santayana would stand on th is point.
(3 ) HA,p.236
(91) ib id . Santayana retained these unobjectionable opinions until the end 
of his l i f e .  They occur again in a le t t e r  to Corliss T amont, (dated 
6/1/1950) T otters,p.389
(10) 3A, p.237
(11) c f. S c , pp. 21-2
(12*) (A,p.237. The doctrine th. t music is  a world apart is  put forward by 
Santayana, in less de ta il, in several other works o f dates both before and 
a fter that o f ' season in A r t '.  In 'Interpretations of Poetry and (e lig lon ', 
(1900) Santayana writes that a vision o f the ideal is  momentary, and has 
a l l  it s  value in i t s e l f ;  yet such a vision does remind us that perfection 
is  possible: " i t  reminds us, lik e  music, that there are worlds fa r removed 
from the actual which are yet liv in g  and near to the heart. *(IP il,p . 19) 
Thirteen years la te r , in his essay, 'Shelley, or the Poetic Value of 
(evolutionary P rin c ip les ', he writes: "(Music) is relevant to l i f e
(476)
(12*, ctd.) unmistakably, fo r i t  stimulates by means o f a torrent o f 
abstract movements and images the formal and emotional p o ss ib ilit ie s  o f 
liv in g  vinicn l i e  in tne sp ir it, dy so doing music oeoomes a part o f l i f e ,  
a congrous addition, a para lle l l i f e ,  as i t  were, to  the vulgar one."
( 'SheJley', p.249) • And in 'Persons and Places’ , (1944) he describes the 
Church music he heard as a young man: " I t  transports: the means may be at 
times inferior, but the end is att.' ined. The end is to escape into another 
world, to live freely for a while in a medium made by us and f it  for us to 
live in ."(?P,p.172)
Possibly, and one must stress the tentativeness o f the suggestion, 
Santayana had f ir s t  come across the assimilation of music to mathematics 
in Io tze : "We often hear quoted the saying that architecture is  frozen 
music: hence I  have some hope o f gaining a modicum o f undying fame by 
taking a step further and ca llin g  mathematics desslcated music, ’’’or what 
element of music does mathematics lack except the liv in g  sound?" ('M icro- 
coomus* ,v.2,p.442)
(13) HA,p.239
(14) c f. SB, pp.79-33
(15) HA,p.240
(16) op. e it . , p.241
(17) ibid
(13) o p .d t . , p.242
(19») op .c it. , p.243. The delightfulness o f the formal properties o f music 
is a theme foreshadowed in 'Interpretations of Poetry and .e lig io n ': 
"...m usic, for a l l  that i t  contains nothing of a material or 
practice!- nature, o ffers  a f ie ld  for tho development o f human 
faculty and presents laws and conditions which, within its  sphere, 
must be obeyed and whioh reward obedience with the keenest and 
purest pleasures." (IPrt,p.66)
(20) Hansllck, op.cit. ,ch.V, 'Musical Contemplation', pt salm.
(21) (A, p. 244
(22) Ibid
(23) op#oil*, pp.244^5
( 24) op. e i t . ,  p.245
(25*) Ibid. Very much the same point had been made ea r lie r  by rianslick, 
o f. op.clt.,pp.20sqq.
(26*) HA,p.245. Much the same point Is made In 'Egotism In German Phil­
osophy' .music is  the means o f giving form to  our inner feelings without 
attaching them to events or objects in the world. Music Is articu late, but 
articu late in a language which avoids, or at least v e ils , the articulation 
of the world we liv e  in . . "  (E3P,p.244)
(27*) RA,pp.245"*6. Much the same point, i t  w i l l  be recalled, is put for­
ward by Santayana a propos o f poetry. 3y uniting elements disparate 
except for a common overtone o f fee lin g , the poet can create new feelings: 
"Poets can..arouse sentiments fin er than any which they have known, and 
in the act o f composition become discoverers of new realms o f delight­
fulness and g r ie f . "  (IPii,pp. 133-4)
( 28) Cooke,op.olt. , p.112: 'The Characterising Agents'.
(29) Hanslick, o p .c it . , p .54
(30) HA,p.246
(31) op. e i t . ,  p.247
(32) op. c i t . ,  pp. 247-3
(33) op. o i t . , p.248
(34) o f. Ianger PNK,pp.233-5; TF,pp.39-40, and her la test work: 'Mind: An 
Essay on Human Reeling ', v . I , (1967),pp.30-l
(35) This point is made also by W. Charlton: 'A esth etics ', Hutchinson, 
pp. 26—7
(36) linger,PNK,p.238; o f. FP,p.55 on the variable emotional colourings 
taken on by fo lk  songs and hymn tunes.
(37) langer, PIT,p.113
(38) op .o lt.,p .l2 9
(39) HA, pp. 248-50
( 40) op. c i t . , p.250
U77)
U78)
(A l) op.eit.,p.251  
(A2) op. o it . ,p. 252
(A3*) op.cit.,p .253. Duron points out that, in general, "La notion 
santay&nienne de la  musique est a insi à l'oppose/ de ce lle  qui soutenait le 
pessimisme sohonenhauerien," (Duron,p.365) since fo r ;antayana the material 
o f art is l i f e  as i t  is , and the function o f art is  to make that l i f e  better. 
(AA*) WD,pp.138-9. Another dismissal of music occurs in 'The Sense o f 
Bèauty'. There he writes that music, while the purest and most impressive 
o f the arts, is  the least human and Instructive of them. While the world 
o f sound can s t ir  us deeply, yet, " i t  has proved the less serviceable and 
constant apparition."(SB,p.56) No expansion is  provided fo r this moat 
sweeping o f condemnations.
(A5) BA,p.238
(A6*) o p .c lt . , p.255. Cf.pp.26A»-5 fo r the same point, and IC5,p.65. The 
doctrine here assumed -  that, language was in it ia l ly  undeliberated s e l f -  
expression -  is applied by Santayana in his theory of prayers "..th e  fund 
o f words and phrases latent in the mind flow out under stress of emotion; 
they flow because they belong to  the situation, because they f i l l  out and 
complete a perception absorbing the mind; they do not flow primarily to 
be listened to."(.Bil,p.30) Santayana considers prayer to be such a use of 
language. Its  nature is  misconceived, in his view, i f  i t  is assimilated to 
dialogue.
As to  the influences on 'Santayana's view o f language, commentators 
disagree. Duron considers that views such as Santayana puts forward have 
been common in psycholo^r since Condillac and Hamilton, (Duron, p .3A l), 
while SeTior Tida, on the other hand, asserts a debt to  Wilhelm von Mumbolt, 
and claims sim ilarity o f views with Bergson (in  'Matière et Mémoire'), 
Tanduberg, Cassirer, and Welsberger. (Llda,pp.85-6;p.96)
(A7) BA,p.255 
(A3) op.oit.,p.256 
(A9) ibid
(479)
(50*) ib id . The same views are put forward lr> la te works, indicating that 
Santayana did not change his mind on the point: e f. 'Some Meanings o f the 
Word "Is",p .279; 3AF,pp.198-9} 'Cries and l ames', TOM’ ,pp. 107-8; 
pp. 109-10 and D?, Bk.I, ^ .3 ,  chs. 3 and 4» passim.
(51) ÍU, p.257
(52) o p .d t . , p.258
(53*) I,ida appears to suggest the Influence o f Vico on these doctrines:
"El hombre -  dice Santayana con palabras que recuerdan las de la  'Scienza 
! uova' -  empieza por imaginar poéticamente e l mundo, y  analiza despue's y 
comprueba científicamente lo  Imaginado." (Lida,p.92) Tr. "Man -  remarks 
Santayana in words which reca ll those o f the • Scienza 1'uova1 -  begins by 
conceiving the world with a poetic imagination, then analyses and ve r ifie s  
what has been imagined."
(54*) HA,p.260. These doctrines are foreshadowed in 'The Sense o f Beauty', 
C h .Ill, sub-section, 'Form in Words'. Music is the primary side o f 
language, which has to be controlled by u t i l i t y  i f  i t  is to be helpful in 
coping with experience, ""hough representative to a degree, i t  always 
colours its  subject-matter with its  own p rop erties :".. .language is  primar­
i l y  a sort o f music, and the beautiful e ffects  which i t  produces are due 
to its  own structure, giving, as i t  crysta llises in a new fashion, an 
unforeseen form to  experience."(33 ,p.130)
(55) HA,p.262
(56) op .c it. ,pp, 262-3
(57) HSe,p.132
(58») The non-coincidence o f gram atical and metaphysical categories is 
noted also by Lida, p.93, note 1.
(59“ ) HA,p.263. The same point is  remade much la te r  in 'The Realm of 
Truth' (p .33). As so often, Oantayana did not modify his views on language.
(60) HA,p.264
(61) o p .d t .  , p.265
(62») The same idea o f the foreshortening o f experience by language recurs
(62*, ctd .) In 'Soliloquies in England and Later Soliloqu ies ' (1922):
"Every idea o f sense or science is  a summary sign, on a d iffe ren t plane and 
scale altogetner irom nne d iffu se material facts vrtiicn i t  covers: one 
unexampled colour fo r many rays, one indescribaole note fo r  many vibrations 
one picture fo r many particles o f  paint, one word fo r a series o f noises 
or le tte rs . A word is a very Platonic thing: you cannot say when i t  begins 
when i t  ends, how long i t  la sts , nor where i t  ever is ; and yet i t  is  the 
only unit you mean to  utter, or normally hear. Platonism is  the intuition 
o f essences in the presence of things, in order to describe them: i t  is 
mind its e lf ." (S K I3 ,p.252) And more generally, the Intuition of essences 
is  assumed in the doctrine o f l i t e r a l  and symbolic knowledge, the central 
doctrine o f the epistemology o f Santayana's la te r  philosophy in the 
iealms of Being.
(63) HA,p.266
(64) op .cit. , pp.266-7
(65) op .c it.,p p .267-8; same point on pp.316-7
(66) .{A,p.269
(67) op .c it. , p.269
(68) op.cit.,p.270
( 69* ) op.cit.,p.271. he phrasing o f th is passage, far more so than of 
the corresponding passages in 'Interpretations o f  Poetry and le lig ion '
(c f .  Ch. V, above) suggest an analogy with Nietzsche's analysis of the 
DionysLac and Apollonian components in Greek thought. In Nietzsche's view, 
the Apollonian consciousness o f the Greek, the ordered world of individ­
uals, was merely a thin v e il hiding from him the whole Dionysiac realm. 
There is  an obvio is sim ilarity between Apollonian consciousness, and what 
Santayana would c a ll ordinary experience on the one hand, and Oionysiac 
intoxication and the chaos of immediate experience on the o ther.(e f. 
i’ ietzsche: 'The Birth of Tragedy', esp. oh .II) Santayana almost certainly 
knew Nietzsche's work by this time. Whether there is a deot is impossible 
to  say with certainty; but the s im ila rity  is notable.
(4-81)
(70) HA, p.272
(71*) op. c i t . ,  p.278. The same theme of the fa ls ity  o f poetic language is 
present in several la te works. Yet again, uantayana did not change his
opinion on th is point: c f. 3£LS,no.4.5, 'Occam's a zo r '; SAP,pp.130 and
220-1; -iM,p.306
(72) HA,p.277
(73) o p .c it . , p.278
(74) ibid
(75) op.cit.,p .279
(76) op .cit. ,p.281
(77») o p .c it . , p.280. The same point that poetry is  an interest o f  youth 
reappears again in the la te  ' iealm of Essence', p.xxi.
(73) 3A,p.231
(79) op .cit.,p .233
(80) op .cit.,p .284
(81) ibid
(82) op .cit.,p .287
(83) o p .c it . , p.288 
(AO o p .c it . , p .239
(85*) op .cit.,p .289 and pp.344-5. 3« ntayana expr esses the same point six
years la te r in the conclusion o f 'Three Philosophical Poets' (1910). The 
ideal o f rational art consists f i r s t ly  in having a comprehensive knowledge 
of the world, and secondly in expressing the ideals implied by our actions. 
The ideal rational poet, "should l iv e  in the continual presence o f a l l  
experience, and respect i t ;  he should at the same time understand nature, 
the ground o f that experience, and he should have a delicate sense fo r the 
ideal echoes o f his own passions, and fo r a l l  the colours o f his possible 
happiness." (TPP,p. L42)
( *>) RA,pp.273-4
(87*) o p .c it . , p.233, A good deal o f work remains to be done on the influ­
ence which this ideal o f poetry, and 'antayana's philosophy in general,
(87*, e td .) had on some major American poets, notably Wallace Stevens and 
William Carlos Williams. That Stevens had a great respect fo r  Santayana 
is  common coin among scholars o f uhe poet; and parallels in b e lie f and 
imagery have been drawn between the writings o f the two men. (c f . ,e .g .
^rank Dog?ett: 'Steven's Poetry o f Thought', passim and A. Valton t i t s :  
'Tntroaoeetive Voyager: The Poetic development of Wallace Stevens',pp.
275 sqq.) Again, Stevens' admiration fo r Santayana is  evident in his poem, 
'To an Old Philosopher in Pome.'
In m as yet unpublished paper, Professor iichard Kuhns argues that 
Stevens was sp ec ifica lly  influenced by the ideal of rational poetry, ^or 
Stevens, the perfect ooet is  the man who has mastered rea lity : he has had 
time enough to  think, and to sum us up. The fee lin g  which attends mastery 
o f rea lity  is peace and quiescence. Certainly, Stevens shared with 
Santayana the notion of the breadth o f v is ion  o f the supreme or rational 
poet; and Stevens' general admiration fo r Santayana lends probability to 
the claim of influence here. (?uhns: 'The fic t io n  that te3ult3 frtra TeelingQ 
As uhns would be the f i r s t  to admit, however, the subject demands a 
detailed investigation which i t  has not yet received; and the same is  true 
in the case o f Williams.
(88) PP,n.118
(39) op .cit.,op .l52-3
(90) MS,p.l6
(91») Passages o f  architectural critic ism  in Santayana's works, ( i . e .  as 
distinct from remarks on the aesthetics o f architecture.)
PP,p.LA7: on tusk in; pp.173-4: on the plans of basilicas; pp.219-20: 
cathedrals and churches in Saragossa;
MS,p.3: baroque und rococo in Oresden
HW 1.22-5: the chapel o f King's College Cambridge (c f .  his poem Inspired 
by its  stained glass: ' ing 's College Chapel, an E legy', rlr s t  printed In 
• The Harvard Monthly',v.26,no.1, March 1893,pp.1-5? repr. In The Triton 
Edition, v .I,pp .265-9 .);pp .50-1: dorlc temples at Paeatum; p.56: the
U82)
(¿83)
(91*, c td .) cathedral at Syracuse; pp.59-62: r gyptian architecture and the 
Pyramids; pp.71 sqq, s The Parthenon, the Prechtheum, and then the cathedral
at St. Sophia; pp, 160-1; contrast of the sp ir its  o f Venice and .tome, via 
th e ir  architecture.
-Iso: 'English Architecture’ (3ELS,no.20) for generalised history and 
description o f that subject; and ’ Towers’ (written between 1912 and 1920; in 
BR) -  praise for the tower of the Palazzo Vecehio in Florence, and a 
comparison o f G iotto ’ s campanile fo r Florence cathedral with the Oiralda of 
S e v ille , to  the advantage o f t  he la tte r .
I t  should be added that a few further points o f architectural aes­
thetics -  presupposing the philosophy o f the Realms of Being -  are dealt 
w ith in Chapter IX, below.
(92*) Writers on Santayana's aesthetics either pass over the section on 
architecture in silence, or content themselves with the brie fest o f c r it ­
icisms. Duron condenses a l l  Santayana's remarks on painting, architecture, 
and sculpture into four pages of uncritical exposition (pp.365-8); Ashmore 
devotes or.e paragraph to  architecture (p.62), and there is  no systematic 
discussion of architecture in either Arnett or Singer.
(93) HA,p.290
(94) op .o it. ,p.291
(95) o p .c It ., p.292
(96) ibid
(?7) o p .c it . , p.293
(98) o p .c it . , p.294
(99) ibid
(100) ibid
(101) op.cit.,p.195
(102) op.cit.,p.295
(103) o p .e lt . , p.196
(104*) ib id . Several o f the themes o f this chapter on architecture are 
adumbrated in 'The Sense o f Beauty', (1396)« ( i )  that adventitious e ffects
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(485)
(129) op.olt.,pp.305-7
(130) Santayana, •’’’he Human Seale ' ,  SFLS,p.73
(131) op.clt.,p.77
(132) ’ riedrich  S illy : 'Notes on a Sketch fo r a Memorial Monument to 
Friedrich the Great', In Holt,III,p .259
(133) Quatremere de Quincy: 'An H istorical Notice on Ohalgrin', from
' Hecueil de Notices Hlstorlque lue dans les seances publiques de l'Aoademie 
Hoyale ues Beaux A rts ', in H olt,III,p .263
(134) :<A,p.309
(135) op.clt• ,p.310
(136») ib id . I t  is worth pointing out, in view o f Santayana's change to 
formalism in the theory o f beauty (o f .  Ch.I above and Ch.IX, below), that 
these remarks on illu s tra tion  would be sympathetically received by form­
a lis ts  lik e  Sell and Fry. Hell, for example, regards representation as a 
drawback in art, fo r  obvious reasons: in representational a rt, the 
spectator is lik e ly  to look at the form as an linage, rather than fo r  i t s e l f  
He would therefore agree with Santayana's view that in illu stra tion , the 
in tellectua l element dominates the aesthetic in a rt . Whether these 
remarks in ' leason in A rt' are the f ir s t  indication o f a change in Santay­
ana's attitude to fora 1ism is  however verydoubtfu l: they are quite 
isolated, and not paralleled by remarks in works produced in the years 
between ' tea eon in Art' and the formalist paper, 'The Mutability of 
Aesthetic Sategories.' (1925) (Once again, cf.Ch.IX, below)
(137) SB,p.22
(138) HA,p.311
(139) op .e it .,p p .311-2 
(14<G) o p .c it . , p.313 
(H I )  ibid
(H 2) op.cit. ,pp.313-4 
(H 3) op .cit.,p .3H  
(H4) ibid
U86)
(145*) o p .o lt ., p.312. Cf. ' l  i t e r a l  and Symbolic Knowledge' (1918)i "Were 
a representation a complete reproduction -  did the statue breath, walk, 
and think -  i t  would no longer represent anything: i t  would be no symbol,
but simply one more thing, in transitive and unmeaning, lik e  everything not 
made to be in terpreted ."(op .cit. ,p.321)
(146) Felson Goodman: 'languages o f  « r t ',p p .3-5
(147) D.C. Barrett, S.J., review o f Goodman, op .cit. ,ln  'B r it ish  Journal 
fo r  the hilosophy of Science',22 (May, 1971),p.l94
(148) Richard Bernheimer: 'The Fature o f Representation: A Phenomeno­
log ica l Enquiry', p. 126
(149) Richard Wollheim : 'Art and Its  Objects', section 13.
(150) W. Charlton: ' Aesthetics ',pp .55-6
(151) c f. Paul " I f f :  'Art and the "Object o f A rt", in Elton,pp.170 sqq.
(152) ¡A, p.317
(153) ibid
(154) op.cit. ,pp.317-3
(155) o p .c it ., p.313
(156) Benvenuto Cellini: Letter to Benedetto Varchi, published by Varehi 
in his "Cue lezzloni", Florence, 1549. In Holt, II,p.35
(157*) ¡A,p.318. The same point Is lade In Santayana's piper, 'Sculpture',
(1908) p. 108.
(158*) ’.'inkelmann earns Santayana's praise fo r having grasped the authent­
ic it y  o f Greek sculpture, which responded to a genuine need in the Greek 
mind: " . . i f  his sense for the chained monsters in the Greek soul was 
inadequate, (he) was at le ' st in real sympathy with what had inspired 
Greek sculpture, love and knowledge o f the human body In the l i f e ,  made 
gentle by discipline and kept strong by tra in ing." EGP, p.231# footnote. 
(159*) <A,p.319. The 3ame dismissal of a l l  but Greek sculpture occurs in 
pieces written both before and a fte r  • ieason in A rt '. In 'The Sense o f 
Beauty’ a l l  post-Gree c sculpture Is c lass ified  as part o f a decline into 
either empty convention or taste less and unimaginative technique. In the
(159*» c td .) paper, 'Sculpture', a l l  modern sculpture la condemned as 
Inauthentic.
( Sri,p. 119; 'sciu.pture',pp. 103-4)
(163) 'Soulpture' , p.110
(161) op. c i t . , p.135
( 162) ibid
(163) op.cit.,pp.105-6
( 164) op. a lt. ,p. 106
(165) ibid
(166) Ibid
(167) Ibid
(168) o p .c it . , p.109
(169) ibid
(170) op .cit. ,p. 108
(171) op.cit.,p .109
(172) Santayana: Ievlev o f Bernard Berenson: 'The Florentine w in ters of 
The Ita lian  Benals3anoe' , In 'The Psychological Review', (1396), p.678
(173) Berenson: 'The Ita lian  painters o f the tennaissance',p. 53
(174) Berenson,op.cit.,p.55
(175) Ibid
(176) Santayana, teview o f Berenson,p.678
(177) ¡A, p.320
(178) ibid
(179) op. c it. ,p. 321
(180) ibid
(181) o p .c it ., p.322
(182) op.alt.,p.323
( 183) ibid
(184») ibid. Santayana's attitude to landscape had mellowed a l i t t l e  by 
the time he came to write ' teason in A rt '.  In his discussion o f landscape
(488)
(184*, c td .) In 'The Sense o f 3eauty', discussed In Ch.ITI, above, he 
condemns ' in  to to 1 both re a lis t ic  5,nd impressionistic landscape. He 
mellowed iurtiaer in in is  respect as ne grew older, in nis autooiography, he 
writes: " I t  is not tru e ...th a t aerial e ffects  in Turner's landscapes are 
exaggerated and melodramatic, lature in nglard and elsewhere -  for 
instance in Venice -  is  often like that, or even tore emphatic; and the 
delicacy with which burner preserves the special character and melody of 
the parts in the midst o f thst vio lent ensemble, shows a sincere love o f 
nature and l i f e  and a devout in»ginntion." (PP,p.243)
(185) <A,pp. 323-4
(136) op. c i t . , p.324
(187) c f. Kenneth Clark: 'Landscape into Art', passim; Max J. Friedlcnder: 
•Landscape. Portrait. S t i ll  L ife , ' pp.11-153.
(188*) :<A,pp.325-6. I t  is perhaps worth asking why Santayana should spend 
so comparatively l i t t l e  time and space on the discussion o f painting. The 
reason may be nothing more than that he was rather near-sighted, and could 
not 3ee w ell enough to enjoy paintings properly. His friend Cory reports 
a remark o f Berenson, to the e ffe c t that, "Santayana was as blind as a 
bat and never saw a picture." Cory is  inclined to agree with this and 
writes o f Santayana, describing the lim itations imposed on him by his 
sight: "My old friend could enjoy large patterns of vivid colour -  stained- 
glass windows, for example, in the tw iligh t o f great, cathedrals. Perhaps 
the visual world fo r Santayana was more like the canvas o f a Monet: 
splashes o f ligh t on vague blocks of seductive colour." (Cory: »"antayana: 
The la te r  Y ears ',p .51.)
Notes to Chapter VIIIt >rt and 'oral tty
( 1 ) Tolstoys 1'Vhat
( 2) ibid
(3) op. c i t . , p. 176
(4) op .cit. ,p.,177
(5) op. c it .  ,p.,231
(489 )
(6 ) o f. A.0. Bradley: " 3oetry fo r Poetry's Sake' In »Oxford Lectures on 
Poetry' ,pp. 11-12
(7) Oscar Wilde, 'The C ritic  as A r t is t ',  Page re fs , to the text o f
' Intentions' in licherd Ellmaq, ed. s 'The A rtist as C ritic « C r it ic a l Writings 
o f Oscar W ild e ',p .393
( 9) o p .c it . , p.394
(9 ) op.cit.,p .381
( 10) o p .c it . , p.380
( 1 1 ) ibid
(12) Oscar Wilde: Preface to 'The Picture of Dorian Cray' in Kllman,op.cit.,
p.236
(13*) ib id . Cautier had made the same point in 1835« "...un  l iv r e  ne fa it  
pas de la soupe a la  gélatine -  un roman n 'est pas une paire de bottes 
sans couture; un sonnet, une seringue a je t  continu; un drame n 'est pas 
un chemin de fe r , toutes choses essentiellement c iv ilisan tes, e t  faisant 
marcher 1 ' human lte/dans la voie du progrès." 'Preface» to 'Mademoiselle de 
Maupin' ,p.28
(14) Wilde, The C ritic  as A r t is t ' In :llman,op.cit.,pp.379-80; c f  the 
attack on ^ola In 'The Decay of Lying', Ellman,op.cit. , pp.296-7
(15) op .c it. , p.364
(16) op.cit.,p.299
(17) HA,p.333
(18) o p .c it . , p.334
(19) op .c it .,p p .334-5
(21) op .c it .,p p .335-6
(21*) In the text, Sontayana writes, of the '.tepublie', 3k.X« "This 
reasoning has been l i t t l e  understood, because Platonists so soon lost sight 
o f their master's Cocratie habit and moral intent. They turned the good 
into an existence, making i t  thereby unmeaning. laoo's d ia lec tic , i f  we 
do not thus abolish the force o f it s  terms, is perfectly cogent.. . " (  tt,p.
335)
(490)
(22) S3,p.27
(23) iA,p.336
(24») op .cit.,p .329. Santayana retained th is  view on the propriety o f a
moral evaluation o f art o f th is kind until at least 1916. In a review 
published in that year ('Two etional M ora lists ') Santayana praises John 
Erskine (in  the la tte r 's  works 'The Moral Obligation to be Intel. H gen t',
Duffield and Co., few York, 1915) fo r correcting ''another error o f the 
recent p a s t . . . ( i . e . )  the notion that the aesthetic realm is  absolute and 
sacrosanct and that there a man must reduce himself to  an abstract sen- 
sorium, without in te lle c t, conscience, or a righ t to be deafened, bored, or 
disgusted. A work that is merely esthetic is  indeed esthetic, but that 
grammatical assignation to i t s  class is  no t i t l e  of honor. The esthetic 
nay not be worth looking a t, and the man who in certain instances thinks 
i t  worth looking at may not deserve to be a liv e . " (op .c it. , in ¿iFSL,pp.352-3.) 
(25*) Writers on Santayana's aesthetics have in general confined themselves 
to uncritical exposition o f the closing chapters of ' Season in Art's o f. 
Duron,pp.368—73; Ashmore,pp.65-9; L id a ,P t.I I; Arnett, ch .T II. Ho fa r  as 
I  know, the only w riter to stress adequately Santayana's insistence that 
the value o f a rt is in principle subject to moral scrutiny is Professor 
Andrew J. keck, in his paper 'The Authority o f Morality over Aesthetics in 
Santayana's Dhilosophy'. ''h lle  he quite co rrectly  exposits Santayana's 
views on the matter, Professor keck does not, howeve-, provide any comment­
ary.
(26») HA,p.330. I t  w i l l  become clear from the text o f the chapter that 
Santayana is  fa r  from maintaining internal consistency in his views on art 
and morality. I t  is paradoxical thrt his f i r s t  argument supposedly defend­
ing art consists in e ffe c t  in the assertion that at least art can do no 
damnge to  l i f e  since i t  has no influence on i t .  Such a view is reminiscent 
o f iautier, o p .c it . , p.26: "Je ne sals qui a d it  je  ne sais oil, que la 
litte ra tu re  et les arts influenaient sur les moeurs. Qui que ce so it, c 'e s t  
indubitablement un grand s o t. .. Ia regence a fa i t  Crebillon, ce n 'est pas
(491)
(26», c td .) Crebillon qui a fa it  la regence#
(27) RA, p .m
(28) op .e lt.,pp .330-1
(29) op.olt.,p.331
(30) Ibid
(31) op,cit.,p.332
(32») op.cit.,p.333. ;arae point:pp.365-6 and 371-2. -elated points occur 
elsewhere in *168800 in » r t ' ,  e.g. the thesis, discussed in Ch. V II, above, 
that music is a world apart, and that the experience i t  provides makes us 
fam iliar with perfection. Perfection then comes to  be desired in other 
areas o f l i f e .
(33) ttt,p.338
(34*) ibid. A remark in a le t te r  written very la te  in Santayana * s l i f e  
indicates that he continued to maintain, not only that art is subject to 
moral scrutiny but that the pursuit o f the morally good is  in some sense 
an art: * I should not destroy anything aesthetica lly  good. The beautiful 
is  a part o f the moral} and the truly moral is a part o f the beautiful: 
only they must not be mixed wrong, any more than sweets and savouries." 
( le t te r  to Martin Sirrbaum, 22.1.1947. Tetters,p.365.)
(35) RA,pp.340—1
(36) op. c i t . , p.341
(37) op.cit.,p.342 
( 3 3 )  op .c it. p.341 
(39) op.cit.,p.342 
(AO) ibid
(43.) Ibid
(42) o p .c it ., p.343
(43) ibid
(AA*) o p .c it ., p.339. The point concerning the amount o f time it  is ration­
a l to a llo t  to art in the l i f e  of each individual is  remaoe in 'Scepticism 
and animal ’alth' (1923) 1 "Which arts and sciences are worth pursuing, and 
how far, is a question fo r  the moralist, to be answered in each case in
1U92)
(44*, e td .) view o f the facu lties and genius o f the person concerned, and 
their opportunities." (op .cit.,p .273 )
(-45) <A* p.358
(46) Ibid
(-47) op .c it. , P.359
(48) ibid
(49) op .c it. , pp. 360-1
(50) op .c it. , P.361
(51) op .c it . , p.362
(52) ibid
(53) op .c it. , P.363
(54) op .c it. , p.364
(55")I op .c it . , p.3655 1
harmonies are real enough but not integrated into the L ife  of eason is 
taken up b r ie f ly  in ' ieason in te lig ion *. Santayana writes that sense is 
"capable o f many refinements by which physical existence be comes its  own 
reward. In the disciplined play o f  fancy which the fine arts afford , the 
mind's free  action ju s t ifie s  i t s e l f  and becomes in tr in s ica lly  de ligh tfu l." 
(ftfi,p.l55) 3ut these episodes are a l l  too often episodes in a l i f e  which 
is  irra tion a l, i .e .  a l i f e  which is  disorganised, and from which s e lf-  
knowledge is  absent.
(56) !<A,p.365
(57) o p .e i t . , p.366
(58) o p .o it . , p.367
(59) op .c it .,p p .367-8
(60) op .c it . ,p.36d
(61) o p .e i t . , p.369
(62) op .c it . ,p .370
(63) o p .c i t . , p.372
( 64) ibid
U92)
(44-*» ctd .) view o f  the facu lties  and genius of the person concerned, and 
their opportunities." ( o p .c it . , p.273)
U5) xAf p* 358
(¿6) ibid
U7) op .cit. , P.359
(48) ibid
(49) op. c it . , pp. 360-1
(50) op. c it . , P.361
(51) op .c it. , p.362
V
T
n ibid
(53) op. c it . , p. 363
(54) op .cit. , p.364
(55*) op .cit. , p.3^5; o f. also pp.361 and 371-2. The theme that aesthetic 
harmonies are rea l enough but not integrated into the L ife  o f eason is 
taken up b r ie fly  in  • ¿eason in ie llg io n '. gantayana writes that sense is 
■capable o f many refinements by which physical existence becomes its  own 
reward. In the d iscip lined play o f fancy which the fine arts a fford , the 
mind's free action Justifies i t s e l f  and beoomes in tr in s ica lly  d e ligh tfu l." 
(ftK,p.l55) 3ut these episodes are a l l  too often episodes in a l i f e  which 
is  irra tiona l, i . e .  a l i f e  which is  disorganised, and from which s e lf-  
knowledge is  absenb.
(56) HA,, p.365
(57) op« c it . , p.366
(58) op« c it . , p.367
(59) op« c it . , pp. 367-8
(60) op. c it . , p.368
(61) op« c it . , P.369
( 62) op. c it . , P.370
(63) op. c it . , P.372
( 64) ibid
(65) o p .o it . , pp.373-4
( 66) o p .o it . , p.357
(67) o p .o it . , p.346
( 68) op. c l t . , p.347
(69) op. 0 i t . ,  pp. 346-7
(70) o p .o it . , p.347
(71) op/d,t.,p. 348
(72) op. c i t . , p.349
(73) ibid
(74) ibid
(75) ibid
(76) o p .o it . , p.350
(77) ibid
(78) op. 0i t . , p.351
(79) op.oit.,p .352
(80) ibid
(31») o p .o it . , p.353. Similar views on criticism  appear in the 1904 papers 
•What is  Aesthetics?*,OS,pp.28-9. (See the Introduction to the present 
thesis, where part o f the relevant passage is quoted.)
(82) IA,p.353.
(83*) There is a sense in which moral terms can be predioated o f these 
works, e. g. i t  Is perfec tly  proper to 3ay that they are sincere, honest, 
a ti.entio, etc. 3ut th is does not a ffe c t the point in hand. Since: ity , for 
example, is not a moral content conveyed by these works.
( 84*) At one ooint in •Scepticism and Animal ’a i th '(1923), Santayana makes 
claims along the3 lin es . The 'mainspring of fic tion , and i t s  popular 
charm" lie s  in the fact that i t  releases "capab ilities  in one's own soul 
which one's personal fortunes may have l e f t  undeveloped...The illu sion  o f 
projecting one's own thoughts inter remote or Imaginary characters is  only 
ha lf an illu sion : these thoughts were never there, but they were always 
here, or knocking at the gate; and there is  an Indirect v ic tory  in reaohing
U93)
(494)
(8^*» c td .) and positing elsewhere, in on e x p lic it  form, the l i f e  which 
accident denied ie, and thereby enjoying i t  'sub rosa' In spite o f  fa te.
And there are many experiences which are to lerab le only in th is dreamlike 
form, when their consequences are negligeable and their vehemence is 
re lieved  by the distance at which they appear, and by the show they make." 
(3A?,p.231) But th is is  not a thought which Santayana develops.
, otes to Chapter 1 Aesthetics '¡nd the ,ealm3 of Being! Later Writings 
on Aesthetics
(1 *) I t  is  interesting to  note in this connexion that Santayana is  reported 
to  have said that he wrote his books in the reverse order to that which a 
systematic exposition demands: " I  should have written my last ones f i r s t  
and the f ir s t  ones l a s t . . . I  should have dea lt with cosmic things f ir s t ,  
because they are not as d i f f ic u lt  as human problems which I  could handle 
better now that X have read more and had more experience."(Quoted by Van 
Meter .roes: 'Proust and Santayana',p.71)
(2*) Major papers on the la te r  epistemology ( fu l l  deta ils in bibliography):
(а) 'L ite ra l and Symbolic Knowledge', (1913); (b) 'Three Proofs o f kealiam', 
(1920); (c ) 'The Vnknowable', (1923) and (d ) 'Some Meanings o f the Word,
" I s " ',(19 24 ).
(3 *) synoptic stateinent o f these doctrines by Santayana himself was 
brought to  ligh t by Cory. Gf. Santayana's essay: 'On Metaphysical Proj­
ection, ' in IHW.
(4 ) In tro , to 1942 one vo l. edn. o f t3,p.xxvi; c f. IiT,pp.47-8
(5 ) One vol edn. o f HB.p.xxvii
(б ) KE,p.l9
(7 ) op .c lt.,pp . 19-20
(8 ) o p .c l t . , pp.21-2
(9 ) o p .c i t . , pp.24-5
(10) o p .c lt . , pp.24-5
(11) op .c it . ,p .36; o f.pp .39-90
(12) op .o lt.,p .70
mam «1
( 13 ) op. e i t .  ,pp.89-99
(14) op .e it .,p p .77-8
(15) op.cit.,pp.92-4
(16*) This experiential theory of the 'a  p r io r i' possibly shows the 
influence o f Herbert Spencer and/or William James. Soencer's very sim ilar 
view is  set out in his 'The Principles o f Psychology', eg. section 197, 
discussing Kant's doctrine o f the forms of perception. James argues fo r 
the physiological ground o f log ica l necessity in ch. XXVIII of his 
'P r in cip les o f Psychology', a point Santayana noted in his review o f the 
work. (C f. repr. o f the review in IHV,pp. 100-1) I t  is worth adding that 
as early  as hi3 doctoral student days, Santayana had espoused the view that 
lo g ica l principles have a psychological orig in , o f. his marginalia on 
Lotae's 'Logik 's " lo g ic  forces us to admit the psychological nature o f 
lo g ic " . (LSP,p.99)
(17) di.pp. 118-20
(18) o p .c i t . , pp.120-1
(19) op .c it.,pp . 127-30
( 20) op .c it.,pp . 139-41
(21*) o p .c it .,p p .50-53. I t  is  perhaps worth adding a b r ie f note to  explain 
why Santayana should assert, apparently nonsensically, that pure Being 
could be mis identified  with nothing. The problem disappears i f  nothingness 
is taken to be the same as non-existence. Essences are non-existent, and 
so in th is sense could be iden tified  with nothingness. The point Santayana 
wants to ¡lake is  that essences, while non-existent, yet have being, and 
so are not nothing in the s tr ic t  sense o f that term, which would exclude 
them from any ontological status whatever.
(22) HE, pp. 45-6
(23) op .c it. ,pp.49-50
(24) op .o it. ,p.57
(25) o p .c it .,p p .60-63
I
(495)
(26) e f. 'Three Proofs o f dealism' In A?SL,pp. 175-6, footnote 3
(27) From Hartshorne, 'Santayana's Doctrine o f Essence', Hehilppjpp.163-9 
(28*) Hartshorne, op .o it .,p . 156. Gf. other criticism s o f essence in the 
fo llow ing (see.bibliography for d e ta ils ):  ( i )  Aeviey o f 'The ;ealm o f 
Essence by Collingvood; ( i i )  newey: 'Philosophy as a 7ine A rt ' (another 
review of the same work.); ( i i i )  Donald C. Williams: 'O f Essence and 
Existence in Santayana'; ( iv )  Mary W. Galkins: 'On Certain D ifficu lt ie s  in 
the Modern Doctrine o f Essence'; (v ) fo r  a defence o f the doctrine o f 
essence, c f. D.W. P ra ll: 'Essences and Hniversala'.  recently unearthed
MSS fragments, uncollected papers and rejected draft passages on the concept 
o f essence by Santayana are now availab le in Lachs AFSL, P t . I I I  and POML,
(496)
P t . I I I .
(29*) iough drafts and MSS fragments relating to  Santayana's concept of 
matter and associated natural philosophy are now availab le in !achs, POML,
Ft. IT. Among these are several rejected chapters on causation, a subject 
on which there is  no chapter in the published version o f •’’’he iealm of Matted 
■"here are further pieces on natural philosophy by Fantaynna in AFSL, P t . I I ;  
a lso the essays ( i )  'Human Symbols for Matter' (in  IHW) and ( i i )  'Appear­
ance and i,ea lity '(in  3!i). Santayana was defending the concept o f matter 
as early  as his thesis on Iotae, c f . LSP,pp.l6l-2. Santayana's material­
ism is  discussed by W.H. Dennes (in  Schilpp); John Lachs, 'Matter and 
Substance in the Philosophy o f Santayana' end J.H. tandall, j r . ,  'The 
latent Idealism o f a M ateria list ' . ( a review o f 'The Kealm o f M atter'.)
(30) KM, p.192
(31) op. c i t . , p. 199
(32) o p .c it . , pp.231-2
(33) op .c it .,p p .239-90
(34*) op .cit.,p .324. The notion o f the psyche i3 discussed also in the 
essay 'The Psyche' in SETS, Cf. also T3p. ,pp.15-16
(35) KM, p.343
(36) o p .c it .,p o .214-5
(37) o o .o it . ,p p .217-8
(38*) I t  took Santayana eight years t o  produce 'The <ealm o f Truth', the 
snortest o f Ule four volumes o f The calms o f Being'. "he brevity end 
lack o f novelty of the book, together with the absence o f MSS and other 
essays on the subject, suggest that tru th  was a problem to which Santayana 
"ound i t  d i f f ic u lt  to address himself. I t  is  worth remembering also that, 
as o r ig in a lly  conceived, 'The Realms o f Being' was to  consist o f thj e 
volumes only. The decision to include a volume on truth came re la t iv e ly  
la te in the working out of the system.
(39) ¡T ,p .vi. Quoted from COOS.
(4.0) iT ,p .vi. Quoted from COOS.
(41) IT ,p .v i i i .  Quoted from SAP
(42) R T ,p .v iii. Quoted from RE
(43) -iSp.p.vii} c f . PSI,pp. 188-90, and 'The Prestige of the In f in ite ',  
p.241. On s p ir it  in general, c f. a lso the MSS recently printed in POMP,
Pt. IV.
(44) i.;p.pp.9-ll
(45) o p .o i t . ,p . l l
(46) op. c it . ,pp. 13-14
(47) on. c it .  ,pp. 42-4
(48*) This is the doctrine o f l i t e r a l  and symbolio knowledge, set out in 
the paper with that t i t l e  (c f .  note 2» ,  above,) and presupposed throughout 
the volumes o f the Realms o f Being.
(49) '¡Sp. ,p.92
( 50) ibid
(51) op. e it . ,pp. 109-11
(52) op .c it. ,pp. 106-7
(53*) ’’’he other late writings referred to are: 'Platonism and the Spiritual 
l i f e ' (1927) 5 'A Long Way lound to f'irvana' (1923) 5 'The Prestige of the 
Infinite* (1932) j 'Ultimate elig ion '(1933 ) and 'fhe Idea o f Christ in the
U97)
(498)
(53*, ctd .) Cospela' (1946). Cf also the KS3 fra merits in  AFSL,pt.VI and 
POML, pt.V II
(>4) aop,p.H9j o f. '*  long Way touno to  nirvana1, op. 223-4
(55) RSp.,pp. 122-3
(56) op. c i t . , ppJ24-5
(57) op .cIt.,pp. 139-43
(58) op.nlt. ,»n .l65—6
(59*) op .cit.,pp . 137—3, of. p.210, where Santayana Interprets the Christian 
thesis that Christ .may come and dwell within us as a mythopoeic formal tion 
o f the sp iritual tru th  that peace and salvation can be attained only 
through detachment from the world. He la te r  devoted an entire book to  
Interpreting the gospels in th is way: 'The Idea of Christ in the Cospels.• 
On liberation , c f. a lso  PST , pp. 178-81; T>t.,pp.l45 sqq.
(60) ISp., p.195
(61) c f. op .olt. ,pp. 193-5, on the method o f liberation .
(62) op .clt. ,p.220
(63) op .clt. ,pp.253-4
(64) op .cit. ,pp.215 sqq., c f. a lso e .g .pp .256-7 and 'TJltiraate Telig ion ', 
pp.253-4
(65) c f. ISp., pp. 268—9
(66) o p .c lt . , p.271
(67) op. c i t . , pp. 245-6
(63) op .o lt.,p p .230-1
(69) op .cit. ,pp.232-3; c f. P3L,p.214l ,pp.l39 sqq.
(70) ISp.,p.251
(71) loc. c lt .
(72*) On the sp iritu a l l i f e  c f. e .g . Munltz: ,The Moral Philosophy of 
Santayana', p t . I I I ;  S terling P. Lamprechti 'Santayana, Then and Now';
T.V. Smith: 'The Philosophic vay of l i f e ’ , ch.V; and V. Richard Comstock: 
'Aspects of Aesthetic Existence: Klrkegaard and Santayana’ .
(499)
(73) What follows Is a synopsis o f the case put forward by Munitz and 
Laaorecht In the works referred to In the preceding note. Cf, also
i^auiprecht1 s paper In the dcniipp volume, 'a i.uu&1 r'ultn no one ,,ro o f 
In tu it io n ',
(74) 'apologia pro 'tente '’ ua' ,  Cchilpp,p.571
(75) lo c .c lt .
(76) op. c l t . , p.566
(77) op .cIt. , p. 569
(78) John lachs: 'Santayana's Moral Philosophy'.
(79) lachs, o p .c lt . , p.349
(80) 'Proust on Essences',p.175
(81) op .c lt. ,p. 176 
(32) op .c lt. , p.177
(83) op .c lt. , p.178
( 84) Ibid
(85) Ibid
( 86) :<F., pp.67-8
(87*) o p .c lt . , pp.67-9. 3antayana came across sim ilar ideas many years 
e a r lie r  in James's, 'The Principles o f sychology'. Association Is there 
described as a purely physiological matter, accountable fo r In terms of 
brain processes. James contends that brain processes never exactly dupli­
cate one another, and In consequence, neither do the ideas produced in 
consciousness by these processes. Cf. Santayana’ s review of James's work, 
'James's Psychology' In IHW,pp.103-4
( 88) 'Proust on Essences',p. 179. The genesis o f th is paper is discussed 
b r ie f ly  by Cory in his, 'Santayanas The Later Years' , pp.51-2
(89) This paper is exposited b r ie fly  in Ashmore,pp.71-4
(90) 'Penitent A rt ',p p .219-20
(91) op .c it. ,pp.2.?‘‘.i
(92) op. c it .  ,pp.219-20
(93) o p .c lt . ,p .220
(94) Ibid
(95) op .cit.,p .221
(96) op. c i t . ,  p.222
(97) op .cit.,p .223
(98) on. c l t . ,».724
(99) op.clt.p.225
(100) o p .c it . , p.226
(101*) jirt-n l3 torica l data from C.H. lorabrlch: 'The Cartoonist's Armoury' 
in 'Meditations on A Hobby Horse' ,pp. 134-5. (In  making the present object­
ion to  Santayana’ s views, i t  is assumed that by 'caricature ' he means 
what is ord inarily meant by the term ir a rt-h is to rica l discourse. I f  he 
is using i t  in a private technical sense, then i t  is  simply quite unclear 
what he means by i t .  The remarie he ma*® descriptive o f caricature are 
compatible with its  ordinary a rt-h is to r ica l usage.)
(102) Albert Sleizes and Jean Metzinger: 'Du Cubisme'. Tr. and quoted in 
Charles dwa*-d lausss " ’he Aesthetic Theories of ?rench Artists: r^om 
Aealism to Surrealism',p.75
(103) C leizes and Metzinger,o p .c it . , in Teuss,op. c it .  ,p.71
(104) lleizes and Metzinger, o p .c it ., in Jauss, op .c it. ,p.76
(105) 'The u tab illty  o f esthetic Categories',pp .418-9
(106) o p .c it . , p.419
(107) ibid
(108) o p .c it . , p.420
(109) ib id . Same point in a letter to C.J. Ducasse, Letters,p.235
(110) 'The Mutability of .esthetic Cate 'o r le s ', p.424
(111) op .c it. , p.425
(112) ibid
(113) o p .c it . , p.426
(114») ib id . Santayana maintains that he himself never round the fine arts 
to be the ch ief source of beauty, e.g . in the 'Apologia pro Mente Sua':
(500)
(1 U * , ctd .)
" . . .  nor has my love o f the beautiful ever found its  ch ief 
sustenance In the arts. I f  art t ran a port a. I f  It  liberates the 
mind and heart, I  prize I t ;  but nature and re flection  do so more 
often and with greater authority. I f  ever I  have been captivated 
I t  has been by beautiful places, beautiful manners, and beautiful 
institutions. . . "  (op .c it . ,Schllpp,p. 501)
Sim ilar remarks occur In a le t te r  written at very much the same time. He 
had met "iereason by chance, and the la tte r  had enthused over the manner in 
which certain Viennese painters capture the harmonies o f ligh t peculiar to 
Venice. Santayana comments:
" . . . I  don’ t  rea lly  know or care who painted or who saw those 
harmonies most perfectly . ach probably saw a d ifferen t e ffe c t, 
and painted i t  according to his own convention. What I  care about 
is  the harmonies themselves, which can't be had at second hand; 
they are s t r ic t ly  momentary and incommunicable..."(letter to Mrs. 
Crawford H. Toy, 10.10.1939. Letters, p.342.)
Whether these remarks mnde la te  in l i f e  »re  trus of Santayana in his 
e a r lie r  years is  to be doubted. I t  is hard to believe that he did not 
find great beauty in the poets he praised so highly, notably Dante; and 
he took immense pleasure in architecture, (c f .  Oh.VII, section iv , and 
note 91* to that chapter.) ’033ibly,lnte in l i f e ,  a life lo n g  acquaint­
ance with art had made i t  seem a l i t t l e  sta le to Santayana; but this is 
only speculation.
(115) ’ The Mutability o f Aesthetic Categories', p.426.
(116) op .c it. ,p .¿27
(117) ibid
(118) ibid
(119) op.cit.,p .429
(120) ibid
(121) op .c it. ,p .¿22. The same point about pleasure is made in 'The Id ler 
and his Works' ,IHW,pp. 11-12
(501)
(502)
(122) 'The Mutability o f Aesthetic Categories', p.422
(123) ibid
(124) ib id . Tor another interpretation of th is passage o f . Arnett,p.30(125) ¡iE,p.9
(126) o p .c it .,p .lO
(127) ibid
(128) ibid
(129) op. c lt .  , p.149
(130) op .cit.,p .150
(131) ibid
(132) op .d t.,p .151
(133) op .cit.,p .150
(134) ibid
(135) 'An Aesthetic '’ o v ie t ' ,p,187
(136) op .cit.,p .188
(137) cp .cit.,p .189
(138) ibid
(139) op. o i t . , pp. 190-1
(140) o p .c it . , p.192
(141) ibid
(142) ibid
(143) o p .e it . , p.193
(144) op. d t . , p. 195
( 145) o p .c it . , p.195-6
(146) o p .c it . , p.196
(147) ibid
(148) ibid
(149) o p .c it . , p.197
(150) ibid
(151) op .c it. ,op. 197-8
(152) op .c it. , p.198
(503)
(153) e f. D P ,p .vil and p.22j the same correction o f 'The L ife  o f .eason* 
la  made in 'The Id ler and His Works', in IHW,pp.H-15 
(154-) D P.p .vil
(155) Ibid
(156) op .c lt. ,p . l
(157) op. a lt .  p.24
(158) Ibid
(159) op .c it.,p ,87
(160) op. o l t . , pp.90-1
(161*) The distinction between the lib e ra l and the fine arts is implied In 
remarks such as the follow ing. The economic arts are animated by an 
intense proprietary passion. This same fe e lin g  "overflows ille g it im a te ly  
in to the l ib e ra l arts a lso, even into what we ca ll fine a rt ." (o p .c it .,p .9 3 )
(162) op .e it. ,pp.92-A
(163) op .cit.,p .138
( 164) op .c it. , p.139
(165) ibid
(166) ib id . Gf. SAP,pp. 133 and 150-2 for sim ilar la te  remarks on music, and 
the piece 'C ries and Karnes' in P0ML,p.l05. Again, o f. ST,p.l4
(167) DP, p.139
(168) op. e i t .  ,p. 168
(169) op .c it .,p p .168-9
(170*) o p .c i t . , p.170. The same thought concerning the fa te  o f the a rt is t  
too involved in the world occurs in Santayana's, 'Marginal Notes on 
"C iv iliza tion  in the Pnited States"• (1922) . Santayana is writing about 
a comment by Deems Taylor to the e ffect that the American Musician works 
in a vacuum: he is out of things and knows i t .  Santayana's comment is 
that a true musician would not mind that, since music is a world apart.
The real d lf f lo u lty  l ie s  in,
"a divided allegiance: the musician w ill  not liv e  on music alone, 
he is  no true musuoian. Snobbery, the anxiety to sucoeed, nnd a
. ..
(504)
(170», ctd .)
sort o? cowardly soc ia l Instinct stand between the a rt is t  and his 
work. I t  Is because he vents ’ to be In things' that he fa l ls ,  and 
deserves to f a i l . " (o p . e l t .  ,ln  3A,p.l72).
(171) DP,pp.170-1
(172) o p .e lt . , p.170
(173) op. d t . , p.187
i:ote to the Conclusion
(1) John Passmore: 'A Hundred Years o f  Philosophy', p .287
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Bibliofrraphy 
Introductory Not«
(506)
The follow ing bibliography does not o^nia to be exhaustive. „  
complete l i s t  o f works by and about Santayana (not to  mention other read- 
in » on the subjects considered in the present thesis) would require another 
volume equal in 3ize to the present one. ’ .'hat follows is  lim ited to works 
consulted in the preparation of this thesis.
I :  bibliographies
(1) '"he most exhaustive bibliography o f works by and about Santayana iss 
Escudero, Ceferino antos, S .J., "B ib liogra fía  General de Jorge Santayana", 
Pontifica Universitas Coramillensis, Comillas, 1965.
(2) The follow ing is  a chronological l i s t  o f Santayana's works up to  194-0, 
with an index:
Terzian, Shohig: "Bibliography o f the Writings of Jeorge Santayana", 
in Paul «rthur Sohilpp,ed., "The Philosophy o f Seorge Santayana", 7 o l.I I  
of the series, "The Library o f Living Philosophers",pp.607-78
(3) leas complete but useful l is t s  of works by and about Santayana are 
included in the commentaries by Duron and Munson, fu ll  de ta ils  o f which are 
given in section I I I ,  below.
I I :  Works by Santayana
Lote: In the follow ing l i3 t  o f  Santayana's works, deta ils  are given of the 
f i r s t  date end piece of publication o f each t i t l e .  ” here, as is most often  
the case, the edition used is other than the f i r s t  ed ition , deta ils  are 
given a fter the rubric, " rd itlon  used". The edition used is the one to 
which page references are given in the foregoing notes. There is no com­
plete edition o f Cantayana's works: the nearest to th is ideal is the Triton 
Edition, 1936-40, 15 vo ls ., and I  have used this text wherever possible.
Many pieces were however le f t  out o f th is  edition, and others appeared a fte r  
its  publication had been completed. For t: ese there is as yet no standard 
edition.
(1) 'An Aesthetio S ov ie t ', 'The D ia l', 82, May, 1927,361-70
(507)
(1, e td .) Edition used: 'Obiter S c r ip ts '. (q .v . )
(2) 'The Alleged Catholic Danger', 'The New Republic',5, (1916) ,pp. 269-71.
_dition used: "Seorge Santayana's ..asrica", q .v .
(3 ) 'A lternatives to  lib e ra lism ', 'The Saturday <eview o f lite ra tu re ',
10, (June 23, 1934),pp.761 eqq.
Edition used: "The Birth of reason and other "•gsays", q .v .
(<4) 'Americanism', 'V irg in ia  Cuarterly ieview ',31,Winter, 1955,pp. 1-26 
Edition used: "The Id le r  and Hie Works", q.v.
(5 ) 'America's Young ted ica ls ', 'The "orum', 67,(1922) pp.371-5 
Edition used: "Seorge Santayana's America", q .v .
(6) "Animal Faith and Spiritual L ife : Previously Unpublished and Uncollected 
Writings by Seorge Santayana with C r itica l Essays on his Thought",ed.
John Iachs. few York: Appleton—Century-Croft3,1967
(7 ) 'Appearance and 'e a lity ' ,  in """he Birth o f reason and Other Essays", 
pp. H2-4
(8 ) 'Apologia pro Mente Sua* in P.A. Schllpp, ed, "The Philosophy o f Seorge 
Santayana", Northwestern ’’n iversity  Press, Evanston and Chicago, 19AO,
pp. 495-605
(9) 'Apology for Snobs', 'The Athenaeum', no. ¿661, Aug. 29,1919» pp. 805-6 
Edition used: "Soliloquies in Tingland", q .v.
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